That the present day society profits from research in many areas is evident. This has stimulated a keen desire to emulate similarly advantageous contributions in other areas. It appears to imply not only a need to know how to (better) support action in general or any action, but also how to support the act of making "better" itself (better businesses, better houses, better emotions, better objectives, etc.). Developing the latter type of knowledge has proved to pose a major challenge, however. (...) Although the challenge has been taken up in areas such as social policy, economics, therapy, management, architecture, design, and others, leading to a number of responses, a complete characterisation seems still to be lacking. Such a characterisation is attempted in this article. Typical characteristics are the inclusion of non-observational experiences and a simultaneous striving for individual and collective high quality. (shrink)

Dichotomous categories, such as the West and the rest, primitive and modern, are discussed within a phenomenological theory that suggests humans create structures through which we perceive objects. The perception of culture as an object and its construction through the epistemological practices of fieldwork and interpretation within the metaphor of West and non-Western reveals the structure of sociocultural anthropological inquiry and expresses embodiment of the cosmology of nations. Experiences of, and shared understandings regarding, the body, soul, knowledge, thoughts, emotions, memories, (...) spirits, voice, and speech are compared from descriptions, participant observation, and embodiment as a multi-site ethnographic performance artist expressing new genres of ethnography. Harmony is defined as social location. (shrink)

We hear that a glass of red wine prolongs life, that alcohol is a carcinogen, that pregnant women should drink not a drop of alcohol. Major medical journals first claimed that hormone replacement therapy reduces the risk of heart disease, then reversed themselves and said it increases the risk of heart disease. What are the effects caused by consuming alcohol or by receiving hormone replacement therapy? These are causal questions, questions about the effects caused by treatments, policies or preventable exposures. (...) Some causal questions can be studied in randomized trials, in which a coin is flipped to decide the treatment for the next experimental subject. Because randomized trials are not always practical, nor always ethical, many causal questions are investigated in non-randomized observational studies. The reversal of opinion about hormone replacement therapy occurred when a randomized clinical trial contradicted a series of earlier observational studies. Using minimal mathematics - high school algebra and coin flips -- and numerous examples, Observation and Experiment explains the key concepts and methods of causal inference. Examples of randomized experiments and observational studies are drawn from clinical medicine, economics, public health and epidemiology, clinical psychology and psychiatry. (shrink)

The main problems faced by a conception of perception as passive will be introduced through a critical examination of John McDowell's account of 'empirical thinking'. Overcoming these difficulties will lead to a conception of perception as involving an active cognitive participation of the perceiver, and an account of how observational judgment is warranted that is focused on the conditions of experience. In both cases, analogies to inquiry in scientific experimental practice will be explored.

Traditionally the intentionality of consciousness has been understood as the idea that many conscious states are about something, that they have objects in a broad sense - including states of affairs - which they represent, and it is on account of being representational that they are said to have contents. It has also been claimed, more controversially, that conscious intentional contents must be available to the subject as reasons for her judgments or actions, and that they are therefore necessarily conceptual. (...) This paper challenges the assumptions that all conscious intentional contents are representations of objects, and that they are essentially conceptual. Both assumptions will be shown to be intimately connected. The first main part of the paper offers an account of conscious intentionality that is not prejudicial on the issue of whether all intentional contents of conscious mental states represent objects which the mental state can be said to be about. The author then shows that many personal-level perceptual contents, including those involved in our evaluative stance towards aspects of the world, have non-conceptual components even on a wide construal of the conceptual sphere , allowing for demonstrative concepts. In the second main part of the paper it is argued that experiences themselves, as contrasted with what they are experiences of, are non-conceptual contents. To this purpose the author reconstructs and develops some suggestive observations found in the phenomenology of Husserl to the effect that experiences as directly presented or 'lived through' are not objects of consciousness. It is argued that this thesis, properly understood, is true and that it entails that experiences as directly presented in consciousness are themselves non-conceptual intentional contents. Husserl's thesis is illuminating and important, allowing among other things a more satisfactory account of the elusive phenomenon of depth we normally attribute to the conscious self - the idea that there is always more to our experienced selves at any moment than what we are capable of articulating at the time. (shrink)

Summary In several places Popper describes a little experiment in which an audience is given the non-specific command ‚Observe!‘ He draws a number of conclusions from this experiment, in particular that observation takes place in the presence of theoretical problems, questions, hypotheses or points of view. The paper argues that while Popper's experiment is instructive, it hardly supports the strong conclusions he draws about the theory-dominance of observation in science. In particular, it is argued that talk of principles of selection (...) which guide us to relevant observations, rather than the host of irrelevant observations of the naive inductivist, is misleading. Rather, it is the goals, aims, motives or interests of an observer that guide observation and these need not always involve a theoretical component. (shrink)

In “Study of Concepts”, Peacocke puts forward an argument for non-conceptualism derived from the possession conditions of observational concepts. In this paper, I raise two objections to this argument. First, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are scenario contents, then perceptual experiences cannot present perceivers with the circumstances specified by the application conditions of observational concepts and, therefore, they cannot play the semantic and epistemic roles Peacocke wants them to play in the possession conditions of these concepts. (...) Second, I argue that if non-conceptual perceptual contents are protopropositions, then Peacocke’s account of the possession conditions of observational concepts falls into the Myth of the Given. (shrink)

The thesis is intended to contribute to the growing understanding of the indispensable role played by phenomenal consciousness in human cognition, and specifically in making our concepts of the external world available. The focus falls on so called observational concepts, a type of rudimentary, perceptually-based objective concepts in our repertoire — picking out manifest properties such as colors and shapes. A theory of such concepts gets provided, and, consequently, the exact role that perceptual consciousness plays in making concepts of (...) this sort available gets settled. In the first half of the thesis, observational concepts get construed as a special type of recognitional concepts. On an analogy with perceptual demonstratives, having such concepts would involve having non-trivial knowledge of their reference. The experiential basis of such concepts would, among other things, provide for such constitutive knowledge. The theoretical background relevant to the hypothesis gets provided in the first chapter. A defence of the hypothesis follows in the second. In the second half of the thesis, care is taken to distinguish among two ways in which the constitutive knowledge of the reference of an observational concept could be fleshed out. In the third chapter, perceptual experience is shown to provide the basis both for knowledge of observational properties by acquaintance, and for knowledge of the essence of such properties — provided that knowledge of essence gets construed in the right, modest way. It might be natural to take knowledge by acquaintance to be the sort relevant to observational concept possession, especially given that in the case of perceptual demonstratives this is the role likely played by experience. However, this initial impression proves to be mistaken. The constitutive knowledge of the referent of an observational concept turns out to consist in the capacity to determine a priori the essence of the respective property. To show this, an argument gets provided in the penultimate fourth chapter, based on the key role played by experiences of instances of observational properties in optimal viewing conditions in enabling the possession of the respective observational concept. (shrink)

EEGs were analyzed to investigate the effect of experiences in listening to preferred music in dancers and non-dancers. Participants passively listened to instrumental music of their preferred genre for 2 min, alternate genres, and silence. Both groups showed increased activity for their preferred music compared to non-preferred music in the gamma, beta, and alpha frequency bands. The results suggest all participants' conscious recognition of and affective responses to their familiar music, appreciation of the tempo embedded in their preferred music and (...) emotional arousal, and enhanced attention mechanism for cognitive operations such as memory retrieval. The observed alpha activity is considered in the framework of the alpha functional inhibition hypothesis, in that years of experience listening to their favorite type of music may have honed the cerebral responses to achieve efficient cortical processes. Analyses of the electroencephalogram activity over 100s-long music pieces revealed a difference between dancers and non-dancers in the magnitude of an initial alpha event-related desynchronization and the later development of an alpha event-related synchronization for their preferred music. Dancers exhibited augmented alpha ERD, as well as augmented and uninterrupted alpha ERS over the remaining 80s. This augmentation in dancers is hypothesized to be derived from creative cognition or motor imagery operations developed through their dance experiences. (shrink)

