This is a review of a volume including Locke's Second Treatise, Rousseau's Social Contract, and Hume's "Of the Original Contract." The Rousseau essay is translated by Gerard Hopkins, and Ernest Baker provides an introduction to the texts.

Tracking theories of knowledge are widely known to have the consequence that knowledge is not closed. Recent arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne claim both that there are no legitimate examples of knowledge without closure and that the costs of theories that deny closure are too great. This paper considers the tracking theories of Dretske and Nozick and the arguments by Vogel and Hawthorne. We reject the arguments of Vogel and Hawthorne and evaluate the costs of closure denial for tracking theories (...) of knowledge. (shrink)

Despite hundreds of definitions, no consensus exists on a definition of life or on the closely related and problematic definitions of the organism and death. These problems retard practical and theoretical development in, for example, exobiology, artificial life, biology and evolution. This paper suggests improving this situation by basing definitions on a theory of a generalized particle hierarchy. This theory uses the common denominator of the “operator” for a unified ranking of both particles and organisms, from elementary particles to animals (...) with brains. Accordingly, this ranking is called “the operator hierarchy”. This hierarchy allows life to be defined as: matter with the configuration of an operator, and that possesses a complexity equal to, or even higher than the cellular operator. Living is then synonymous with the dynamics of such operators and the word organism refers to a select group of operators that fit the definition of life. The minimum condition defining an organism is its existence as an operator, construction thus being more essential than metabolism, growth or reproduction. In the operator hierarchy, every organism is associated with a specific closure, for example, the nucleus in eukaryotes. This allows death to be defined as: the state in which an organism has lost its closure following irreversible deterioration of its organization. The generality of the operator hierarchy also offers a context to discuss “life as we do not know it”. The paper ends with testing the definition’s practical value with a range of examples. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Drawing inspiration from Fred Dretske, L. S. Carrier, John A. Barker, and Robert Nozick, we develop a tracking analysis of knowing according to which a true belief constitutes knowledge if and only if it is based on reasons that are sensitive to the fact that makes it true, that is, reasons that wouldn’t obtain if the belief weren’t true. We show that our sensitivity analysis handles numerous Gettier-type cases and lottery problems, blocks pathways leading to skepticism, and validates the (...) epistemic closure thesis that correct inferences from known premises yield knowledge of the conclusions. We discuss the plausible views of Ted Warfield and Branden Fitelson regarding cases of knowledge acquired via inference from false premises, and we show how our sensitivity analysis can account for such cases. We present arguments designed to discredit putative counterexamples to sensitivity analyses recently proffered by Tristan Haze, John Williams and Neil Sinhababu, which involve true statements made by untrustworthy informants and strange clocks that sometimes display the correct time while running backwards. Finally, we show that in virtue of employing the paradox-free subjunctive conditionals codified by Relevance Logic theorists instead of the paradox-laden subjunctive conditionals codified by Robert Stalnaker and David Lewis. (shrink)

In a recent very interesting and important challenge to tracking theories of knowledge, Williams & Sinhababu claim to have devised a counter-example to tracking theories of knowledge of a sort that escapes the defense of those theories by Adams & Clarke. In this paper we will explain why this is not true. Tracking theories are not undermined by the example of the backward clock, as interesting as the case is.

El trabajo expone, analiza, y evalúa los datos de una nueva fuente sobre las visiones jurídicas de los ‛ulamā’ con respecto al estatuto islámico de las comunidades islámicas bajo dominio cristiano en la Península Ibérica desde el siglo XII hasta el siglo XVI. Se trata de una fetua desconocida e inédita del sabio andalusí Ibn Rabī‛ y fetuas desconocidas de los principales cadíes de los cuatro madhabs sunníes en El Cairo hacia 1510 A.D. Muy probablemente, hay que relacionar la primera (...) fetua con los acontecimientos en Murcia tras la sublevación mudejar de 1265 y la reconquista cristiana de la ciudad en 1266. El muftí subraya que los musulmanes que viven bajo dominio cristiano están imperativamente obligados a emigrar a territorio islámico. Los principales cadíes de los cuatro madhabs sunníes en El Cairo al principio del siglo XVI, sin embargo, defienden un modo de ver mucho más pragmático. Probablemente, las preguntas fueron planteadas por mudejares de Valencia, que estaban en El Cairo camino de la peregrinación. Finalmente, los autores plantean que hay que distinguir dos tipos coexistentes de visiones con respecto al estatuto del Islam bajo dominio cristiano en la Península Ibérica desde principios del siglo xii; una visión pragmática, equivalente a un reconocimiento de facto del Islam bajo dominio cristiano, y una visión «de rechazo», que asume la obligación de emigrar de la España cristiana a Dār al-Islām. El impacto variable de estas visiones jurídicas merece un estudio más profundo dentro del ambiente histórico de las complejas y cambiantes relaciones políticas entre Islam y Cristiandad en esa época. (shrink)

