The Heirs of Plato is the first full study of the various directions in philosophy taken by Plato's followers in the first seventy years after his death in 347 BC - the period generally known as 'The Old Academy', unjustly neglected by historians of philosophy. Lucid and accessible, John Dillon's book provides an introductory chapter on the school itself, and a summary of Plato's philosophical heritage, before looking at each of the school heads and other chief characters, exploring both (...) what holds them together and what sets them apart. (shrink)

The Heirs of Plato is the first book exclusively devoted to an in-depth study of the various directions in philosophy taken by Plato's followers in the first seventy years or so following his death in 347 BC--the period generally known as 'The Old Academy'. Speusippus, Xenocrates, and Polemon, the three successive heads of the Academy in this period, though personally devoted to the memory of Plato, were independent philosophers in their own right, and felt free to develop his (...) heritage in individual directions. Dillon's clear and accessible book fills a significant gap in our understanding of Plato's immediate philosophical influence, and will be of great value to scholars and historians of ancient philosophy. (shrink)

The Old Academy developed in an unplanned fashion and, as its structure evolved, changes in leadership and institutional culture were mirrored by shifting Academic historical traditions. As the Old Academy became an institution that presented a systematized philosophy, its leadership placed increased emphasis upon traditions about Plato and other Academic leaders that illustrated the power and practical application of this Academic teaching. This suggests a conscious attempt by the scholarchs of the Old Academy to craft a distinctive (...) institutional identity centred as much upon the character and exemplary lifestyle of its leadership as upon its specific doctrinal teaching. (shrink)

: By examining the passage on virtues in the Epinomis, possibly by Philip of Opus, I aim to show that the ethical theory expounded there differs both from the account of the Laws and from the notions we find in the fragmentary evidence concerning the Old Academy. Unlike the account in the Laws the unity of virtue is provided, not by justice, but by piety interpreted as a virtue involving mathematics, especially astronomy. The peculiar importance of mathematics in virtue (...) is not attested in any of the other authors of the Old Academy. (shrink)

As the first President of the Royal Academy of Arts, Joshua Reynolds played a pivotal role in shaping the course of British art in the 18th century. In these discourses, Reynolds reflects on the nature of art, the role of the artist, and the importance of aesthetic education. With insightful commentary on the works of the Old Masters and a wealth of practical advice for aspiring artists, this volume is a must-read for anyone interested in the history of art (...) or art theory. This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work is in the "public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC)Carlos SteelJohn M. Dillon. The Heirs of Plato: A Study of the Old Academy (347–274 BC). Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2003. Pp. x + 252. Cloth, $65.00.When Plato died, in 347 BC, he left behind not only the collection of philosophical dialogues we still read with admiration, but also a remarkable organization, the "Academy," wherein (...) his students continued the discussion he had initiated. Dillon's latest book is an attempt to recreate the intellectual climate in the Academy during the first generations after Plato's death, the "Old Academy," called thus to distinguish it from the "New Academy," which started with Arcesilaus in the mid 270's, who abandoned doctrinal speculations for a sceptical stance. Given the elusive nature of the dialogues, the interpretation of Plato's philosophy has been controversial from the beginning. Therefore, scholars always have been eager to know in which direction Plato's first successors—Speusippus, Xenocrates, Polemo—took the Academy; thus they hoped to find some justification for their own interpretation of Plato. Unfortunately, our information on the doctrines of Plato's first successors is scarce. Browsing through the fragments collected by scholars, one may be tempted to conclude that it is not such a great disaster that most texts of the Old Academy have been lost. For it seems that the Academy after Plato was leaning towards a rather esoteric metaphysical speculation about the first principles, which makes us lament on what has become of the philosophical heritage of Plato, a genius fallen into the hands of epigones. One gets the impression that the original and refreshing philosophical contributions came from outside the Academy, from the Lyceum founded by Aristotle and continued by Theophrastus, and later from Epicurus and Zeno and their new schools, which will dominate the Hellenistic period. This, however, is not the view of Dillon: "It will be the thesis of this book that Speusippus and Xenocrates set the agenda for what was to become, over the succeeding centuries, the intellectual tradition which we call Platonism" (v). Even early Stoicism is, in Dillon's view, a "development and formalization of contemporary Platonism" (235).In an introductory chapter Dillon discusses the location and juridical structure of the Academy and gives a general survey of the main doctrines of the school. The following three chapters present the lives, work and thought of the first heads of the Academy; a final chapter is devoted to some minor members of the early Academy. The book concludes with a short epilogue on Arcesilaus and the reasons for his turn to scepticism. Dillon is an [End Page 204] excellent writer who knows how to tease out and expound the most abstruse philosophical doctrines in a captivating way, mixing, as he does here, biographical anecdotes and witty comments with a sharp analysis of arguments and a speculative reconstruction of lost doctrines. I doubt, however, whether this book will become such a classic as his celebrated The Middle Platonists (Ithaca, 1977).My first worry is anticipated by Dillon himself: "This is perforce a rather speculative book, and no doubt it will be criticized for that" (vii). Dillon defends himself against this critique: I have tried, he says, "to put the most favourable construction on the evidence available to us," his assumption being that the figures he is dealing with "were not philosophical imbeciles"(vii). My reservations are not about Dillon's attempt to construct a coherent doctrine using all relevant information on an author, but about his method of reconstruction, in particular his speculation and his preference for often questionable later material to fill the gaps in our information. "With a good deal of speculation, our exiguous information on Polemo's philosophical position can be fleshed out somewhat" (176). Thus, in his exposition of Speusippus's doctrine of the first principles, Dillon does not start from Aristotle, considering him too biased, but from chapter 4 of Iamblichus's treatise De communi mathematica scientia. In this Neo-Pythagorean treatise, Speusippus is not even mentioned. Even if there are arguments, as Dillon believes, to attribute the doctrine of Chapter 4 to Speusippus, one should... (shrink)

