In his third and final investigation into the science of belief, bestselling author Michael Shermer tackles the evolution of morality and ethics A century and a half after Darwin first proposed an “evolutionary ethics,” science has begun to tackle the roots of morality. Just as evolutionary biologists study why we are hungry (to motivate us to eat) or why sex is enjoyable (to motivate us to procreate), they are now searching for the roots of human nature. In The Science (...) of Good and Evil , psychologist and science historian Michael Shermer explores how humans evolved from social primates to moral primates, how and why morality motivates the human animal, and how the foundation of moral principles can be built upon empirical evidence. Along the way he explains the im-plications of statistics for fate and free will fuzzy logic for the existence of pure good and pure evil and ecology for the development of early moral sentiments among the first humans. As he closes the divide between science and morality, Shermer draws on stories from the Yanamamo, infamously known as the “fierce people” of the tropical rain forest, to the Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan, to John Hinckley’s insanity defense. The Science of Good and Evil is ultimately a profound look at the moral animal, belief, and the scientific pursuit of truth. (shrink)

A subtheory of the theory of self-referential truth known as FS is shown to be weak as a theory of truth but equivalent to full FS in its proof-theoretic strength.

From Galileo and Newton to Thomas Hobbes and Martin Luther King, Jr., thinkers throughout history have consciously employed scientific techniques to better understand the non-physical world. The Age of Reason and the Enlightenment led theorists to apply scientific reasoning to the non-scientific disciplines of politics, economics, and moral philosophy. Instead of relying on the woodcuts of dissected bodies in old medical texts, physicians opened bodies themselves to see what was there; instead of divining truth through the authority of an ancient (...) holy book or philosophical treatise, people began to explore the book of nature for themselves through travel and exploration; instead of the supernatural belief in the divine right of kings, people employed a natural belief in the right of democracy. In this provocative and compelling book, Shermer will explain how abstract reasoning, rationality, empiricism, skepticism--scientific ways of thinking--have profoundly changed the way we perceive morality and, indeed, move us ever closer to a more just world. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Temps zéro, nº 1, 2007. Nous remercions Michael Sheringham de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : Si l'expérience de la quotidienneté, qui préoccupe un philosophe comme Henri Lefebvre ou un écrivain comme Georges Perec, semble résister à l'emprise du roman, Michel de Certeau a pu mettre une réflexion sur le récit au cœur de son essai fondamental, L'invention du quotidien. En effet, les notions de « récits délinquants » ou d'« (...) énonciations piétonnières », chez Certeau, (...) - Poétique et Études littéraires – GALERIE – Nouvel article. (shrink)

rnst Mayr was born in Kempten, Germany, on July 5, 1904, making him, at age 95, the grand old man of evolutionary biology, one of the primary architects of the modem synthesis of genetic and evolutionary theory, and arguably one of the most influential scientists of the 20th century. His career interests have spanned a remarkable five different fields, including: (1) ornithology, (2) systematics, (3) zoogeography, (4) evolutionary theory, and (5) philosophy and history of science. Such broad research interests grew (...) from his education at a German Gymnasium (the equivalent of American high school, but at that time considerably more demanding), followed by a Candidacy in Medicine at the University of Greifswald in 1925 and a Ph.D. in zoology at the University of Berlin in 1926. (shrink)

_ Source: _Page Count 11 Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. By Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. New York: Oxford University Press, 2012. Pp. xiii +279. isbn 978–0–19–993647–2.

Convergences and conflicts in the dialogue between Buddhism and modern science occasionally find precedent in historical sources and encounters, some of which have set the stage for scenarios that are commonplace in the current dialogue. This paper brings recent scholarship and Tibetan sources on astronomy and geography in Tibet into conversation with the ongoing Buddhism and science dialogue. In response to a lack of context in the dialogue, the paper gives attention to how two contexts in particular, namely, the contemplative (...) and historical, inform currents in the Buddhism and science dialogue about cosmology. The paper challenges claims made that Tibetans did not encounter European science until the twentieth century and that Tibetans were unaware of scientific cosmological ideas, and therefore have not updated the Buddhist Mount Meru cosmology. To address tensions inherent in the binary discourse on science vs religion, this paper asks, does the Mount Meru cosmology represent a domain wherein Buddhism or science hold more appropriate tools for meaningful discourse and resolution about its existence? (shrink)

