Cette étude défend l’idée que, contrairement à l’opinion de Latour sur la nécessité de laisser de côté l’épistémologie pour traiter de tout ce qui a de la valeur pour la science, Mario Bunge a systématiquement construit une épistémologie détaillée et approfondie. La stratégie argumentative consistera à montrer (a) qu’il est faux que nous n’avons jamais été modernes (b) que l’épistémologie est là pour de bon et (c) que Mario Bunge soutient un réalisme scientifique fort, une version du matérialisme, du systémisme (...) et de l’émergentisme, comportant une dimension morale (il existe des valeurs objectives comme la vérité, la paix et la justice qui méritent d’être étudiées). Ensuite, le réalisme de Bunge rejette la neutralité axiologique rendant les scientifiques responsables de leurs actions. Bunge a toujours été moderne et continue à enrichir ses propres positions. (shrink)

“Towards a Theory of Taxation” is a proper theme for an Englishman to take when giving a paper in America. After all it was from the absence of such a theory that the United States derived its existence. The Colonists felt strongly that there should be no taxation without representation, and George III was unable to explain to them convincingly why they should contribute to the cost of their defense. Since that time, understanding has not advanced much. In Britain we (...) still maintain the fiction that taxes are a voluntary gift to the Crown, and taxing statutes are given the Royal Assent with the special formula, “La Reine remercie ses bons sujets, accepte leur benevolence, et ainsi le veult” instead of the simple “La Reine le veult,” and in the United States taxes have regularly been levied on residents of the District of Columbia who until recently had no representation in Congress, and by the State of New York on those who worked but did not reside in the State, and so did not have a vote. Taxes are regularly levied, in America as elsewhere, on those who have no say on whether they should be levied or how they should be spent. I am taxed by the Federal Government on my American earnings and by state governments on my American spending, but I should be hard put to it to make out that it was unjust. Florida is wondering whether to follow California in taxing multinational corporations on their world-wide earnings. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 40.1 (2002) 123-124 [Access article in PDF] Book Review Textes philosophiques: conclusions philosophiques. Dissertation en deux parties sur la vision des vérités en Dieu et l'amour de la vertu. Régle du bon sens. De la liberté de l'homme Antoine Arnauld. Textes philosophiques: conclusions philosophiques. Dissertation en deux parties sur la vision des vérités en Dieu et l'amour de la vertu. Régle du bon (...) sens. De la liberté de l'homme. Épiméthée. Translated by Denis Moreau. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 2001. Pp. xi + 333. Cloth, FF 198.00. This collection should prove useful to anyone doing research on Antoine Arnauld, or more generally on philosophical theology in seventeenth-century France. The collection contains excellent French translations of three Latin texts, and a scholarly, if not critical, edition of a fourth text that appeared originally in French. They are accompanied by helpful [End Page 123] introductions and copious scholarly notes. A bibliography of 533 secondary works on Arnauld is provided.Studies of Arnauld's philosophy have concentrated on his polemics with Malebranche and Leibniz. Moreau suggests that Arnauld's philosophy is worth studying in its own right, and the texts he has selected provide a start for such a study. The first text, Conclusiones Philosophicae, is a set of theses composed by Arnauld for defense by one of his students in 1641, when Arnauld himself was twenty-nine years old. It is our only record of Arnauld's early philosophical thought. Moreau points out that Conclusiones anticipates themes developed by Arnauld during the rest of his long career, and that the text is also valuable as an indicator of the sort of philosophical questions being discussed in Paris at the time that Descartes wrote the Meditations. The original Latin and Moreau's French translation are given on facing pages.The second and third texts in the collection, Dissertatio Bipartita and Régles du Bon Sens, were parts of a debate within Jansenist circles near the end of Arnauld's life. Arnauld's friend, and his collaborator in the Port-Royal Logic, Pierre Nicole, had introduced into Port-Royal the speculation that every human being receives a "grace générale" that makes it possible for her to perform morally good actions. Arnauld attacked this theory in the late 1680s. Given the Augustinian assumption that an action is morally good only if it is directed to God as the agent's final end, and given that some people have never thought about God, the theory of a grace générale raised a philosophical question: How could someone who has no knowledge of God act out of the love of God? Nicole's answer was that the grace générale given to every human being brings with it a sort of implicit, confused, and imperceptible knowledge and love of God. In defense of this answer, Nicole refers to a thesis written by the Louvain theologian Gommaire Huygens, also a friend of Arnauld's, and defended by one of Huygens's students in 1688. Huygens says that anyone who has knowledge of a necessary and immutable truth sees that truth "in the first and uncreated truth, which is God," and that anyone who loves chastity or any other moral virtue, by that very fact loves "the eternal reason of chastity, which is in God." These positions seemed to support the notion that everyone might have an implicit knowledge and love of God even if some have never consciously thought about God. Arnauld attacked these claims in 1692 in his Latin Dissertatio bipartita, of which Moreau provides a French translation. Nicole was impressed and disturbed by the Dissertatio, confessing that he did not know how to respond. He asked another mutual friend of his and Arnauld's, the Benedictine François Lamy, to answer Arnauld. In reply to Lamy, Arnauld wrote... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 100-101 [Access article in PDF] Kathy Eden. Friends Hold All Things in Common: Tradition, Intellectual Property, and the Adages of Erasmus. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2001. Pp. ix + 194. Cloth, $35.00. When Erasmus returned from England to the continent in 1500 almost all his money was confiscated before he embarked, although his patron, Lord Mountjoy, had assured him (...) that customs regulations applied only to English currency. Upon his arrival in Paris—poor as a church mouse and feeling rather unwell—he immediately set out writing a new gift for his patron, lest Mountjoy would assume that the humanist was angry with him. A few days later Erasmus had gathered a modest collection of 818 proverbs or adagia, a "treasury or storehouse of the accumulated wealth of classical antiquity collected for common use and thus one of his principal contributions to a cultural program for cooperation," as Kathy Eden defines them (4); not a material but an intellectual wealth, a wisdom transmitted throughout generations and civilizations in the form of proverbs.This Adagiorum Collectanea became a bestseller because it provided both humanists and careerists with numerous bon mots to embellish their (Latin) style and to enhance their arguments. During his first visit to Italy Erasmus spent a few months in the household of the famous humanist and printer Aldus Manutius in Venice. This resulted in a reissue in [End Page 100] 1508 of what was now entitled Adagiorum chiliades, since the collection had been expounded to 3260 proverbs. It opened with 'Friends hold all things in common', an ancient wisdom acknowledging the commonality between friendship and property. Eight more official editions came from the press with an ever-increasing number of adagia, up to 4151 in the final edition, published as volume two of the collected works (Basle: Froben, 1536). Erasmus kept also enlarging the entries themselves, some of them becoming small essays—for instance, the famous Festina lente (Adag. II i 1) or the equally well-known Dulce bellum inexpertis (Adag. IV i 1)—which were even republished separately.In her introduction to Friends Hold All Things in Common Kathy Eden gives a quick survey of the genesis of the Adagia referring her readers for further information to more specific studies on the topic. In keeping with the opening adage she focuses on the ancient philosophical tradition that Erasmus claims as his intellectual inheritance from the past, a tradition rooted in the legal transfer of property. The humanist inherits his understanding of both friendship and property from an ancient philosophical tradition going back to Pythagoras and Plato, as well as Aristotle and Cicero. This pagan tradition is confronted and linked with the concepts of early-Christian writers, such as Tertullian, Origen, Jerome, Basil and Augustine. Not only is there a similarity between some ideas of pagan philosophers and Christian thinkers; they can even be a source of inspiration to pious living. The publication of the Adages also reflected changing attitudes and practices concerning property: thanks to the press of Manutius in Venice (and later of Frobenius in Basle), an increasing number of people was able to appropriate the heritage of classical wisdom, which had hitherto been the intellectual property of only very few. It was precisely in Venice, around the transition from the fifteenth to the sixteenth century, that the first laws regarding intellectual property—be it copyright of the author or protection of the printer's efforts—began to make an occurrence.The author proves to be well-read in both classical, biblical and patrologic sources—I particularly appreciated her combinations and confrontations of pagan and Christian sources. Of course, she is thoroughly familiar with Erasmus's Adagia, too, with an occasional excursion towards his other pedagogical treatises, such as the Antibarbarus, the Enchiridion or the Paraclesis, an adhortation to study Christian philosophy.Friends Hold All Things in Common is a carefully edited publication with hardly any noticeable language or printing errors. As a classicist I feel slightly disappointed... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:AN EARLY ACCOUNT OF DAVID HUME In New Letters of David Hume, Professor Klibansky and Mossner lamented the "dearth of information on Hume's early development". Though some new facts and documents have emerged since 1954, the early period of Hume's life, to 1740, remains the most obscure. The account of Hume in 1740 presented below adds nothing to our knowledge of the evolution of Hume's philosophy, but it does (...) give us an interesting picture of the young philosopher in society, and it suggests that those traits of character which later earned him the title of "le bon David" were already in evidence. The sketch below stresses, as many of his friends and adversaries were later to do, the divergence between the detached scepticism of his writings and his amiable engagement in the social life of a company. And if we take seriously the report that Hume was left in charge of the domestic "oeconomy" in the family he was visiting at Richmond, we might see this as foreshadowing his solicitude over, and constant interest in, the management of his own household and financial affairs in later years. The account printed here is an extract from a letter by William Mure of Caldwell to his sister Agnes, 2 dated "Richmond June 5th 1740". Mure has long been recognized as one of Hume's most intimate friends: Hume himself summed up the relationship when he wrote, on Mure' s death in 1776, "The Baron was among the oldest and best Friends I had 3 in the World." The document published here constitutes the earliest concrete evidence of their friendship yet recovered, ante-dating Hume's first published letter to Mure by more than two years. It appears that the two men were spending the summer of 17 40 in or near London, and possibly both staying at the house of some mutual friend. Mure had at this time just finished his study of law at Edinburgh University, and would probably have been vacationing in 79 London eri route to Leyden, where he was to complete his legal training. Hume may have been in the capital preparing to see Book III of his A Treatise of Human Nature, "Of Morals", through