During a showing of the video Some Everybodies, which observes tourist behaviour at a non-tourist site in Bath, the work will be discussed as evolving through non-dualist processes of film-making (enabled through new technology), whilst also attempting to create a non-dualist filmic experience for the spectator. Shot with a fixed-frame camera at a corner scene (which is the site of a minor accident), the film does not possess a traditional narrative structure or design, and has been described as a (...) moving painting. There is no central character (people are viewed more as moving bodies), and the momentum (rather than linear progression of scenes) has been made entirely in the editing suite, rather than on-site through a directorial eye. Dialogue from the site has been included as a multivalent communal poem that scrolls as subtitles beneath the images. Here the traditional understanding of subtitles is, once again, questioned, and they no longer exist as semiotic colonizers of othered national experiences, but evolve as asides from the passers-by themselves. Time-as-intervention will be discussed through the bleached colouration of the pictorial image, reminiscent of old postcards. This visual sense of well-worn familiarity is juxtaposed against a soundtrack that has been slowed down, creating primal groans and utterances. The significance of still-images within film-making will be explored, as the narrative freezes whilst the tourists themselves freeze, or snap, their own narratives. These mementos are also included on postcards and posters as part of a larger installation. The walk-through, yet high-walled cross design of the installation creates corners (said to be the places where people meet), and optimal viewing points a tourist leit-motif. The site is designed to illustrate the dislocation of time and place, where images of the video site (as posters and postcards) are seen before the video itself. Reference will be made to film-maker Joseph Robakowski, artist Barbara Kruger, the scientist Dirk Helbing (with particular reference to dynamical flow and pilgrim crowd behaviour at Mecca) and film theorist and film-maker Professor Laura Mulvey. (shrink)

The quality of the consent obtained from 41 volunteer subjects in eight experiments is evaluated. Five subjects (all physicians) gave informed consent; 22 subjects gave partially informed consent; and 14 subjects merely gave consent. It is argued that 'informed' consent is obtainable only from medically trained people, and that lip service to this concept in laymen should cease. The concept of medical competence should instead be introduced and a personal medical referee appointed to adjudicate on behalf of the volunteer.

An experiment, in the standard scientific sense of the term, is a procedure in which some object of study is subjected to interventions that aim at obtaining a predictable outcome or at least predictable aspects of the outcome. The distinction between an experiment and a non-experimental observation is important since they are tailored to different epistemic needs. Experimentation has its origin in pre-scientific technological experiments that were undertaken in order to find the best technological means to achieve chosen ends. Important (...) parts of the methodological arsenal of modern experimental science can be traced back to this pre-scientific, technological tradition. It is claimed that experimentation involves a unique combination of acting and observing, a combination whose unique epistemological properties have not yet been fully clarified. (shrink)

Ethical approval must be obtained before medical research can start. We describe the differences in EA for an pseudonymous, non-interventional, observational European study. Sixteen European national coordinators of the international study on very old intensive care patients answered an online questionnaire concerning their experience getting EA. N = 8/16 of the NCs could apply at one single national ethical committee, while the others had to apply to various regional ECs and/or individual hospital institutional research boards. The time between (...) applying for EA and the first decision varied between 7 days and 300 days. In 9/16 informed consent from the patient was not deemed necessary; in 7/16 informed consent was required from the patient or relatives. The upload of coded data to a central database required additional information in 14/16. In 4/16 the NCs had to ask separate approval to keep a subject identification code list to de-pseudonymize the patients if questions would occur. Only 2/16 of the NCs agreed that informed consent was necessary for this observational study. Overall, 6/16 of the NCs were satisfied with the entire process and 8/16 were unsatisfied. 11/16 would welcome a European central EC that would judge observational studies for all European countries. Variations in the process and prolonged time needed to get EA for observational studies hampers inclusion of patients in some European countries. This might have a negative influence on the external validity. Further harmonization of ethical approval process across Europe is welcomed for low-risk observational studies. Getting ethical approval for low-risk, non-interventional, observational studies varies enormously across European countries. (shrink)

Background Previous analyses of democracy and population health have focused on broad measures, such as life expectancy at birth and child and infant mortality, and have shown some contradictory results. We used a panel of data spanning 170 countries to assess the association between democracy and cause-specific mortality and explore the pathways connecting democratic rule to health gains. -/- Methods We extracted cause-specific mortality and HIV-free life expectancy estimates from the Global Burden of Diseases, Injuries, and Risk Factors Study 2016 (...) and information on regime type from the Varieties of Democracy project. These data cover 170 countries and 46 years. From the Financing Global Health database, we extracted gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, also covering 46 years, and Development Assistance for Health estimates starting from 1990 and domestic health spending estimates starting from 1995. We used a diverse set of empirical methods—synthetic control, within-country variance decomposition, structural equation models, and fixed-effects regression—which together provide a robust analysis of the association between democratisation and population health. -/- Findings HIV-free life expectancy at age 15 years improved significantly during the study period (1970–2015) in countries after they transitioned to democracy, on average by 3% after 10 years. Democratic experience explains 22·27% of the variance in mortality within a country from cardiovascular diseases, 16·53% for tuberculosis, and 17·78% for transport injuries, and a smaller percentage for other diseases included in the study. For cardiovascular diseases, transport injuries, cancers, cirrhosis, and other non-communicable diseases, democratic experience explains more of the variation in mortality than GDP. Over the past 20 years, the average country's increase in democratic experience had direct and indirect effects on reducing mortality from cardiovascular disease (−9·64%, 95% CI −6·38 to −12·90), other non-communicable diseases (−9·14%, −4·26 to −14·02), and tuberculosis (−8·93%, −2·08 to −15·77). Increases in a country's democratic experience were not correlated with GDP per capita between 1995 and 2015 (ρ=–0·1036; p=0·1826), but were correlated with declines in mortality from cardiovascular disease (ρ=–0·3873; p<0·0001) and increases in government health spending (ρ=0·4002; p<0·0001). Removal of free and fair elections from the democratic experience variable resulted in loss of association with age-standardised mortality from non-communicable diseases and injuries. -/- Interpretation When enforced by free and fair elections, democracies are more likely than autocracies to lead to health gains for causes of mortality (eg, cardiovascular diseases and transport injuries) that have not been heavily targeted by foreign aid and require health-care delivery infrastructure. International health agencies and donors might increasingly need to consider the implications of regime type in their efforts to maximise health gains, particularly in the context of ageing populations and the growing burden of non-communicable diseases. (shrink)

Can politics be thought?, asks Alain Badiou in the title of a recent book. The question itself reveals an experienced lack: that of politics. A lack which the so-called “return of the subject,” far from resolving, would stigmatize. The “return of the subject,” as he asserts, is merely the counterface of the break of politics, its reduction to an “ethics of tolerance” from which all its properly political traces have previously been erased. If politics cannot be associated with the “return (...) of the subject,” this is because politics does not relate to any subject but rather to the very impossibility of conceiving of it. Thus, the attempt to reactivate politics becomes inextricably linked to the endeavor of rethinking, or better said, unthinking the subject. As this article shows, this project articulates a specially dynamic current of thought in the last years, which we may call, generically, “poststructuralist Marxist.” That project not only gave a new impulse to Marxist thinking, articulating a space of reflection which delimitates this current from that one with which it borders—deconstructionism—and from which it can interpellate the entire philosophical tradition. Ultimately, it comes to condense an issue whose relevance far exceeds the ambit of Marxist thinking: how politics is possible in a post-metaphysical and post-subjective context. Being and Event, by Alain Badiou, is, no doubt, the most systematical attempt to answer that question. It allows us to observe the main contributions of these current to contemporary philosophical thinkings, revealing, at the same time, the kind of aporias that that issue poses to it. (shrink)

