Research has shown that individuals with high levels of psychopathic personality traits are likely to cause harm to others in the workplace. However, there is little academic literature on the potentially adaptive outcomes of corporate psychopathy, particularly because the “boldness” psychopathy domain has largely been under-acknowledged in this literature. This study aimed to elaborate on past findings by examining the associations between psychopathy, as operationalized using scales from the relatively new triarchic model of psychopathy, and both adaptive and maladaptive workplace (...) behaviors. Participants were 343 working community adults who completed a series of self-report questionnaires that measured psychopathy and various workplace behaviors, including counterproductive work behaviors, tactics of influence, unethical decision-making, leadership strategies, team play, and creativity. Structural equation modeling was used to estimate the associations between latent constructs of boldness, meanness, and disinhibition, and the eight different constructs related to workplace behaviors. It was found that boldness preferentially predicted the use of soft tactics of influence, adaptive leadership, and team play, and negatively predicted passive leadership. Meanness predicted unethical decision-making, poor team play, and hard tactics of influence. Disinhibition positively predicted CWB and passive leadership. Meanness also moderated the association between disinhibition and CWB, in that greater scores on both psychopathy domains indicated greater levels of CWB. These findings provide conceptual support for the triarchic model, including the “boldness” domain, which measures adaptive aspects of psychopathy in addition to maladaptive ones, as well as suggest that not all individuals high on psychopathy would be an overt menace to the workplace. The different psychopathy traits may also interact with each other to predict different types or levels of workplace behaviors. (shrink)

The concept of Orientalism has been widely dealt with in the humanities and social sciences. It helps explain a peculiar construction of the Arab-Muslim world. Orientalism has operated in various historical paradigms but has always emphasised specific Western constructions of the Orient. Nowadays, the concept has metamorphosed to refer to new constructions of the Orient. New representations of Islam and the Muslim world are dominating the Western public space. The aim of this paper is twofold. It explores the historical development (...) and paradigmatic shifts that have affected the concept of Orientalism. It then suggests that a neo-Orientalism has recently emerged, is less territorialised and operating within a new paradigm. It holds a new ideologically motivated agenda, constructs new objects, and feeds the social phenomenon called Islamophobia. (shrink)

One of the central aims of the neo-mechanistic framework for the neural and cognitive sciences is to construct a pluralistic integration of scientific explanations, allowing for a weak explanatory autonomy of higher-level sciences, such as cognitive science. This integration involves understanding human cognition as information processing occurring in multi-level human neuro-cognitive mechanisms, explained by multi-level neuro-cognitive models. Strong explanatory neuro-cognitive reduction, however, poses a significant challenge to this pluralist ambition and the weak autonomy of cognitive science derived therefrom. Based on (...) research in current molecular and cellular neuroscience, the framework holds that the best strategy for integrating human neuro-cognitive theories is through direct reductive explanations based on molecular and cellular neural processes. It is my aim to investigate whether the neo-mechanistic framework can meet the challenge. I argue that leading neo-mechanists offer some significant replies; however, they are not able yet to completely remove strong explanatory reductionism from their own framework. (shrink)

