A large amount of research in cognitive psychology is focused on memory distortions, understood as deviations from various (largely implicit) standards. Many alleged distortions actually suggest a highly functional system that balances the cost of acquiring new information with the benefit of relevant, contextually appropriate decision-making. In this sense many memories may be examples of functionally adaptive misbelief.

Aristotelian commenters have long noted an apparent contradiction between what Aristotle says in Posterior Analytics I.2 and Physics I.1 about how we obtain first principles of a science. At Posterior 71b35–72a6, Aristotle states that what is most universal (καθόλου) is better-known by nature and initially less-known to us, while the particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον) is initially better-known to us, but less-known by nature. At Physics 184a21-30, however, Aristotle states that we move from what is better-known to us, which is universal (καθόλου), (...) to what is better-known absolutely, which is particular (καθ’ ἕκαστον). This paper turns to two of Aristotle’s most notable medieval commentators—Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas—to resolve this apparent contradiction. The key to Thomas and Albert’s solutions, we will argue, is a twofold distinction between a sense-perceptive and scientific universal, and the particulars as sensed individuals and as differentiating attributes. Our Synthetic treatment of these distinctions contributes to the ongoing scholarly effort to understand the Stagyrite’s complex theory of knowledge. (shrink)

Cancer cells seem to exploit mechanisms that evolve as part of physiological tolerance, which is a complementary and often beneficial form of defense. The study of physiological systems of tolerance can therefore provide insights into the development of a state of host tolerance of cancer, and how to break it. Analysis of these models has the potential to improve our understanding of existing immunological therapeutic targets, and help to identify future targets and rational therapeutic combinations. The treatment of cancer with (...) immune checkpoint inhibitors aims to reverse the progression to tolerance of cancer, and achieve an immunogenic, rather than tolerogenic, homeostasis. Broadening the efficacy and durability of checkpoint inhibitors focuses on reversing tolerance and stimulating immunogenicity in the cancer, host, and environment. Two examples of important physiological states of tolerance that may inform tolerance of cancer are microbial infection and placental reproduction. These states of tolerance result from bilateral shaping of host and non‐self, akin to immunoediting in cancer, and offer reliable models to study the immune tolerance paradigm. (shrink)

In their environment, plants are continuously submitted to natural stimuli such as wind, rain, temperature changes, wounding, etc. These signals induce a cascade of events which lead to metabolic and morphogenetic responses. In this paper the different steps are described and discussed starting from the reception of the signal by a plant organ to the final morphogenetic response. In our laboratory two plants are studied: Bryonia dioica for which rubbing the internode results in reduced elongation and enhanced radial expansion and (...) Bidens pilosa for which the response occurs at distance, hence pricking the cotyledon of a plantlet induces the growth inhibition of both the hypocotyl and the axillary bud of the pricked cotyledon. Reception of the signal and transmission of the message. In Bryonia the signal is received by epidermal cells while in Bidens they are the cells adjacent to the midrib of the cotyledon which receive the mechanical signal. In both plants the message is transmitted via a wave of electric depolarization. This latter is composed of an action potential associated with a slow wave whose transmission rates are respectively 1cm s−1 and 1 mm s−1. Recent results have shown the involvement of Ca2+ in the triggering of the slow wave and the role of the H+ pump during the slow wave. Transient and fast biochemical responses. An entry of extraceilular Ca2+ into the cells and a transient increase in IP3 occur within seconds following the mechanical stimulus. At the same time, the membrane becomes more fluid, correlated with qualitative changes in phospholipids. The rapid increase in the concentration of peroxidated lipids may be correlated with ethylene biosynthesis which is stimulated after rubbing. Other parameters such as cytoplasmic pH, relative water content, hydric potential, membrane potential and modifications of K+, Mg2+-ATPase and Ca2+-ATPase activities, play a key role in the early responses induced by the traumatisms. Irreversible-biochemical responses. The mechanical stimulus performed on a Bryonia internode induces an acceleration of: i) enzymatic activities related to the lignification, ii) esterification of phenolic acids in the cell wall. Consequently the lignification process is accelerated. Storage of the information. After being received by the target cells the information can be stored during several days before being expressed. At the level of cotyledonary bud, the first message, previously stored, can be expressed or not by a second treatment. Bidens thus behaves as if it was able to “store” and to “retrieve” morphogenetic messages, using a sort of rudimentary memory. The nuclei of the bud cells of the pricked cotyledon show that these cells, initially in G2 phase, divide and then remain in the G1 phase. In Bryonia, calli derived from young stimulated internodes, keep thigmomorphogenetic characteristics during several weeks. In the last part of this paper the particularity of our plant model which permits a study of the transmission and storage of the message, is underlined. The links between the different steps induced by the stimulus are discussed. Special attention is devoted to second messengers and to the amplification of the message. (shrink)