Computer simulations and experiments share many important features. One way of explaining the similarities is to say that computer simulations just are experiments. This claim is quite popular in the literature. The aim of this paper is to argue against the claim and to develop an alternative explanation of why computer simulations resemble experiments. To this purpose, experiment is characterized in terms of an intervention on a system and of the observation of the reaction. Thus, if computer simulations are experiments, (...) either the computer hardware or the target system must be intervened on and observed. I argue against the first option using the non-observation argument, among others. The second option is excluded by e.g. the over-control argument, which stresses epistemological differences between experiments and simulations. To account for the similarities between experiments and computer simulations, I propose to say that computer simulations can model possible experiments and do in fact often do so. (shrink)

This book is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal (...) holds that experiential content is necessarily under¬pinned by sophisticated cognitive influences. My alternative, the continuum theory, holds that these influences are relevant to experience only at certain levels of organisation and that at other levels there are contents which such features do not capture at all. Central to my account is that there are degrees to which cognitive influences affect experiential content; indeed, for the most part, experience is an amalgam of both inferential and non-inferential features. I claim that the inferentialist proposal is fundamentally flawed and deserves replacement, and I argue that my alternative fills the hollow that remains. The book is divided into four sections. In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce two traditionally rival views of experiential content. In Chapter 2, I develop my continuum alternative. Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between experience and language, while Chapter 4 explores the relationship between beliefs and experience. The overall argument is that it has been a mistake to understand experience simply in inferential or non-inferential terms. In Part II, I examine the structure of mental content. Chapter 5 is concerned with the kinds of experiences which escape the inferentialist analysis. Chapter 6 considers Kant’s metaphysic of experience counterpointed to Lorenz’s reading of his work in the light of evolutionary biology. Chapter 7 treats animal experience in relation to the continuum view I am developing, while Chapter 8 reviews Fodor’s contribution to perceptual psychology. It is argued that the view of experiential content being developed is both consistent with empirical data on informationally local perceptual sub-systems, but also accords well with evolutionary theory and a naturalist interpretation of Kant’s taxonomy. Part III deals with inferentialism in the philosophy of science. In Chapter 9, I assess the theory dependence of observation thesis as it is advanced by Paul Feyerabend. I bring out of his account a subtle confusion concerning the importance of inference in the context of scientific inquiry. Part IV deals with the issue of experience in the philosophy of mind. In Chapter 10, I look at Wilfred Sellars’s attack on sense data theories. Chapter 11 confronts Paul Churchland’s treatment of ‘folk psychology’ while Chapter 12 isolates the issue of experiential qualia and the position of property dualism. I offer a critical review of Thomas Nagel’s work in this chapter and claim that his position can be read in a way which is consistent with the continuum account I am developing. I conclude the book in the usual fashion with a summary of the central claims. (shrink)

Problem: The inclusion of the observer into scientific observation entails a vicious circle of having to observe the observer as dependent on observation. Second-order science has to clarify how its underlying circularity can be scientifically conceived. Method: Essayistic and conceptual analysis, sporadically illustrated with agent-based experiments. Results: Second-order science - implying science in general - is fundamentally and ineluctably circular. Implications - The circularity of second-order science asks for analytical methods able to cope with phenomena of complex causation and “synchronous (...) asynchrony,” such as tools for analyzing non-linearly interacting dynamics, decentralized, clustered networks and in general, systems of complex interacting components. Key Words: Observer dependency, second-order science, complexity, information, intentionality. (shrink)

In this article I investigate several possibilities to define the concept of “temporal non-locality” within the standard framework of quantum theory. In particular, I analyze the notions of “temporally non-local states”, “temporally non-local events” and “temporally non-local observables”. The idea of temporally non-local events is already inherent in the standard formalism of quantum mechanics, and Basil Hiley recently defined an operator in order to measure the degree of such a temporal non-locality. The concept of temporally non-local states enters as soon (...) as “clock-representing states” are introduced in the context of special and general relativity. It is discussed in which way temporally non-local measurements may find an interesting application for experiments which test temporal versions of Bell inequalities. (shrink)

Using examples of observations of primates in the wild, I will focus in this chapter on the ways in which some of the main feminist critiques are applicable to the observation of non-human animals. In particular, I will focus on the relationship between primatology and various conceptions of human nature and on the fact that primatology has often been described as a “feminist science.” I argue that in primatology there is an openness to a diversity of approaches and to feminist (...) values that has made it possible for researchers to understand primates in new, more complex ways. Finally, I include a brief discussion of an avenue of future research that will show that even the feminist perspectives explored in this chapter are situated within a specific western background and that it is important to remember that this feminist perspective is just one among many different perspectives. To illustrate variations in the roles that feminist critiques can play in animal observation, I will use examples from my own personal experience of Latinx identity while conducting research in Gombe National Park (Tanzania, Africa). (shrink)

The debate on realism in physics is usually focused on the reality of unobservable entities admitted in physical theories. This reality has been often denied (e.g., by Bas van Fraassen). The present book shows that observability is a very complex notion that does not really have direct implications on ontological issues related to the existence of the non-observable entities. This is shown through historical, philosophical and scientific considerations presented in the different parts of the book. Emphasis is also given to (...) the role of experiments, measurement procedures and computer-analyzed data as interface between the theoretical and experimental cultures. (shrink)

This note argues that quantum observables can include not just self-adjoint operators, but any member of the class of normal operators, including those with non-real eigenvalues. Concrete experiments, statistics, and symmetries are all expressed in this more general context. However, this more general class of observables also introduces a new restriction on which sets of operators can be interpreted as observables at once. These sets are referred to here as 'sharp sets.

Within a variety of contemplative traditions, non-dual-oriented practices were developed to evoke an experiential shift into a mode of experiencing in which the cognitive structures of self-other and subject–object subside. These practices serve to de-reify the enactment of an observing witness which is usually experienced as separate from the objects of awareness. While several contemplative traditions, such as Zen, Mahāmudrā, Dzogchen, and Advaita Vedanta emphasize the importance of such a non-dual insight for the cultivation of genuine wellbeing, only very few (...) attempts in contemplative science have turned toward the study of non-dual-oriented practices. This article starts from a recently developed theoretical cognitive science framework that models the requirements of a temporary experiential shift into a mode of experiencing free from cognitive subject–object structure. This model inspired by the enactive approach contributes theoretically grounded hypotheses for the much-needed rigorous study of non-dual practices and non-dual experiences. To do so, three steps are taken: first, common elements of non-dual-oriented practices are outlined. Second, the main ideas of enactive cognitive science are presented including a principled theoretical model of what is required for a shift to a pure non-dual experience, that is, an experiential mode that is unbound by subject–object duality. Third, this synthesized theoretical model of the requirements for the recognition of the non-dual is then compared with a specific non-dual style of meditation practice, namely, Mahāmudrā practice from Tibetan Buddhism. This third step represents a heuristic for evaluating the external coherence of the presented model. With this, the aim is to point toward a principled enactive view of non-dual meditative practice. In drawing the implications of the presented model, this article ends with an outlook toward next steps for further developing a research agenda that may fully address the concrete elements of non-dual practices. (shrink)