Este artículo está dedicado al famoso pergamino encontrado en 1588 en el antiguo minarete de la que había sido mezquita aljama de Granada, con textos en árabe, latín y castellano. Junto con los libros plúmbeos descubiertos en diversas cuevas a las afueras de la ciudad entre 1595 y 1600, el pergamino está en los orígenes de un importante culto nacional. El artículo presenta un análisis de la composición y escritura del pergamino y pasa revista a las trascripciones y traducciones que (...) se hicieron por testigos cristianos y musulmanes . Éstas se comparan críticamente con los principales elementos del pergamino y se discuten los comentarios paleográfícos hechos por estos testigos contemporáneos . Como conclusión, los autores mantienen que el documento transferido desde el Vaticano en el año 2000, es el original encontrado en 1588 a pesar de lo incomprensible de los textos árabes y de la corrupción de los textos castellano y latino Según los autores, no hay base para considerar al pergamino como documento proto-islámico, puesto que se trata de un mensaje católico romano anunciando la destrucción del islam. Al mismo tiempo, el documento incluye un mensaje simbólico al mostrar que los cristianos granadinos del siglo I, incluyendo a Cecilius, escribían árabe y castellano, lo mismo que hacían los moriscos. Así, aunque el Islam había de ser extirpado, la lengua árabe se podía armonizar con una vida genuinamente cristiana. (shrink)

Dispute types can roughly be divided in two classes. One class in whichthe notion of justification is fundamental, and one in which thenotion of opposition is fundamental. Further, for every singledispute type there exist various types of protocols to conduct such adispute. Some protocols permit local search (a process in which oneis allowed to justify claims partially, with the possibility to extendjustifications on request later), while other protocols rely on globalsearch (a process in which only entire arguments count as justifications).This (...) paper integrates the two above-mentioned types of dispute withthe use of a protocol that permits local search. The locality aspect isrelatively new to computer scientists, while the detailed computationalelaboration of the approach is relatively new to philosophical logicians.The proposed protocol is demonstrated with the help of eight benchmarks.These benchmarks are centered around the problem that co-concludingarguments sometimes accrue, and sometimes do not. (shrink)

Este artículo tiene por objeto dar una versión diferente y más breve del poema que contiene una demanda morisca de ayuda al Imperio Otomano, poema estudiado por James Monroe en Al-Andalus XXXI, 281-303. Esta versión indica que había habido otra demanda similar por parte de los moriscos al sultán mameluco de El Cairo, y que ésta era la original. El artículo contiene: 1) un análisis comparativo de las versiones de la casida dirigidas a los mamelucos y a los otomanos, 2) (...) el marco histórico de las relaciones entre los reinos cristianos y musulmanes de la Península Ibérica por un lado y los territorios mameluco y otomano por otro, y 3) una discusión de la fecha de las dos versiones de la casida, así como su autoría. Parece probable que el autor de la casida perteneciera a círculos de musulmanes granadinos que habían formado parte de las clases dirigentes de Granada y que luego habían aceptado puestos en la administración cristiana de la ciudad, como son, por ejemplo, varios miembros de la familia al-Baqannī, algunos de los cuales habían emigrado con Ibn al-Azraq al Norte de África, pero regresaron para integrarse en los grupos dirigentes mudéjares. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la aportación de los moriscos a los estudios árabes, concluyendo que ésta fue modesta en la Península Ibérica. Algunos moriscos contribuyeron de forma activa al conocimiento del árabe a través de sus estudios sobre temas árabo-islámicos. Se demuesttra que el converso mudéjar conocido como Juan Andrés, autor de uno de los más influyentes tratados contra el Islam, fue un canónigo de la Catedral de Granada. Se aborda brevemente la cuestión de la contribución de los moriscos a la (...) traducción e interpretación de los Libros Plúmbeos y se estudia su contribucción, con posterioridad a la expulsión, a los estudios árabes e islámicos. La última parte del trabajo se centra en Holanda (República de los Siete Países Bajos Unidos) donde, como resultado de circunstancias históricas y ciertas contingencias como las relaciones personales, los moriscos desarrollaron un importante papel. En este caso, además del estudio de la lengua árabe en sí mismo, las ciencias físicas cobraron una notable importancia, circunstancia relacionada, en un marco más amplio, con la emergencia de los estudios árabes en Europa, que incorporan tanto las ciencias físicas como la religión y la filosofía, además del interés por el Norte de África, incluidas sus aplicaciones en la vida diaria. (shrink)

