“The pattern is new,” T. S. Eliot has written, “at every moment”: for our past and the history of our culture forms a pattern for us, and each new step that we take implies a revaluation of all that has gone before. Professional philosophers are no longer much given to sayings of this sort; they leave it to poets to make them. Yet surely if these words apply anywhere they apply to the history of Philosophy. A new philosophy or a (...) new position in Philosophy, genuinely new, involves the adoption of different categories, a new orientation; it involves the re-writing of its history and a changed outlook on a whole landscape of problems. The perspective is altered, we find; the masses re-group themselves and the relations fall differently into place. (shrink)

This study reconsiders the purported benefits of community found in Community Supported Agriculture (CSA). Using an online survey of members who belong to CSAs in New York, between November and December 2010, we assess members’ reasons for joining a CSA, and their perceptions of community within their CSA and beyond. A total of 565 CSA members responded to the survey. Results show an overwhelming majority of members joined their CSA for fresh, local, organic produce, while few respondents joined their CSA (...) to build community, meet like-minded individuals or share financial risk with farmers. Members reported that they do not derive a strong sense of community from either their CSA or other forms of community, yet they volunteered at their CSA and appear to be engaged in activities within their communities, though the frequency of the latter is unknown. These data suggest New York CSAs are oriented toward the instrumental and functional models, which emphasize the economic aspects of farming rather than collaborative models, which foster community (Feagan and Henderson 2009). (shrink)

At the beginning of The Principles of Literary Criticism I. A. Richards complained of the chaos of critical theories—a complaint that we hear pretty often, generally from theorists about to add to it, each making his small contribution. Richards' own contribution was a plan for reckoning the merit of poetry in terms of the more or less organised psychological state that it serves to induce in its readers: for poetry, he held, organises our ‘attitudes’—a term that may be taken in (...) different ways. The theoretical picture that Richards connects with it, a vivid enough picture in its way, is of a kind of stock exchange of neural impulses; but perhaps in his practical criticism the word reverts to its ordinary sense. And surely the practical criticism, not the neurological speculation, is what has served to keep Richards' work alive. This is the aspect, at least, to which I shall confine my attention here; my concern is with the use of these and similar concepts in the practical business of criticism. For here we have critical approach, a technique and an orientation, that has in point of fact increasingly established itself. And the fact is one, surely, that aesthetics cannot ignore; a general theory should take notice of practice. But if this is only to add still more to the notorious chaos, I cannot see any alternative course short of abandoning the subject altogether; and that alternative, at least for those who are instinctive theorists and generalisers, is an impossible one. (shrink)

David Pole; II*—The Excellence of Form in Works of Art, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 13–40, https://doi.org/1.

“The pattern is new,” T. S. Eliot has written, “at every moment”: for our past and the history of our culture forms a pattern for us, and each new step that we take implies a revaluation of all that has gone before. Professional philosophers are no longer much given to sayings of this sort; they leave it to poets to make them. Yet surely if these words apply anywhere they apply to the history of Philosophy. A new philosophy or a (...) new position in Philosophy, genuinely new, involves the adoption of different categories, a new orientation; it involves the re-writing of its history and a changed outlook on a whole landscape of problems. The perspective is altered, we find; the masses re-group themselves and the relations fall differently into place. (shrink)

In the United States, lay-adults with a range of educational backgrounds often conceptualize species change within a non-Darwinian adaptationist framework, or reject such ideas altogether, opting instead for creationist accounts in which species are viewed as immutable. In this study, such findings were investigated further by examining the relationship between religious belief, scientific expertise, and ecological reasoning in 132 college-educated adults from 6 religious backgrounds in a Midwestern city. Fundamentalist and non-fundamentalist religious beliefs were differentially related to concepts of evolution, (...) adaptation, and extinction. Biological expertise and creationism were significantly and differentially related to the endorsement of the Darwinian concept of common descent. Yet, creationists were more likely to reject macroevolutionary than microevolutionary concepts. Overall, the greater the taxonomic distance between species, the less likely were participants to agree that species-pairs had common ancestors. It is argued that lay adults from contemporary industrialized societies adopt a view of evolution in which species adapt to novel environments, but remain the same "kind" despite changes. Therefore, extinction is considered unlikely and the relations between micro- and macroevolution misconstrued. Lay-adults' species concepts appear to be an amalgam of a common-sense understanding of species and of evolutionary ideas, modified but not transformed by religious and scientific beliefs. Finally, it is argued that the development of scientific expertise does not involve the radical transformation of ingrained worldviews. Rather, scientists select specializations that are compatible with their existing philosophies, then consciously apply the constructs of their disciplines in order to transcend their common-sense folk beliefs. (shrink)

The author's purpose is to distinguish and characterize the various distinctive experiences that are associated with the appreciation of art. the author is especially concerned with the variousness of such experiences "and the folly of a monopolistic view on the part of aestheticians as to the things we are to permit ourselves to value as aesthetic." (staff).