The aim of this study was to obtain an increased understanding of the experiences of elderly people in geriatric care, with special reference to integrity. Data were collected through qualitative interviews with elderly people and, in order to obtain a description of caregivers’ integrity-promoting or non-promoting behaviours, participant observations and qualitative interviews with nursing students were undertaken. Earlier studies on the integrity of elderly people mainly concentrated on their personal and territorial space, so Kihlgren and Thorsén opened up the possibility (...) of considering the concept of integrity from a broader view by recognizing its relationship to the larger framework of the self-concept. Based on this, findings in the present study indicate that elderly people’s integrity relating to their corporal self were the least violated. On the other hand, their psycological, information and cultural selves were the most exposed. The study also identified a further dimension (i.e. one relating to social self), which should be included in the concept of integrity because respecting elderly people’s social self reduces their feelings of loneliness, isolation and seclusion. In summary, the results indicate that the concept of integrity is complex and has several dimensions. (shrink)

We discuss the intertwined topics of Fulling non‐uniqueness and the Unruh effect. The Fulling quantization, which is in some sense the natural one for an observer uniformly accelerated through Minkowski spacetime to adopt, is often heralded as a quantization of the Klein‐Gordon field which is both physically relevant and unitarily inequivalent to the standard Minkowski quantization. We argue that the Fulling and Minkowski quantizations do not constitute a satisfactory example of physically relevant, unitarily inequivalent quantizations, and indicate what it would (...) take to settle the open question of whether a satisfactory example exists. A popular gloss on the Unruh effect has it that an observer uniformly accelerated through the Minkowski vacuum experiences a thermal flux of Rindler quanta. Taking the Unruh effect, so glossed, to establish that the notion of particle must be relativized to a reference frame, some would use it to demote the particle concept from fundamental status. We explain why technical results do not support the popular gloss and why the attempted demotion of the particle concept is both unsuccessful and unnecessary. Fulling non‐uniqueness and the Unruh effect merit attention despite these negative verdicts because they provide excellent vehicles for illustrating key concepts of quantum field theory and for probing foundational issues of considerable philosophical interest. (shrink)

Dance is regarded as visual art form by common arts and science perspectives. Definitions of dance as means of communication agree that its message is conveyed by the dancer/choreographer via the human body for the observer, leaving no doubt that dance is performed to be watched. Brain activation elicited by the visual perception of dance has also become a topic of interest in cognitive neuroscience, with regards to action observation in the context of learning, expertise and aesthetics. The view that (...) the aesthetic experience of dance is primarily a visual one is still shared by many artists and cultural institutions, yet there is growing interest in making dance performances accessible for individuals with visual impairment / blindness. Means of supporting the non-visual experience of dance include verbal (audio description), auditive (choreographed body sounds, movement sonification), and haptic (touch tour) techniques, applied for different purposes by artists and researchers, with three main objectives: to strengthen the cultural participation of a non-sighted audience in the cultural and aesthetic experience of dance; to expand the scope of dance as an artistic research laboratory toward novel ways of perceiving what dance can convey; and to inspire new lines of (neuro-cognitive) research beyond watching dance. Reviewing literature from different disciplines and drawing on the personal experience of an inclusive performance of Simon Mayer's “Sons of Sissy,” we argue that a non-exclusively visual approach can be enriching and promising for all three perspectives and conclude by proposing hypotheses for multidisciplinary lines of research. (shrink)

Wilderness experiences were celebrated by the Great Romantics, and figures such as Wordsworth and Thoreau emphasized the need to seek direct contact with the non-human world. Later deep ecologists accentuated the way in which wilderness experiences can spark moral epiphanies and lead to action on behalf of the natural environment. In recent years, psychological studies have manifested how the observations made by the Romantics, nature authors and deep ecologists apply to laypeople: contact with the wilderness does tend to lead to (...) epistemological, ontological and normative ‘epiphanies.’ This paper analyses four different umbrella terms with which to make sense of the content of wilderness experiences. First, mystical experience, peak experience and elevation are explored. Although all three offer promising models for explicating the nature of wilderness experiences, they also run the risk of reducing those experiences to sheer experiential hedonism.... (shrink)

Philosophy and science employ abstract hypothetical scenarios- thought experiments - to illustrate, defend, and dispute theoretical claims. Since thought experiments furnish no new empirical observations, the method prompts two epistemological questions: whether anything may be learnt from the merely hypothetical, and, if so, how. Various sceptical arguments against the use of thought experiments in philosophy are discussed and criticized. The thesis that thought experiments in science provide a priori knowledge through non-sensory grasping of abstract entities is discussed and rejected. The (...) thesis that thought experimentation consists in manipulations of mental models is examined and found to be of limited epistemological relevance. It is argued that thought experiments are associated with characteristic arguments in a manner similar to ordinary experiments. It is further argued that thought experiments function in the same way as experiments in general: by providing premises for their associated arguments. Like other experiments, a thought experiment is successful when the premises it provides are true. This holds both for philosophical and scientific thought experiments. An argument schema is proposed and shown to be a formal analogue to that associated with ordinary experiments; similar in being subject to epistemological holism; but differing in being modal: in employing statements about possibility and necessity. The evaluation of thought experiments thus depends on how modal statements may be justified. Intuition and conceivability are discussed as sources of modal justification and found problematic. Instead it is suggested that evaluation proceed by accommodation of the statements describing the experiment's hypothetical scenario. The method of accommodation is developed and applied to five influential thought experiments in philosophy: the brain in a vat; Putnam's Twin Earth; Burge's arthritis example; Searle's Chinese Room; and Newcomb's problem. Its application shows some of these to be failed, others to be successful only relative to controversial philosophical doctrines. (shrink)

We discuss the intertwined topics of Fulling non-uniqueness and the Unruh effect. The Fulling quantization, which is in some sense the natural one for an observer uniformly accelerated through Minkowski spacetime to adopt, is often heralded as a quantization of the Klein-Gordon field which is both physically relevant and unitarily inequivalent to the standard Minkowski quantization. We argue that the Fulling and Minkowski quantizations do not constitute a satisfactory example of physically relevant, unitarily inequivalent quantizations, and indicate what it would (...) take to settle the open question of whether a satisfactory example exists. A popular gloss on the Unruh effect has it that an observer uniformly accelerated through the Minkowski vacuum experiences a thermal flux of Rindler quanta. Taking the Unruh effect, so glossed, to establish that the notion of particle must be relativized to a reference frame, some would use it to demote the particle concept from fundamental status. We explain why technical results do not support the popular gloss and why the attempted demotion of the particle concept is both unsuccessful and unnecessary. Fulling non-uniqueness and the Unruh effect merit attention despite these negative verdicts because they provide excellent vehicles for illustrating key concepts of quantum field theory and for probing foundational issues of considerable philosophical interest. (shrink)

In two separate experiments, we examined 17-month-olds’ imitation in a third-party context. The aim was to explore how seeing another person responding to a model’s novel action influenced infant imitation. The infants watched while a reliable model demonstrated a novel action with a familiar (Experiment 1) or an unfamiliar (Experiment 2) object to a second actor. The second actor either imitated or did not imitate the novel action of the model. Fewer infants imitated the model’s novel behavior in the non-imitation (...) condition than in the imitation condition in Experiment 1. In Experiment 2, infants’ likelihood of imitating was not influenced by whether they had watched the second actor imitating the model’s novel action with the unfamiliar object. The findings indicate that infants take into account a second adult’s actions in a third party context when infants receive information that contradicts their existing knowledge and when it corresponds with their own experiences. If infants do not have prior knowledge about how to handle a certain object, then the second adult’s actions do not seem to matter. (shrink)

We investigated motor resonance in children using a priming paradigm. Participants were asked to judge the weight of an object shortly primed by a hand in an action-related posture or a non action-related one . The hand prime could belong to a child or to an adult. We found faster response times when the object was preceded by a grasp hand posture . More crucially, participants were faster when the prime was a child’s hand, suggesting that it could belong to (...) their body schema, particularly when the child’s hand was followed by a light object . A control experiment helped us to clarify the role of the hand prime. To our knowledge this is the first behavioral evidence of motor simulation and motor resonance in children. Implications of the results for the development of the sense of body ownership and for conceptual development are discussed. (shrink)