Pollitt and Bouckaert and their neo-Weberian state (NWS) have been chosen as the subject for this essay because the book has become a standard work in the public management movement. It is frequently cited and has been re-published in multiple editions (most recently in 2017). The authors also refer explicitly to Max Weber.This contribution seeks to draw attention to three important aspects, which inevitably overlap with one another:1. There is no Weber in the neo-Weberian State (introduction, 1; section II). Pollitt (...) and Bouckaert fail to grasp that Weber’s understanding of the state [the state as an “institution” (Anstalt); and the state as an “idea of validity” (Geltungsvorstellung)] is not identical to his ideal type of modern bureaucracy; it is the features of the latter on which they draw. The ideal type is a standard measure constructed in order to establish how close any concrete, given instance of bureaucracy comes to it (introduction, 3). Meanwhile, the “neutral official” insisted upon by Weber has “taken their leave” in Germany from important positions (section III, 3). Furthermore, Weber did not address those structures and processes internal to the administration which are precisely the object of interest for the new public management reformers. Weber’s lack of interest arises from the fact the members of anAnstalt, whether it is the state or the Church (WuG, § 15, no. 2), are subject to imposed orders (oktroyierte Ordnungen) and, as such, do not enjoy the “right to have a say”. Scharpf (1973a) was the first to pay particular attention to the problems brought about by specialisation and by the division of labour within the administration that are responsible for an incremental form of politics (section III, 3); even if he later ascribes advantages to the combination of “negative” and “positive coordination” (Scharpf 1991: 18ff.).2. The “legalistic culture” that characterises Germany will be considered in a more differentiated way, drawing on empirical studies which provide information, for example, on how laws (i.e. programmes)actuallyoriginate inside the ministerial apparatus (introduction, 2; section III, 2 and 3) or how use is made of the power of authority (Weisungsrecht) in practice (introduction, 2; section III, 2 and 3), even when, formally, it claims to have validity (section III). In this way, only empirical studies (Benz 1994; Bohne 1981; Dose 1997; Dose/Voigt 1995; Treiber 2007a) prove that the administration that implements laws has often, in practice, become a “negotiative administration” (introduction, 2). Such a phenomenon as a “co-operative administration”, which negotiates rather than rules, is a “foreign concept” in Weber’s discussion of the state and modern bureaucracy. Scharpf’s (1970) comparison between constitutional governance in Germany and legal relief in America is enlightening when it comes to the meaning of the constitutional state (Rechtsstaat) (introduction, 2; section III); the same applies to his discussion of the failed federalist reforms, which sought, among other things, to mitigate, if not entirely eliminate, the opportunities for blockades provided by political entanglement (Politikverflechtung) (section III). Neither was it possible to realise long overdue proposals to reform administrative law (Verwaltungsrecht) (section III, 1), which involved weakening or removing altogether three important assumptions in the dominant administrative doctrine (the “dogmatic normality”) and which also included the ambitious intention for the law to achieve tangible impact (Hoffmann-Riem 1994). Nonetheless, while no-one would dispute that reform of the federal government and administration remained “on the agenda” (Scharpf 1991, Mayntz/ Scharpf 1973), the priorities of such a reform were, and still are, different to those of new public management reform [the key terms here arePlanung(“planning”) and the term that replaced it,Steuerung(“management”)]1.3. Pollitt and Bouckaert ascribe to the neo-Weberian state extremely varied functions without providing any (theoretical) basis for them. In this way, the notion of public management reform that they present acquires the status of a “reformist philosophy” (introduction, 3; section IV). See Scharpf (1991) for a theoretically well-founded argumentation on the State’s ability to act in our days. Scharpf’s essay will be discussed briefly (section IV).ConclusionThere is no Weber in the neo-Weberian state. According to the discussion presented here, the neo-Weberian state can only mean: how would a modern state constituted by Weber look today? (shrink)

Recent Neo-Davidsonian accounts of the semantics of progressive constructions of action verbs reflect an ontological distinction between processes or incomplete events on the one hand, and complete events on the other. This paper has two goals. First, it attempts to show that this putative ontological distinction is beset with problems. The second goal of this paper is to offer the beginnings of a positive proposal that seeks to show how the ontologically austere Davidsonian can account for the truth conditions of (...) progressive constructions without the need for an enriched ontology. (shrink)

Pyrrhonism involves the inability to defend claims about the unobservable world, or, more generally, about what is really going on beyond the phenomena. As a result, the Pyrrhonist is not engaged in developing a philosophical doctrine, at least in the sense of defending a view about the underlying features of reality. The issue then arises as to whether the Pyrrhonist also has something positive to say about our knowledge of the world, while still keeping Pyrrhonism. In this paper, I develop (...) a positive neo-Pyrrhonist attitude, indicating that we can use this attitude to make sense of important aspects of science and empirical knowledge. To do that, I explore the connection between this revived form of Pyrrhonism and contemporary versions of empiricism, in particular constructive empiricism. Although constructive empiricism is not a form of skepticism, there are important elements in common between constructive empiricism and Pyrrhonism. The resulting form of Pyrrhonism suggests that there is something right about the original stance articulated by Sextus Empiricus, and that suitably formulated it provides an insightful approach to think about empirical knowledge. (shrink)

Neo‐Kantianism, a movement with roots deep in the nineteenth century, dominated German academic philosophy between 1890 and 1920. Though it carried the impulse of German Idealism into the culture of the twentieth century and set the agenda for philosophies which displaced it, the movement is little studied now. One encounters it primarily in liberation narratives constructed by those whose own thinking took shape in the clash between neo‐Kantianism and the “rebellious” interwar generation spearheaded by jaspers (see Article 17) and heidegger (...) (see Article 18). Thus, before Heidegger – so Hannah Arendt (Arendt 1978, p. 294) – “philosophy was not so much communicated as drowned in a sea of boredom.” And with Heidegger – so Hans‐Georg Gadamer (Gadamer 1977, p. 214) – “the complacent system‐building of neo‐Kantian methodologism” gave way; its “calm and confident aloofness … suddenly seemed to be mere child's play” (Gadamer 1977, p. 230). Here neo‐Kantianism is the terminus ad quem of a “liberation from the unbreakable circle of reflection” toward recovery of the “evocative power of conceptual thinking and philosophical language” (Gadamer 1977, p. 202). It thus enters the lore of Continental philosophy as the father who had to be slain in order that philosophy might live. (shrink)

