Cost effectiveness. Economics. This is an introduction, accessible to non-economists as well as to economists, to the practice of cost benifit analysis. It begins from a discussion of financial appraisal. The distinguishing features of cost benifit analysis are then introduced progressively. Practical examples are used whenever possible to aid the exposition. Economic theory is introduced only where it is immediately relevant to practice. Nonetheless the approach is firmly grounded in economic principles and considerable space is devoted to those (...) ideas that are central to practical cost benefit analysis - shadow prices, consumers' surplus, and valuation of unmarked goods. The additional needs of economically trained readers are catered for by a number of appendices which relate the ideas expounded in the book to mainstream economic theory. (shrink)

This book is a major contribution to the study of the philosophy of action, moral philosophy, and political philosophy. Its central idea is a radically unorthodox theory of rational action. Most contemporary Anglo-American philosophers believe that action is motivated by desire. Professor Benn rejects the doctrine and replaces it with a reformulation of Kant's ethical and political theory, in which rational action can be determined simply by principles, regardless of consequences. The book analyzes the way in which (...) value conflicts can be rationally resolved, the objectivity of value, the concept of moral personality, the principles of non-interference and respect of persons, the ideals of autonomy and community and various aspects of individual rights - focusing on the rights to freedom, welfare, and privacy. (shrink)

When it reaches its absolute limit, namely, when it comes to the question of good and evil, politics must seek ethics for help, for I do not wish to consider political power as an ultimate end in itself though it is an intermediary end. There is not only the reality of power but also an ethic of power as well. For “the concept of the ‘good life’ mutually implicates politics and ethics.” As a relationship between man and man, the exercise (...) of power is not ethically neutral but is moral; and ethical questions arise only when man is not alone, that is, he exists in relation to others. Because the possibility of evil is inherent in every move of power, the problem of power is an ethical problem: “the problematic of evil is intertwined with the problematic of power.”The idea of human dignity is what underlies an existentialist ethics. Gabriel Marcel has this in mind when he speaks of “the existential background of human dignity.” A preponderance of the existentialist critique of the dehumanizing, alienating and depersonalizing tendency of modern man and society accentuates this singular, self-same idea of human dignity. Human dignity is not just an idea of equality, political or otherwise. It infuses all such principles of politics as freedom, justice, equality and responsibility one wishes to defend, and it underlies such problems of politics as war and peace, racism, human rights and colonialism. All these principles and problems of politics make direct or indirect, and explicit or implicit reference to human dignity.By human dignity is meant an affirmation of the moral respect for the absolute worthiness of each and every individual as a human person. To appeal to and call upon human dignity is to affirm the very humanity of man, both the quality of being truly human and a collectivity of men. The idea of human dignity is never a testimonial to atomic individualism, the allegation of which is often made by many critics of existentialism and should properly be reserved for the “possessive individualism” of the Hobbesian and Lockeian political tradition. Rather, it is an appeal to solidify and strengthen the sense of a human community. For to be authentically human (to be “personal”) means to be social or intersubjective. The ethical accent on human dignity is not a move away from politics for the sake of the romanticism of political defeat much less of “an escape for the bewildered” and of harboring the idea of the absurd. But rather it is to bring politics close to ethics or to close the gap between politics and ethics, a two-faced Janus. I wish to defend the ethical triumph of political man, the consummation of politics.By widening the gap between ethics and politics in the name of the logic of science and value neutrality, the political behavioralist as a theorist (not as an individual actor) is totally oblivious to the ethical foundation of politics. It should be said that one cannot make a commitment noncommittally, the behavioralist's commitment to value neutrality notwith-standing.The cardinal malaise of the methodological credo of value neutrality is the indifference to or insensibility of political behavioralism to the living dialectic of truth and action when its declared aim is merely to acquire knowledge whose subject matter is the anonymous object inhumanly called “man.” It is the conspiracy of political epistemology narrowly conceived rather than political silence or depoliticization which is on trial in a phenomenological critique of political behavioralism. To summon the credo of relevance to remove the barriers of political silence or to solicit the politicization of the political science profession alone is, though a leap forward, far short of resolving the predicament endemic to political behavioralism as an adequate theory of politics. (shrink)