the press: it was published in November 1740. This, and the first two books of the Treatise, which had been published in 1739, were presumably the writings which he discussed with the company at Richmond. We have been here now these ten days, and pass our time in a very agreeable way, we have our aountrey man Mr. Hume the author of the Metaphysical books 7 that you heard so much of last summer as a party in our retirement, he is a very sensible young fellow and extreamly curious in most parts of learning and how much soever he has shown himself a Sceptick upon subjects of speculation and enquiry, he is as far from it as any man with regard to the qualities of a well natured friendly disposition, and an honest heart which are no doubt of greater consequence to the intrinsick worth of a character than any abstract opinions whatever. As he is very communicative of all his knowledge we have a great deal from him in the way of dispute and argument, and not a little too in the way of plain information we reason upon every point with the greatest freedom, even his own books, (which we are working at at present) we canvass with ease, and attack him boldly whereever we can get the least hold of him, and question or contradict his most favourite notions; all this goes on with thè greatest good humour, and affords us entertainment both within doors, and in the feilds at our walks in this delightful country, which is the finest that one can possibly imagine, and has the preference by people that has travel'd throw most of Europe, to any they ever saw. We make use of our Philosopher too in another way less becoming the dignity of his Character, as- we 80 keep family within ourselves, he provides the necessaries of household (¡economy and manages all the affairs of house keeping. From these... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Jesus the World-Protector:Eighteenth-Century Gelukpa Historians View Christianity1Michael J. SweetThe assumption that religion was so seamlessly woven into non-Western and preindustrial cultures that it was not even distinguished as a separate entity, let alone regarded as an object for study, has been a commonplace among Western scholars of religion for some decades.2 From this point of view, which can be broadly characterized as postmodernist and postcolonialist, the concept of religion (...) "is not a native category... it is a category imposed from outside... it is the other... colonialists who are solely responsible for the content of the term."3 This is a somewhat reductionistic and Eurocentric perspective that ignores the universal human capacity to empathically understand other belief systems.One counterexample to this school of thought is found in the works of three eighteenth-century religious historians, all of whom were learned monks in the Gelukpa tradition of Tibetan Buddhism: Gombojab (Mgon po Skyabs, late seventeenth century–after 1766),4 Sumba Khembo (Sum pa Mkhan po Yes shes dpal 'byor, 1704–1776), and Tuken (Thu'u Bkwan Blo bzang Chos kyi Nyi ma, 1737– 1802), authors of The History of Buddhism in China, The Auspicious Wish-Fulfilling Tree,5 and The Crystal Mirror,6 respectively. These scholars had clear conceptions of their own and other religious systems (Tib.: chos lugs), and compared to earlier Tibetan accounts they present relatively tolerant evaluations of other religious philosophies—for example, Chinese Buddhism, Daoism, and the Literati Tradition (Ru jiao, "Confucianism")—while asserting the superiority of the Gelukpa form of Tibetan Buddhism.7As a case in point, we will see how they describe and evaluate Christianity, a religion that was quite foreign to them and that they appear to have understood only imperfectly. Earlier Tibetan Buddhist religious histories, of which the best-known are the Blue Annals of 'Gos Lotsawa and Bu ston's "History of the Dharma," are immensely valuable sources, but they are more parochial in their range of interest than those of the eighteenth-century Tibeto-Mongol scholars.8 For the earlier historians Indo-Tibetan Buddhism was the only religious system worth serious consideration, and Chinese Buddhism, Indian non-Buddhist religious philosophies, Bon, [End Page 173] and Islam were dealt with in a polemical or (especially in the case of Islam) a frankly hostile fashion. Something changed in the eighteenth century that produced works closer to modern comparative religion than to medieval heresiography.A major motive for this shift was surely the triumph of the Manchu Qing dynasty, which by the mid-eighteenth century had incorporated Tibet and Mongolia definitively into its sphere. Thus, the horizon of the Tibeto-Mongol intelligentsia widened to include the vast Manchu empire, whose leadership in its turn was becoming increasingly aware of other Asian societies and of the European colonial powers. I believe it is significant that Sumba Khembo, Tuken, and Gombojab were all of Mongol ethnicity, the first two from Amdo and the last from Mongolia; they were able to combine an encyclopedic mastery of Tibetan Buddhist texts and ritual with the greater objectivity available to people stemming from the geographical and cultural periphery of that tradition. All three of them were exposed to the cosmopolitan world of imperial Beijing, where they had ample opportunity to meet followers of non-Buddhist religions of a wide range of ethnicities.9By the mid-eighteenth century there were four Catholic churches in Beijing, serving thousands of Chinese Christian converts. Dozens of European priests were employed by the imperial court as well.10 The prevailing syncretic view of the three major Chinese religious philosophies (sanjiao)—Buddhism, Daoism, and the Literati Tradition—as being mutually complementary,11 prevailed in the capital. This is the view that is approvingly cited by Tuken: "there are three great traditions (lugs srol) which clarify the ultimate nature of things, the Literati Tradition, Daoism, and Buddhism."12In turning to these scholars' treatment of Christianity, we find the earliest notice of this religion in Gombojab's History of Buddhism in China,13 written around the mid-1730s.14 Gombojab renders the name of Jesus in its traditional Chinese form of Yesu; he is called the World... (shrink)