We now know of a number of ways of developing real analysis on a basis of abstraction principles and second-order logic. One, outlined by Shapiro in his contribution to this volume, mimics Dedekind in identifying the reals with cuts in the series of rationals under their natural order. The result is an essentially structuralist conception of the reals. An earlier approach, developed by Hale in his "Reals byion" program differs by placing additional emphasis upon what I here term Frege's Constraint, (...) that a satisfactory foundation for any branch of mathematics should somehow so explain its basic concepts that their applications are immediate. This paper is concerned with the meaning of and motivation for this constraint. Structuralism has to represent the application of a mathematical theory as always posterior to the understanding of it, turning upon the appreciation of structural affinities between the structure it concerns and a domain to which it is to be applied. There is, therefore, a case that Frege's Constraint has bite whenever there is a standing body of informal mathematical knowledge grounded in direct reflection upon sample, or schematic, applications of the concepts of the theory in question. It is argued that this condition is satisfied by simple arithmetic and geometry, but that in view of the gap between its basic concepts (of continuity and of the nature of the distinctions among the individual reals) and their empirical applications, it is doubtful that Frege's Constraint should be imposed on a neo-Fregean construction of analysis. (shrink)

Cet article envisage deux types de fondements possibles pour une « économie du bien-être néo-samuelsonnienne ». On défend l’idée que l’approche néo-samuelsonnienne en économie mène à un problème de réconciliation entre l’économie positive et l’économie normative, en raison du fait que l’agent économique n’est plus nécessairement l’unité normativement pertinente. Deux formes de réconciliation ayant des implications radicalement différentes pour le statut de l’économie normative sont envisagées. La première consiste à adopter une approche normative en termes de « welfarisme formel » (...) prétendant à une complète neutralité quant à l’identité du sujet et l’unité de mesure de l’analyse normative. L’implication principale est de faire de l’économie du bien-être une branche de l’économie positive. Une seconde approche consiste à une donner une importance axiologique particulière aux personnes, non parce qu’elles sont des prototypes d’agents économiques, mais parce qu’elles sont dotées de la capacité de se représenter, auprès des autres et d’elles-mêmes, comme des entités raisonnables au travers de processus de construction narrative. Cette capacité donne une justification à la vision selon laquelle le bien-être est constituée des préférences d’une personne, dans le sens où ces préférences sont fondées sur des raisons et valeurs définissant l’identité personnelle. (shrink)

Cet article envisage deux types de fondements possibles pour une « économie du bien-être néo-samuelsonnienne ». On défend l’idée que l’approche néo-samuelsonnienne en économie mène à un problème de réconciliation entre l’économie positive et l’économie normative, en raison du fait que l’agent économique n’est plus nécessairement l’unité normativement pertinente. Deux formes de réconciliation ayant des implications radicalement différentes pour le statut de l’économie normative sont envisagées. La première consiste à adopter une approche normative en termes de « welfarisme formel » (...) prétendant à une complète neutralité quant à l’identité du sujet et l’unité de mesure de l’analyse normative. L’implication principale est de faire de l’économie du bien-être une branche de l’économie positive. Une seconde approche consiste à une donner une importance axiologique particulière aux personnes, non parce qu’elles sont des prototypes d’agents économiques, mais parce qu’elles sont dotées de la capacité de se représenter, auprès des autres et d’elles-mêmes, comme des entités raisonnables au travers de processus de construction narrative. Cette capacité donne une justification à la vision selon laquelle le bien-être est constituée des préférences d’une personne, dans le sens où ces préférences sont fondées sur des raisons et valeurs définissant l’identité personnelle. (shrink)