This article examines valuation and payment practices of psychoanalysts in Buenos Aires, Argentina. Psychoanalysts do not use explicit sliding scales but rather reach an agreement about fees in conversation with the patient. This negotiation is conducted with some principles of gift-giving, where parties try to give more, rather than through competitive bargaining (an inverted bazaar). Drawing on the sociology of money, morals and markets, and valuation studies literatures, I distinguish four factors to explain this: 1) Some formally (...) produced prices as well as market mechanisms shape benchmarks for fees, but the peculiar service psychologists offer (which makes quality judgments hard), the way patients and therapists are matched, and the lack of public information about prices allow for high flexibility in price-setting; these are structural factors that remain unsaid in the conversation on fees. 2) A professional narrative that highlights a responsibility towards patients that should not be contaminated by economic interest. 3) Psychoanalysts’ elaborations on the meanings of the payment, which should reflect the uniqueness of each patient and the bond analyst-patient and symbolize the patient’s commitment to treatment, involving a cost and a loss beyond the economic. 4) The prevalence of cash, face-to-face payment without intermediaries, which helps desacralize the analyst and disentangle the session from the rest of the economic life of the analyst, but impedes evading moralization of the transaction. Payments in psychoanalysis are delicate arrangements, and analysts often stress about valuation and payments. They have to be careful to ensure this flexibility results in morally acceptable transactions. (shrink)

The principle of economy favours the theory which gives the most accurate predictions; of two equally accurate theories, economy favours the one which incorporates least metaphysics. The intention is to show that were metaphysical commitments of theories openly acknowledged and simplicity and other virtues generally accepted as judges in theory choice, the progress rate of science would likely become more optimal.

이 글은 들뢰즈가 주장했던 개념에 대한 분명한 이해를 목적으로 기획되었다. 일찍이 들뢰즈는 사르트르의 타인-구조에 대해 구조주의의 선구자로서의 면모를 갖추었다고 상찬한 바 있지만, 그것을 ‘시선’을 통해 정의함으로써 결국 타자를 또 다시 주체와 대상의 범주로 떨어지게 만들었다며 아쉬워했다. 부정과 모순 을 기반으로 하고 있는 주체철학의 구도에서 축조된 사르트르의 타인이론은 결국 에 머물 수밖에 없기 때문이다. 게다가 능동적인 의 재인능력은 만을 가능하도록 이끎으로써 우리의 사유를 치명적으로 제한하는 문제점을 안고 있다. 따라서 들뢰즈는 서양철학에서의 선-철학적 전제로 인해 재현적 사유만이 가능한 인격 적인 주체 개념을 비인격적 (...) 개체인 로 대신하였을 뿐만 아니라, 재인으로부터 를 구하기 위해, 즉 에 관심 을 쏟았고 그러는 가운데 로 을 지목함으로써 의 구도를 벗어나게 된다. 그 과정을 톺아보면 사르트르의 타인-시선 구조는 들뢰즈에게 전 해져 지각장의 한 구조로서의 타인과 절대적 구조인 으로 좀 더 면밀 히 구분되는데, 이 절대적인 구조는 그것을 채우는 항들에 앞서 존재하는 것이 아니라 중 단 없이 연속적으로 변이하며 전개되어 간다. 이처럼 타인-구조와 개체화는 긴밀히 연관 되어 있기에, 만약 우리가 진정 새로워지고 싶다면 우선 재현의 개체화만을 일으키는 기존 의 타인-구조를 와해시킴으로써 창조적 사유자인 로 거듭나기 위한 조건을 만들 어야만 한다. 이는 우리의 사유가 어떻게 재현의 방식을 벗어나 자유로워질 수 있는가 하 는 방법의 문제이기도 하며 뒤집어 말해, 우리 사유의 독특성과 다양성에 대한 설명이기도 하다. 들뢰즈의 이론을 통해 타인은 투쟁의 대상이나 유사함과 감미로움의 대상을 넘어, 이라는 고유한 의미의 타인으로 새롭게 태어난다. (shrink)

