We show that the so-called quantum probabilistic rule, usually introduced in the physical literature as an argument of the essential distinction between the probability relations under quantum and classical measurements, is not, as it is commonly accepted, in contrast to the rule for the addition of probabilities of mutually exclusive events. The latter is valid under all experimental situations upon classical and quantum systems. We discuss also the quantum measurement situation that is similar (...) to the classical one, described by the Bayes formula. We show the compatibility of the description of this quantum measurement situation in the frame of purely classical and experimentally justified straightforward frequency arguments and in the frame of the quantum stochastic approach to the description of generalized quantum measurements. In view of derived results, we argue that even under experiments upon classical systems the classical Bayes formula describes particular experimental situations that are specific for context-independent measurements. The similarity of the forms of the relation between the transformation of probabilities, which we derive in the frame of the quantum stochastic approach and in the frame of the approach, based on straightforward frequency arguments, underlines once more that the projective (von Neumann) measurements represent only a special type of measurement situations in quantum physics. (shrink)

Two radically different views about time are possible. According to the first, the universe is three dimensional. It has a past and a future, but that does not mean it is spread out in time as it is spread out in the three dimensions of space. This view requires that there is an unambiguous, absolute, cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. According to the second view about time, the universe is four dimensional. It is spread out in both space and time (...) - in space-time in short. Special and general relativity rule out the first view. There is, according to relativity theory, no such thing as an unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "now" at each instant. However, we have every reason to hold that both special and general relativity are false. Not only does the historical record tell us that physics advances from one false theory to another. Furthermore, elsewhere I have shown that we must interpret physics as having established physicalism - in so far as physics can ever establish anything theoretical. Physicalism, here, is to be interpreted as the thesis that the universe is such that some unified "theory of everything" is true. Granted physicalism, it follows immediately that any physical theory that is about a restricted range of phenomena only, cannot be true, whatever its empirical success may be. It follows that both special and general relativity are false. This does not mean of course that the implication of these two theories that there is no unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" at each instant is false. It still may be the case that the first view of time, indicated at the outset, is false. Are there grounds for holding that an unambiguous cosmic-wide "now" does exist, despite special and general relativity, both of which imply that it does not exist? There are such grounds. Elsewhere I have argued that, in order to solve the quantum wave/particle problem and make sense of the quantum domain we need to interpret quantum theory as a fundamentally probabilistic theory, a theory which specifies how quantum entities - electrons, photons, atoms - interact with one another probabilistically. It is conceivable that this is correct, and the ultimate laws of the universe are probabilistic in character. If so, probabilistic transitions could define unambiguous, absolute cosmic-wide "nows" at each instant. It is entirely unsurprising that special and general relativity have nothing to say about the matter. Both theories are pre-quantum mechanical, classical theories, and general relativity in particular is deterministic. The universe may indeed be three dimensional, with a past and a future, but not spread out in four dimensional space-time, despite the fact that relativity theories appear to rule this out. These considerations, finally, have implications for views about the arrow of time and free will. (shrink)

To solve the probability problem of the Many Worlds Interpretation of Quantum Mechanics, D. Wallace has presented a formal proof of the Born rule via decision theory, as proposed by D. Deutsch. The idea is to get subjective probabilities from rational decisions related to quantum measurements, showing the non-probabilistic parts of the quantum formalism, plus some rational constraints, ensure the squared modulus of quantum amplitudes play the role of such probabilities. We provide a new (...) presentation of Wallace’s proof, reorganized to simplify some arguments, and analyze it from a formal perspective. Similarities with classical decision theory are made explicit, to clarify its structure and main ideas. A simpler notation is used, and details are filled in, making it easier to follow and verify. Some problems have been identified, and we suggest possible corrections. (shrink)

Everettian quantum mechanics faces the challenge of how to make sense of probability and probabilistic reasoning in a setting where there is typically no unique outcome of measurements. Wallace has built on a proof by Deutsch to argue that a notion of probability can be recovered in the many worlds setting. In particular, Wallace argues that a rational agent has to assign probabilities in accordance with the Born rule. This argument relies on a rationality constraint that Wallace (...) calls state supervenience. I argue that state supervenience is not defensible as a rationality constraint for Everettian agents unless we already invoke probabilistic notions. (shrink)

