Business and Society: Ethics and Stakeholder Management, 5th edition employs a stakeholder management framework, emphasizing business' social and ethical responsibilities to both external and internal stakeholder groups. A twin theme of business ethics to illustrate how ethical or moral considerations are included the public issues facing organizations and the decision making process of managers. The text is written from a managerial perspective that along with the twin themes of stakeholders and ethics, shows how to identify stakeholders, incorporate their concerns into (...) the organization's strategy and operations, and also integrate ethical wisdom into their decision making process. In addition, 35 case histories are included to help connect theory and practice through timely and interesting examples. (shrink)

Indigenous language bilingual schooling, introduced in Australia's Northern Territory (NT) in 1973, was a reality for over twenty-five schools at the program's height. Today, the language-of-instruction in these same settings is English only, with only 7 state schools operating bilingual programs. Overt Government hostility began with an attempt to defund Indigenous bilingual education in 1998-99. This paper argues that the discursive techniques used to justify these cuts were crucial to developing key themes in ‘mainstreaming discourses’ in Indigenous politics, which has (...) rehabilitated assimilationist thinking in a neoliberal context through the 2000s and since. Using a discourse-historical method, this paper elucidates how mainstreaming discourses were constructed against bilingual education in the 1998–99 debate, and how they emphasized English-only education geared towards neoliberal assimilation for remote Indigenous communities. Indigenous bilingual education was conceived as part of ‘failed’ self-determination in remote Australia. This paper enhances understanding of the patterns and themes of mainstreaming discourses by tracing their genealogical development in this debate. (shrink)

Doxastic involuntarists have paid insufficient attention to two debates in contemporary epistemology: the permissivism debate and the debate over norms of assertion and belief. In combination, these debates highlight a conception of belief on which, if you find yourself in what I will call an ‘equipollent case’ with respect to some proposition p, there will be no reason why you can’t believe p at will. While doxastic involuntarism is virtually epistemological orthodoxy, nothing in the entire stock of objections to belief (...) at will blocks this route to doxastic voluntarism. Against the backdrop of the permissivism debate and the literature on norms of belief and assertion, doxastic involuntarism emerges as an article of faith, not the obvious truth it’s usually purported to be. (shrink)

Does knowledge depend in any interesting way on our practical interests? This is the central question in the pragmatic encroachment debate. Pragmatists defend the affirmative answer to this question while purists defend the negative answer. The literature contains two kinds of arguments for pragmatism: principle-based arguments and case-based arguments. Principle-based arguments derive pragmatism from principles that connect knowledge to practical interests. Case-based arguments rely on intuitions about cases that differ with respect to practical interests. I argue that there are insurmountable (...) problems for both kinds of arguments, and that it is therefore unclear what motivates pragmatism. (shrink)

BackgroundAdvances in healthcare artificial intelligence (AI) are occurring rapidly and there is a growing discussion about managing its development. Many AI technologies end up owned and controlled by private entities. The nature of the implementation of AI could mean such corporations, clinics and public bodies will have a greater than typical role in obtaining, utilizing and protecting patient health information. This raises privacy issues relating to implementation and data security. Main bodyThe first set of concerns includes access, use and control (...) of patient data in private hands. Some recent public–private partnerships for implementing AI have resulted in poor protection of privacy. As such, there have been calls for greater systemic oversight of big data health research. Appropriate safeguards must be in place to maintain privacy and patient agency. Private custodians of data can be impacted by competing goals and should be structurally encouraged to ensure data protection and to deter alternative use thereof. Another set of concerns relates to the external risk of privacy breaches through AI-driven methods. The ability to deidentify or anonymize patient health data may be compromised or even nullified in light of new algorithms that have successfully reidentified such data. This could increase the risk to patient data under private custodianship.ConclusionsWe are currently in a familiar situation in which regulation and oversight risk falling behind the technologies they govern. Regulation should emphasize patient agency and consent, and should encourage increasingly sophisticated methods of data anonymization and protection. (shrink)

This perspectives article seeks to comment and reflect on my 1999 BAS article titled “Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional Construct,” and subsequent writings addressing these same topics. First, perspectives on the 1950-1999 period are offered. Second, reflections on the 2000-2020 period are presented. Finally, thoughts about the future and the new normal for CSR are set forth. Hopefully, the observations presented will stimulate further thinking on this important concept. And, it will be interesting to all of us to (...) see where the dust settles when the pandemic ends and organizations have had a chance to re-imagine or reset their missions, goals, and processes with respect to CSR. (shrink)