In his encyclical 'Aeterni Patris' (1879), Pope Leo XIII expressed the conviction that the renewed study of the philosophical legacy of Saint Thomas Aquinas would help Catholics to engage in a dialogue with secular modernity while maintaining respect for Church doctrine and tradition. As a result, the neo-scholastic framework dominated Catholic intellectual production for nearly a century thereafter. This volume assesses the societal impact of the Thomist revival movement, with particular attention to the juridical dimension of this epistemic community. Contributions (...) from different disciplinary backgrounds offer a multifaceted and in-depth analysis of many different networks and protagonists of the neo-scholastic movement, its institutions and periodicals, and its conceptual frameworks. Although special attention is paid to the Leuven Institute of Philosophy and Faculty of Law, the volume also discloses the neo-Thomist revival in other national and transnational contexts. By highlighting diverse aspects of its societal and legal impact, 'Neo-Thomism in Action' argues that neo-scholasticism was neither a sterile intellectual exercise nor a monolithic movement. The book expands our understanding of how Catholic intellectual discourse communities were constructed and how they pervaded law and society during the late 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. (shrink)

This article explores some open questions related to the problem of verification of theories in the context of empirical sciences by contrasting three epistemological frameworks. Each of these epistemological frameworks is based on a corresponding central metaphor, namely: (a) Neo-empiricism and the gambling metaphor; (b) Popperian falsificationism and the scientific tribunal metaphor; (c) Cognitive constructivism and the object as eigen-solution metaphor. Each of one of these epistemological frameworks has also historically co-evolved with a certain statistical theory and method for testing (...) scientific hypotheses, respectively: (a) Decision theoretic Bayesian statistics and Bayes factors; (b) Frequentist statistics and p-values; (c) Constructive Bayesian statistics and e-values. This article examines with special care the Zero Probability Paradox (ZPP), related to the verification of sharp or precise hypotheses. Finally, this article makes some remarks on Lakatos’ view of mathematics as a quasi-empirical science. (shrink)

Neo-Kantian constructivism aspires to respond to moral skepticism by compelling agents to act morally on pain of irrationality. According to Christine Korsgaard, a leading proponent of constructivism, we construct all reasons for action by following correct deliberative procedures. But if we follow these procedures we will find that we only have reasons to act in morally permissible ways. Thus, we can show the skeptic that he is rationally constrained to act morally. Unfortunately, as I argue in my first chapter, this (...) strong response to moral skepticism renders deliberate immoral action unintelligible. This result is problematic since we often do interpret ourselves and others as deliberately choosing to do wrong. I further suggest that this problem follows from central commitments of Korsgaard’s constructivism, so that any adequate account of immoral action must abandon constructivist metaethics in favor of moral realism, a suggestion reinforced by the argument of my second chapter. There, I call attention to Kant’s solution to a similar problem in his own account of morality. I argue that Korsgaard’s constructivist commitments prevent her from embracing Kant’s solution. I proceed in my third chapter to argue that there is a further tension between Korsgaard’s response to moral skepticism and her work in non-ideal theory. In particular, Korsgaard maintains that, when confronted with injustice, the virtuous person may have reason to do what is wrong in the name of morality. She thus relies on the assumption that one can deliberately do wrong. I argue that this assumption undermines the response to skepticism that motivated Korsgaard’s constructivism in the first place. But despite the problems with constructivism, we may worry that moral realism fails to offer an adequate response to moral skepticism. Indeed, Korsgaard rejects realism in part because she believes that realists simply refuse to respond to moral skepticism. I thus conclude by arguing that moral realists can offer adequate responses to moral skepticism. In fact, I believe Korsgaard’s response is no more effective than those suggested by some moral realists. (shrink)

A synthesis of neo-Schumpeterian evolutionary, sociological, and historical coevolution ary models could be used for constructive technology assessment, aimed at the active management of the process of technological change. This article proposes a synthetic quasi-evolutionary model, in which variation and selection are neither independent nor coincidental processes. Variation and selection are linked by actors, resulting in the actor role labeled technological nexus. On the basis of the quasi-evolutionary approach, three constructive technology assessment strategies are proposed: stimulating alternative variations, changing the (...) selection environment, and creating or utilizing technological nexus. The usefulness of these concepts is demonstrated for the case of clean technolo gies. Ultimately, a conscious application of these strategies could result in a new actor role for government as a creative social regulator of technological change. (shrink)