The Alcibiades purports to offer us the very first conversation between Socrates and Alcibiades. Previously, it seems, Socrates has just lingered at the back of a crowd of lovers looking rather stupid. This is hardly surprising. Socrates did look stupid, and both Aristophanes and his rival Ameipsias thought that he was good enough material for a laugh to present him on stage in their comedies at the Dionysia of 423 BC. The only slight surprise here is that Alcibiades, though he (...) is mentioned in other Aristophanic comedies, is never actually named in the Clouds. One might suspect that the young man Pheidippides, whom Socrates exposes to the corrupting influence of philosophic argument and the ensuing amoral attitudes, bears some relationship to Alcibiades. He shares with him a partially Alcmaeonid background, a passion for horse-racing, and an interesting lisp, but as the play stands Pheidippides is never seen as having been in any way close to Socrates.1 Their relationship is in fact akin to one between the principal of a college and an individual first-year student, with no sinister overtones whatever. I doubt that the relationship with Alcibiades had by that stage been seen as in any way unusual; either its bizarre nature was a well-kept secret, or it was not seen as very unusual after all. Alcibiades had experienced the attentions of a host of would-be lovers, so what would have made Socrates special? (shrink)

In this book, William H. F. Altman turns to Demosthenes-universally regarded as Plato's student in antiquity-and Plato's other Athenian students in order to add external and historical evidence for Plato's original curriculum.

This article is currently available as a free download on ingentaconnect.