According to what I will call ‘the disanalogy thesis,’ beliefs differ from actions in at least the following important way: while cognitively healthy people often exhibit direct control over their actions, there is no possible scenario where a cognitively healthy person exhibits direct control over her beliefs. Recent arguments against the disanalogy thesis maintain that, if you find yourself in what I will call a ‘permissive situation’ with respect to p, then you can have direct control over whether you believe (...) p, and you can do so without manifesting any cognitive defect. These arguments focus primarily on the idea that we can have direct doxastic control in permissive situations, but they provide insufficient reason for thinking that permissive situations are actually possible, since they pay inadequate attention to the following worries: permissive situations seem inconsistent with the uniqueness thesis, permissive situations seem inconsistent with natural thoughts about epistemic akrasia, and vagueness threatens even if we push these worries aside. In this paper I argue that, on the understanding of permissive situations that is most useful for evaluating the disanalogy thesis, permissive situations clearly are possible. (shrink)

As we transition to the 21st century, it is useful to think about some of the most important challenges business and other organizations will face as the new millennium begins. What will constitute “business as usual” in the business ethics arena as we start and move into the new century? My overall thought is that we will pulsate into the future on our current trajectory and that the new century will not cause cataclysmic changes, at least not immediately. Rather, the (...) problems and challenges we face now we will face then. Undoubtedly, new issues will arise but they will more likely be extensions of the present than discontinuities with the past. (shrink)

Margaret Egan and Jesse Hauk Shera's original conception of social epistemology has never been defined unambiguously, or developed significantly beyond its early formulation. An interesting consequence of this lack of conceptual clarity has been the application of several interpretations of social epistemology. This article discusses how social epistemology was linked with the ideology of apartheid, and with racially segregated library and information services in the Republic of South Africa. In a fraudulent scientific vision for librarianship, social epistemology was assigned a (...) role that violated its original purpose. The intellectual content of social epistemology needs to be articulated in order to prevent further examples of such conceptual abuse. The paper ends with an attempt to do this with some suggestions based on Shera's own seminal ideas. (shrink)

Alvin Plantinga theorizes the existence of a sensus divinitatis – a special cognitive faulty or mechanism dedicated to the production and non-inferential justification of theistic belief. Following Chris Tucker, we offer an evidentialist-friendly model of the sensus divinitatis whereon it produces theistic seemings that non-inferentially justify theistic belief. We suggest that the sensus divinitatis produces these seemings by tacitly grasping support relations between the content of ordinary experiences (in conjunction with our background evidence) and propositions about God. Our model offers (...) advantages such as eliminating the need for a sui generis religious faculty, harmonizing the sensus divinitatis with prominent theories in the cognitive science of religion, and providing a superior account of natural revelation. (shrink)

The epistemic value of seemings is increasingly debated. Such debates are hindered, however, by a lack of consensus about the nature of seemings. There are four prominent conceptions in the literature, and the plausibility of principles such as phenomenal conservatism, which assign a prominent epistemic role to seemings, varies greatly from one conception to another. It is therefore crucial that we identify the correct conception of seemings. I argue that seemings are best understood as sui generis mental states with propositional (...) content and a distinct phenomenal character. Rival conceptions are shown to succumb to numerous difficulties. (shrink)

This article presents a three-stage model of how isomorphic mechanisms have shaped corporate social responsibility reporting practices over time. In the first stage, defensive reporting, companies fail to meet stakeholder expectations due to a deficiency in firm performance. In this stage, the decision to report is driven by coercive isomorphism as firms sense pressure to close the expectational gap. In the second stage, proactive reporting, knowledge of CSR reporting spreads and the practice of CSR reporting becomes normatively sanctioned. In this (...) stage, normative isomorphism leads other organizations to look to CSR reporting as a potential new opportunity for achieving the firm’s goals. In the third stage, imitative diffusion, the defensive reporters together with the proactive reporters create a critical mass of CSR reporters that reaches a threshold at which the benefits of CSR reporting begin to outweigh any costs due to mimetic isomorphism. The study finds support for the model in an examination of Fortune 500 firms from 1997 to 2006. (shrink)

Purists think that changes in our practical interests can’t affect what we know unless those changes are truth-relevant with respect to the propositions in question. Impurists disagree. They think changes in our practical interests can affect what we know even if those changes aren’t truth-relevant with respect to the propositions in question. I argue that impurists are right, but for the wrong reasons, since they haven’t appreciated the best argument for their own view. Together with “Minimalism and the Limits of (...) Warranted Assertability Maneuvers,” “The Pragmatic Encroachment Debate,” and “Anti-Intellectualism” (below), this paper constitutes my attempt to refute the entire pragmatic encroachment debate. As I show in this paper, there is an argument for impurism sitting in plain sight that is considerably more plausible than any extant argument for pragmatism. (shrink)