We develop and defend the thesis that the Hilbert space formalism of quantum mechanics is a new theory of probability. The theory, like its classical counterpart, consists of an algebra of events, and the probability measures defined on it. The construction proceeds in the following steps: (a) Axioms for the algebra of events are introduced following Birkhoff and von Neumann. All axioms, except the one that expresses the uncertainty principle, are shared with the classical event space. The only models (...) for the set of axioms are lattices of subspaces of inner product spaces over a field K. (b) Another axiom due to Soler forces K to be the field of real, or complex numbers, or the quaternions. We suggest a probabilistic reading of Soler's axiom. (c) Gleason's theorem fully characterizes the probability measures on the algebra of events, so that Born's rule is derived. (d) Gleason's theorem is equivalent to the existence of a certain finite set of rays, with a particular orthogonality graph (Wondergraph). Consequently, all aspects of quantum probability can be derived from rational probability assignments to finite "quantum gambles". (e) All experimental aspects of entanglement- the violation of Bell's inequality in particular- are explained as natural outcomes of the probabilistic structure. (f) We hypothesize that even in the absence of decoherence macroscopic entanglement can very rarely be observed, and provide a precise conjecture to that effect .We also discuss the relation of the present approach to quantum logic, realism and truth, and the measurement problem. (shrink)

We discuss the meaning of probabilities in the many worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. We start by presenting very briefly the many worlds theory, how the problem of probability arises, and some unsuccessful attempts to solve it in the past. Then we criticize a recent attempt by Deutsch to derive the quantum mechanical probabilities from the nonprobabilistic parts of quantum mechanics and classical decision theory. We further argue that the Born probability does not make sense even as (...) an additional probability rule in the many worlds theory. Our conclusion is that the many worlds theory fails to account for the probabilistic statements of standard (collapse) quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The concepts of joint probability as implied by the Copenhagen and realist interpretations of quantum mechanics are examined in relation to (a) the rules for manipulation of probabilistic quantities, and (b) the role of the Bell inequalities in assessing the completeness of standard quantum theory. Proponents of completeness of the Copenhagen interpretation are required to accept a modification of the classical laws of probability to provide a mechanism for complementarity. A new formulation of the locality postulate is (...) given, not involving factorizability or conditional probabilities, which clarifies the role of locality in the derivation of the Bell inequalities. (shrink)

In a quantum universe with a strong arrow of time, it is standard to postulate that the initial wave function started in a particular macrostate---the special low-entropy macrostate selected by the Past Hypothesis. Moreover, there is an additional postulate about statistical mechanical probabilities according to which the initial wave function is a ''typical'' choice in the macrostate. Together, they support a probabilistic version of the Second Law of Thermodynamics: typical initial wave functions will increase in entropy. Hence, there (...) are two sources of randomness in such a universe: the quantum-mechanical probabilities of the Born rule and the statistical mechanical probabilities of the Statistical Postulate. I propose a new way to understand time's arrow in a quantum universe. It is based on what I call the Thermodynamic Theories of Quantum Mechanics. According to this perspective, there is a natural choice for the initial quantum state of the universe, which is given by not a wave function but by a density matrix. The density matrix plays a microscopic role: it appears in the fundamental dynamical equations of those theories. The density matrix also plays a macroscopic / thermodynamic role: it is exactly the projection operator onto the Past Hypothesis subspace. Thus, given an initial subspace, we obtain a unique choice of the initial density matrix. I call this property "the conditional uniqueness" of the initial quantum state. The conditional uniqueness provides a new and general strategy to eliminate statistical mechanical probabilities in the fundamental physical theories, by which we can reduce the two sources of randomness to only the quantum mechanical one. I also explore the idea of an absolutely unique initial quantum state, in a way that might realize Penrose's idea of a strongly deterministic universe. (shrink)