Still waters, they tell us, run deep; as for philosophy, one who aims at anything like depth cannot always hope to move briskly. Let it excuse my beginning ploddingly, with familiar distinctions. We commonly distinguish what we call mere fact-gathering, however copious, from anything like real understanding; and again, superficial mental quickness from deeper processes, processes, to repeat the truism, that may run comparatively slowly. Philosophers have begun to distinguish too, but barely more than begun, understanding as a performance—I mean (...) an overt linguistic or other behavioural performance—from something else that sometimes happens inwardly. Something happened, presumably, to the Wedding Guest, who on visible evidence only ‘went as one who has been stunned’, but also, presumably, understood. (shrink)

Philosophers almost by profession are minders of other people's business, that is their intellectual business; which, though a necessary trade, is not always a popular one. So Socrates found long ago. Discretion may therefore seem called for, and still more so in writing of Dr Leavis. Leavis is, so to speak, a hot subject; and not only so in himself, hence to be taken up with caution, but a cause that heat is in other men. Nor is that all; other, (...) harder obstacles remain. It would seem that Leavis explicitly shuts the door on any philosophical approach. Philosophers, broadly speaking, deal in abstractions . Leavis wrote long ago, at the start of Revaluation , ‘No treatment of poetry can be worth much that does not keep very close to the concrete’. That ruling, which might debar my whole enterprise, I can take instead as raising immediately its main theme. (shrink)

David Pole; II*—The Excellence of Form in Works of Art, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 72, Issue 1, 1 June 1972, Pages 13–40, https://doi.org/1.

The work of artists is to make works of art, and of theorists theoretical works. In our ordinary dealings with such things, elusive as ontologists may find them, we seem to know well enough in either instance how we should regard and handle them. Ontological questions are none the less raised: what species of entity may they be? It is a question, I confess, to which I could never respond with much enthusiasm. My own interest in art is more ordinary; (...) I care about paintings and poems, about what serves to make them good or bad, about how we should look at or read them. Yet it may prove after all that the two issues are not wholly unrelated. (shrink)

The work of artists is to make works of art, and of theorists theoretical works. In our ordinary dealings with such things, elusive as ontologists may find them, we seem to know well enough in either instance how we should regard and handle them. Ontological questions are none the less raised: what species of entity may they be? It is a question, I confess, to which I could never respond with much enthusiasm. My own interest in art is more ordinary; (...) I care about paintings and poems, about what serves to make them good or bad, about how we should look at or read them. Yet it may prove after all that the two issues are not wholly unrelated. (shrink)

'David Pole, in his The Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein, makes an admirable attempt to clarify the central points of Wittgenstein's philosophy in a straightforward manner. He approaches it from the outside with sympathy and good sense. And since he combines a clear head with a fluent style of writing – a combination that is rare among the initiated – his book will prove an excellent introduction for those who need a succinct account of Wittgenstein's later philosophy without any mystical overtones.' (...) - The Economist 'There is now a real need for a commentary on what must in frankness be admitted to be an exceedingly difficult corpus of philosophy. Mr Pole's little book is a response to that need; if small in bulk, it is rich in ideas... and all students of Wittgenstein will turn to it with gratitude.' - Sunday Times. (shrink)

American men experience worse outcomes on a wide range of health and well-being variables compared to women, including disease, educational problems, violence, addiction, suicide, unemployment, and life expectancy. Because of this, organizations have created programs that focus on helping men both psychologically and spiritually; however, it is important to assess the effectiveness of these programs. The Crucible Project, founded in 2002, attempts to facilitate the development of integrity, courage, and grace in men using a weekend retreat format. The purpose of (...) this pilot study was to explore the effect of the weekend retreat on participants’ authenticity, assertiveness, and willingness to forgive. Participants completed measures before the weekend retreat, immediately after the weekend retreat, and at a 1-month follow-up. Results indicate that weekend retreat participants demonstrated a significant increase in scores on measures of authenticity and willingness to forgive and a trend toward increased scores on the measure of assertiveness over time. We conclude by discussing limitations of the study, areas for future research, and implications for spiritual and character development. (shrink)

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

First published in 2000. Routledge is an imprint of Taylor & Francis, an informa company.