Intellectualists disagree with anti-intellectualists about the relationship between knowledge and truth. According to intellectualists, this relationship is intimate. Knowledge entails true belief, and in fact everything required for knowledge is somehow relevant to the probability that the belief in question is true. According to anti-intellectualists, this relationship isn’t intimate. Or, at least, it’s not as intimate as intellectualists think. Factors that aren’t in any way relevant to the probability that a belief is true can make a difference to whether it (...) counts as knowledge. In this paper, I give a new argument for anti-intellectualism and draw out consequences of this argument for the pragmatic encroachment debate. The standard purist objection to pragmatism is that pragmatism entails anti-intellectualism. As I show, anti-intellectualism follows from premises that are plausible even if purism is true, so the standard purist objection to pragmatism fails. (shrink)

If God is transcendent, how can human beings speak meaningfully about him? The answer lies in analogy, which recognizes both similarity and dissimilarity between God and our God-talk. In his erudite study, Archie Spencer argues for a christological account of analogy as the answer to the problem of God's speakability.

The epistemic value of seemings is increasingly debated. Such debates are hindered, however, by a lack of consensus about the nature of seemings. There are four prominent conceptions in the literature, and the plausibility of principles such as phenomenal conservatism, which assign a prominent epistemic role to seemings, varies greatly from one conception to another. It is therefore crucial that we identify the correct conception of seemings. I argue that seemings are best understood as sui generis mental states with propositional (...) content and a distinct phenomenal character. Rival conceptions are shown to succumb to numerous difficulties. (shrink)

A number of philosophers :171–187, 2011; Arnold 2011, in Ethics Politics XV:101–138, 2013) have argued that agent-based, evolutionary game theory models of the evolution of cooperation fail to provide satisfying explanations of cooperation because they are too disconnected from actual biology. I show how these criticisms can be answered by employing modeling approaches from the situated cognition research program that allow for more biologically detailed models. Using cases drawn from recent situated cognition modeling research, I show how agent-based models of (...) the evolution of cooperation can become more empirically-informed and relevant to explaining the evolution of cooperation in real populations. I argue that because situated cognition models allow for more detailed representations of not just agents’ brains but bodies and environments as well, they can be informed by a much wider breadth of empirical research than traditional agent-based models. Moreover, because the simulated bodies of these agents exhibit particular behaviors, they can be more readily compared to the behaviors of actual organisms. I conclude that employing situated cognition approaches to modeling the evolution of cooperation is a more promising way to investigate the evolution of cooperation than more traditional agent-based evolutionary game theory models. (shrink)

Questions surrounding the evolution of cooperation, especially human cooperation, have driven research in many disciplines. Two key methodologies used to research and explain the evolution of cooperation are modeling and narrative construction. A number of scientists and philosophers have suggested that advancing research on the evolution of cooperation will require integrating models and narratives. But, relatively little has been said about what challenges exist to integrating models and narratives, how to go about integrating models and narratives, and what particular benefits (...) might be gained by accomplishing such integration. In this dissertation project, I address these questions in order to show how models and narratives can be integrated to produce better research on and explanations of the evolution of cooperation. The major challenge to integrating models and narratives concerning the evolution of cooperation that I address in this dissertation stems from the criticisms that such models and narratives lack empirical support. I answer this challenge by defending models and narratives from these criticisms. In the case of models, I argue both that at least some models of the evolution of cooperation have stronger empirical support than supposed by critics and that evolutionary robotics modeling approaches can be used to create even better models. In the case of narratives, I argue that several means of defending narratives from evidential challenges already developed by philosophers can be used to defend narratives about the evolution of cooperation as well. To show how narratives and models can be integrated to better research and explain the evolution of cooperation, I first establish an account of integration by drawing on the work of other philosophers. I then argue that models and narratives can provide certain benefits to each other via integration. Models can benefit from integration with narratives by using the narratives as sources of information as well as hypotheses to test. Indeed, as models are used to test such hypotheses, they also gain explanatory power. Narratives can benefit from integration with models by using the models as sources of support and constraint. Moreover, models can help deepen the understanding of historical contingency provided by narratives. (shrink)

I show that Eric Winsberg’s principles of model-building given in Science in the Age of Computer Simulation are insufficient to argue for the external validation of simulation data in cases in which simulation results conflict, and that laboratory experiments have an advantage over simulations because conflicting experimental results can be decided between on the basis of reproducibility. I also argue that robustness of predictions serves the same function for simulations as repeatability does for laboratory experiments in either adjudicating between conflicting (...) results or allowing us to say that we do not have sufficient justification to validate the results. Finally, I argue for an interpretation of the argument from robustness that appeals to the convergence of many well-built and diverse models rather than the more common interpretation which appeals to the probability that one of a set of models is likely to be true. (shrink)