In their environment, plants are continuously submitted to natural stimuli such as wind, rain, temperature changes, wounding, etc. These signals induce a cascade of events which lead to metabolic and morphogenetic responses.In this paper the different steps are described and discussed starting from the reception of the signal by a plant organ to the final morphogenetic response. In our laboratory two plants are studied: Bryonia dioica for which rubbing the internode results in reduced elongation and enhanced radial expansion and Bidens (...) pilosa for which the response occurs at distance, hence pricking the cotyledon of a plantlet induces the growth inhibition of both the hypocotyl and the axillary bud of the pricked cotyledon. (shrink)

Recent work in biology, cognitive psychology, and archaeology has renewed evolutionary perspectives on the role of natural selection in the emergence and recurrent forms of religious thought and behavior, i.e., mental representations of supernatural agents, as well as artifacts, ritual practices, moral systems, ethnic markers, and specific experiences associated with these representations. One perspective, inspired from behavioral ecology, attempts to measure the fitness effects of religious practices. Another set of models, representative of evolutionary psychology, explain religious thought and behavior as (...) the output of cognitive systems (e.g., animacy detection, social cognition, precautionary reasoning) that are not exclusive to the religious domain. In both perpectives, the question remains open, whether religious thought and behavior constitute an adaptation or a by-product of adaptive cognitive function. (shrink)

We draw a distinction between the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift and the Aharonov–Bohm effect. Although the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift occurring when an electron beam passes around a magnetic solenoid is well-verified experimentally, it is not clear whether this phase shift occurs because of classical forces or because of a topological effect occurring in the absence of classical forces as claimed by Aharonov and Bohm. The mathematics of the Schroedinger equation itself does not reveal the physical basis for the effect. However, the (...) experimentally observed Aharonov–Bohm phase shift is of the same form as the shift observed due to electrostatic forces for which the consensus view accepts the role of the classical forces. The Aharonov–Bohm phase shift may well arise from classical electromagnetic forces which are simply more subtle in the magnetic case since they involve relativistic effects of the order v 2 /c 2 . Here we first review the experimentally observable differences between phenomena arising from classical forces and phenomena arising from the quantum topological effect suggested by Aharonov and Bohm. Second we point out that most discussions of the classical electromagnetic forces involved when a charged particle passes a solenoid are inaccurate because they omit the Faraday induction terms. The subtleties of the relativisitic v 2 /c 2 classical electromagnetic forces between a point charge and a solenoid have been explored by Coleman and Van Vleck in their analysis of the Shockley–James paradox; indeed, we point out that an analysis exactly parallel to that of Coleman and Van Vleck suggests that the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift is actually due to classical electromagnetic forces. Finally we note that electromagnetic velocity fields penetrate even excellent conductors in a form which is unfamiliar to many physicists. An ohmic conductor surrounding a solenoid does not screen out the magnetic field of the passing charge, but rather the time-integral of the magnetic field is an invariant; this time integral is precisely what is involved in the classical explanation of the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. Thus the persistence of the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift when the solenoid is surrounded by a conductor does not exclude a classical force-based explanation for the phase shift. At present there is no experimental evidence for the Aharonov–Bohm effect. (shrink)