Valuations are ubiquitous. We may be for or against genetically modified food; we find some politicians irresponsible; we prefer Beethoven to rock ‘n’ roll or vice versa; some enjoy bird-watching while others find it boring; and we may think that we have to tighten up on green-house gas emissions. Valuing is pervasive and often we are not even aware that we are valuing. However, many of our valuations are ill grounded and rationally defective. They are frequently based on misinformation, sloppy (...) thinking, prejudice, and are biased in many ways as psychological research shows. For this reason there is widespread agreement among phi-losophers that we need an account of substantive valuational rationality, both for the theory of practical reasoning and for ethics as well. My main object in this paper is to outline such an account and to present a principle that allows a non-technical rational criticism of valuations. (shrink)

The paper explores the relationship between the Principle of Double Effect and Just War Theory, with emphasis on their relationship in the philosophy of Thomas Aquinas. Both PDE and JWT are of Medieval origin, and are classical exponents of medieval moral philosophy. The main connection between them is, however, that they can both be viewed as theories about permissible violence and harm, that is theories about when it is morally permissible to harm and possibly kill another human being. The (...) final point of the paper is that PDE is an important element within JWT, or rather that when just war theorists manage to justify a certain types of violence they do so by extensive use of PDE. This only applies to one part of JWT, jus in bello, which concerns the actual morality of fighting, not the right to war itself. If these assumptions can be reasonably fleshed out, and if it is possible to show that PDE is of crucial importance to certain elements of jus in bello, such as methods for justifying civilian casualties, that would entail that our own moral examinations of warfare differ precisely because we either accept or don’t accept PDE as a viable and reasonable principle in normative ethics. (shrink)

In this essay, “The Principle of Autonomy in Kant’s Moral Theory: Its Rise and Fall,” Pauline Kleingeld notes that Kant’s Principle of Autonomy, which played a central role in both the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals and the Critique of Practical Reason, disappeared by the time of the Metaphysics of Morals. She argues that its disappearance is due to significant changes in Kant’s political philosophy. The Principle of Autonomy states that one ought to act as if one were (...) giving universal laws through one’s maxims. The criterion of just legislation that Kant accepted in the mid-1780s does not require any actual consent on the part of the citizens—genuine universality is sufficient for a law to be just. Hence, at that time, Kant could indeed explicate the criterion governing the moral permissibility of one’s maxims by drawing an analogy with the criterion governing the justice of political laws. In the Metaphysics of Morals and in other works in the 1790s, however, he added the further condition that laws must be given with the consent of the citizens. With this further condition, the moral criterion was no longer fully analogous to the criterion for political laws being just. Accordingly, Kleingeld argues, Kant dropped the Principle of Autonomy, which was firmly based on that analogy. (shrink)

This article considers the difficult question of whether there are any reasons for theocratic religious devotees to affirm liberalism and liberal institutions. Swaine argues not only that there are reasons for theocrats to affirm liberalism, but that theocrats are committed rationally to three normative principles of liberty of conscience, as well. Swaine subsequently discusses three institutional and strategic implications of his arguments. First, he outlines an option of semisovereignty for theocratic communities in liberal democracies, and explains why an appropriate (...) valuation of liberty of conscience may justify a standard of that kind. Second, he addresses the question of permissible government aid for religion and symbolic endorsement of religious groups. Third, Swaine considers innovations and new approaches that could be employed internationally to better display liberal government's affirmation of religiosity, to promote liberty of conscience, and to help improve relations between liberal and theocratic parties around the globe. (shrink)