An account of classic problems of moral and political theory—with an emphasis on the views of famous philosophers in history. The book is organized around 10 chapters, each framed as a question: 1) Why Be Moral? 2) What is the Good Life? 3) Is Morality Objective? 4) Can Morality Be Defined? 5) Is It Reasonable to Rely on a Moral System? 6) Why Obey the Law? 7) Are Some Races Intellectually Superior? 8) Is Democracy a Blessing? 9) Is Marxism Still (...) Tenable? and 10) Why Does God Permit Evil? Philosophers discussed include Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, Boethius, Aquinas, Machiavelli, Thomas More, Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, Rousseau, Adam Smith, Kant, Edmund Burke, Tocqueville, Frederick Douglass, Marx, and Freud. (shrink)

tephen Jay Gould's Wonderful Life: The Burgess Shale and the Nature of History , has become something of a watershed for those who study contingency and complexity, especially applied to organisms, societies, and history, and discussions of it can be found in many works. Walter Fontana and Leo Buss, for example, ask in the title of their chapter "What Would Be Conserved If 'The Tape Were Played Twice'?" This is a direct reference to Gould's suggestion in Wonderful Life that if (...) the tape of life were rewound to the time of the organisms found in the Canadian outcrop known as the Burgess Shale, dated to about 530 million years ago, and replayed with a few contingencies tweaked here and there, humans would most likely never have evolved. (shrink)

A variety of intracellular motile processes involve the directed movement of particles along microtubules, including organelle transport, endoplasmic reticulum extension, and movements in mitosis. Recently, a microtubule‐dependent motor protein, kinesin, was purified and was found to be present in a soluble form in a wide variety of organisms and tissues. Because microtubules provide polar pathways over long distances within cells, kinesin and the motors which move in the opposite direction to kinesin on microtubules provide a mechanism for directed communications within (...) cells. The possible roles of kinesin and other soluble microtubule‐dependent motors in intracellular motile functions are discussed in the light of recent studies of the reconstitution of organelle motility with isolated components. (shrink)

Why does so much famous philosophy come out of classical Greece? Actually, the answer derives from two accidents of geography—1) the smoothness of the Mediterranean Sea, which facilitated ancient trade, and 2) the multitude of mountains and islands in Greece, which made the classical city-states small. From these two geographical accidents flow most of the special features of classical Greek thought. This thesis is also defended in chapter 7 of The Questions of Moral Philosophy and in chapters 1 and 2 (...) of If A, Then B: How the World Discovered Logic. (shrink)

In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978–1979, Barthes focuses at length on the activity of ‘la notation’ (in English, notation): grabbing a fleeting event or impression as it happens, and registering it in your notebook. This article explores the ramifications of notation, as outlined in the lectures (where it is associated with haiku, Joycean epiphany and Proustian impressionism), linking it to Barthes’s longstanding interest in the ontology of modes of signification. Allied to his concept of the ‘third (...) meaning’, and to later terms such as the incident and the romanesque, notation is seen to be central to the preoccupation with affect, subjectivity and individuality we associate with Barthes’s later work. Linked with the fantasy of writing a novel, notation also chimes with the “fantasmatic pedagogy” of Barthes’s lectures where ideas are explored in a highly personal way through the accumulation of discontinuous traits. Through notation the affect-driven, decentred Barthesian subject finds its voice. (shrink)

In his lectures at the Collège de France in 1978–1979, Barthes focuses at length on the activity of ‘la notation’ (in English, notation): grabbing a fleeting event or impression as it happens, and registering it in your notebook. This article explores the ramifications of notation, as outlined in the lectures (where it is associated with haiku, Joycean epiphany and Proustian impressionism), linking it to Barthes’s longstanding interest in the ontology of modes of signification. Allied to his concept of the ‘third (...) meaning’, and to later terms such as the incident and the romanesque, notation is seen to be central to the preoccupation with affect, subjectivity and individuality we associate with Barthes’s later work. Linked with the fantasy of writing a novel, notation also chimes with the “fantasmatic pedagogy” of Barthes’s lectures where ideas are explored in a highly personal way through the accumulation of discontinuous traits. Through notation the affect-driven, decentred Barthesian subject finds its voice. (shrink)

This book is a survey of Kant's three Critiques that makes use of an "interpretive concept" that Nuzzo calls "transcendental embodiment" . According to Nuzzo, if we think of Kant as holding that there is something like the " a priori of the human body" or body as "the transcendental site of sensibility," which "displays a formal, ideal dimension essential to our experience as human beings" , then our understanding of Kant will be greatly improved. That is because the "notion (...) of transcendental embodiment provides the unifying thread of Kant's epistemology, moral philosophy, aesthetics and teleology of living nature" .The main body of the book is divided into three parts, each corresponding to one of the three Critiques. In turn, each part is divided into three chapters.For some grip on what Nuzzo means by "transcendental embodiment," the first chapter of the first part is the most helpful. What is behind this "interpretive concept" is Kant's argument against Leibnizian nominalism about space from "incongruent counterparts." Kant's argument is that there can be two. (shrink)