Although there is good experimental evidence for the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift occurring when a solenoid is placed between the beams forming a double-slit electron interference pattern, there has been very little analysis of the relevant classical electromagnetic forces. These forces between a point charge and a solenoid involve subtle relativistic effects of order v 2 /c 2 analogous to those discussed by Coleman and Van Vleck in their treatment of the Shockley–James paradox. In this article we show that a treatment (...) exactly analogous to that given by Coleman and Van Vleck predicts classical electromagnetic forces which provide the basis for the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. The magnetic force on the solenoid due to the passing charge leads to a displacement of the solenoid center of energy which must be balanced by the displacement of the passing charge. This classical displacement of the passing charge is exactly what is required to account for the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. Also, we discuss a magnetic moment model which appears frequently in the literature and note that although the model provides conservation of linear momentum, it does not satisfy the general requirements for relativistic theories. We give an example suggesting that the new equation of motion for a magnetic moment proposed by Aharonov, Pearle, and Vaidman based upon the hidden momentum of the magnetic moment is completely inappropriate. Finally, we emphasize that the Aharonov–Casher phase shift is also explained by classical electromagnetic forces exactly parallel to those explaining the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. (shrink)

Maud Boyer Arnaud Destrebecqz Axel Cleeremans.

A fundamentally new understanding of the classical electromagnetic interaction of a point charge and a magnetic dipole moment through order v 2 /c 2 is suggested. This relativistic analysis connects together hidden momentum in magnets, Solem's strange polarization of the classical hydrogen atom, and the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift. First we review the predictions following from the traditional particle-on-a-frictionless-rigid-ring model for a magnetic moment. This model, which is not relativistic to order v 2 /c 2 , does reveal a connection between (...) the electric field of the point charge and hidden momentum in the magnetic moment; however, the electric field back at the point charge due to the Faraday-induced changing magnetic moment is of order 1/c 4 and hence is negligible in a 1/c 2 analysis. Next we use a relativistic magnetic moment model consisting of many superimposed classical hydrogen atoms (and anti-atoms) interacting through the Darwin Lagrangian with an external charge but not with each other. The analysis of Solem regarding the strange polarization of the classical hydrogen atom is seen to give a fundamentally different mechanism for the electric field of the passing charge to change the magnetic moment. The changing magnetic moment leads to an electric force back at the point charge which (i) is of order 1/c 2 , (ii) depends upon the magnetic dipole moment, changing sign with the dipole moment, (iii) is odd in the charge q of the passing charge, and (iv) reverses sign for charges passing on opposite sides of the magnetic moment. Using the insight gained from this relativistic model and the analogy of a point charge outside a conductor, we suggest that a realistic multi-particle magnetic moment involves a changing magnetic moment which keeps the electromagnetic field momentum constant. This means also that the magnetic moment does not allow a significant shift in its internal center of energy. This criterion also implies that the Lorentz forces on the charged particle and on the point charge are equal and opposite and that the center of energy of each moves according to Newton's second law F=Ma where F is exactly the Lorentz force. Finally, we note that the results and suggestion given here are precisely what are needed to explain both the Aharonov–Bohm phase shift and the Aharonov–Casher phase shift as arising from classical electromagnetic forces. Such an explanation reinstates the traditional semiclassical connection between classical and quantum phenomena for magnetic moment systems. (shrink)