A conservative extension of general relativity is proposed by alleviating the differentiability of the metric and allowing for non-smooth solutions. We show that these metrics break some symmetries of the Riemann tensor, yielding a new scalar curvature invariant besides the usual Ricci scalar. To first order in the curvature, this adds a new piece of information to the action, containing interesting and unexplored physics. The spectrum of the theory reveals the presence of an additional massless spin-1 field apart from the (...) massless spin-2 graviton. We argue that this new contribution violates P and CP symmetries at leading order in the curvature and we discuss the possibility of observing these effects in existing experiments. (shrink)

This essay is divided into two parts, deeply intermingled. Part I examines not only the origin of conscious experience but also how it is possible to ask of our own consciousness how it came to be. Part II examines the origin of experience itself, which soon reveals itself as the ontological question of Being. The chief premise of Part I is that symbolic communion and the categorizations of language have enabled human organisms to distinguish between themselves as actually (...) existing entities and their own immediate experience of themselves and their world. This enables them to reflect upon abstract concepts, including “self,” “experience,” and “world.” Symbolic communication and conceptualization grow out of identification, the act of first observing conscious experiencing and intimating what it is like, mimesis, a gestural protolanguage learned through imitation, and reflection, seeing oneself through the eyes of others. The step into actual intentional speech is made through self-assertion, narrative, and intersubjectivity. These three become the spiral of human cultural development that includes not only the adaptive satisfaction of our biological needs, but also the creativity of thought. With the mental-conceptual separation of subject and object – of self and world – the human ability to witness the universe (and each other) is the ground of our genuinely human quality. Consciousness gives human life its distinctively human reality. It is, therefore, one and the same ability that enables us to shape planet Earth by means of conceptual representations (rather than by means of our hands alone) while also awakening us to the significance of being. -/- Looking beyond human self-consciousness to investigate the origin and nature of awareness itself in Part 2, reductive objective materialism is found to be of little use. Direct experience also falls short in that, in order to be transformed into objective knowledge about itself, it must always be interpreted through and limited by the symbolic contexts of culture and the idiosyncratic conceptualizations of the individual. Awareness-in-itself must thus be considered ultimately unexplainable, but this may more indicate its inexpressible transcendence of all symbolic qualifiers than its nonexistence. It is suggested that awareness is not “self-aware” (as in deity) but is instead unknowing yet identical with the only true universal: the impetus of creative unfolding. Our human knowledge, as an expression of this unfolding, is seen to emerge from our conscious experiencing and, in turn, to have the power – and enormous responsibility – of directing that experience. Our underlying symbolic worldviews are found to be autopoietic: They limit or open our conscious experience, which, in turn, confirms those worldview expectations. As we explore a future of unforeseeable technological breakthroughs on an ailing planet who patiently copes with our “success,” truly vital decisions about the nature, meaning, extent, and future of conscious experience will have to be made. (shrink)

This thesis is about experiential content: what it is; what kind of account can be given of it. I am concerned with identifying and attacking one main view - I call it the inferentialist proposal. This account is central to the philosophy of mind, epistemology and philosophy of science and perception. I claim, however, that it needs to be recast into something far more subtle and enriched, and I attempt to provide a better alternative in these pages. The inferentialist proposal (...) holds that experiential content is necessarily under¬pinned by sophisticated cognitive influences. My alternative, the continuum theory, holds that these influences are relevant to experience only at certain levels of organisation and that at other levels there are contents which such features do not capture at all. Central to my account is that there are degrees to which cognitive influences affect experiential content; indeed, for the most part, experience is an amalgam of both inferential and non-inferential features. I claim that the inferentialist proposal is fundamentally flawed and deserves replacement, and I argue that my alternative fills the hollow that remains. The thesis is divided into four sections. In Part I, Chapter 1, I introduce two traditionally rival views of experiential content. In Chapter 2, I develop my continuum alternative. Chapter 3 assesses the relationship between experience and language, while Chapter 4 explores the relationship between beliefs and experience. The overall argument is that it has been a mistake to understand experience simply in inferential or non-inferential terms. In Part II, I examine the structure of mental content. Chapter 5 is concerned with the kinds of experiences which escape the inferentialist analysis. Chapter 6 considers Kant’s metaphysic of experience counterpointed to Lorenz’s reading of his work in the light of evolutionary biology. Chapter 7 treats animal experience in relation to the continuum view I am developing, while Chapter 8 reviews Fodor’s contribution to perceptual psychology. It is argued that the view of experiential content being developed is both consistent with empirical data on informationally local perceptual sub-systems, but also accords well with evolutionary theory and a naturalist interpretation of Kant’s taxonomy. Part III deals with inferentialism in the philosophy of science. In Chapter 9, I assess the theory dependence of observation thesis as it is advanced by Paul Feyerabend. I bring out of his account a subtle confusion concerning the importance of inference in the context of scientific inquiry. Part IV deals with the issue of experience in the philosophy of mind. In Chapter 10, I look at Wilfred Sellars’s attack on sense data theories. Chapter 11 confronts Paul Churchland’s treatment of ‘folk psychology’ while Chapter 12 isolates the issue of experiential qualia and the position of property dualism. I offer a critical review of Thomas Nagel’s work in this chapter and claim that his position can be read in a way which is consistent with the continuum account I am developing. I conclude the thesis in the usual fashion with a summary of the central claims. (shrink)

The dominant model for interpreting brain imaging experiments assumes that the brain is organized to support mental processes that control behavior. However functional neuroimaging experiments, particularly of cognitive tasks, have not shown a high level of reproducibility and localization. This lack of clear functional segregation has been blamed on limitations in imaging technology and non linearity and regional overlap in how the brain implements these processes. However the validity of the underlying cognitive models used to describe the brain have rarely (...) been questioned or directly tested against imaging results. We propose an alternative model of brain function which correlates observed human behavior directly with measured brain activity without assumptions about intervening cognitive processes, that we term the Non-Cognitive Behavioral Model (NBM). Our model derives from Behavioral Psychology but is extended to include brain activations in addition to behavior as an observable. A further extension is the role of neuroplasticity as opposed to innate cognitive processes in the development of the brains support of cognitive behavior. Applications of NBM to neuroimaging studies are described and contrasted with the standard methodology which we refer to as the Standard Cognitive Model (SCM). In one application, the NBM correctly predicted the global, total energy consumption as the brain parameter that best correlates with a person being in the state of consciousness, a correlation missed by studies using the SCM due to its assumption that global activity does not support cognitive processes. Neuroplasticity is shown to provide a natural explanation of findings that object recognition activating the fusiform facial area comes from expertise through raining as opposed to the SCM explanation of an innate cognitive process specialized for face recognition. The conclusions are generalized to explain the poor reproducibility of cognitive processes reported in functional neuroimaging and to suggest how such studies can be used to better explain how the brain supports behavior. (shrink)

This study addresses the dynamical nature of a “representation‐hungry” cognitive task involving an imagined action. In our experiment, participants were handed rods that systematically increased or decreased in length on subsequent trials. Participants were asked to judge whether or not they thought they could reach for a distant object with the hand‐held rod. The results are in agreement with a dynamical model, extended from Tuller, Case, Ding, and Kelso (1994). The dynamical effects observed in this study suggest that predictive judgments (...) regarding the possibility or impossibility of a certain action can be understood in terms of dynamically evolving basins of attraction instead of as depending on representational structures. (shrink)