An interesting link between two very different physical aspects of quantum mechanics is revealed; these are the absence of third-order interference and Tsirelson’s bound for the nonlocal correlations. Considering multiple-slit experiments—not only the traditional configuration with two slits, but also configurations with three and more slits—Sorkin detected that third-order (and higher-order) interference is not possible in quantum mechanics. The EPR experiments show that quantum mechanics involves nonlocal correlations which are demonstrated in a violation of the Bell or (...) CHSH inequality, but are still limited by a bound discovered by Tsirelson. It now turns out that Tsirelson’s bound holds in a broad class of probabilistic theories provided that they rule out third-order interference. A major characteristic of this class is the existence of a reasonable calculus of conditional probability or, phrased more physically, of a reasonable model for the quantum measurement process. (shrink)

An integrated view concerning the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics is obtained by systematic confrontation of the Kolmogorov formulation of the abstract theory of probabilities, with the quantum mechanical representationand its factual counterparts. Because these factual counterparts possess a peculiar spacetime structure stemming from the operations by which the observer produces the studied states (operations of state preparation) and the qualifications of these (operations of measurement), the approach brings forth “probability trees,” complex constructs with treelike spacetime support.Though (...) it is strictly entailed by confrontation with the abstract theory of probabilities as it now stands, the construct of a quantum mechanical probability treetransgresses this theory. It indicates the possibility of an extended abstract theory of probabilities including explicit representations of the cognitive operations involved in the probabilistic descriptions. So quantum mechanics appears to be neither a “normal” probabilistic theory nor an “abnormal” one, but a pioneering particular realization of afuture extended abstract theory of probabilities.The consequences of the integrated perception of the probabilistic organization of quantum mechanics are developed constructively. The current identifications of spectral decompositions, with superpositions of states, are removed. Then: (a) Inside the frontiers of the purely operational-observational orthodox formalism, operators of state preparation and the calculus with these are defined consistently with the definition and the calculus of quantum mechanical operators representing measurable dynamical quantities. This permits to grasp the physical meaning of superselection rules. Furthermore, a complement to the quantum theory of measurements is obtained. These prolongations of the orthodox formalism bring forth a “probabilistic incompleteness” of the quantum theory. (b) Beyond quantum mechanics as it now stands, a model is outlined that removes this probabilistic incompleteness, “the [particle + medium] individual model,”microscopic by certain aspects andcosmic by others.Globally, the approach draws attention upon the possibility and the interest of a general representation of the descriptions of any kind founded upon the explicit specification of the epistemic operations—with their spacetime features—by which the observer, who always is involved, produces the objects to be qualified and the qualifications of these. (shrink)

A major problem facing no-collapse interpretations of quantum mechanics in the tradition of Everett is how to understand the probabilistic axiom of quantum mechanics (the Born rule) in the context of a deterministic theory in which every outcome of a measurement occurs. Deutsch claims to derive a decision-theoretic analogue of the Born rule from the non-probabilistic part of quantum mechanics and some non-probabilistic axioms of classical decision theory, and hence concludes that no (...) probabilistic axiom is needed. I argue that Deutsch’s derivation begs the question. (shrink)

These lecture notes present a concise and introductory, yet as far as possible coherent, view of the main formalizations of quantum mechanics and of quantum field theories, their interrelations and their theoretical foundations. The "standard" formulation of quantum mechanics (involving the Hilbert space of pure states, self-adjoint operators as physical observables, and the probabilistic interpretation given by the Born rule) on one hand, and the path integral and functional integral representations of probabilities amplitudes on the (...) other, are the standard tools used in most applications of quantum theory in physics and chemistry. Yet, other mathematical representations of quantum mechanics sometimes allow better comprehension and justification of quantum theory. This text focuses on two of such representations: the algebraic formulation of quantum mechanics and the "quantum logic" approach. Last but not least, some emphasis will also be put on understanding the relation between quantum physics and special relativity through their common roots - causality, locality and reversibility, as well as on the relation between quantum theory, information theory, correlations and measurements, and quantum gravity. Quantum mechanics is probably the most successful physical theory ever proposed and despite huge experimental and technical progresses in over almost a century, it has never been seriously challenged by experiments. In addition, quantum information science ha s become an important and very active field in recent decades, further enriching the many facets of quantum physics. Yet, there is a strong revival of the discussions about the principles of quantum mechanics and its seemingly paradoxical aspects: sometimes the theory is portrayed as the unchallenged and dominant paradigm of modern physical sciences and technologies while sometimes it is considered a still mysterious and poorly understood theory, waiting for a revolution. This volume, addressing graduate students and seasoned researchers alike, aims to contribute to the reconciliation of these two facets of quantum mechanics. (shrink)