La fin des années 1960, en Amérique du Nord, demeure, dans l’imaginaire d’un bon nombre, une ère dominée par la contre-culture où s’affichent une sexualité affranchie et un certain anarchisme à prétention de gauche. C’est l’époque de la contestation étudiante qu’alimente l’implication grandissante des Américains au Viêt-nam. Or, comme en contrepoint, presque en opposition,..

Le mot 'goût' désigne non seulement le discernement et l'appréciation gustative des qualités des aliments et de la boisson, mais aussi le choix de ce qui, dans un milieu cultivé, est estimé comme étant 'de bon goût'. Ce qu'on appelle 'goût' chez les animaux est une forme du sens chimique, par laquelle l'animal remarque ce qui est comestible. C'est sur la base de cette fonction sensorielle que s'appuye le goût humain. Celui-ci se développe chez le jeune enfant dès qu'il apprend (...) à goûter, à prendre goût a quelque chose, et cela en conformité avec les préférences du milieu ambiant, références que peu à peu il adopte et fait siennes. La formation du goût comporte donc une relation permanente au milieu social ainsi qu'à la langue qui, dans la civilisation, précise tout discernement et toute appréciation. Le plaisir du goût qui juge de la qualité des aliments et des boissons a une valeur exemplaire pour toute relation à ce qui est éprouvé, apprécié et préféré d'une manière sensorielle. C'est cela qu'on dit être 'de bon goût'. Dans une société dont la civilisation et la prospérité sont en progrès, le bon goût exerce une fonction sociale. Mais cette fonction est différente de celle de l'art. Le beau à d'autres dimensions que ce qui est 'de bon goût'. Et dans le phénomène de la mode le bon goût semble pouvoir railler parfois le sens artitistique, sinon la civilisation elle-même. Le domaine du bon goût est comme un domaine intermédiaire et ambigu de la civilisation, où une nature humanisée et une humanité naturelle se fondent l'une dans l'autre. Ce domaine du goût prédominant confine d'une part au champ du besoin du boire et du manger en voie d'humanisation et d'autre part à l'espace illimité de l'art comme culture. Le goût, situé entre le sens naturel et le sens artistique, est la préfiguration du spirituel. Sa signification propre a trouvé son expression dans le langage à l'avènement de l'homo sapiens, cet être caractérisé par l'intelligence, le goût (sapor) de la mesure, de la proportion et de la valeur. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of FranceAndrew J. McKennaThe Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France, by Eugene Webb; ix & 268 pp. Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1993, $35.00.That psychology and sociology are one science is the fundamental premise guiding Eugene Webb’s The Self Between, which he defines early on as “a self constituted dynamically and continuously by (...) the relationships it finds itself involved i n.” The “new social psychology of France” designated by his subtitle is mostly the one inspired by René Girard’s mimetic model of human behavior, to which four of Webb’s seven chapters are specifically devoted.Girard’s idea, which he learned from our literary masterpieces, is that human desire is mimetic, that it imitates other desires in its choice of objects and in pursuit of their possession. As desires converge on a single object, the locus of conflict will be between subjects rather within their individual psyches, a consequence that motivates Girard’s ongoing critique of Freudian psychoanalysis.But Freud’s theories are everywhere disputed in this book, which reports reliably on the devastating critiques advanced by François Roustang, Marie Balmary, and Mikkel Borch-Jacobsen. Roustang has convincingly (and entertainingly) uncovered Freud’s blindness to the pathologies of transference and discipleship investing the foundation of psychoanalysis. A pattern of rivalry for recognition and preeminence guides Freud’s career in a way that is reenacted around Lacan. Balmary, somewhat a Lacanian her self, has turned psychoanalytic theory against Freud to explore his own family secrets, while severely questioning the master’s bid for a universal theory pursued via self-analysis amidst a period of emotional upheaval. And Borch-Jacobsen has shown how th e dynamics of hypnosis that Freud rejected early on were brought back as transference, while arguing for his own part that mimetic identification with the other, rather than any primordial drives, is what brings the subject into being. These informat ive chapters help bring us up to date on significant debates that have developed since Lacan drew the French intellectual world, and so many Americans after it, into the orbit of psychoanalysis.But by far the bulk of Webb’s attention goes to Girard’s work and to that of [End Page 191] scholars and practitioners who have sought to extend it further in the social sciences. Principle among them is Jean-Michel Oughourlian, whose Puppet of Desire (translated by Webb in 1991) demonstrates how the mimetic model plays out in psychotherapy, notably in the workings of hypnotism and somnambulism, in cases of demonic possession, and in obsessional neurosis. In each case, the subject is unwitt ingly captive of another’s desire in a way that produces behavioral anomalies and disorders that are nonetheless available to lucid, jargon-free diagnosis. What is appealing here is the deployment of a rational explanation for irrational behavior, once we grasp the paradoxical rationale of desire; equally appealing prospects of actual healing are outlined here and at the end of the book, where possibilities of freedom and responsibility are resurrected from a technical vocabulary that smothers them.Girard’s idea of the self as relation, as interdividuality, rather than as a discreet unit, has social and political dimensions to which we only find tantalizing allusions in his works. They have been pursued with acumen by such writers as André Orléan, Paul Dumouchel and especially Jean-Pierre Dupuy, who figures importantly among those aligning systems theory with theories of social and economic organization. Like Borch-Jacobsen and Roustang, Dupuy restores due attention to concep tions of crowd behavior outlined at the end of the last century by Tarde and Le Bon, whose best insights Freud studiously discarded.This is richly interdisciplinary work, strongly suggesting that we variously redraw and erase lines defining academic fields. Occam’s razor flicks often and decisively in these pages, which restore needed balance to the effects of some wild er French imports. Webb brings no new ideas of his own to this capable synthesis, but his accurate report will help guide researchers toward major recent developments in France around and mostly beyond Freudian psychoanalysis... (shrink)

Les paradoxes de l’horreur et de la tragédie posent la question de savoir si, et comment, il peut être rationnel de s’exposer intentionnellement, comme nous le faisons, à des œuvres fictionnelles qu’on qualifie parfois de « douloureuses ». J’entreprends de résoudre ces paradoxes en remettant en question l’idée de valence intrinsèque des émotions sur laquelle ils sont fondés et en expliquant pourquoi les émotions dirigées vers des fictions ne sont jamais désagréables ou déplaisantes, mais sont au contraire hédoniquement positives. Il (...) est donc rationnel de s’exposer aux œuvres qui les suscitent. (shrink)