This study addresses the dynamical nature of a “representation‐hungry” cognitive task involving an imagined action. In our experiment, participants were handed rods that systematically increased or decreased in length on subsequent trials. Participants were asked to judge whether or not they thought they could reach for a distant object with the hand‐held rod. The results are in agreement with a dynamical model, extended from Tuller, Case, Ding, and Kelso (1994). The dynamical effects observed in this study suggest that predictive judgments (...) regarding the possibility or impossibility of a certain action can be understood in terms of dynamically evolving basins of attraction instead of as depending on representational structures. (shrink)

Goodman's analytical treatment of art is most subtle as it unites the comprehending of a general theory of symbolic systems with doing justice to the peculiar characteristics of art symbolics. My only two reservations about his argumentation concern: a) the cognitive status of art and b) the cultural aspects as the exclusive framework of aesthetic experience. Goodman states that art's primary purpose is cognition but does not differentiate the meanings of the cognitive status of a work of art. I (...) find that he neglected the para-Philosophical kind of cognition and entirely left out of his scheme the empathic experiences and hermeneutic proceedings. My conclusion is then that the arts differ among themselves as to symbolic structures and are unequally outfitted with cognition. Moreover, In some arts (or some particular cases) the non-Cognitive elements can take priority over the cognitive ones. With respect to the second reservation I argue that although all symbolic systems are culturally made, It would be too hasty to reject some supracultural standards of artistic practice and aesthetic experience. I cite some concrete instances which provide counter arguments to goodman's thesis. (shrink)

According to standard rational choice theory, as commonly used in political science and economics, an agent's fundamental preferences are exogenously fixed, and any preference change over decision options is due to Bayesian information learning. Although elegant and parsimonious, such a model fails to account for preference change driven by experiences or psychological changes distinct from information learning. We develop a model of non-informational preference change. Alternatives are modelled as points in some multidimensional space, only some of whose dimensions play a (...) role in shaping the agentís preferences. Any change in these "motivationally salient" dimensions can change the agent's preferences. How it does so is described by a new representation theorem. Our model not only captures a wide range of frequently observed phenomena, but also generalizes some standard representations of preferences in political science and economics. (shrink)

Two qualitative projects have brought together non-directive and semi-directive interviews with 49 young people who had a paranormal experience between the ages of 11 and 18. A sequential analysis shows an emotional and cognitive pattern comprising four stages, accompanied by periods of anxiety. Young people move through those stages that correspond to a cognitive acceptance or rejection of what they are experiencing in order to maintain or re-establish paradigmatic stability. This study complements the many observations linking paranormal beliefs and (...) anxiety, bringing with it the new discovery of a mechanism underlying the link between anxiety and some aspects of paranormal or anomalous experiences in young people. (shrink)

Much working time is spent in meetings and, as a consequence, meetings have become the subject of multidisciplinary research. Virtual Meeting Rooms (VMRs) are 3D virtual replicas of meeting rooms, where various modalities such as speech, gaze, distance, gestures and facial expressions can be controlled. This allows VMRs to be used to improve remote meeting participation, to visualize multimedia data and as an instrument for research into social interaction in meetings. This paper describes how these three uses can be realized (...) in a VMR. We describe the process from observation through annotation to simulation and a model that describes the relations between the annotated features of verbal and non-verbal conversational behavior. As an example of social perception research in the VMR, we describe an experiment to assess human observers’ accuracy for head orientation. (shrink)

BackgroundThe introduction and wide application of non-invasive prenatal testing (NIPT) has triggered further evolution of routines in the practice of prenatal diagnosis. ‘Routinization’ of prenatal diagnosis however has been associated with hampered informed choice and eugenic attitudes or outcomes. It is viewed, at least in some countries, with great suspicion in both bioethics and public discourse. However, it is a heterogeneous phenomenon that needs to be scrutinized in the wider context of social practices of reproductive genetics. In different countries with (...) their different regulatory frameworks, different patterns of routines emerge that have different ethical implications.This paper discusses an ethics of routines informed by the perspectives of organizational sociology and psychology, where a routine is defined as a repetitive, recognizable pattern of interdependent organizational actions that is carried out by multiple performers. We favour a process approach that debunks the view – which gives way to most of the concerns – that routines are always blindly performed. If this is so, routines are therefore not necessarily incompatible with responsible decision-making. Free and informed decision-making can, as we argue, be a key criterion for the ethical evaluation of testing routines. If free and informed decision-making by each pregnant woman is the objective, routines in prenatal testing may not be ethically problematic, but rather are defensible and helpful. We compare recent experiences of NIPT routines in the context of prenatal screening programmes in Germany, Israel and the Netherlands. Notable variation can be observed between these three countries (i) in the levels of routinization around NIPT, (ii) in the scope of routinization, and (iii) in public attitudes toward routinized prenatal testing.ConclusionAn ethics of routines in the field of prenatal diagnostics should incorporate and work with the necessary distinctions between levels and forms of routines, in order to develop sound criteria for their evaluation. (shrink)

Reductive physicalism is a minority view in contemporary philosophy as well as in science, and therefore arguments for endorsing it often amount to arguments against the alternative views, in particular so-called non-reductive physicalism. In this paper we put forward a new argument for reductive physicalism, according to which it is the best account of the empirical data that we have. In particular, we show that: (a) a reductive physicalist theory of the mind forms an essential part of the very argument (...) for the existence of an external world: if one rejects psychophysical identity physicalism, one’s case for believing in the existence of an external world is substantially weakened; and (b) the success of a physical account of the mind is the most important criterion for the success of (future) physics; and (c) reductive physicalism is the only approach in which relying on science in order to account for the external world makes sense; and finally, (d) within reductive physicalism, one can provide a new criterion for theory preference in science, and a new argument for scientific realism. In our physicalist view the experience forms the initial data, which is then reduced to fundamental physics. (shrink)