El presente artículo tiene lugar a partir de un estudio de caso autoetnográfico basado en experiencia de acoso laboral de la autora en una universidad española. El objetivo central del trabajo es examinar, desde un abordaje de ética aplicada, la compleja trama de poder en la que emergen y se desarrollan prácticas de violencia y acoso laboral en instituciones académicas y universitarias. Frente a los dispositivos que facilitan la perpetuación de estas prácticas de violencia y exclusión, así como su naturalización, (...) el artículo propone revisitarlas a la luz de los criterios de las éticas organizacionales y los liderazgos morales, en aras de enriquecer las herramientas ya existentes en distintas universidades para detectar acoso y promover éticas colectivas. El artículo argumenta la necesidad de potenciar las estrategias multimodales contra el acoso laboral en la academia, a fin de que realmente sean efectivas y no parte de protocolos meramente formales. Finalmente, se propone apelar a una profunda crítica desde la ética filosófica en torno a los discursos y prácticas de acoso laboral académico y universitario, para erradicar las violencias no sólo en estas instituciones sino en cualquier ámbito de la vida social. ABSTRACT This article arises from an autoethnographic case study based on the author’s experience of harassment at work in a Spanish university. The main objective is to examine from an approach of applied ethics, the complex web of power in which emerge and develop practices of violence and harassment in academic and university institutions. Against the dispositive that facilitate the perpetuation of these practices of violence and exclusion, as well as their naturalization; the article proposes to revisit them in the light of the criteria of organizational ethics and moral leaderships, to enrich the tools already existing in different universities to detect mobbing and promote collective ethics of others. The article shows and argues the need to strengthen and radicalize the multimodal strategies to eradicate mobbing in the academy and the university so that they are effective and not part of merely formal protocols. Finally, it proposes to appeal to a deep criticism from the philosophy and ethics around the speeches and practices of academic and university mobbing to eradicate violence not only in these institutions but in any area of social life. (shrink)

Women’s entry into the legal academy in significant numbers—first as students, then as faculty—was a 1970s and 1980s phenomenon. During those decades, women in law schools struggled: first, for admission and inclusion as individual students on a formally equal footing with male students; then for parity in their numbers in classes and on faculties; and, eventually, for some measure of substantive equality across various parameters, including their performance and evaluation both in and in front of the classroom, as well (...) as in the quality of their experiences as students and faculty members and in the benefits to be reaped from their tenure. This part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 1980s—a story of attempted admission, then inclusion, then integration and assimilation, and then, finally, equality—is now a familiar one, at least in broad outline. It is not, in its entirety, an uplifting story. According to a raft of articles produced by women law students in the 1980s, 1990s, and 2000s, women law students during those decades participated less in the classroom, were called on and responded to differently when they did participate, suffered from more law-school-induced anxiety disorders and other mental health issues, graduated with lower GPAs and less law review experience, published fewer notes and filled fewer editorial positions on those journals, held fewer leadership positions overall while in law school, and had far more difficulties connecting with mentors, teachers, and would-be recommenders among the faculty than male students. Women law professors during those decades were tenured at significantly lower rates than men and, particularly at high prestige schools and at schools with fewer female faculty among the tenured ranks, were hired at lower rates that did not reflect their number in the pool of qualified applicants, had trouble asserting or maintaining authority in the classroom or being perceived as having authority, taught lower-prestige courses and received low teaching evaluations, and, like their students, were published far less frequently in the major and most prestigious law reviews. Much of this, albeit not all, has not changed much for either students or faculty. As women in law schools enter the posttenure and midcareer phase, many of the old problems persist while new ones appear: women faculty are invited to participate on panels less often than men, and both women students and faculty are underrepresented as authors in law reviews. Although gender-neutral parental leave is now available to faculty at most law schools, many such policies are still ad hoc. There is considerable worry, although no hard evidence, over whether men disproportionately use the time off to write rather than care for children. Women are still disproportionately overrepresented in some fields and underrepresented or unrepresented in others, and those fields correlate in unsurprising ways with levels of prestige: the more women in a field, the less prestigious. As elsewhere in the workforce, women faculty in legal education suffer from sexual harassment, most of which is unremedied. Women still suffer a pay gap in law schools that remains unaddressed at most universities, as it does elsewhere in academia. There is a sizeable literature on these depressing phenomena that stubbornly do not seem to abate. In these comments, however, I want to focus on another, less appreciated, part of the story of women’s entry into the legal academy in the 1970s and 1980s: the emergence of a body of scholarship—sometimes called feminist legal theory—produced by some of these women legal scholars over the same time period. The story I want to focus on, in other words, is not that of second- or third-wave women’s struggles within the academy, either for admission, acceptance, assimilation, or equality in law schools. Rather, this Article focuses on the story of the scholarship some of those second-wave assimilated women produced once they got there. Feminist jurisprudence, understood largely as scholarship on issues pertaining to gender equality, was launched in the 1970s, endures today, and continues to shape debates. Feminist legal theory, however, was in effect a subfield within feminist jurisprudence and, as its name implies, was an attempt to fashion a broad- based theoretical account of the relationship of law in liberal legal regimes to women’s subordination, patriarchy, and gender and sexual inequality— particularly in a post–civil rights era, when women enjoyed broad access to rights of formal equality, reproductive liberty, and liberal antidiscrimination law. Feminist legal theory so understood—a body of scholarship in search of a theoretical understanding of the relation of law to women’s subordination or, more simply, of law and patriarchy—was birthed in the 1970s, nurtured in the 1980s, and matured in the 1990s. I suggest in this Article that it is now seemingly in decline, and may soon disappear altogether. The reasons for this trajectory, I believe, are to date unexplored. Some reasons are fairly self-evident. Feminist legal theory was a product of three time-specific factors peculiar to the 1970s and 1980s: it reflected the political and the legal struggles of second-wave feminism. The critical theory schools were, to varying degrees, present or thriving in the academy in the 1970s and 1980s, within which feminist legal theory was birthed, grew, and then coexisted with critical theory, albeit at times very uneasily; and this feminist theory reflected second-wave women faculty and students’ mixed experiences of assimilation, success, and alienation in law schools themselves, as briefly recited above. Those three factors—the background politics, the presence of critical theory in law schools, and the differences in women’s experience of those schools—are all themselves either disappearing or dissipating in felt urgency, albeit in different ways and at different speeds, and that dissipation clearly is a part of the story of feminist legal theory’s decline. There are other reasons for its decline as well, however. Some are internal to feminism and feminist theory, and some pertain to the changing nature of legal scholarship from the 1980s to the present. I explore these reasons in Part II below. The story of the development of a distinctively feminist legal theory during the 1970s through the 1990s, and the story of its decline in the 2000s, is of obvious relevance to the history of second- and third-wave feminism. It should also be of interest for what it reveals about the nature of legal scholarship as it was understood, received, and produced in those decades. Its decline likewise reveals something about the changing nature of legal scholarship and the legal academy today. Thus, one conclusion I draw is that the feminist legal theory of the 1970s through the 1990s—regardless of the truth or lasting power of its claims—stands as an example of a type of legal scholarship that was somewhat distinctive to those decades. That form of legal scholarship, furthermore, likely can only emanate from the legal academy. For a host of reasons, we are currently in danger of losing this entire genre of intellectual work, which would be the polity’s loss, not just feminism’s or the legal academy’s. (shrink)