A historically persistent way of reading Leibniz regards him as some kind of conceptualist. According to this interpretation, Leibniz was either an ontological conceptualist or an epistemological conceptualist. As an ontological conceptualist, Leibniz is taken to hold the view that there exist only concepts. As an epistemological conceptualist, he is seen as believing that we think only with concepts. I argue against both conceptualist renditions. I confront the ontological conceptualist view with Leibniz’s metaphysics of creation. If the ontological conceptualist interpretation (...) were right, then Leibniz could not invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation. But since he does invoke compossibility as a criterion of creation, the ontological conceptualist approach cannot be right. I confront the epistemological conceptualist interpretation with Leibniz’s assertion of non-conceptual content. Since Leibniz acknowledges non-conceptual content at least when it comes to metaphysical knowledge, Leibniz could not have been an epistemological conceptualist either. So, Leibniz could not have been a conceptualist at all. (shrink)

In this paper, I show that by “Monade” the later Husserl means roughly what he meant by “das reine Bewußtsein” in the period of Ideas I. Of both consciousness and Monade, Husserl claims that objects of perception are immanent to them. I describe this claim as “quasi-representationalist” just because it bears enough similarity to some versions of contemporary representationalism. Since Husserl also claims that perceptual objects are publicly accessible, the inevitable conclusion seems to be that parts of perceptual consciousness must (...) also be publicly accessible. So strong internalist, Cartesian or idealist, interpretations of Husserl must be wrong. By the same token, if perceptual objects are necessarily physical, it then seems Husserl must agree that the physical can be, in some sense, immanent to consciousness. (shrink)

This article reviews current methods for evaluating models in the cognitive sciences, including theoretically based approaches, such as Bayes factors and minimum description length measures; simulation approaches, including model mimicry evaluations; and practical approaches, such as validation and generalization measures. This article argues that, although often useful in specific settings, most of these approaches are limited in their ability to give a general assessment of models. This article argues that hierarchical methods, generally, and hierarchical Bayesian methods, specifically, can provide a (...) more thorough evaluation of models in the cognitive sciences. This article presents two worked examples of hierarchical Bayesian analyses to demonstrate how the approach addresses key questions of descriptive adequacy, parameter interference, prediction, and generalization in principled and coherent ways. (shrink)

Completely revised and updated in its Second Edition, Language and Reality provides students, philosophers and cognitive scientists with a lucid and provocative introduction to the philosophy of language.

Eminent moral philosopher Michael Slote argues that care ethics presents an important challenge to other ethical traditions and that a philosophically developed care ethics should, and can, offer its own comprehensive view of the whole of morality. Taking inspiration from British moral sentimentalism and drawing on recent psychological literature on empathy, he shows that the use of that notion allows care ethics to develop its own sentimentalist account of respect, autonomy, social justice, and deontology. Furthermore, he argues that care (...) ethics gives a more persuasive account of these topics than theories offered by contemporary Kantian liberalism. The most philosophically rich and challenging exploration of the theory and practice of care to date, _The Ethics of Care and Empathy_ also shows the manifold connections that can be drawn between philosophical issues and leading ideas in the fields of psychology, education, and women's studies. (shrink)

There has been a good deal of interest in moral sentimentalism in recent years, but most of that interest has been exclusively either in meta-ethical questions or in normative issues about caring or benevolence. The present book seeks to offer a systematically unified picture of both sorts of topics by making central use of the notion of empathy. The hope is that such an approach will give sentimentalism a "second chance" against the ethical rationalism that has typically dominated the landscape (...) of ethical theory. (shrink)

This 1996 book is the result of a uniquely productive union of philosophy, psychoanalysis and anthropology, and explores the complexity and importance of emotions. Michael Stocker places emotions at the very centre of human identity, life and value. He lays bare how our culture's idealisation of rationality pervades the philosophical tradition and leads those who wrestle with serious ethical and philosophical problems into distortion and misunderstanding. Professor Stocker shows how important are the social and emotional contexts of ethical dilemmas (...) and inner conflicts, and he challenges philosophical theories that try to overgeneralise and over-simplify by leaving out the particulars of each situation. In offering a realistic account of emotions and an in-depth analysis of how psychological factors affect judgments of all kind, this book will interest a broad range of readers across the disciplines of philosophy and psychology. (shrink)