The actions of “world‐based” multinational corporations (MNCs) have effectively decoupled the revenue generation and the production sides of the business equation. This decoupling has led to an end of “virtuous capitalism,” which has widespread ramifications for the societies within highly developed countries as well as those in developing and underdeveloped nations. This article presents an overview of the defining aspects of virtuous corporations and the linkages to virtuous capitalism. It then describes the actions of Apple Computer as emblematic of an (...) MNC that is nonvirtuous in its practices. The article then discusses how the encouragement of globalized trade has prompted the shift away from virtuous capitalism and closes with a summary of possible actions that could reverse the decline in corporate virtue. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Editor’s IntroductionGerard A. HauserThe call for papers for this special issue of Philosophy and Rhetoric1 acknowledged the continuous centrality of human agency across the history of Western thought on rhetoric. At its ancient Greek origins, the Sophists and philosophers were at swords points over the question of what constituted responsible speech and who had responsibility for the consequences of moving the demos to public actions that bore on the (...) city-state and the lives of its citizens. On the one hand, sophistic understood the human world as indeterminate, progressing or regressing through appeals that would establish social and political reality for the community through the power of language and argument to move the minds and hearts of citizens. Protagoras expressed this vision with his aphorism, "Man is the measure of all things, of the things that are, that they are, and of the things that are not, that they are not." Central to their understanding of the human world was a recognition and exploration of language's psychogogic powers. For the philosophers, on the other hand, sophistic's position represented a problematic abandonment of the quest for Eternal Truth.The tension between the quest for contingent truth and Eternal Truth is illustrated by Xenophon's rendition of the aftermath of the Athenian naval victory at Arginoussai, in 406 BCE. In his Hellenika,2 he recounts how some of the victorious fleet's sailors became separated from it during the confusion of battle and were left behind. Although the commanders sent a group to rescue them, violent seas thwarted their efforts and the men drowned. Upon returning to Athens as victors, the commanders were arrested and charged with cowardice. The Ecclesia met to decide whether to bind them over for trial. The commanders seemed to have persuaded most of their innocence, but time ran out for that day's proceedings before a vote on whether to bind them over for a trial could be taken. That evening, at a festival in the city, opponents of the commanders attended dressed in [End Page 181] black mourning clothes and pretended to be grieving relatives of the lost sailors. Their displays of sorrow over the sailors' deaths were so convincing that they swung the emotions of many in the opposite direction.The next day, opponents of the commanders played upon the events of the night before and the citizens, remembering the displays of grief they had witnessed, were persuaded to try the commanders themselves, rather than deciding whether to bind them over to the courts for trial. Arguments went back and forth on how to interpret the tragic event—were the commanders brave but foiled by nature, or was their conduct spineless? Did they deserve a laurel wreath for their victory in battle, or to be executed for cowardice in allowing the stranded sailors to drown? Finally a vote was taken and, reversing their sentiment from the day before, the citizens voted to condemn the commanders. The military leaders were taken away to be executed. Soon thereafter, Xenophon tells us, the citizens had a change of heart and wished to reverse their verdict. However, since it was too late—the generals having already been put to death!—they lodged a complaint against those who had persuaded them to convict for "deceiving the People."The story may be read as a representative anecdote of rhetoric's fatal flaw or of rhetoric's constitutive powers of agency. On one reading, Athenian Ecclesiasts, convulsed with emotion, were stripped of their agency by arguments seeking the probable through sensory engagement structured by phantasia and mimesis3 while lacking a foundation in the Eternally True. However, it also may be read as disclosing the absence of Eternal Truth on which to ground a human world, and the agential power of language—of rhetoric—to constitute understanding and action.4 On one side, agency resided in the self-aware person who made responsible arguments with reference to pure reason and ideal justice. On the other, agency resided in the powers of language to engage thoughts and emotions, of discourse to circulate, and of representative thinking5 for discovering human reality. These latter were products of human... (shrink)