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss a probabilistic framework that is adequate for the formulation of quantum theory and faithful to its applications. Contrary to claims, which are examined and rebutted, that quantum theory employs a nonclassical probability theory based on a nonclassical "logic," the probabilistic framework set out here is entirely classical and the "logic" used is Boolean. The framework consists of a set of states and a set of quantities that (...) are interrelated in a specified manner. Each state induces a classical probability space on the values of each quantity. The quantities, so considered, become statistical variables (not random variables). Such variables need not have a "joint distribution." For the quantum theoretic application, there is a uniform procedure that defines and determines the existence of such "joint distributions" for statistical variables. A general rule is provided and it is shown to lead to the usual compatibility-commutivity requirements of quantum theory. The paper concludes with a brief discussion of interference and the misunderstandings that are involved in the false move from interference to nonclassical probability. (shrink)

We present an information-theoretic interpretation of quantum formalism based on a Bayesian framework and devoid of any extra axiom or principle. Quantum information is construed as a technique for analyzing a logical system subject to classical constraints, based on a question-and-answer procedure. The problem is posed from a particular batch of queries while the constraints are represented by the truth table of a set of Boolean functions. The Bayesian inference technique consists in assigning a probability distribution within a (...) real-valued probability space to the joint set of queries in order to satisfy the constraints. The initial query batch is not unique and alternative batches can be considered at will. They are enabled mechanically from the initial batch, quite simply by transcribing the probability space into an auxiliary Hilbert space. It turns out that this sole procedure leads to exactly rediscover the standard quantum information theory and thus provides an information-theoretic rationale to its technical rules. In this framework, the great challenges of quantum mechanics become simple platitudes: Why is the theory probabilistic? Why is the theory linear? Where does the Hilbert space come from? In addition, most of the paradoxes, such as uncertainty principle, entanglement, contextuality, nonsignaling correlation, measurement problem, etc., become straightforward features. In the end, our major conclusion is that quantum information is nothing but classical information processed by a mature form of Bayesian inference technique and, as such, consubstantial with Aristotelian logic. (shrink)

Dutch book arguments have been applied to beliefs about the outcomes of measurements of quantum systems, but not to beliefs about quantum objects prior to measurement. In this paper, we prove a quantum version of the probabilists' Dutch book theorem that applies to both sorts of beliefs: roughly, if ideal beliefs are given by vector states, all and only Born-rule probabilities avoid Dutch books. This theorem and associated results have implications for operational and realist interpretations of (...) the logic of a Hilbert lattice. In the latter case, we show that the defenders of the eigenstate-value orthodoxy face a trilemma. Those who favor vague properties avoid the trilemma, admitting all and only those beliefs about quantum objects that avoid Dutch books. (shrink)

D. Dieks has proposed a semantical rule which he claims yields a realistic interpretation of the formalism of quantum mechanics without the projection postulate. I argue that his proposal is unacceptable because it violates a natural requirement of psychophysical parallelism. His "semantical rule" is not an acceptable interpretive rule because it does not identify structures in the theory with structures in our experience, but postulates a merely probabilistic relationship between the two. Dieks' interpretation is contrasted (...) with Everett's relative state interpretation, which attempts the same task but respects psychophysical parallelism. (shrink)