"A demain le bon sexe"... disait, non sans une pointe d'ironie, Michel Foucault, au plus fort de la "révolution sexuelle", et l'on sentait que ce n'était pas gagné. Qu'est-ce que le bon sexe? J'ai écrit ce livre en neuf mois... et toute une vie... Sans doute, pour moi, une manière de réaliser une certaine façon qui fut mienne d'être femme je me revois, dans ma petite chambre mansardée, étudiante, tentant en vain de lire en son entier l'Histoire de la sexualité (...) de Michel Foucault... Que savais-je de la sexualité, que pouvais-je recevoir de cet essai, que je trouvais grandiose, lumineux et obscur? Foucault, le seul des philosophes à parler de "ces choses-là", était bien isolé. Il faudrait du temps pour que ses écrits fassent leur route et du temps pour changer les mentalités. Du temps aussi pour moi, pour pouvoir les entendre, qu'ils fassent écho en moi. "Le sexe, disait Foucault, ça s'administre, la sexualité, ça se subit ; quant à la sensualité, elle est chaque jour à inventer." J'ai voulu rouvrir le dossier, emprunter les chemins qu'il a tracés en 1976 en écrivant son Histoire de la sexualité, qui est l'histoire des discours sur la sexualité, eux-mêmes histoire des corps investis par le pouvoir. Danièle Sastre. (shrink)

En 378 ap. J.-C., alors que les Romains s'accommodent bien de leur cohabitation avec les populations barbares d'Europe occidentale, y puisant la main-d'oeuvre de leur agriculture et de leur armée, les Goths viennent tout d'un coup, sans doute pour échapper aux Huns, s'amasser trop nombreux sur les rives du Danube. Débordés par la multitude des demandeurs d'asile, les Romains hésitent à entrouvrir leur frontière, et les Barbares, exaspérés, finissent par entrer en force. La situation dégénère, amorçant le phénomène qui mènera (...) à la chute de l'Empire romain. Mais ces événements aboutiront aussi à la création de l'Europe telle que nous la connaissons.In 378 BC, when the Romans will do well to cohabit with the barbarian peoples of Western Europe, including drawing on the labor of their agriculture and their armies, the Goths come suddenly probably to escape the Huns, too many gather on the banks of the Danube. Overwhelmed by the multitude of asylum seekers, the Romans are reluctant to loosen their border, and the Barbarians, exasperated, finally come into force. The situation escalates, initiating the phenomenon leading to the fall of the Roman Empire. But these events lead to the creation of Europe as we know it. (shrink)

« S’il faut avoir un enfant tous les neuf mois pour se confesser, je ne consentirai jamais » ; c’est la réponse que redoute d’entendre un prêtre qui écrit en septembre 1898 à la revue l’Ami du Clergé, revue dont l’influence fut grande parmi les ecclésiastiques français. Soixante-dix ans plus tard, une lectrice s’exprime ainsi dans le magazine Elle du 2 septembre 1968 : « Je suis catholique, bien élevée au couvent. J’ai quatre enfants régulièrement conçus dans le mariage mais (...) que j’ai eu l’exo... (shrink)

« S’il faut avoir un enfant tous les neuf mois pour se confesser, je ne consentirai jamais » ; c’est la réponse que redoute d’entendre un prêtre qui écrit en septembre 1898 à la revue l’Ami du Clergé, revue dont l’influence fut grande parmi les ecclésiastiques français. Soixante-dix ans plus tard, une lectrice s’exprime ainsi dans le magazine Elle du 2 septembre 1968 : « Je suis catholique, bien élevée au couvent. J’ai quatre enfants régulièrement conçus dans le mariage mais (...) que j’ai eu l’exo... (shrink)

« S’il faut avoir un enfant tous les neuf mois pour se confesser, je ne consentirai jamais » ; c’est la réponse que redoute d’entendre un prêtre qui écrit en septembre 1898 à la revue l’Ami du Clergé, revue dont l’influence fut grande parmi les ecclésiastiques français. Soixante-dix ans plus tard, une lectrice s’exprime ainsi dans le magazine Elle du 2 septembre 1968 : « Je suis catholique, bien élevée au couvent. J’ai quatre enfants régulièrement conçus dans le mariage mais (...) que j’ai eu l’exo... (shrink)

Bayle est souvent considéré comme sceptique, mais sa conception de la raison n’est pas toujours claire ; ce qui en revanche est clair, c’est qu’il manifeste une profonde méfiance à l’égard des capacités de la raison de livrer une connaissance certaine. Cependant, une nouvelle interprétation de Bayle comme rationaliste « stratonicien » a été développée par Gianluca Mori, qui donne une description détaillée de Bayle comme philosophe critique désireux de rendre compte de toutes positions possibles dans leur complexité et de (...) tirer toutes les conséquences des arguments invoqués au service des principes dits « stratoniciens ». Cette conception de Bayle comme rationaliste critique stratonicien rend possible une interprétation de Bayle moins comme un « supersceptique » à la Richard Popkin, que celui qui permet à la raison d’opérer avec une portée et une autorité plus grandes que ne le permettrait le scepticisme. Mori affirme que la conception de la raison chez Bayle est assez forte ; selon lui, la raison peut aller jusqu’au bout, avec une autorité absolue, et tirer des conclusions. Je soutiens que la conception de la nature et de la fonction de la raison chez Bayle se situe en fait entre le rationalisme stratonicien de Mori et l’interprétation « supersceptique » de Popkin. Comme Mori, je pense qu’il s’agit d’un rationalisme « critique » ; mais contre lui, je pense que la raison elle-même définit et recommande ses propres limites. J’appelle cette conception de la raison « sceptico-rationaliste » et, en suivant Bayle, je suggère comment le « bon sens » (qui fait partie de la raison) aide à définir ces limites. (shrink)