This paper revisits the historiography of seventeenth-century scientific academies by analyzing an informal academy established in Coimbra by André de Almada, a nobleman and professor of theology at the University of Coimbra. By promoting this academy and sponsoring the publication of science books, Almada stimulated research on astronomy and animated links of patronage, which included not only members of the universities but also the community of astronomers and astrologers active in Lisbon. This paper challenges the traditional view of (...) academic societies as innovative institutions opposed to the old-fashioned universities and provides an insight into the complex relationship established between patronage, the institutional settings, and the practices of science in a country wherein science was poorly institutionalized and political power increasingly centralized. (shrink)

Julia Annas here offers a fundamental reexamination of Plato's ethical thought by investigating the Middle Platonist perspective, which emerged at the end of Plato's own school, the Academy. She highlights the differences between ancient and modern assumptions about Plato's ethics--and stresses the need to be more critical about our own. One of these modern assumptions is the notion that the dialogues record the development of Plato's thought. Annas shows how the Middle Platonists, by contrast, viewed the dialogues as multiple (...) presentations of a single Platonic ethical philosophy, differing in form and purpose but ultimately coherent. They also read Plato's ethics as consistently defending the view that virtue is sufficient for happiness, and see it as converging in its main points with the ethics of the Stoics. Annas goes on to explore the Platonic idea that humankind's final end is "becoming like God"--an idea that is well known among the ancients but virtually ignored in modern interpretations. She also maintains that modern interpretations, beginning in the nineteenth century, have placed undue emphasis on the Republic, and have treated it too much as a political work, whereas the ancients rightly saw it as a continuation of Plato's ethical writings. (shrink)