Berkeley's idealism started a revolution in philosophy. As one of the great empiricist thinkers he not only influenced British philosophers from Hume to Russell and the logical positivists in the twentieth century, he also set the scene for the continental idealism of Hegel and even the philosophy of Marx. There has never been such a radical critique of common sense and perception as that given in Berkeley's Principles of Human Knowledge (1710). His views were met with disfavour, and his (...) response to his critics was the Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous. This edition of Berkeley's two key works has an introduction which examines and in part defends his arguments for idealism, as well as offering a detailed analytical contents list, extensive philosophical notes, and an index. (shrink)

Leibniz viewed the principle of continuity, the principle that all natural changes are produced by degrees, as a useful heuristic for evaluating the truth of a theory. Since the Cartesian laws of motion entailed discontinuities in the natural order, Leibniz could safely reject it as a false theory. The principle of continuity has similar implications for analyses of Leibniz's theory of consciousness. I briefly survey the three main interpretations of Leibniz's theory of consciousness and argue that (...) the standard account entails a discontinuity that Leibniz could not allow. I argue that the principle of continuity and the textual data favor an interpretation according to which a conscious mental state just is a perception that is distinct to a sufficient degree. (shrink)

We give an explicit axiomatic formulation of the quantum measurement theory which is free of the projection postulate. It is based on the generalized nondemolition principle applicable also to the unsharp, continuous-spectrum and continuous-in-time observations. The “collapsed state-vector” after the “objectification” is simply treated as a random vector of the a posterioristate given by the quantum filtering, i.e., the conditioning of the a prioriinduced state on the corresponding reduced algebra. The nonlinear phenomenological equation of “continuous spontaneous localization” has been (...) derived from the Schrödinger equation as a case of the quantum filtering equation for the diffusive nondemolition measurement. The quantum theory of measurement and filtering suggests also another type of the stochastic equation for the dynamical theory of continuous reduction, corresponding to the counting nondemolition measurement, which is more relevant for the quantum experiments. (shrink)

xi should hope for "first and foremost" from any historical investigation, including his own, was that "it may not be too tedious. " II That hope is generally realized in Mach's historical writings, most of which are as lively and interesting now as they were when they appeared. Mach did not follow any existing model of historical or philosophical or scientific exposition, but went at things his own way combining the various approaches as needed to reach the goals he set (...) for himself. When he is at his best we get a sense of the Mach whom William James met on a visit to Prague, the Mach whose four hours of "unforgettable conversation" gave the forty year old, well traveled James the strongest "impression of pure intellectual genius" he had yet received, and whose "absolute simplicity of manner and winningness of smile" captivated him completely. 12 Consider, for example, the first few chapters of this book, Principles of the Theory of Heat, which Mach devotes to the notion of temperature, that most fundamental of all thermal concepts. He begins by trying to trace the path that leads from our sensations of hot and cold to a numerical temperature scale. (shrink)

Maintaining plural values is important when there is no conclusive principle by which the relative priority of normative positions can be determined. Value-articulating institutions predicated upon such principles have a low pluralistic potential. In response to the failures of stated-preference approaches to economic valuation, new perspectives have been developed to capture plural values. Three broad approaches are identified. The first, functional diversification, seeks to encompass the multiple qualities of the object of valuation, whereas positional modification enforces a (...) particular mode of thinking on the subject. Both entail a prior judgement of values and benefit from a reduction in the range of values. Eventually, therefore, both approaches collapse pluralism to a problem that can be tackled. The third approach, structural reconstruction, has greater pluralistic potential, recognising that the more diverse and uncertain the object of valuation, the more compelling it is. (shrink)

In this paper an outline of a metaphysical conception of modern science is presented in which a fundamental distinction is drawn between scientific principles, laws and theories. On this view, ontologicalprinciples, rather than e.g. empirical data, constitute the core of science. The most fundamental of these principles are three in number, being, more particularly (A) the principle of the uniformity of nature, (B) the principle of the perpetuity of substance, and (C) the principle of causality.These three principles (...) set basic constraints on the methodology of both empirical and theoretical science. The uniformity principle is central to the empirical aspect of science, suggesting a methodology consisting in the attempt to discover empiricallaws, while the causality principle is central to the theoretical aspect of science, suggesting the postulation of scientifictheories capable of indicating the causal basis of the laws. And the perpetuity principle functions so as to form a bridge between the theories and the laws. (shrink)