Nonrelativistic quantum mechanics can be derived from real Markov diffusion processes by extending the concept of probability measure to the complex domain. This appears as the only natural way of introducing formally classical probabilistic concepts into quantum mechanics. To every quantum state there is a corresponding complex Fokker-Planck equation. The particle drift is conditioned by an auxiliary equation which is obtained through stochastic energy conservation; the logarithmic transform of this equation is the Schrödinger equation. To every (...) quantum mechanical operator there is a stochastic process; the replacement of operators by processes leads to all the well-known results of quantum mechanics, using stochastic calculus instead of formal quantum rules. Comparison is made with the classical stochastic approaches and the Feynman path integral formulation. (shrink)

Using a result of H. Hanche-Olsen, we show that (subject to fairly natural constraints on what constitutes a system, and on what constitutes a composite system), orthodox finite-dimensional complex quantum mechanics with superselection rules is the only non-signaling probabilistic theory in which (i) individual systems are Jordan algebras (equivalently, their cones of unnormalized states are homogeneous and self-dual), (ii) composites are locally tomographic (meaning that states are determined by the joint probabilities they assign to measurement outcomes on the (...) component systems) and (iii) at least one system has the structure of a qubit. Using this result, we also characterize finite dimensional quantum theory among probabilistic theories having the structure of a dagger-monoidal category. (shrink)

Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an objective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introducing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be made concrete. In particular, we show (...) that the Born probability rule, and sets of definite-valued observables to which the Born probabilities pertain, can be uniquely defined from the quantum state and Hilbert space structure. We discuss the status of probability in modal interpretations, and to this end we make a comparison with many-worlds alternatives. An overall point that we stress is that the modal ideas define a general framework and research programme rather than one definite and finished interpretation. (shrink)

We present a Gedankenexperiment that leads to a violation of detailed balance if quantum mechanical transition probabilities are treated in the usual way by applying Fermi’s “golden rule”. This Gedankenexperiment introduces a collection of two-level systems that absorb and emit radiation randomly through non-reciprocal coupling to a waveguide, as realized in specific chiral quantum optical systems. The non-reciprocal coupling is modeled by a hermitean Hamiltonian and is compatible with the time-reversal invariance of unitary quantum dynamics. Surprisingly, (...) the combination of non-reciprocity with probabilistic radiation processes entails negative entropy production. Although the considered system appears to fulfill all conditions for Markovian stochastic dynamics, such a dynamics violates the Clausius inequality, a formulation of the second law of thermodynamics. Several implications concerning the interpretation of the quantum mechanical formalism are discussed. (shrink)

Modal interpretations have the ambition to construe quantum mechanics as an objective, man-independent description of physical reality. Their second leading idea is probabilism: quantum mechanics does not completely fix physical reality but yields probabilities. In working out these ideas an important motif is to stay close to the standard formalism of quantum mechanics and to refrain from introducing new structure by hand. In this paper we explain how this programme can be made concrete. In particular, we show (...) that the Born probability rule, and sets of definite-valued observables to which the Born probabilities pertain, can be uniquely defined from the quantum state and Hilbert space structure. We discuss the status of probability in modal interpretations, and to this end we make a comparison with many-worlds alternatives. An overall point that we stress is that the modal ideas define a general framework and research programme rather than one definite and finished interpretation. (shrink)

This paper proposes an approach to investigate norm-governed learning agents which combines a logic-based formalism with an equation-based counterpart. This dual formalism enables us to describe the reasoning of such agents and their interactions using argumentation, and, at the same time, to capture systemic features using equations. The approach is applied to norm emergence and internalisation in systems of learning agents. The logical formalism is rooted into a probabilistic defeasible logic instantiating Dung’s argumentation framework. Rules of this logic are (...) attached with probabilities to describe the agents’ minds and behaviours as well as uncertain environments. Then, the equation-based model for reinforcement learning, defined over this probability distribution, allows agents to adapt to their environment and self-organise. (shrink)