Nous sommes aujourd'hui confrontés, à travers les objets techniques comme la réalité virtuelle ou, plus quotidiennement les images des jeux vidéo, à un changement qui affecte non pas les objets de la perception mais la perception elle-même. Ce changement a un nom qui est aussi un des grands impensés de la philosophie du XXe siècle : la «perception artificielle». A travers les textes d'Edmund Husserl, Jacques Derrida et Bernard Stiegler et en s'appuyant sur des cas empruntés tant aux jeux vidéos (...) et aux dispositifs de simulation qu'au cinéma, Elsa Boyer se livre à une enquête philosophique à la fois radicale et profonde. Car c'est la perception elle-même que son artificialité l'amène à repenser, par-delà l'opposition entre le réel et l'imaginaire. Relisant Husserl après Derrida et confrontant le dernier au fantôme du premier, Elsa Boyer nous montre comment la réalité virtuelle nous oblige à (re)faire de la philosophie. (shrink)

The Aharonov–Bohm phase shift in a particle interference pattern when electrons pass a long solenoid is identical in form with the optical interference pattern shift when a piece of retarding glass is introduced into one path of a two-beam optical interference pattern. The particle interference-pattern deflection is a relativistic effect of order $$1/c^{2}$$, though this relativity aspect is rarely mentioned in the literature. Here we give a thorough analysis of the classical electromagnetic aspects of the interaction between a solenoid or (...) toroid and a charged particle. We point out the magnetic Lorentz force which the solenoid or toroid experiences due to a passing charge. Although analysis in the rest frame of the solenoid or toroid will involve back Faraday fields on the charge, the analysis in the inertial frame in which the charge is initially at rest involves forces due to only electric fields where forces are equal in magnitude and opposite in direction. The classical analysis is made using the Darwin Lagrangian. We point out that the classical analysis suggests an angular deflection independent of Planck’s constant $$\hbar $$, where the deflection magnitude is identical with that given by the traditional quantum analysis, but where the deflection direction is unambiguous. (shrink)

Selon Rawls, le PD permet de regarder les différences de talents comme un « atout commun ». Le libertarien Nozick y a vu l’aveu par Rawls que sa société se rend propriétaire de nos personnes, faites de nos talents propres. C’est un sophisme : seule la distribution des dons peut être vue comme un bien commun, fournissant une palette de complémentarités possibles qui est un atout commun (voir Smith sur la division du travail, comme le note Arrow). Arrow a peut-être (...) hésité sur ce point, mais il a finalement opté, comme Rawls et Nozick, pour l’idée que nous possédons nos talents, à ceci près que nous ne pouvons les développer que dans un cadre social qui rend légitime (contra Nozick) que l’impôt nous reprenne une partie de nos bénéfices pour aider les plus démunis à sortir de leur misère. Le PD éloigne de la pure méritocratie. Via Pascal, cité par Arrow, on en revient à l’importance de la notion de personne dans toute approche non utilitariste, plaidant pour la coopération entre économie et philosophie, par exemple pour généraliser le PD à plus de deux classes, si c’est possible sans entamer la souhaitable simplicité cognitive des principes de justice, ni détruire le système des incitations. Classification JEL : I13. (shrink)

La crise de la démocratie représentative nous amène à la questionner : est-elle vraiment démocratique ou s’agit-il d’un régime mixte? Les représentants sont censés représenter le peuple, mais qu’est-ce que le peuple? Comment sortir de l’âge de la défiance des citoyens envers l’élite au pouvoir? Partant des analyses du citoyen de Genève pour qui l’exécutif a toujours tendance à subjuguer le législatif souverain, nous aborderons les enjeux actuels de cette crise qui se manifeste aussi par le « populisme » et (...) la « démocratie sauvage » (les « gilets jaunes »). Ensuite, nous nous demanderons si la solution réside dans la « démocratie participative ». Peut-on en définitive espérer vivre dans une société harmonieuse, une « démocratie apaisée » ou bien faut-il admettre que le conflit est au cœur du social? (shrink)