D. Pole, whose Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein appeared in 1958, here makes a new attack on the problem of value-judgement by taking it out of its limited ethical context. Beginning with an examination and criticism of current views that base all moral and other principles on personal choice or decision, he finds a point of departure for his own account of the problem in the claim that rational inquiry of any sort rests on the possibility of evaluation. The place of (...) the one process within the other is then worked out in some detail; and an attempt is made to show how inquiry, as a collective undertaking, involves the progressive search for and establishment of new principles. (shrink)

D. Pole, whose Later Philosophy of Wittgenstein appeared in 1958, here makes a new attack on the problem of value-judgement by taking it out of its limited ethical context. Beginning with an examination and criticism of current views that base all moral and other principles on personal choice or decision, he finds a point of departure for his own account of the problem in the claim that rational inquiry of any sort rests on the possibility of evaluation. The place of (...) the one process within the other is then worked out in some detail; and an attempt is made to show how inquiry, as a collective undertaking, involves the progressive search for and establishment of new principles. (shrink)

David Pole; VII—On Practical Reason and Benevolence, Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Volume 68, Issue 1, 1 June 1968, Pages 129–144, https://doi.org/10.

The aim of this study was to develop the concept of the dignified death of children in Brazilian pediatric intensive care units (PICUs). The Hybrid Model for Concept Development was used to develop a conceptual structure of dignified death in PICUs in an attempt to define the concept. The fieldwork study was carried out by means of in-depth interviews with nine nurses and seven physicians working in PICUs. Not unexpectedly, the concept of dignified death was found to be a complex (...) phenomenon involving aspects related to decisions made by the multidisciplinary team as well as those related to care of the child and the family. Knowledge of the concept’s dimensions can promote reflection on the part of healthcare professionals regarding the values and beliefs underlying their conduct in end-of-life situations. Our hope is that this study may contribute to theoretic and methodological development in the area of end-of-life care. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to develop the concept of the dignified death of children in Brazilian pediatric intensive care units . The Hybrid Model for Concept Development was used to develop a conceptual structure of dignified death in PICUs in an attempt to define the concept. The fieldwork study was carried out by means of in-depth interviews with nine nurses and seven physicians working in PICUs. Not unexpectedly, the concept of dignified death was found to be a complex (...) phenomenon involving aspects related to decisions made by the multidisciplinary team as well as those related to care of the child and the family. Knowledge of the concept’s dimensions can promote reflection on the part of healthcare professionals regarding the values and beliefs underlying their conduct in end-of-life situations. Our hope is that this study may contribute to theoretic and methodological development in the area of end-of-life care. (shrink)

During the last third of the 20C, public discourse in the United States has become increasingly acerbic. Parallel to this development there has been an increasing enrollment in College level logic courses, courses that focus on arguments and their appraisal. Could there be a connection? A number of majorphilosophers do not just see arguments as either 100% correct or 100% incorrect. Notable in this regard are Plato, Aquinas and Hume. Their approach to “logic” and that of others is offered as (...) a palliative to the types of logic that we now teach. (shrink)

How to use truth tables to narrow down the number of possible candidates for missing premise. and, how to use philosophical analysis to pick the most plausible candidate from among those. this activity is a nice capstone to a course in logic for it combines formal and informal procedures.

ABSTRACTThis paper situates the discourse of the Occupy movement within the context of radical political philosophy. Our analysis takes place on two levels. First, we conduct an empirical analysis of the ‘official’ publications of Occupy Wall Street and Occupy London. Operationalising core concepts from the framing perspective within social movement theory, we provide a descriptive-comparative analysis of the ‘collective action frames’ of OWS and OL. Second, we consider the extent to which radical political philosophy speaks to the discourse of Occupy. (...) Our empirical analysis reveals that both movements share diagnostic frames, but there were notable differences in terms of prognostic framing. The philosophical discussion suggests that there are alignments between anarchist, post-anarchist and post-Marxist ideologies at the level of both identity and strategy. Indeed, the absence of totalising anti-capitalist or anti-statist positions in Occupy suggests that – particularly with Occupy London – alignments are perhaps not so distant from typically social democratic demands. (shrink)