The principle of relevance of Sperber and Wilson (1995) underestimates the role of cooperation, and the theory’s inclination toward an individual intentionality is problematic. These are two of the critical observations that this paper introduces and discusses. Through a constant counterpoint with the aforementioned authors, the core arguments of their theory are analyzed in each section of this paper. The discussion will allow us to observe why it is necessary to include the notions of cooperation and collective intention (...) in the explanation of the relevance theory and, at the same time, the concept of trust . Finally, it is also important to stress the distinction between the informative and argumentative conversational modes to achieve a full understanding of relevance. (shrink)

A principle, according to which any scientific theory can be mathematized, is investigated. Social science, liberal arts, history, and philosophy are meant first of all. That kind of theory is presupposed to be a consistent text, which can be exhaustedly represented by a certain mathematical structure constructively. In thus used, the term “theory” includes all hypotheses as yet unconfirmed as already rejected. The investigation of the sketch of a possible proof of the principle demonstrates that it should (...) be accepted rather a metamathematical axiom about the relation of mathematics and reality. The main statement is formulated as follows: Any scientific theory admits isomorphism to some mathematical structure in a way constructive. Its investigation needs philosophical means. Husserl’s phenomenology is what is used, and then the conception of “bracketing reality” is modelled to generalize Peano arithmetic in its relation to set theory in the foundation of mathematics. The obtained model is equivalent to the generalization of Peano arithmetic by means of replacing the axiom of induction with that of transfinite induction. The sketch of the proof is organized in five steps: a generalization of epoché; involving transfinite induction in the transition between Peano arithmetic and set theory; discussing the finiteness of Peano arithmetic; applying transfinite induction to Peano arithmetic; discussing an arithmetical model of reality. Accepting or rejecting the principle, two kinds of mathematics appear differing from each other by its relation to reality. Accepting the principle, mathematics has to include reality within itself in a kind of Pythagoreanism. These two kinds are called in paper correspondingly Hilbert mathematics and Gödel mathematics. The sketch of the proof of the principle demonstrates that the generalization of Peano arithmetic as above can be interpreted as a model of Hilbert mathematics into Gödel mathematics therefore showing that the former is not less consistent than the latter, and the principle is an independent axiom. The present paper follows a pathway grounded on Husserl’s phenomenology and “bracketing reality” to achieve the generalized arithmetic necessary for the principle to be founded in alternative ontology, in which there is no reality external to mathematics: reality is included within mathematics. That latter mathematics is able to self-found itself and can be called Hilbert mathematics in honour of Hilbert’s program for self-founding mathematics on the base of arithmetic. The principle of universal mathematizability is consistent to Hilbert mathematics, but not to Gödel mathematics. Consequently, its validity or rejection would resolve the problem which mathematics refers to our being; and vice versa: the choice between them for different reasons would confirm or refuse the principle as to the being. An information interpretation of Hilbert mathematics is involved. It is a kind of ontology of information. The Schrödinger equation in quantum mechanics is involved to illustrate that ontology. Thus the problem which of the two mathematics is more relevant to our being is discussed again in a new way A few directions for future work can be: a rigorous formal proof of the principle as an independent axiom; the further development of information ontology consistent to both kinds of mathematics, but much more natural for Hilbert mathematics; the development of the information interpretation of quantum mechanics as a mathematical one for information ontology and thus Hilbert mathematics; the description of consciousness in terms of information ontology. (shrink)