Le fait d'être humain ne procède pas uniquement de nous-mêmes, comme le fait d'être d'une culture, d'une histoire ne procède pas d'un seul autre, ou d'un seul semblable, mais de l'ensemble des autres, de tous les semblables, et plus loin encore de l'autre à venir, du dissemblable, de l'étranger, de l'autre culture, de l'autre histoire. Où et comment se pose la question de l'honneur à cet instant? N'est-ce pas à cette pliure que fait courir à l'espèce le mépris, l'incompréhension, le (...) refus de l'autre? Aujourd'hui nous devons faire face. Et savoir d'instinct, savoir sans le comprendre que la seule force, la seule valeur, la seule dignité, c'est de ne pas comprendre si comprendre nous fait renoncer à l'amour de l'autre. Voilà ce qui fonde, voilà ce qui fait la légitimité non seulement d'une existence mais de toute communauté. (shrink)

La crise de la représentation politique est un thème récurrent depuis de nombreuses années. Et nous voulons montrer que, philosophiquement parlant, c’est Jean-Jacques Rousseau qui, dans le Contrat social, l’a pensée comme le mal politique de notre modernité. En effet, en suivant la grille de lecture proposée par Jacques Derrida dans De la grammatologie, la démocratie r eprésentative en tant que « supplément » de la démocratie directe impossible, ne peut que dénaturer cette dernière, c’est-à-dire tendre à dessaisir le peuple (...) de sa souveraineté. Et si ce mal est inhérent à la démocratie représentative des « peuples modernes », cela montre que Rousseau ne peut pas être nostalgique de la démocratie directe antique comme on le dit d’habitude mais le penseur lucide de notre temps. (shrink)

Le chapitre de L’Être et le néant sur « les conduites de mauvaise foi » est connu pour ses exemples comme « une femme qui s’est rendue à un premier rendez-vous » ou « le garçon de café », mais aussi pour sa critique de la psychanalyse. Or, il s’agit pour Sartre de montrer que ce qui est en jeu dans la mauvaise foi, comme dans la sincérité d’ailleurs, c’est qu’alors que les choses sont ce qu’elles sont, l’homme fuit ce (...) qu’il est, à savoir « un être qui est ce qu’il n’est pas et qui n’est pas ce qu’il est ». Dès lors, l’enjeu de ce chapitre est : qu’en est-il au juste de l’authenticité? (shrink)

The main experiments concerning the Aharonov–Bohm phase shifts, seen in an electron interference pattern, and their Boyer semiclassical explanations are reviewed. A new experiment is also presented which emphasizes the subtleties involved in the interpretations of the magnetic Aharonov–Bohm phase shift as a result of a non-dispersive or dispersive effect.

Taking Emerson as his starting point, Cornel West’s basic task in this ambitious enterprise is to chart the emergence, development, decline, and recent resurgence of American pragmatism. John Dewey is the central figure in West’s pantheon of pragmatists, but he treats as well such varied mid-century representatives of the tradition as Sidney Hook, C. Wright Mills, W. E. B. Du Bois, Reinhold Niebuhr, and Lionel Trilling. West’s "genealogy" is, ultimately, a very personal work, for it is imbued throughout with the (...) author’s conviction that a thorough reexamination of American pragmatism may help inspire and instruct contemporary efforts to remake and reform American society and culture. "West... may well be the pre-eminent African American intellectual of our generation."—The Nation "_The American Evasion of Philosophy_ is a highly intelligent and provocative book. Cornel West gives us illuminating readings of the political thought of Emerson and James; provides a penetrating critical assessment of Dewey, his central figure; and offers a brilliant interpretation—appreciative yet far from uncritical—of the contemporary philosopher and neo-pragmatist Richard Rorty.... What shines through, throughout the work, is West's firm commitment to a radical vision of a philosophic discourse as inextricably linked to cultural criticism and political engagement."—Paul S. Boyer, professor emeritus of history, University of Wisconsin–Madison. Wisconsin Project on American Writers Frank Lentricchia, General Editor. (shrink)