We survey and clarify some recent appearances of the term ‘emergence’. We distinguish epistemological emergence, which is merely a limitation of descriptive apparatus, from ontological emergence, which should involve causal features of a whole system not reducible to the properties of its parts, thus implying the failure of part/whole reductionism and of mereological supervenience for that system. Are there actually any plausible cases of the latter among the numerous and various mentions of ‘emergence’ in the recent literature? Quantum mechanics seems (...) to offer one, in the Bell properties of entangled particles, but other apparently promising candidates, such as non‐linear dynamical systems investigated by complexity studies and chaos theory, seem on careful analysis to display only epistemological emergence. We examine the consequences for physicalism of admitting ontological emergence in the micro‐physical. (shrink)

Sceptical theists--e.g., William Alston and Michael Bergmann--have claimed that considerations concerning human cognitive limitations are alone sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil. We argue that, if the considerations deployed by sceptical theists are sufficient to undermine evidential arguments from evil, then those considerations are also sufficient to undermine inferences that play a crucial role in ordinary moral reasoning. If cogent, our argument suffices to discredit sceptical theist responses to evidential arguments from evil.

This book is a survey of Kant's three Critiques that makes use of an "interpretive concept" that Nuzzo calls "transcendental embodiment" . According to Nuzzo, if we think of Kant as holding that there is something like the " a priori of the human body" or body as "the transcendental site of sensibility," which "displays a formal, ideal dimension essential to our experience as human beings" , then our understanding of Kant will be greatly improved. That is because the "notion (...) of transcendental embodiment provides the unifying thread of Kant's epistemology, moral philosophy, aesthetics and teleology of living nature" .The main body of the book is divided into three parts, each corresponding to one of the three Critiques. In turn, each part is divided into three chapters.For some grip on what Nuzzo means by "transcendental embodiment," the first chapter of the first part is the most helpful. What is behind this "interpretive concept" is Kant's argument against Leibnizian nominalism about space from "incongruent counterparts." Kant's argument is that there can be two. (shrink)

A paradigm-shifting work that revolutionizes our understanding of the origins and structure of science. Captivatingly written, interwoven with tantalizing illustrations and historical vignettes ranging from Newton's alchemy to quantum mechanics to the storm surge of Hurricane Sandy, Michael Strevens's wholly original investigation of science asks two fundamental questions: Why is science so powerful? And why did it take so long, two thousand years after the invention of philosophy and mathematics, for the human race to start using science to learn (...) the secrets of nature? The Knowledge Machine's radical answer is that science calls on its practitioners to do something irrational: by willfully ignoring religion, theoretical beauty, and, especially, philosophy-essentially stripping away all previous knowledge-scientists embrace an unnaturally narrow method of inquiry, channeling unprecedented energy into observation and experimentation. Like Yuval Harari's Sapiens or Thomas Kuhn's 1962 classic, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, The Knowledge Machine overturns much of what we thought we knew about the origins of the modern world. (shrink)

Constitutivism is the view that we can derive a substantive account of normative reasons for action—perhaps a Kantian account, perhaps a hedonistic account, perhaps a desire-fulfillment account, this is up for grabs—from abstract premises about the nature of action and agency. Constitutivists are thus bound together by their conviction that such a derivation is possible, not by their agreement about which substantive reasons can be derived, and not by agreement about the features of action and agency that permit the derivation. (...) In the final section of the penultimate chapter of Reasons, a chapter devoted to discussing the merits of constitutivism, Eric Wiland has this to say: Constitutivism is ambitious. It attempts to extract an account of reasons for action from reflection on the bare ideas of action and agency. So we shouldn’t be surprised if doubts remain. Those who claim to extract reasons out of agency might remind us of those who claim to pull rabbits out of hats. you suspect that there must be a trick. (shrink)

We present the problem of perceptual agreement (of determinate color) and submit that it proves to be a serious and long overlooked obstacle for those insisting that colors are not objective features of objects, viz., nonobjectivist theories like C. L. Hardin’s (2003) eliminativism and Jonathan Cohen’s (2009) relationalism.

We argue that the stakeholder perspective on corporate social responsibility is in the process of being enlarged. Due to the process of institutional isomorphism, corporations are increasingly adopting organizational features designed to promote proactivity over mere reactivity in their stakeholder relationships. We identify two sources of pressure promoting the emergence of the proactive corporation -- stakeholder activism and the recognition of the social embeddedness of the economy. The final section describes four organizational design dimensions being installed by the more proactive (...) corporations today -- cooperation, participation, negotiation, and direct anticipation. (shrink)