The article purports to show that the preference of theôria in Nicomachean Ethics X 7–8 does not represent Aristotle's definitive conception of the best form of life, because it is compatible neither with his overall conception of happiness in the EN nor with its political framework. The critical chapters rather recall an early contribution of Aristotle's to a controversy on the best form of life in the Academy, attested to in Politics VII 2–3; its central point is resolved in (...) Politics VII 13–15 in a sketch of the life of leisure that combines both politics and philosophy. (shrink)

In the age of change in the institutional and conceptual setting in which the ancient tradition of Jewish learning would go forward, what we see in the two most important figures of the transitional generation is only the end of the old, not the beginning of the new. Saul Lieberman continued the received tradition that learning means exegesis of texts, but did not fully master the logic of that received tradition and so distorted it. Salo W. Baron undertook a new (...) intellectual tradition, one that pursued historical study in place of the exegesis of texts, but did. not really grasp the requirements of the kind of new history that he proposed to write. Announcing the advent of social history into the academy of Jewish learning, what he wrote as the economic part of that social history was merely the paraphrase of received texts, with glosses that look suspiciously like a kind of free-associative exegesis. While the one scholar demonstrated the decadence of an old tradition of learning, the other succeeded in showing only the difficulty of actually mastering the discourse of an entirely new academic world. (shrink)

Anyone paying the least attention to philosophy in the last four decades cannot fail to have noticed the revival of virtue ethics in Anglo-American moral philosophy. This revival, with its roots in post-war Oxford and Cambridge, has sought to reconnect ethics with the vocabulary and concepts of the ancient Greeks. By recourse to its vocabulary of virtue, moral theorists have sought a richer and deeper moral psychology as well as consideration of nature and teleology. The movement has bred some of (...) the most interesting and powerful work in recent Anglo-American ethics by thinkers as diverse as Iris Murdoch, Martha Nussbaum, and Alasdair MacIntyre, and interest in the virtues continues unabated. It has indeed spread beyond the academy into the political and cultural scene. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Salonnières and the Philosophes in Old Regime France: The Authority of Aesthetic Judgment*Jolanta T. PekaczDuring the eighteenth century a significant shift occurred in the perception of the authority of aesthetic judgment in France, from a group usually referred to as “polite society” and widely considered the exclusive source of taste (goût) to various competing groups arrogating to themselves the right to judge artistic matters. 1 In the present (...) article I discuss the changing recognition of the genders as arbiters of taste, exemplified by Parisian salonnières on the one hand, and the philosophes on the other, during two eighteenth-century quarrels over the French and Italian operas: the Querelle des Bouffons in the 1750s and the controversy between Gluckistes and Piccinistes in the 1770s. I argue that by the end of the 1770s, as a result of the collapse of the old paradigm of “polite society” of which salons were a part, Parisian salon women lost the position (however illusory it might have been) which they enjoyed in the seventeenth century as arbiters of taste. While the philosophes attended feminine salons, [End Page 277] they rejected the idea of consulting salonnières on the matters of taste (and on other matters), as was previously the case, and relegated them to formal, if not merely decorative, roles of guardians of good manners and propriety, the roles accepted by salonnières.The ousting of the salonnière from aesthetic arbitration exemplified by the two operatic quarrels may be viewed as a continuation of the process of exclusion of salon women from discursive development that began in the seventeenth century, as discussed by Erica Harth in Cartesian Women: Versions and Subversions of Rational Discourse in the Old Regime (1992) and, most recently, by Joan DeJean in Ancients against Moderns: Culture Wars and the Making of a Fin de Siècle (1997). In the seventeenth century the norms of feminine bienséance (decorum, propriety) allowed a woman to establish a salon but made it impossible for a salonnière to create a space intellectually comparable to that of the French Academy. After having lost a gendered competition for intellectual space with the Academy by the 1680s, the salon, as Erica Harth put it, “proved a discursive dead end for women.”In this essay I carry through this argument into the eighteenth century and demonstrate that salon women lost a competition with the philosophes not only in the intellectual but also in the aesthetic sphere. Salonnières did not choose not to make aesthetic judgments out of respect for the exclusive right of the philosophes to make such judgments 2 but rather were silenced by the philosophes and complied in order not to violate the limits of feminine bienséance in the public sphere, that is, to survive as salonnières. The seventeenth-century ideals of feminine bienséance taken over by eighteenth-century salonnières were no longer perceived as sufficient (or legitimate) to recognize women as arbiters of taste. In fact these ideals proved to be as detrimental as a source of authority for salon women in the siècle des lumières as they were ambiguous in the grand siècle.Ironically, not only were the eighteenth-century Parisian salonnières ousted from aesthetic arbitration, but neither did they succeed in their roles as guardians of propriety and good manners for the philosophes, that is, in keeping the Enlightenment discourse civil. In both operatic quarrels the dominant genre of discourse was a pamphlet, a libelle, not a salon conversation. While during the Querelle des Bouffons the philosophes were unanimously pro-Italian, the Gluck-Piccini quarrel caused a deep split among them, followed by fratricidal fighting, which seriously undermined their authority in public matters.I. The negative connotation associated with the epithets pedant, savant, and their derivatives in seventeenth-century French treatises on honnêteté indicates [End Page 278] that the authority of judgment of “persons of quality” in matters of taste resulted from the code of bienséances in social relations. Blaise Pascal probably best summarized arguments for the superiority of an honnête person (as opposed to a professional) in the realm of aesthetics; being an... (shrink)