_Philosophy and Rhetoric, _one of Penn State Press’s longest-running journals, was conceived at a time of immense philosophical upheaval: rhetoric as a field of study—first dismissed by Descartes—was being reexamined after decades of neglect. Now, nearly forty years later, _Philosophy and Rhetoric _continues to hold pride of place in this reinvigorated discipline. The brainchild of Penn State professors Carroll Arnold and Henry Johnstone, _Philosophy and Rhetoric_ boasts work from dozens of international luminaries from a broad spectrum of specializations. To commemorate (...) the fortieth year of publication, current series editor Gerard Hauser assembled a volume of the journal’s most noteworthy articles, beginning with Henry Johnstone’s gem of an essay underscoring the essential relationship between the art of rhetoric and philosophy. Donald Verene elaborates that initial thesis and suggests that rhetoric and philosophy are not distinct entities in conversation, but instead that rhetoric provides a forum in which philosophy can exist. Jean Goodwin looks at the theory in terms of a teacher/student relationship, and Barbara Biesecker looks at how governments in the war on terror employ rhetoric to manipulate the social consciousness. A concluding article by Carroll Arnold casts rhetoric as a dramatic device essential to establishing personal sovereignty. During its forty years, Hauser writes, the journal “radically altered the relationship between philosophy and rhetoric from irreconcilable antagonists to interlocutors in a shared inquiry into the constitutive powers of discourse.” This series of essays brilliantly traces the arc of that accomplishment. (shrink)

Computational dialectics is concerned with the formal representation of argument and dispute. The field emerged from developments in philosophy, artificial intelligence and legal theory. Its goal is to suggestalgorithms, procedures and protocols to investigate the tenability of logical claims, on the basis of information in the form of rules and cases. Currently, the field slowlyconverges to the opinion that dispute is the most fair and effective way to investigate claims. The basic assumption of this field is that dispute is the (...) most fair and effective way to investigate claims. The definition of a formal dispute varies throughout the literature, butis considered not to vary within one and the same logical system. In this paper it is shown that parts of the definition of a dispute may change within one logical system.To this end, the notion of partial protocol specification (PPS) is introduced. A PPS is a part of the definition of the protocol. A modification to the protocol, in the form of a PPS, can be put forward, disputed, established and incorporated as aneffective `point of order. The paper demonstrates the existence of self-undermining PPSs, it discusses the relevance of PPSs for dialectical models of legal argument and concludes with a description of how PPSs can be built into existing argumentation systems. (shrink)

James Arnt Aune, who served on the editorial board of Philosophy and Rhetoric, died on 8 January 2013. Jim was an accomplished scholar of the first rank, whose articles, books, and papers reflected broad knowledge and deep insight. He left his mark on the journal through frequent and reliably rigorous reviews that were distinctive for their careful attention to arguments and extensive historical and bibliographic references aimed at improving work, even when he had profound intellectual differences with the author. His (...) comments to the editor often included his own concerns that he may have been too harsh or that his criticisms might be defeating to the author. I seldom felt the need to edit them, however, because .. (shrink)