Starting from the quantization of the action variable as a basic principle, I show that this leads one to the probabilistic description of physical quantities as random variables, which satisfy the uncertainty relation. Using such variables I show that the ensemble-averaged action variable in the quantum domain can be presented as a contour integral of a “quantum momentum function,” pq(z), which is assumed to be analytic. The condition that all bound states pq(z) must yield the quantized values (...) of the action variable requires the equation for pq(z) to be the Riccati differential equation, which can be converted to the Schrödinger equation for the wave function. The rule for probabilities in quantum mechanics follows from the physical meaning of pq(z) and its connection with the probability density. The discussion involves the correspondence principle and the assumption that the spacetime symmetries known in classical physics are valid in the quantum domain. (shrink)

Bell's theorem is expounded as an analysis in Bayesian inference. Assuming the result of a spin measurement on a particle is governed by a causal variable internal (hidden, “local”) to the particle, one learns about it by making a spin measurement; thence about the internal variable of a second particle correlated with the first; and from there predicts the probabilistic result of spin measurements on the second particle. Such predictions are violated by experiment: locality/causality fails. The statistical nature of (...) the observations rules out signalling; acausal, superluminal, or otherwise. Quantum mechanics is irrelevant to this reasoning, although its correct predictions of experiment imply that it has a nonlocal/acausal interpretation. Cramer's newtransactional interpretation, which incorporates this feature by adapting the Wheeler-Feynman idea of advanced and retarded processes to the quantum laws, is advocated. It leads to an invaluable way of envisaging quantum processes. The usual paradoxes melt before this, and one, the “delayed choice” experiment, is chosen for detailed inspection. Nonlocality implies practical difficulties in influencing hidden variables, which provides a very plausible explanation for why they have not yet been found; from this standpoint, Bell's theoremreinforces arguments in favor of hidden variables. (shrink)

This paper provides a general method for defining a generalized quantum observable that supplies properly normalized conditional probabilities for the time of occurrence. This method treats the time of occurrence as a probabilistic variable whose value is to be determined by experiment and predicted by the Born rule. This avoids the problematic assumption that a question about the time at which an event occurs must be answered through instantaneous measurements of a projector by an observer, common to (...) both Rovelli and Oppenheim et al.. I also address the interpretation of experiments purporting to demonstrate the quantum Zeno effect, used by Oppenheim et al. to justify an inherent uncertainty for measurements of times. (shrink)

What are quantum entities? Is the quantum domain deterministic or probabilistic? Orthodox quantum theory (OQT) fails to answer these two fundamental questions. As a result of failing to answer the first question, OQT is very seriously defective: it is imprecise, ambiguous, ad hoc, non-explanatory, inapplicable to the early universe, inapplicable to the cosmos as a whole, and such that it is inherently incapable of being unified with general relativity. It is argued that probabilism provides a very (...) natural solution to the quantum wave/particle dilemma and promises to lead to a fully micro-realistic, testable version of quantum theory that is free of the defects of OQT. It is suggested that inelastic interactions may induce quantum probabilistic transitions. (shrink)

We define propositional quantum Frege proof systems and compare them with classical Frege proof systems.

We prove a Gleason-type theorem for the quantum probability rule using frame functions defined on positive-operator-valued measures, as opposed to the restricted class of orthogonal projection-valued measures used in the original theorem. The advantage of this method is that it works for two-dimensional quantum systems and even for vector spaces over rational fields—settings where the standard theorem fails. Furthermore, unlike the method necessary for proving the original result, the present one is rather elementary. In the case of (...) a qubit, we investigate similar results for frame functions defined upon various restricted classes of POVMs. For the so-called trine measurements, the standard quantum probability rule is again recovered. (shrink)

I present a proof of the quantum probability rule from decision-theoretic assumptions, in the context of the Everett interpretation. The basic ideas behind the proof are those presented in Deutsch's recent proof of the probability rule, but the proof is simpler and proceeds from weaker decision-theoretic assumptions. This makes it easier to discuss the conceptual ideas involved in the proof, and to show that they are defensible.

I put forward a micro realistic, probabilistic version of quantum theory, which specifies the precise nature of quantum entities thus solving the quantum wave/particle dilemma, and which both reproduces the empirical success of orthodox quantum theory, and yields predictions that differ from orthodox quantum theory for as yet unperformed experiments.