First published in 1749 and reissued here in its 1765 printing, this novel by Sarah Fielding attempts to encourage young women to lives of virtue and benevolence through the story of nine girls living with their governess, Mrs Teachum, in a school in the north of England. The girls, aged between eleven and fourteen years old, learn the feminine graces and manners from various lessons and field trips organised by their teacher, as well as through the tales they tell each (...) other. Skilled in conveying moral messages in this educational context, Fielding, whose brother was the novelist Henry Fielding, had also published anonymously The Adventures of David Simple. The present work is particularly notable for being the first novel written in English expressly for children. An important text in eighteenth-century literature, it will appeal especially to readers interested in the history of women's education. (shrink)

Anyone paying the least attention to philosophy in the last four decades cannot fail to have noticed the revival of virtue ethics in Anglo-American moral philosophy. This revival, with its roots in post-war Oxford and Cambridge, has sought to reconnect ethics with the vocabulary and concepts of the ancient Greeks. By recourse to its vocabulary of virtue, moral theorists have sought a richer and deeper moral psychology as well as consideration of nature and teleology. The movement has bred some of (...) the most interesting and powerful work in recent Anglo-American ethics by thinkers as diverse as Iris Murdoch, Martha Nussbaum, and Alasdair MacIntyre, and interest in the virtues continues unabated. It has indeed spread beyond the academy into the political and cultural scene. (shrink)

The author argues, that the exigencies of inter‐school rivalry, initially between the Academy and the Peripatos, but then between later Platonists and both Stoics and Aristotelians, demanded that Platonism become more formalized than it was left by Plato himself, and that it was primarily Xenocrates, in a vast array of treatises, both general and particular, who provided the bones of this organized corpus of doctrine. Not that the Platonists were ever subject to anything like a monolithic orthodoxy. Platonic doctrine (...) was not anything handed down centrally, from above; it was rather a self‐regulating system, in which everyone knew what it meant, broadly, to be a Platonist, and managed to stay within those parameters, while squabbling vigorously with each other, as well as with the other schools. (shrink)

31 chapters covering the Old Academy to Late Antiquity. See attached TOC.

CHAPTER ONE The Old Academy and the Themes of Middle Platonism Plato, on his death in 347 BC, left behind him a philosophical heritage that has not yet lost ...

Platonists beginning in the Old Academy itself and up to and including Plotinus struggled to understand and articulate the relation between Plato’s Demiurge and the Living Animal which served as the model for creation. The central question is whether “contents” of the Living Animal, the Forms, are internal to the mind of the Demiurge or external and independent. For Plotinus, the solution depends heavily on how the Intellect that is the Demiurge and the Forms or intelligibles are to be (...) understood in relation to the first principle of all, the One or the Good. The treatise V.5 [32] sets out the case for the internality of Forms and argues for the necessary existence of an absolutely simple and transcendent first principle of all, the One or the Good. Not only Intellect and the Forms, but everything else depends on this principle for their being. (shrink)