Defeasible reasoning is concerned with the logics of non-deductive argument. As is described in the literature, the study of this type of reasoning is considerably more involved than the study of deductive argument, even so that, in realistic applications, there is often a lack of resources to perform an exhaustive analysis. It follows that, in a theory of defeasible reasoning, the order and direction in which arguments are developed, i.e. theprocedure, is important. The aim of this article is to show (...) that debate is the most efficient procedure to argue in the presence of limited resources. To do so, there is first some general theory on defeasible argumentation, which is followed by an introduction to the problem of dialectical search. The problem of dialectical search is (or at least, should be) the essential issue in every theory on argumentation, and emerges at every occasion that involves adjudication on competing arguments. Starting with an example, it is explained that dialectical search can be best scheduled according to classical debating techniques, that work along well-tried methods. These methods (which include various forms of curtailment, interruption, and interpretation) have proven their value in keeping debating efforts within reasonable bounds. How they apply in a theory of formal argument, will be shown in this article. (shrink)

The Ethics Program at General Dynamics was evaluated relative to its stated objectives and its implied objectives. The program was found to have met its specific objectives which require employees to follow rules and standards of conduct. The program did not apparently meet its implied objectives which would have created a more humanistic work environment for employees. This result apparently stemmed from program planners' intentions to use the hope for better working conditions as a motivation for employees to follow company (...) standards. A substantial conflict was found between the philosophical bases for ethics programs and work environment improvement programs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Philosophy and Rhetoric 33.1 (2000) vii-ix [Access article in PDF] In Memory of Henry I first met Henry W. Johstone Jr. during the spring of 1968. I was a doctoral candidate at the University of Wisconsin and Henry was in Madison as part of a distinguished visitor series hosted by my mentor, Lloyd Bitzer. Lloyd had invited a group of graduate students to his home to meet the guest (...) of honor. I was particularly excited because Henry had accepted my paper on Aristotle's theory of exemplification to appear in the new international journal Philosophy and Rhetoric, which he edited. This was my first publication and I wanted to thank him, which seemed to this novice the appropriate thing to do. I remember that evening for Henry's seeming reserve, which I later learned was a deep shyness that masked his capacity for uncanny directness and a wicked sense of humor, and for his generosity in deflecting my naiveté about the basis for editorial judgments. I also remember it for his deft way of engaging a room of young rhetoricians with questions that conveyed his doubt about their subject (he later changed his mind) without clouding his sincere openness to what we had to say. The following fall, we met again during my interview for a position in the Speech Department at Penn State University. I was offered the position and became Henry's colleague as Book Review Editor of P&R. For the next thirty years, I was blessed to serve as Henry's partner-in-crime in the joys of life that may remain today only among the professoriate. We shared in the editorial work of the journal, in co-teaching our graduate seminar in Philosophy and Rhetoric, in our intellectual passion for the bonds and wars between philosophy and rhetoric, and in the pleasure of choosing the right bottle of wine. But more than that, we shared these common pursuits in contexts of luncheons, dinners, and social occasions that mixed intellectual work with the pleasure of treasured company.My son phoned today to tell me that Henry had died. His passing leaves a void in my life that goes beyond the loss of a friend and colleague. Henry was the person who, through patient selection of manuscripts for me to referee and guidance, taught me how to read journal submissions and offer critiques that might help the author to improve and the journal to prosper. Henry was the person who taught me the