C.S. Lewis was a major public intellectual in Britain, beginning from the late 1930s and continuing to his death in 1963. In both his non-fiction, especially The Abolition of Man, and his fiction, most importantly in That Hideous Strength, he offers a critique of rationalism and scientism that is often strikingly similar to those that Michael Oakeshott penned in the late 1940s and early 1950s. This essay examines the question to what extent this similarity is merely superficial, and to what (...) extent the two writers shared a similar basis for their views. Furthermore, it examines whether there is an actual thread of influence: had Oakeshott been reading Lewis before writing his critique of rationalism, and if so, to what extent did Lewis’s work inform Oakeshott’s? (shrink)

La Théorie de la justice de John Rawls a souvent été critiquée pour son individualisme de principe, qui compliquerait la prise en compte de nombreux enjeux sociaux tenant aux collectifs et aux relations entre groupes. Dans son Apologie de John Rawls, Alain Boyer a exploré avec pertinence les raisons de conclure à l’ouverture de la théorie aux enjeux proprement collectifs de la vie commune. Ce réexamen fournit l’occasion de revenir ici sur la nécessité de ne pas confondre l’agencement de (...) la maquette de choix rationnel dans l’ouvrage de Rawls avec des présupposés descriptifs sur la vie sociale. C’est aussi le motif d’un approfondissement des raisons de prendre en compte, pour une enquête du genre de celle que Rawls a menée, la dimension relationnelle et les attitudes partagées en société. (shrink)

Western societies today are coming unmoored in the face of an earth-shaking ethical and cultural paradigm shift. At its core is the question of what it means to be human and how we are meant to live. The old answers are no longer accepted; a dizzying array of options are offered in their stead. Underpinning this smorgasbord of lifestyles is a thicket of unquestioned assumptions, such as the separation of gender from biological sex, which not so long ago would have (...) been universally rejected as radical notions. In the spring of 2019, a group of Orthodox Christian scholars drawn from a wide variety of academic disciplines met together to offer responses to the moral crisis our generation faces, elaborating upon its various forms and facilitating a fuller understanding of some of its theological and philosophical foundations. In doing so they offer support to all those who question the claims that are so forcefully insisted upon today--a clarity that will aid them in standing up and resisting trends that have already shown to be the cause of great suffering and unhappiness. (shrink)

Currently, humanity is experiencing an explosive growth in technological objects designed to improve the body and mind. The main objective of this article is to review two recent classificatory and explanatory systems to cognitive enhancement cybernetic technologies, including both wearable and implantable artifacts that reorganize human embodiment or extend the mind. I argue that an outdated model of the cognitive sciences serves as the basis for these revised systems and taxonomies. Taking an embodied approach to the cognitive sciences, I propose (...) an alternative focus to classify cognitive enhancement cybernetic technologies. Specifically, by adopting a non-orthodox enactive approach to embodied cognition, I propose a new classificatory system that redefines the notion of the cybernetically enhanced human, restricting it to a purely cognitive context. Finally, I evaluate some philosophical implications of my system. (shrink)

Self-criticism is a trait associated with increased psychopathology, but self-criticism is also a personality state reflecting an action that people do in moments of time. In the current study, we explored factors associated with heightened self-criticism in daily life. Participants (N = 197) received five random prompts per day for one week on their mobile phones, where they reported their current affect (negative and positive affect), willpower self-efficacy, distress intolerance, degree of support and criticism from others, current context (location, activity, (...) hunger, tiredness) and momentary self-criticism. We first demonstrated that self-criticism varies over time and across contexts, and is associated with heightened trait self-criticism. Then, using multilevel modelling, we explored the contextual factors associated with greater self-criticism. We found that self-criticism was higher when people were at home, and more tired. We also found higher self-criticism to be associated with greater negative and lower positive affect, greater distress intolerance, lower willpower and greater perceived criticism from others. In addition, self-criticism predicted subsequent distress intolerance, willpower and positive affect in lagged analyses. This study provides evidence that both environmental and psychological factors are associated with the dynamics of self-critical thoughts. (shrink)