Toute une génération de penseurs catholiques allemands du xxe siècle a cru pouvoir se rattacher à la pensée de la finitude développée par M. Heidegger pour la faire dialoguer avec, d’une part l’idéalisme allemand, et d’autre part surtout, la métaphysique de Thomas d’Aquin et l’ouverture à Dieu Ipsum esse per se subsistens qu’elle semblait ménager via la différence ontologique. À cet égard, ils effectuaient bon gré mal gré une tentative de conciliation toute kantienne en ses origines, entre le thomisme transcendantal (...) du jésuite belge J. Maréchal et la pensée de Heidegger. Przywara, en dépit d’un apparent souci commun de concilier métaphysiques de la « finitude » et de l’« infinitude », n’épargne pas ce qu’il appelle « école heideggerienne catholique ». Nous tâcherons de comprendre ici précisément pourquoi, en donnant un aperçu de la lecture effectuée par le jésuite allemand, tant des entreprises maréchalienne et heideggerienne pour elles-mêmes que de quelques tentatives de leurs confrontations. (shrink)

Dans cet article, j'envisagerai quelques voies par lesquelles des sociétés dites primitives surent éviter et la soumission à l'État et la guerre généralisée.On comprend que pour opposer un front commun à leurs ennemis, des hommes soient amenés à s'allier et, pour ce faire, échangent de bons precédés, des biens et des femmes. Ainsi, les nécessités de la guerre entraîneraient la formation d'alliances.

Nul n'est plus fuyant que le mauvais goût. Qu'il soit relatif, ancré dans son temps, frontière sociale ou revendiqué tel une profession de foi artistique. Dans ce Dictionnaire amoureux intime et partial, Nicolas d'Estienne d'Orves vous invite dans son grenier braillard et cocasse. 'Le mauvais goût échappe à toute définition, famille ou clan. Tout comme le bon goût, il est relatif, circonstanciel, ancré dans son temps. Il peut également être une frontière sociale, un racisme de classe. En ce cas, le (...) mauvais goût c'est celui de l'autre, celui qu'on n'a pas et qu'on se défend d'avoir au risque de trahir les siens. Enfin il y a le mauvais goût patenté, revendiqué, qui n'est pas une attitude, une mode, mais une profession de foi artistique, un manifeste esthétique. C'est -sans doute- ce qu'on pourrait appeler le kitsch. C'est-à-dire un style en soi, des formes volontaires, pensées, destinées à déranger la norme. Ce livre sera donc, par essence, partial. Avec le mauvais goût, j'entre dans une zone marécageuse. Est-il possible de faire un livre plus intime, plus narcissique, puisqu'il explore la part d'ombre de ma propre sensibilité? Petit enfant sous Giscard, adolescent sous Mitterrand, j'ai pris racine dans des époques aux esthétiques très contrastées qui seront forcément présentes dans ces pages. Souvenirs intimes, émissions de télévision, films, livres, plats, commerces, personnages imaginaires ou pas, attitudes de tous poils, mon mauvais goût est une auberge qui n'a rien d'espagnole mais tout d'un grenier. Un grenier braillard et cocasse, que j'ai moi-même tenté de ranger pour les besoins de la cause. Le mauvais goût ne se partage pas, en ce qu'il est une exploration de nos propres frontières esthétiques, la ligne de crête entre ce que l'on goûte et ce que l'on recrache. Bienvenue dans mon train fantôme!'"--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)

“La théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister”J. M. CharcotRoughly speaking, references relate what is said to just those things about which it is said. A theory of reference is commonly taken to be a statement or characterization of that relation which references effect — that relation, that is, which holds between something that is said and some object just in case in that which is said reference is made to that object. Such a theory is often further conceived (...) as answering one or both of the questions: For any given object X, what is it for a reference to be made to X, and For any given reference, R, what is it for an object X to be the referent of R. Let us call a theory which correctly answers at least some of these questions a classical theory of reference. (shrink)

“La théorie, c'est bon, mais ça n'empêche pas d'exister”J. M. CharcotRoughly speaking, references relate what is said to just those things about which it is said. A theory of reference is commonly taken to be a statement or characterization of that relation which references effect — that relation, that is, which holds between something that is said and some object just in case in that which is said reference is made to that object. Such a theory is often further conceived (...) as answering one or both of the questions: For any given object X, what is it for a reference to be made to X, and For any given reference, R, what is it for an object X to be the referent of R. Let us call a theory which correctly answers at least some of these questions a classical theory of reference. (shrink)