value of generosity with junior colleagues by his respectful and serious engagement of my own work. He had a marvelous capacity to entertain any idea seriously, to consider the possibility that even a far-fetched conjecture might have value rather than rejecting it out of hand. He lived the ideas he wrote about as a philosopher, arguing always ad hominem and con amore. Henry was the person who took me in tow as a young Turk and suffered my impatience with the conservative ways of our established institution [End Page vii] by taking me to lunch, engaging me in discussions of ideas, and sharing the delights of intellectual work, and in the process helping me retain my ideals and my focus.Lunch for Henry was more than a noontime meal. It was the way he sustained bonds with those he valued as friends and colleagues. He would call two weeks in advance to arrange a date at the Allen Room of the State College Hotel. He would arrive at my office ten minutes early and we would take a leisurely stroll along the Old Main Mall to the hotel. Our arrival was announced by the host with "Good afternoon Dr. Johnstone," that showed in its formality deep respect and in its tone equally deep affection. Henry always took a cocktail with lunch, inviting his companion to join him, and unless you were specific about the bill beforehand, Henry usually insisted on paying. Settling the bill was never an issue for Henry. He often included a graduate assistant from the journal or an assistant professor in our party and seemed to... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Memory:James Patrick McDanielGAHJames Patrick McDaniel, who served as Book Review Editor of Philosophy and Rhetoric, died November 10, 2004, at age 38. He was at the beginning of a career with exceptional promise and whose accomplishments had earned him the National Communication Association's Karl Wallace Award, given to support the research of a scholar within ten years of earning the doctorate. James was just beginning to place his (...) stamp on our book review section. His selection of books reflected his broad command of diverse literatures; his selection of reviewers showed a commitment to bringing fresh and welcome voices into our conversation. James touched the journal in other ways. His essay "Liberal Irony: A Program for Rhetoric" (35:4) was part of an important and ongoing intellectual exchange in P&R. I called on him frequently to review submissions, especially ones that needed a reader with an eye for making a manuscript better. His critiques were models of generosity, even when he disagreed with the author, and his comments, singularly insightful and intelligent, reflected judgment I came to trust. He was invaluable to me as journal editor and as a student of rhetoric.In addition to his work with the journal, I had come to know him as a valued colleague in Colorado's Communication department, a sublimely gifted teacher, an astute mentor of graduate students, a remarkable father, and a loyal and loving friend. In more ways than I dare mention, Jim made the journal better from his association with it and my life happy from the pleasure of his company. I shall miss him dearly.Copyright © 2005 The Pennsylvania State University... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:In Memory Thomas FarrellOn June 12, 2006, Thomas Farrell died after a long illness. Tom was Professor of Communication Studies at Northwestern University and a long-standing member of the journal's editorial board. He was appointed by the journal's founding editor, Henry Johnstone, and Henry regarded him as among the most talented minds writing about our common subject. Tom also was a publishing author in Philosophy and Rhetoric. His research (...) refl ected a deep understanding of the intersections of philosophical thought and rhetoric with respect to argumentation, language, speech acts, and political theory. His award-winning book, Norms of Rhetorical Culture (Yale, 1993), is a testament to the insights afforded by the rapprochement between philosophy and rhetoric that has been the journal's defi ning character. With his passing, the inter-discipline has lost one of its most eloquent and accomplished voices, the journal has lost a contributor and editorial advisor of the first rank, and those of us who knew Tom have lost a dear friend, whose intellect and wit always brightened our moments together.Copyright © 2006 The Pennsylvania State University... (shrink)