Context: The detection of objective reality, truth, and lies are still heated topics in epistemology. When discussing these topics, philosophers often resort to certain thought experiments, engaging an important concept that can be broadly identified as “the global observer.” It relates to Putnam’s God’s Eye, Davidson’s Omniscient Interpreter, and the ultimate observer in quantum physics, among others. Problem: The article explores the notion of the global observer as the guarantor of the determinability and configuration of events in the world. It (...) analyzes the consistency of the notion “global observer” from the standpoint of logic and philosophy, and discusses why application of this notion in some contexts poses challenges and appears to be paradoxical. Method: The paper uses conceptual methods of argumentation, such as logical and philosophical kinds of proof. Its key approach is the engagement of thought experiments. Results: The notion of a global observer is incoherent: “being global” and “being an observer” appear to be incompatible features. It is claimed that from the standpoint of global observation, there are no events occurring in the world. Furthermore, the indefiniteness of the world as a whole is asserted, which is related to the uninformedness of the global observer regarding the “true state of affairs.” “Global observation” turns out to be incompatible with the concept of the observer, blocking, as a result, the opportunity for a determinable configuration of events. It only makes sense to discuss local observations, which are limited to mutual observation or introspections, and not to assume the existence of some absolute truth, reality, or the state of affairs beyond the local observations. Constructivist content: The article emphasizes the role of the observer and observation. It opens up some problematic consequences of the core philosophical assumptions of globally observing existence. Referring to von Foerster’s and Luhmann’s idea that we can only speak reasonably about local observations, the paper argues that reality is neither external to nor independent of the observer. Implications: The paper could be productive for epistemic theories, theories of quantum physics, and theories of non-classical logic. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Toward a Non-Cartesian Psychotherapeutic Framework: Radical Pragmatism as an AlternativeLouis S. Berger (bio)AbstractPostmodern criticism has identified important impoverishments that necessarily follow from the use of Cartesian frameworks. This criticism is reviewed and its implications for psychotherapy are explored in a psychoanalytic context. The ubiquitous presence of Cartesianism (equivalently, representationism) in psychoanalytic frameworks—even in some that are considered postmodern—is demonstrated and criticized. The postmodern convergence on praxis as a desirable (...) alternative to Cartesianism is reported, and its relevance for psychoanalysis is considered. The severe conceptual difficulties entailed in formulating such an alternative are discussed, as are those difficulties that would be encountered were psychoanalysis to attempt the shift from explanatory mental science to praxis. The principal psychoanalytic problematics explored are: the paradoxical relationships between theory and therapeutic technique; the therapeutic action; and validation of clinical practices. Initial, nontraditional suggestions for addressing these problems are offered.Keywordspsychoanalysis, therapeutic action, representation, state space, praxis, hermeneutics, Descartes, Heidegger, Wittgenstein“But the inability to bring one’s subject under conceptual control, fixing it propositionally, is not the end of thinking; on the contrary, it were better to say that the breakdown of concepts and the failure of words is an opening that takes us out of the realm where representation and calculation are all that matter to thinking.... [T]his is what happens in the Socratic dialogue where the negativity in which one ends up at a loss for words is at the same time that which sets thinking free.”Bruns 1989, 9“To evolve theory as though our methods and processes of study were essentially the same, or could be the same, as those of other sciences, or could be disregarded when it comes to theory, implies a view of reality that is no longer tenable, least of all in that ambiguous area which we call psychic reality. Nevertheless, all of us are still more or less captives of an erroneous understanding of objectivity and objective reality....”Loewald 1970, 45 [End Page 169]CartesianismCartesianism still underlies and dominates much of today’s thought. It is the label for a network of interrelated ideas and themes:the ontological duality of mind and body; the subjective individualism implicit in the ultimate appeal to direct personal verification; the method of universal doubt which was supposed to lead us to indubitable truths; the doctrine that language and signs are an external disguise for thought; the doctrine that vagueness is unreal and that the philosophic endeavor is one of knowing clearly and distinctly a completely determinate reality; and most fundamentally, the doctrine that we can break out of the miasma of our language or system of signs and have direct intuitive knowledge of objects. (Bernstein 1971, 5–6)[The Cartesian assumptions] constitute a picture of science and the world somewhat as follows: there is an external world which can in principle be exhaustively described in scientific language. The scientist, as both observer and language-user, can capture the external facts of the world in propositions that are true if they correspond to the facts and false if they do not. Science is ideally a linguistic system in which true propositions are in one-to-one relation to facts, including facts that are not directly observed because they involve hidden entities or properties, or past events or far distant events. These hidden events are described in theories, and theories can be inferred from observation, that is, the hidden explanatory mechanism of the world can be discovered from what is open to observation. Man as scientist is regarded as standing apart from the world and able to experiment and theorize about it objectively and dispassionately.(Hesse 1980, vii)Hesse goes on to say that “almost every assumption underlying this account has been subjected to damaging criticism,” a view echoed by others: “Most contemporary philosophers have been in revolt against the Cartesian framework” (Bernstein 1971, 5); “A rejection of the Cartesian view is a central theme for both of the giants of twentieth-century philosophy, Heidegger and Wittgenstein” (Sass 1992, 444n 77); and “The notion of alternative conceptual frameworks has been a commonplace of our culture since Hegel” (Rorty 1982, 3).These criticisms arise... (shrink)

The Ottoman State contains many different ethnic elements which constituted a legal perspective. In this regard, the necessary precautions were taken to ensure that Muslims and non-Muslims live together peacefully in Vidin, a border city that was very important for the Western military expeditions of the Ottoman State known as “dār al-jihad wa-l-mujāhidīn” during the 18th century which set a historical example. The economic and social dimensions of the relations between the Muslim and non-Muslim population comprising the society in Vidin (...) who have shared the same city, neighborhood and public space during 1700-1750 were examined in this study and the conflicting subjects with regard to the ongoing relations between these two communities were tried to be determined. A total of 15 shari‘aregistries kept by the qāḍī (Muslim Judge) court for the related period located at the Oriental Department of National Library of Bulgaria constitute the main resources of the study. The shari‘aregistries that are the main resources of urban historical studies are full of countless examples that provide information on the relations between Muslims and non- Muslims in Vidin. The examination of these examples is of significant importance for putting forth the methods with which the nation system is applied by the Ottoman Empire as well as their opinions towards the non-Muslims they rule.SummaryVidin, located today in northwest Bulgaria was founded during the 1stcentury BC to the right of the River Danube by the Romans and named as Bononia. This settlement which was named as V’dinby the Muslims throughout the Middle Ages was transformed into a castle about 800 years after its foundation. The city that continuously changed hands due to its location at the border fell under the Ottoman rule after Battle of Nicopolis dated 1396. Vidin became one of the important border cities of the Ottoman against Serbia, Walachia and Hungary until the beginning of the 16thcentury. This importance of Vidin gradually decreased after the Ottoman Empire conquered Belgrade, Budin and Timişoara. Vidin retrieved its status as a border city against the Hungarians and the Wallachians after the Habsburgs dominated the region following the Great Turkish Wars that took place during 1683-1699, and thus regained its past importance. Even though the pressure influenced Vidin as a result disappeared with the 1739 Treaty of Belgrade, the conflicts between Austria and the Ottoman Empire did not end completely and continued throughout the 18thcentury. Vidin preserved its status as a first-degree border city for the Ottomans during the period of time, as examined in this study, which was also known as “dār al-jihad wa-l-mujāhidīn” starting from the beginning of the new century. Majority of the settled public were comprised of military classes in Vidin due to its geographical location where the Muslims and non-Muslims lived together. While the Muslim population was higher during the period of time following the establishment of the Ottoman rule, the non-Muslim population continued to increase throughout the 17thcentury reaching 23.961 taxpayer non-Muslim men in the 18thcentury. The Ottoman Empire based its ruling in Vidin, where almost the same number of Muslim and non-Muslims lived, on the principles of Islamic Law rules for non-Muslims. Since this legal system takes into consideration religious differences, non-Muslims were not held responsible from the prayers of Muslims and the actions that were not prohibited in their religion did not pose any contradictions with regard to Islamic law. The Ottoman Empire did not apply the Islamic Law on its non-Muslim citizens living in Vidin and allowed them to continue their social and religious lives based on their own religious principles in a special legal stance. Thanks to the system applied, the Muslim and non-Muslim community in Vidin were able to continue their daily lives without serious conflicts.The main purpose of this study is to explain how the Muslim and non-Muslim population related with each other in the city of Vidin during the second half of the 18thcentury and the dynamics with which they continued these relationships. Following this purpose, the cases between Muslims and non-Muslims in court records kept by the Vidin sharia court during 1700-1750 are examined. The relations between Muslims and non-Muslims are subject to two different classifications as economic and social issues, and each topic is supported and explained as sub-titles using different case examples. Majority of the relations between Muslims and non-Muslims in the city are economic according to Vidin court records. In this regard, it seems that there is no religious discrimination between the artisan groups in the city. In addition, many home, land, store and vineyard sales took place between the Muslims and non-Muslims which were resolved in the court mostly for registration purposes. It can also be understood from the court records that there were commercial relations between the Muslims and non-Muslims, that they had partnerships and that they lent money to each other which can be seen as an example of interpersonal support. Various social relationships were also established between the Muslim and non-Muslim population in Vidin during the period examined in this study. Even though non-Muslims had the right to carry out marriages and resolve their issues at their own community courts, it was observed that they frequently applied to the sharia courts for these purposes. They have developed witnessing relationships in such cases with the Muslims. The non-Muslim community did not experience any issues in finding Muslim witnesses for their cases with the Muslims; many Muslims acted as witness against their fellow Muslims without any hesitation. Two cases of injuries and few robbery issues were reflected in the courts of Vidin between the Muslims and non-Muslims during the fifty-year period examined in the study and no incident ending with death took place. Various singular cases took place between the two groups which were resolved at the sharia courts without escalating into severe conflicts. When all court records are taken into consideration, it can be understood that the Muslim judge of Vidin did not make any distinctions between the non-Muslims and Muslims and that he did not compromise from the principle of fairness. Both the Muslims and non-Muslims managed to live comfortably by acting carefully so as to not cross their own lines in both their economic and social relations in Vidin. When the faith-related conflicts that are taking place in our day in many regions of the world despite the level of education and culture are taken into consideration, it is very meaningful that people living in Vidin during the first half of the 18thcentury managed to live in peace. (shrink)