Scientific theories do much more than answer empirical questions. This can be understood along empiricist lines only if those other aspects are instrumental for the pursuit of empirical strength and adequacy, or serving other aims subordinate to these. This chapter accordingly addresses four main questions: Does the rejection of realism lead to a self‐defeating scepticism? Are scientific methodology and experimental design intelligible on any but a realist interpretation of science? Is the ideal of the unity of science, or even the (...) practice of using distinct theories in conjunction, intelligent on an empiricist view? What sense can an empiricist position accord to those theoretical virtues––such as simplicity, coherence, explanatory power––that are not reducible to empirical strength or adequacy? The answers to these questions rely strongly on the pragmatics of scientific inquiry, and advocate a ‘Clausewitz doctrine’ of experimentation as a continuation of theorizing by other means. (shrink)

This chapter parodies Aquinas’ Five Ways to prove the existence of God by displaying similar arguments reminiscent of those often given in support of scientific realism. This is followed by a parody of scientific realists’ attempts to defend themselves against objections to such arguments.

The opposition between empiricism and realism with respect to science is old: it appeared clearly in the seventeenth century sense of superiority of the ‘mechanical philosophy’ to Scholastic metaphysics, and continued for the next three centuries’ debates over the philosophical foundations of physics. Empiricist views developed by the logical positivists of Vienna and Berlin were defeated by the emergence of scientific realism in the mid‐twentieth century. This defeat was largely due to the inadequacy of the positivist theories of meaning and (...) language. To present a viable empiricist account of science, we need conceptions of theory structure, truth, and empirical adequacy that are essentially independent of a theory's linguistic formulation. Correlative to this discussion of the relationship between theory and world is the question what it is to accept a scientific theory––how much belief is involved? And what is involved other than belief? The position to be developed here will view scientific activity as one of construction rather than discovery: construction of models that must be adequate to the observable phenomena, and not discovery of the truth about postulated unobservable parts of nature. Acceptance of a scientific theory so viewed will have an irreducible pragmatic dimension in addition to involving only a modest amount of belief. (shrink)

The Aristotelian tradition in science, dominant before the advent of modern science, saw real modalities in nature: necessity, possibility, contingency, potentiality, and essence. Throughout the modern period and the early twentieth century, empiricists struggled to maintain that there was nothing to be found between matters of actual fact on the one hand and relations between ideas or words on the other. Probability has the logical form of a modality, but until the twentieth century, it could be construed as a measure (...) of ignorance, or of actual proportions and frequencies, not a basic parameter in nature itself. That changed with the advent of quantum mechanics and the admission of indeterminism as a theoretical possibility. The legitimacy of irreducible probabilities was admitted in the modelling of natural processes. The challenge to the empiricist now is to interpret probability as it appears there, and this includes the larger challenge of displaying an empiricistically acceptable role for modalities in general in the scientific image. This chapter provides a systematic critique of frequentist and propensity interpretations of physical probability, but also characterizes the models of probability theory as constructible from families of sequences constrained by limiting frequencies. This formal agreement with a certain kind of ’ideal frequency’ account is embedded in a philosophical view of modalities in general that turns on an account of the language of science on the level of pragmatics. (shrink)

What is the empirical content of a theory? If a theory is identified with one of its linguistic formulations, the only available answers allow for no non‐trivial distinction between empirical and non‐empirical content. The restriction of such a formulated theory to a narrow ‘observational’ vocabulary is not a description of the observable part of the world but a hobbled and hamstrung description of its entire domain, still with non‐empirical implications. Viewing a theory as identified through the family of its models––the (...) structures it makes available for modelling the phenomena––yields a new approach. The distinctions so made are illustrated with Newton's physics, absolute versus relative motion, nineteenth‐ century ether theory of electromagnetism, and quantum mechanics. A hermeneutic circle in the interpretation is noted, and the theory‐independence of the observable/unobservable distinction maintained. (shrink)