I begin with an anecdote. While a senior at a small liberal arts college, I participated in a year-long senior seminar on evolution. The central questions were how we come to be human and, more basically, what it means to be human. Units were taught from the perspectives of biology, various traditions of philosophy, theology, education, history, and world literature. Faculty were drawn from across the curriculum, each taking units and assigning readings from their discipline that addressed our central questions (...) from an evolutionary perspective. Importantly, the faculty leading seminar discussions also attended each session, so that every meeting possessed the possibility of full-scale intellectual battle not only... (shrink)

Thagard's theory of explanatory coherence (TEC) is a conceptual and computational framework that is used to show how new scientific theories can be judged to be superior to previous ones. In Structures in Science (SiS), Kuipers criticizes TEC as a model that does not faithfully reflect scientific practice. This article tries to explain the machinery behind TEC, and tries to indicate where TEC falls short (conceptually speaking) and where it can be improved. The main idea proposed in this article is (...) not to derive a coherence network from the input (à la TEC), but to construct a coherence network right from the input itself. (shrink)

Dispute types can roughly be divided in two classes. One class in whichthe notion of justification is fundamental, and one in which thenotion of opposition is fundamental. Further, for every singledispute type there exist various types of protocols to conduct such adispute. Some protocols permit local search (a process in which oneis allowed to justify claims partially, with the possibility to extendjustifications on request later), while other protocols rely on globalsearch (a process in which only entire arguments count as justifications).This (...) paper integrates the two above-mentioned types of dispute withthe use of a protocol that permits local search. The locality aspect isrelatively new to computer scientists, while the detailed computationalelaboration of the approach is relatively new to philosophical logicians.The proposed protocol is demonstrated with the help of eight benchmarks.These benchmarks are centered around the problem that co-concludingarguments sometimes accrue, and sometimes do not. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to outline a schematic system for describing texts or “discourses” with respect to discourse function. In this system the concepts of performative and of descriptive discourse function take a central position. Provisional explicate for the said two concepts are introduced. A special sort of performative is identified, viz. statements; the concept of statement is to function as a pragmatic counterpart to that of description. An examination and comparison is made of the requirements which the (...) communication context of a discourse has to fulfil in order that this latter qualify as a performative in general or as a statement. Then the question is considered how a performative and a descriptive discourse can be “justified” or shown to be adequate. Eventually the aforesaid descriptive system is introduced, and the role is examined which the explicata of performative and descriptive discourse function may play in the philosophy of science and in axiology. (shrink)

Begging the question — roughly, positing in the premises what is to be proved in the conclusion — is a perplexing fallacy.1 Are not question-begging arguments valid? Yes, we may find ourselves saying, but they are fallacious despite their validity, owing to their inability to establish the truth of a conclusion which is not already known. But are not question-begging arguments sometimes effective in bringing an audience to an awareness of the truth of the conclusion? How can a dialectical maneuver (...) which is capable of effecting epistemic progress be a fallacy, an illegitimate maneuver? In such cases of success, we can reply, the audience was simply in need of some logical coaching — a question-begging argument is of its very nature ill-suited for producing new knowledge in someone who is being fully rational. But then are not all valid arguments question-begging, since the conclusions are at least implicitly contained in the premises in such a way that a fully rational individual can never augment his knowledge through such arguments? No, we may answer, only those valid arguments in which the proposition constituting the conclusion appears, whether distinguised or not, as a distinct premise are question-begging; if several premises go together to imply a conclusion, the argument does not beg the question, But why is it legitimate to posit premises which more-or-less implicitly contain the conclusion, while it is illegitimate to posit premises which more-or-less explicitly contain the conclusion? Because, we are tempted to say, a question-begging argument is one in which what is to be proved in the conclusion is posited in the premises, and this positing must be more-or-less explicit in order for a fallacy to be committed! (shrink)

Closure is the epistemological thesis that if S knows that P and knows that P implies Q, then if S infers that Q, S knows that Q. Fred Dretske acknowledges that closure is plausible but contends that it should be rejected because it conflicts with the plausible thesis: Conclusive reasons (CR): S knows that P only if S believes P on the basis of conclusive reasons, i.e., reasons S wouldn‘t have if it weren‘t the case that P. Dretske develops an (...) analysis of knowing that centers on CR, and argues that the requirement undermines skepticism by implying the falsity of closure. We develop a Dretske-style analysis of knowing that incorporates CR, and we argue that this analysis not only accords with closure, but also implies it. In addition, we argue that the analysis accounts for the prima facie plausibility of closure-invoking skeptical arguments, and nonetheless implies that they are fallacious. If our arguments turn out to be sound, the acceptability of Dretske‘s analysis of knowing will be significantly enhanced by the fact that, despite implying closure, it undermines closure-based skepticism. (shrink)

In a recent article entitled, ‘The Logic of Cause’ Scriven has presented a series of formidable arguments against the possibility of explicating the concept of cause in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Some of his main arguments center on the difficulties of capturing the asymmetry of cause and effect and of handling a certain kind of over-determination he calls linked overdetermination. Scriven's contention that there is no way to capture the asymmetry of cause and effect (...) will be countered by constructing a definition of the concept of causal priority in terms of the concepts of sufficient condition and necessary condition. Scriven's contention that the existence of linked overdetermination undermines the necessary condition feature of the definition will be countered by distinguishing two senses of necessary conditionship. My rebuttal of Scriven's arguments, if successful, indicates that the ‘common sense’ view of the cause as a necessary and sufficient condition of its effects may yet prove to be at least roughly accurate. (shrink)