Nonmonotonic reasoning is often claimed to mimic human common sense reasoning. Only a few studies, though, investigated this claim empirically. In the present paper four psychological experiments are reported, that investigate three rules of system p, namely the and, the left logical equivalence, and the or rule. The actual inferences of the subjects are compared with the coherent normative upper and lower probability bounds derived from a non-infinitesimal probability semantics of system p. We found a relatively good agreement of human (...) reasoning and principles of nonmonotonic reasoning according to the coherence interpretation of system p. Contrary to the results reported in the “heuristics and biases” tradition, the subjects committed relatively few upper bound violations (conjunction fallacies). More lower than upper bound violations were observed. When the premises were presented in terms of intervals higher mean lower bounds were observed as when the premises were presented in terms of point percentages. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Commentary on “Non-Cartesian Frameworks”Rom Harré (bio)There are three points in Dr. Berger’s paper that seem to me to call for immediate comment:1. There is the familiar (but in Berger’s case, only a partial) misunderstanding of the upshot of the third phase of Wittgenstein’s private-language argument. Having shown that expressive and descriptive discourse are radically different, and that expressive discourse can be learned only in contexts of action in which (...) there are natural expressions of personal feeling, experience, and so on, Wittgenstein goes on to show that whatever furnishes the mind, it is not thing-like. He does this by showing that “sameness” of thoughts and feelings cannot be spelled out in the same terms as sameness of things, that is, in terms of numerical and qualitative identity. Yet there is a proper use for the concept of sameness of thoughts and feelings. It is to be found in the role that expressions of feelings and declarations of thoughts play in the language games that constitute a form of life. There is no “unresolved tension,” as Berger seems to think. Although pains are not thing-like, they do have a location, do endure, and do differ from one another.The introduction of the powerful expressive/descriptive distinction is the key to the fallacies of representationalism. Expressive acts do not represent but descriptive acts might. But we can draw on the demonstration that mental “somethings” are not thing-like to eliminate that possibility. The root of representationalism is the seventeenth-century conception of the mind as a container of mental entities: ideas. Ideas are to psychology what atoms are to physics. According to Hume, ideas are copies of impressions. In that disastrous thesis, representationalism was born, as a generalization of Locke’s grounding principle that the ideas of primary qualities resembled primary qualities. The cure for this complex mesh of mistakes must be deeply philosophical. It must not be confined to easy criticisms of Locke’s resemblance doctrine, not yet to more subtle Berkleyan strictures on the supposed distinction between ideas and qualities. It must cut at the very deepest assumption of representationalism—that there are mental entities. And on that matter, Wittgenstein’s analysis will, one hopes, prove to be final.2. With representationalism cast onto the midden of history, what account are we to give of mentation? In a sense, Wittgenstein’s insights abolish the inner/outer distinction, an offshoot of the concept of the container-mind. But they leave standing the distinction between what is done privately and what is done publicly. Yet these domains must be of the same nature, since in the expressive use of signs, we find a holism encompassing what we feel and our disposition to express it. Linguistic substitutes for natural forms [End Page 185] of expression must share that holism. But there are no natural expressions of propositional thoughts. Why? Because we are capable of private propositional thinking just insofar as we have mastered public uses of the instruments of propositional thought. These instruments are cultural products.The practice of psychotherapy can be nothing other than discursive. The quotations concerning praxis that Berger offers are disconcertingly vague. To add, as Berger does, that we must take theory into account does not cure the vagueness. We do not know what Berger takes theory to be, only that it is not theory as physicists have it; i.e., systems of hypotheses about hidden processes which bring about that which can be observed. Following Wittgenstein one step farther, we can say that the only thing that could be theory-like in the enterprises of psychotherapists would be grammars. Grammars express the often unformulated norms of discourses. Psychoanalytic theories could then be addressed as expressions of the norms of certain kinds of discourses. Incorporating a “theory” would then be nothing but determining to adopt a certain grammar in one’s therapeutic discourses. Freed of the idea that one of some set of theories must be true and preferred to all others, one is free to adopt and adapt grammars to occasions. Some grammars are tied to natural expressions and so to the ethology of the human form of life... (shrink)

The main idea of quantum mechanics, whether formulated in terms of the Planck constant or the noncommutativity of certain observables, must be tied to the recognition of the relativity and nonuniversality of the abstract concept of set (manifold) in the description of quantum systems. This entails the necessarily probabilistic description of quantum systems: since a quantum system ultimately cannot be decomposed into elements or sets, we have to describe it in terms of probabilities of only a relative selection of certain (...) elements or sets in its structure. This gives rise to the potential possibilities of quantum systems in an actual physical situation, and as a result the corresponding probabilities are ontologically real, like any other physically verifiable relationships. In this way, the quantum potential possibilities (and probabilities as their measure) are no less objectively real than the conventional reality which we identify with the physically directly verifiable elements, particles, etc. Indeed, the distribution of probabilities described by the nonfactorizable wave function is as objectively real and concrete as chairs, walls and all other physical things. In the pure quantum state the probabilities of selection of elements from the ultimately detailed state of the system are mutually coordinated and correlated by the phenomenon of wholeness of the system, and form an implicative logical structure governed by this phenomenon of wholeness. This idea of the implicative logical organization of the probabilistic structure of a quantum system in the so-called pure (non-detailable) state, and the governing role of the phenomenon of wholeness (in the redistribution of probabilities depending on the nature of the development of the real experiment), is in good agreement with the results of quantum correlation experiments (for example, the experiments of Alain Aspect, Nicolas Gisin and others). (shrink)

The main idea of quantum mechanics, whether formulated in terms of the Planck constant or the noncommutativity of certain observables, must be tied to the recognition of the relativity and nonuniversality of the abstract concept of set (manifold) in the description of quantum systems. This entails the necessarily probabilistic description of quantum systems: since a quantum system ultimately cannot be decomposed into elements or sets, we have to describe it in terms of probabilities of only a relative selection of certain (...) elements or sets in its structure. This gives rise to the potential possibilities of quantum systems in an actual physical situation, and as a result the corresponding probabilities are ontologically real, like any other physically verifiable relationships. In this way, the quantum potential possibilities (and probabilities as their measure) are no less objectively real than the conventional reality which we identify with the physically directly verifiable elements, particles, etc. Indeed, the distribution of probabilities described by the nonfactorizable wave function is as objectively real and concrete as chairs, walls and all other physical things. In the pure quantum state the probabilities of selection of elements from the ultimately detailed state of the system are mutually coordinated and correlated by the phenomenon of wholeness of the system, and form an implicative logical structure governed by this phenomenon of wholeness. This idea of the implicative logical organization of the probabilistic structure of a quantum system in the so-called pure (non-detailable) state, and the governing role of the phenomenon of wholeness (in the redistribution of probabilities depending on the nature of the development of the real experiment), is in good agreement with the results of quantum correlation experiments (for example, the experiments of Alain Aspect, Nicolas Gisin and others). (shrink)