We revisit Heisenberg indeterminacy principle in the light of the Galois-Grothendieck theory for the case of finite abelian Galois extensions. In this restricted framework, the Galois-Grothendieck duality between finite K-algebras split by a Galois extension L and finite Gal-sets can be reformulated as a Pontryagin-like duality between two abelian groups. We then define a Galoisian quantum theory in which the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle between conjugate canonical variables can be understood as a form of Galoisian duality: the larger the (...) group of automorphisms H of the states in a G-set O = G/H, the smaller the ``conjugate'' observable algebra that can be consistently valuated on such states. We then argue that this Galois indeterminacy principle can be understood as a particular case of the Heisenberg indeterminacy principle formulated in terms of the notion of entropic indeterminacy. Finally, we argue that states endowed with a group of automorphisms H can be interpreted as squeezed coherent states, i.e. as states that minimize the Heisenberg indeterminacy relations. (shrink)

The book considers foundational thinking in quantum theory, focusing on the role the fundamental principles and principle thinking there, including thinking that leads to the invention of new principles, which is, the book contends, one of the ultimate achievements of theoretical thinking in physics and beyond. The focus on principles, prominent during the rise and in the immediate aftermath of quantum theory, has been uncommon in more recent discussions and debates concerning it. The book argues, (...) however, that exploring the fundamental principles and principle thinking is exceptionally helpful in addressing the key issues at stake in quantum foundations and the seemingly interminable debates concerning them. Principle thinking led to major breakthroughs throughout the history of quantum theory, beginning with the old quantum theory and quantum mechanics, the first definitive quantum theory, which it remains within its proper (nonrelativistic) scope. It has, the book also argues, been equally important in quantum field theory, which has been the frontier of quantum theory for quite a while now, and more recently, in quantum information theory, where principle thinking was given new prominence. The approach allows the book to develop a new understanding of both the history and philosophy of quantum theory, from Planck's quantum to the Higgs boson, and beyond, and of the thinking the key founding figures, such as Einstein, Bohr, Heisenberg, Schrödinger, and Dirac, as well as some among more recent theorists. The book also extensively considers the nature of quantum probability, and contains a new interpretation of quantum mechanics, "the statistical Copenhagen interpretation." Overall, the book's argument is guided by what Heisenberg called "the spirit of Copenhagen," which is defined by three great divorces from the preceding foundational thinking in physics-reality from realism, probability from causality, and locality from relativity-and defined the fundamental principles of quantum theory accordingly. (shrink)

Stakeholder theory has become a central issue in the literature on business ethics / business and society. There are, however, a number of problems with stakeholder theory as currently understood. Among these are: 1) the lack of a coherent justificatory framework, 2) the problem of adjudicating between stakeholders, and 3) the problem of stakeholder identification. In this essay, I propose that a possible source of obligations to stakeholders is the principle of fairness (or fair play) as discussed in (...) the political philosophic literature of Rawls, Simmons, and Cullity among others. The principle of fairness states that, “Whenever persons or groups of persons voluntarily accept the benefits of a mutually beneficial scheme of co-operation requiring sacrifice or contribution on the parts of the participants and there exists the possibility of free-riding, there exist obligations of fairness on the part of these persons or groups to co-operate in proportion to the benefits accepted.” In this essay I discuss the gaps in the current stakeholder literature, elucidate and defend a principle of fairness that fills the gap, compare the fairness model to other similar models of business ethics, and draw some conclusions for the future of stakeholder theory. (shrink)

" The supreme principle, both in politics and in private life, should be to promote all that is creative, and so to diminish the impulses and desires that center round possession." This book, originally entitled Why Men Fight, is generally seen as the fullest expression of Bertrand Russell's political philosophy. Russell argues that after the experience of the Great War the individualistic approach of traditional liberalism had reached its limits. Political theory must be based on the motivated forces of (...) creativity and impulse rather than on competition. The ideas expressed in Principles of Social Reconstruction have greatly contributed to Russell's fame as a social critic and anti-war activist. The introduction by Richard Rempel locates them in the context of Russell's other writings and show that neither his ideas nor his language have lost their force and topicality over the years. (shrink)

