Extending the range of adaptive misbelief: Memory “distortions” as functional features

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 32 (6):513-514 (2009)
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Abstract

A large amount of research in cognitive psychology is focused on memory distortions, understood as deviations from various (largely implicit) standards. Many alleged distortions actually suggest a highly functional system that balances the cost of acquiring new information with the benefit of relevant, contextually appropriate decision-making. In this sense many memories may be examples of functionally adaptive misbelief.

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Daniel C. Dennett
Tufts University