In classical physics, probabilistic or statistical knowledge has been always related to ignorance or inaccurate subjective knowledge about an actual state of affairs. This idea has been extended to quantum mechanics through a completely incoherent interpretation of the Fermi-Dirac and Bose-Einstein statistics in terms of "strange" quantum particles. This interpretation, naturalized through a widespread "way of speaking" in the physics community, contradicts Born's physical account of Ψ as a "probability wave" which provides statistical information about outcomes that, (...) in fact, cannot be interpreted in terms of 'ignorance about an actual state of affairs'. In the present paper we discuss how the metaphysics of actuality has played an essential role in limiting the possibilities of understating things differently. We propose instead a metaphysical scheme in terms of powers with definite potentia which allows us to consider quantum probability in a new light, namely, as providing objective knowledge about a potential state of affairs. (shrink)

We provide self-contained proof of a theorem relating probabilistic coherence of forecasts to their non-domination by rival forecasts with respect to any proper scoring rule. The theorem recapitulates insights achieved by other investigators, and clarifi es the connection of coherence and proper scoring rules to Bregman divergence.

The aim of this paper is to state the single most powerful argument for use of a non-classical logic in quantum mechanics. In outline the argument is the following. The working logic of a science is the logic of the events and propositions to which probabilities are assigned. A probability should be assigned to every element of the algebra of events. In the case of quantum mechanics probabilities may be assigned to events but not, without restriction, to the (...) conjunction of two events. The conclusion is that the working logic of quantum mechanics is not classical. The nature of the logic that is appropriate for quantum mechanics is examined. (shrink)

A new version of quantum theory is proposed, according to which probabilistic events occur whenever new statioinary or bound states are created as a result of inelastic collisions. The new theory recovers the experimental success of orthodox quantum theory, but differs form the orthodox theory for as yet unperformed experiments.

A probabilistic propositional logic, endowed with a constructor for asserting compatibility of diagonalisable and bounded observables, is presented and illustrated for reasoning about the random results of projective measurements made on a given quantum state. Simultaneous measurements are assumed to imply that the underlying observables are compatible. A sound and weakly complete axiomatisation is provided relying on the decidable first-order theory of real closed ordered fields. The proposed logic is proved to be a conservative extension of classical propositional (...) logic. (shrink)

In many real-life situations, we are interested in the value of a physical quantity y that is difficult or impossible to measure directly. To estimate y, we find some easier-to-measure quantities x1, … , xn which are related to y by a known relation y = f. Measurements are never 100% accurate; hence, the measured values equation image are different from xi, and the resulting estimate equation image is different from the desired value y = f. How different can it (...) be? Traditional engineering approach to error estimation in data processing assumes that we know the probabilities of different measurement errors equation image. In many practical situations, we only know the upper bound Δi for this error; hence, after the measurement, the only information that we have about xi is that it belongs to the interval equation image. In this case, it is important to find the range y of all possible values of y = f when xi ∈ xi. We start the paper with a brief overview of the computational complexity of the corresponding interval computation problems: Most of the related problems turn out to be, in general, at least NP-hard. In this paper, we show how the use of quantum computing can speed up some computations related to interval and probabilistic uncertainty. We end the paper with speculations on whether “hypothetic” physical devices can compute NP-hard problems faster than in exponential time. Most of the paper's results were first presented at NAFIPS'2003 [30]. (shrink)

In this paper we analyze the existence of joint probabilities for the Bell-type and GHZ entangled states. We then propose the usage of nonmonotonic upper probabilities as a tool to derive consistent joint upper probabilities for the contextual hidden variables. Finally, we show that for the extreme example of no error, the GHZ state allows for the definition of a joint upper probability that is consistent with the strong correlations.