The general topic of this book is the theory of categories, its sources, meaning and development. The inquiry can be seen to proceed on two levels. On one, the history of the theory is traced from its alleged genesis in Aristotle, through its main subsequent stages of Kant and Hegel, up to a kind of consummation in two of its prominent twentieth century adherents, Alfred North White head and Nicolai Hartmann. Special attention has been paid to that aspect (...) of the Hegelian conception of the categorial analysis from which the principle of coherence emerged. On the second, deeper level, however, everything starts with Whitehead's metaphysical system, the central part of which con sists of a fascinating, though highly intricate, web of categorial notions and propositions. The historical perspective becomes a means for untangling that web. I am indebted to a number of people for advice, comment and criticism of various parts of this book. My greatest thanks go to my teachers and colleagues Nathan Rotenstreich, Nathan Spiegel, Yaakov Fleischman, as well as to the late Shmuel Hugo Bergman and Pepita Haezrachi. of this book was published in 1967 by An earlier, Hebrew version the Bialik Institute of Jerusalem. I am grateful to Mr Yehoshua Perel, Mr Arnold Schwartz and to my wife Varda for their cooperation in rendering the extensively revised text of the book into readable English. I also owe great appreciation to Miss Liat Dawe for an accurate and painstaking word-processing of the text. (shrink)

The contributions of few contemporary scientists have been as far reaching in their effects as those of Nobel Laureate Werner Heisenberg.

Principles of Behavioral Economics, written by an acknowledged leader in the field, provides a comprehensive introduction to one of the most exciting areas of modern economics. It demonstrates how models of economic theory can be enriched by using interdisciplinary insights from psychology, sociology, evolutionary biology, and neuroscience to build the basis for a more empirically supported set of economic principles. Unique in its level of rigor and lucidity, the book highlights the important link between theoretical and empirical (...) economics by demonstrating the usefulness of a range of data sources such as observational data, lab data, survey data, and neuroeconomic data. This field-defining textbook argues that behavioral economics is not just a supplement to mainstream economics. Taking behavioral economics seriously requires a total rethink, and eventual transformation, of every area of economics. (shrink)

THE PRINCIPLE OF SUPERPOSITION. The need for a quantum theory Classical mechanics has been developed continuously from the time of Newton and applied to an ...

Nelson's stochastic formulation of quantum theory is briefly surveyed and put in relation to the classical stochastic formalisms. The approach is investigated comparatively with the Bohm-Vigier model of stochastic fluctuations. Parallels to the causal interpretation of de Broglie-Bohm are drawn.

This article argues that a successful answer to Hume's problem of induction can be developed from a sub-genre of philosophy of science known as formal learning theory. One of the central concepts of formal learning theory is logical reliability: roughly, a method is logically reliable when it is assured of eventually settling on the truth for every sequence of data that is possible given what we know. I show that the principle of induction (PI) is necessary and sufficient (...) for logical reliability in what I call simple enumerative induction. This answer to Hume's problem rests on interpreting PI as a normative claim justified by a non-empirical epistemic means-ends argument. In such an argument, a rule of inference is shown by mathematical or logical proof to promote a specified epistemic end. Since the proof concerning PI and logical reliability is not based on inductive reasoning, this argument avoids the circularity that Hume argued was inherent in any attempt to justify PI. (shrink)

This article focuses on the ethical implications of so-called ‘collateral damage’. It develops a moral typology of collateral harm to innocents, which occurs as a side effect of military or quasi-military action. Distinguishing between accidental and incidental collateral damage, it introduces four categories of such damage: negligent, oblivious, knowing and reckless collateral damage. Objecting mainstream versions of the doctrine of double effect, the article argues that in order for any collateral damage to be morally permissible, violent agents must comply with (...) high standards of care. In order for incidental harm to be permissible, an agent must take pains to avoid such harm even at higher cost to him- or herself. It is argued that accidentally but negligently caused collateral damage may be just as difficult to excuse as incidental harm. Only if high precautionary standards of care are met, can unintended harm to innocents – incidental or accidental – be permissible. In practice, such a strong commitment to avoiding harm to civilians may well lead us to question more generally and rethink more radically how violent conflicts ought to be fought, how military violence ought to be used and whether there are better ways of achieving those aims that we think are legitimate than those we are currently using. (shrink)