Patient narratives from two investigational deep brain stimulation trials for traumatic brain injury and obsessive‐compulsive disorder reveal that injury and illness rob individuals of personal identity and that neuromodulation can restore it. The early success of these interventions makes a compelling case for continued post‐trial access to these technologies. Given the centrality of personal identity to respect for persons, a failure to provide continued access can be understood to represent a metaphorical identity theft. Such a loss recapitulates the pain of (...) an individual's initial injury or illness and becomes especially tragic because it could be prevented by robust policy. A failure to fulfill this normative obligation constitutes a breach of disability law, which would view post‐trial access as a means to achieve social reintegration through this neurotechnological accommodation. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to give a good account of the argument from ignorance, with a presumptive argumentation scheme, and to raise issues on the work of Walton, the nature of abduction and the concept of epistemic closure. First, I offer a brief disambiguation of how the terms 'argument from ignorance' and 'argumentum ad ignorantiam' are used. Second, I show how attempts to embellish this form of reasoning by Douglas Walton and A.J. Kreider have been unnecessary and (...) unhelpful. Lastly, I offer a full and effective account of the argument from ignorance and discuss the lessons of the analysis.Le but de cet article est double: donner un bon compte rendu de l'argument par l'ignorance, avec un schème d'argumentation présomptif, et soulever des questions sur certains aspects de l’œuvre de Walton, la nature des raisonnements abductifs et le concept de fermeture épistémique. Premièrement, j'offre une brève désambiguïsation de la façon dont les termes «argument par l'ignorance» et «argumentum ad ignorantiam» sont utilisés. Deuxièmement, je montre comment les tentatives de Douglas Walton et de A.J. Kreider d'embellir cette forme de raisonnement ont été ni nécessaires et ni utiles. Enfin, j'offre un compte-rendu complet et utile de l'argument par l'ignorance et je discute des leçons de l'analyse. (shrink)

In this paper I critically examine the implications of the uncodifiability thesis for principlism as a pluralistic and non-absolute generalist ethical theory. In this regard, I begin with a brief overview of W.D. Ross’s ethical theory and his focus on general but defeasible prima facie principles before turning to 2) the revival of principlism in contemporary bioethics through the influential work of Tom Beauchamp and James Childress; 3) the widespread adoption of specification as a response to the indeterminacy of abstract (...) general principles and the limitations of balancing and deductive approaches; 4) the challenges raised to fully specified principlism by the uncodifiability thesis and 5) finally offer a defense of the uncodifiability thesis against various critiques that have been raised. (shrink)

Federico Zuolo | : Most contemporary Western laws regarding the treatment of animals in livestock farming and animal slaughter are primarily concerned with the principle that animal suffering during slaughter should be minimized, but that animal life may be taken for legitimate human purposes. This principle seems to be widely shared, intuitively appealing and capable of striking a good compromise between competing interests. But is this principle consistent? And how can it be normatively grounded? In this paper I discuss critically (...) this principle. I argue that this principle can be justified on the ground of respect for the value commitment toward animal welfare, which is held by many people. The advantage of this perspective is its inclusiveness: it can justify without contradiction the principle at stake and allow for the admissibility of religious slaughter while promoting animals’ interest in not suffering. This justification also has the advantage of being compatible with the cultural and religious pluralism of contemporary societies. | : La plupart des lois contemporaines portant sur le traitement des animaux, leur élevage et les techniques d’abattage en usage en Occident se préoccupent principalement du principe selon lequel la souffrance des animaux doit être minimisée durant l’abattage, mais reconnaissent que les animaux peuvent être tués à des fins humaines légitimes. Ce principe semble être largement accepté par la société, séduisant intuitivement et susceptible de constituer un bon compromis entre des intérêts concurrents. Mais ce principe est-il cohérent? Et quel peut être son fondement normatif? Dans cet article, j’aborde ce principe de manière critique. J’affirme que ce principe peut être justifié dans le cadre du respect de l’engagement envers le bien-être des animaux, lequel est soutenu par de nombreuses personnes. L’avantage de cette perspective est son caractère inclusif : elle permet de justifier de manière non contradictoire le principe en question et rend acceptable l’abattage rituel tout en faisant la promotion de l’intérêt des animaux à la non-souffrance. Cette justification présente également l’avantage d’être compatible avec le pluralisme culturel et religieux qui caractérise les sociétés contemporaines. (shrink)

RésuméEn réponse à l'article de D. C. Matthew, « Racial Integration and the Problem of Relational Devaluation », j'examine la politique de la beauté physique à l'intersection entre les catégories de race et de genre. J’évalue et je rejette l'affirmation de Matthew selon laquelle être perçu comme physiquement attrayant se traduit à coup sûr soit par un bon traitement, soit par une haute estime de soi. Je soutiens que, au contraire, le genre peut fonctionner comme un moyen de contrôle social, (...) dans lequel le désir du corps des femmes n'apporte aucun bon traitement ni n'améliore leur estime de soi. Ce problème peut persister au sein des communautés raciales intragroupes autoségréguées. (shrink)

On admet en général qu’il y a deux sortes de concepts normatifs : les concepts évaluatifs, comme bon, et les concepts déontiques, comme devoir. La question que soulève cette distinction est celle de savoir comment il est possible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. En effet, comme les concepts déontiques semblent constituer le coeur du domaine normatif, plus le fossé entre les deux sortes de concepts est grand, moins il paraîtra plausible d’affirmer que les concepts évaluatifs sont normatifs. Après (...) avoir présenté les différences principales entre les concepts évaluatifs et les concepts déontiques, et montré qu’il y a plus qu’une différence superficielle entre les deux sortes de concepts, j’examinerai la question de la normativité des concepts évaluatifs. Il deviendra apparent que même s’il s’agit de concepts ayant des fonctions différentes, il existe un grand nombre de relations entre les concepts évaluatifs, d’une part, et les concepts de devoir et de raison, d’autre part.It is generally accepted that there are two sorts of normative concepts : evaluative concepts, such as good, and deontic concepts, such as ought. The question that is raised by this distinction is how it is possible to claim that evaluative concepts are normative. As deontic concepts appear to be at the heart of normativity, the more there is a gap between evaluative and deontic concepts, the less it appears plausible to say that evaluative concepts are normative. After having presented the main differences between evaluative and deontic concepts, and shown that there is more than a superficial difference between the two sorts of concepts, the paper turns to the question of the normativitity of evaluative concepts. It will become clear that even if these concepts have different functions, there are a great many ties between evaluative concepts, on the one hand, and the concepts of ought and of reason, on the other hand. (shrink)