This book concerns the metasemantics of quantum mechanics (QM). Roughly, it pursues an investigation at an intersection of the philosophy of physics and the philosophy of semantics, and it offers a critical analysis of rival explanations of the semantic facts of standard QM. Two problems for such explanations are discussed: categoricity and permanence of rules. New results include 1) a reconstruction of Einstein's incompleteness argument, which concludes that a local, separable, and categorical QM cannot exist, 2) a reinterpretation of (...) Bohr's principle of correspondence, grounded in the principle of permanence, 3) a meaning-variance argument for quantum logic, which follows a line of critical reflections initiated by Weyl, and 4) an argument for semantic indeterminacy leveled against inferentialism about QM, inspired by Carnap's work in the philosophy of classical logic. (shrink)

Hans Reichenbach’s posthumous book The Direction of Time ends somewhere between Socratic aporia and historical irony. Prompted by Feynman’s diagrammatic formulation of quantum electrodynamics, Reichenbach eventually abandoned the delicate balancing between the macroscopic foundation of the direction of time and microscopic descriptions of time order undertaken throughout the previous chapters in favor of an exclusively macroscopic theory that he had vehemently rejected in the 1920s. I analyze Reichenbach’s reasoning against the backdrop of the history of Feynman diagrams and the (...) current practice of particle physics. Building upon the debates about processes and conserved quantities between Wesley Salmon and Phil Dowe in the 1990s, and the exchange between Reichenbach and the gestalt theorist Kurt Lewin during the 1920s about topology and genidentity, I investigate whether the aporia about local time order could be avoided by following a strategy that Reichenbach adopted elsewhere in the book and develop a notion of functional genidentity that captures the practice of present-day elementary particle physics and the fact that Feynman diagrams have to be understood in the context of a complex mathematical description of scattering processes. (shrink)

It is usually believed that a picture of Quantum Mechanics in terms of true probabilities cannot be given due to the uncertainty relations. Here we discuss a tomographic approach to quantum states that leads to a probability representation of quantum states. This can be regarded as a classical-like formulation of quantum mechanics which avoids the counterintuitive concepts of wave function and density operator. The relevant concepts of quantum mechanics are then reconsidered and the epistemological implications (...) of such approach discussed. (shrink)

A procedure is given for the transformation of quantum mechanical operator equations into stochastic equations. The stochastic equations reveal a simple correlation between quantum mechanics and classical mechanics: Quantum mechanics operates with “optimal estimations,” classical mechanics is the limit of “complete information.” In this connection, Schrödinger's substitution relationsp x → -iħ ∂/∂x, etc, reveal themselves as exact mathematical transformation formulas. The stochastic version of quantum mechanical equations provides an explanation for the difficulties in correlating quantum (...) mechanics and the theory of relativity: In physics “time” is always thought of as a numerical parameter; but in the present formalism of physics “time” is described by two formally totally different quantities. One of these two “times” is a numerical parameter and the other a random variable. This last concept of time shows all the properties required by the theory of relativity and is therefore to be considered as the relativistic time. (shrink)

We show that the quantum mechanical rules for manipulating probabilities follow naturally from standard probability theory. We do this by generalizing a result of Khinchin regarding characteristic functions. From standard probability theory we obtain the methods usually associated with quantum theory; that is, the operator method, eigenvalues, the Born rule, and the fact that only the eigenvalues of the operator have nonzero probability. We discuss the general question as to why quantum mechanics seemingly necessitates different methods (...) than standard probability theory and argue that the quantum mechanical method is much richer in its ability to generate a wide variety of probability distributions which are inaccessibe by way of standard probability theory. (shrink)

In a recent paper, Michael Friedman and Hilary Putnam argued that the Luders rule is ad hoc from the point of view of the Copenhagen interpretation but that it receives a natural explanation within realist quantum logic as a probability conditionalization rule. Geoffrey Hellman maintains that quantum logic cannot give a non-circular explanation of the rule, while Jeffrey Bub argues that the rule is not ad hoc within the Copenhagen interpretation. As I see it, (...) all four are wrong. Given that there is to be a projection postulate, there are at least two natural arguments which the Copenhagen advocate can offer on behalf of the Luders rule, contrary to Friedman and Putnam. However, the argument which Bub offers is not a good one. At the same time, contrary to Hellman, quantum logic really does provide an explanation of the Luders rule, and one which is superior to that of the Copenhagen account, since it provides an understanding of why there should be a projection postulate at all. (shrink)