Healthcare priority-setting institutions have good reason to want to demonstrate that their decisions are morally justified—and those who contribute to and use the health service have good reason to hope for the same. However, finding a moral basis on which to evaluate healthcare priority-setting is difficult. Substantive approaches are vulnerable to reasonable disagreement about the appropriate grounds for allocating resources, while procedural approaches may be indeterminate and insufficient to ensure a just distribution. In this paper, we set out a complementary, (...) coherence-based approach to the evaluation of healthcare priority-setting. Drawing on Rawls, we argue that an institutional priority-setter’s claim to moral justification can be assessed, in part, based on the extent to which its many normative commitments are mutually supportive and free from dissonance; that is, on the ability to establish narrow reflective equilibrium across the normative content of a priority-setter’s policy and practice. While we do not suggest that the establishment of such equilibrium is sufficient for moral justification, we argue that failure to do so might—like the proverbial canary in the coalmine—act as a generalised warning that something is awry. We offer a theoretical argument in support of this view and briefly outline a practical method for systematically examining coherence across priority-setting policy and practice. (shrink)

Some organisations make vaccination a condition of employment. This means prospective employees must demonstrate they have been vaccinated (eg, against measles) to be hired. But it also means organisations must decide whether _existing_ employees should be expected to meet newly introduced vaccination conditions (eg, against COVID-19). Unlike prospective employees who will not be _hired_ if they do not meet vaccination conditions, existing employees who fail to meet new vaccination conditions risk being _fired_. The latter seems worse than the former. Hence, (...) objections to vaccination mandates commonly centre on the harms that will be visited on existing employees who are unwilling to be vaccinated. However, because this objection does not necessarily entail the claim that vaccination is unnecessary for the effective and safe performance of certain jobs, those making this objection should have less of an objection, or no objection at all (at least on these grounds), to introducing vaccination requirements in some cases for _prospective_ employees. Yet, in this paper, I shall argue that if one has reason to believe vaccination requirements can be justified for prospective employees, one should also believe they are justified for existing employees _despite_ any asymmetry in consequences experienced by the two groups. As a consequence, common objections made against vaccination mandates grounded solely in the harms that may be experienced by existing employees who are unwilling to be vaccinated should be considered unpersuasive. (shrink)

Eleni Panagiotarakou | : The focus of this paper is on the “right to place” as a political theory of wild animal rights. Out of the debate between terrestrial cosmopolitans inspired by Kant and Arendt and rooted cosmopolitan animal right theorists, the right to place emerges from the fold of rooted cosmopolitanism in tandem with environmental and ecological principles. Contrary to terrestrial cosmopolitans—who favour extending citizenship rights to wild animals and advocate at the same time large-scale humanitarian interventions and unrestricted (...) geographical mobility—I argue that the well-being of wild animals is best served by the right to place theory on account of its sovereignty model. The right to place theory advocates human non-interference in wildlife communities, opposing even humanitarian interventions, which carry the risk of unintended consequences. The right to place theory, with its emphasis on territorial sovereignty, bases its opposition to unrestricted geographical mobility on two considerations: the non-generalist nature of many species and the potential for abuse via human encroachment. In a broader context, the advantage of the right to place theory lies in its implicit environmental demands: human population control and sustainable lifestyles. | : Le présent article porte principalement sur le « droit territorial » en tant que théorie politique des droits des animaux sauvages. Issu du débat entre théoriciens cosmopolitistes du droit animal, soit terrestres inspirés par Kant et Arendt, soit enracinés, le droit territorial trouve ses sources dans le cosmopolitisme enraciné qui va de concert avec certains principes environnementaux et écologiques. Contrairement aux cosmopolitistes terrestres, qui préconisent d’étendre les droits de citoyenneté aux animaux sauvages tout en défendant les interventions humanitaires à grande échelle et la mobilité géographique illimitée, j’estime que la théorie du droit territorial est davantage en mesure d’assurer le bien-être des animaux sauvages, grâce à son modèle basé sur la souveraineté. La théorie du droit territorial préconise la non-ingérence dans les communautés fauniques, allant jusqu’à s’opposer aux interventions humanitaires, qui risquent de provoquer des conséquences non désirées. Cette théorie, en mettant l’accent sur la souveraineté territoriale, base son opposition à la mobilité géographique illimitée sur deux considérations : le caractère non généraliste de bon nombre d’espèces, et le risque de mauvais traitements par empiètement humain. Dans un contexte plus large, l’intérêt de la théorie du droit territorial réside dans ses exigences environnementales implicites : le contrôle de la population humaine et l’adoption de modes de vie durables. (shrink)

What is property, and why does our species happen to have it? In The Property Species, the economist Bart Wilson explores how we acquire, perceive, and know the custom of property, and why this might be relevant to social scientists, philosophers, and legal scholars for understanding how property works in the twenty-first century.