This essay attempts to describe the neo-Lamarckian atmosphere that was dominant in French biology for more than a century. Firstly, we demonstrate that there were not one but at least two French neo-Lamarckian traditions. This implies, therefore, that it is possible to propose a clear definition of a (neo) Lamarckian conception, and by using it, to distinguish these two traditions. We will see that these two conceptions were not dominant at the same time. The first French neo-Lamarckism (1879-1931) was structured (...) by a very mechanic view of natural processes. The main representatives of this first period were scientists such as Alfred Giard (1846-1908), Gaston Bonnier (1853-1922) and Félix Le Dantec (1869-1917). The second Lamarckism - much more vitalist in its inspiration - started to develop under the supervision of people such as Albert Vandel (1894-1980) and Pierre-Paul Grassé (1895-1985). Secondly, this essay suggests that the philosophical inclinations of these neo-Lamarckisms reactivated a very ancient and strong dichotomy of French thought. One part of this dichotomy is a material, physicalist tradition, which started with René Descartes but developed extensively during the 18th and 19th centuries. The other is a spiritual and vitalist reaction to the first one, which also had a very long history, though it is most closely associated with the work of Henri Bergson. Through Claude Bernard, the first neo-Lamarckians tried to construct a mechanical and determinist form of evolutionary theory which was, in effect, a Cartesian theory. The second wave of neo-Lamarckians wanted to reconsider the autonomy and reactivity of life forms, in contrast to purely physical systems. (shrink)

Over the past decade, investments in agricultural and food technology startups have grown to previously unknown dimensions. Mushrooming agri-food tech startups that promise to solve critical issues in the agri-food system through technological innovation are increasingly perceived as an attractive new investment opportunity for venture capitalists and investors. This paper investigates how digital agri-food technologies are narrated, constructed, and promoted for financial investment. Through qualitative content analysis of agri-food tech industry reports, articles, and commentaries we trace the logic, rationales, and (...) narratives of this most recent investment rush, and reveal its immanent techno-finance fixes. We conceptualize the agri-food imaginaries produced within the agri-food tech discourse as financialized imaginaries, and argue that they are specifically tailored to construct, incentivize, and legitimize this new agri-food tech space for financial investment. In their attempt to raise money from investors, venture capital firms further fuel this development by discursively creating an ‘agri-food tech investment rush’—similar to the land and gold rushes of the past. Investments in agri-food tech startups, however, are presented to investors as both a profitable investment opportunity as well as a moral obligation, allowing for food production to cope with neo-malthusian and environmental threats. This paper contributes to our understanding of digitization as a socio-technical project, which includes the active envisioning and promotion of desirable agri-food futures. (shrink)

The works of Max Weber have generated a most promising interest in the social sciences with regard to his contribution to contemporary thought. While many of his substantive insights have been recognized, the attention accorded his methodological works has been comparatively scant, and often is a mere reflection of the scattered manner in which Weber himself often pursued this topic. Despite the many confusions and contradictions in Weber's methodological thought, a Weberian methodological program can be constructed from his writings. By (...) focusing on Weber's emphasis on the study of values as developed within a neo-Kantian framework, the development of Weber's methodological thought is outlined, and out of this a methodological program consistent with Weberian principles is proposed. Thus, the argument is made that Weber's methodological works are not merely of historical interest, but inform the ongoing debate over the appropriate methodological orientation of the social sciences. (shrink)

Food sovereignty can be conceptualized as a political proposal for social change in the field of agri-food relations. However, specific strategies of how to achieve this transformative potential are diverse, and context-dependent. The paper explores this diversity by examining discourses on the food sovereignty construction process in Catalonia. Using Q methodology we have explored visions held by individuals participating in the social movement for food sovereignty, identifying five discourses: activism, anti-purism, self-management, pedagogy, and pragmatism. Key strategies of transformation include social (...) mobilization, institutional negotiation, self-management, education to foster value change, and politics of the possible. The relevance assigned to ideological affinity explains different views on the subject of transformation, particularly regarding the involvement of the administration and the productive sector. As regards transformative strategies, discourses assign differing importance to the role of agency for effecting social transformation, which influences their assessment of individual actions as an effective means for social change. Forms of individualized and classic collective action currently coexist within the Catalan agri-food movement, but such diversity is not acknowledged as an effective alliance towards food sovereignty. Moreover, all discourses agree to a dual definition of food sovereignty, both as a process, that is, as democratization of the decision-making process in the agri-food sector, and as a result, that is, establishing an agri-food model alternative to the neo-liberal one. However, the discourses share an unclear view of democracy as decentralized collective decision-making that does not make explicit how this model should be implemented to achieve social control of the agri-food system. (shrink)

Rips et al. argue that the construction of math schemas roughly similar to the Dedekind/Peano axioms may be necessary for arriving at arithmetical skills. However, they neglect the neo-Fregean alternative axiomatization of arithmetic, based on Hume's principle. Frege arithmetic is arguably a more plausible start for a top-down approach in the psychological study of mathematical cognition than Peano arithmetic.

Recently, a number of neuroscientists and philosophers have taken the so-called predictive coding approach to support a form of radical neuro-representationalism, according to which the content of our conscious experiences is a neural construct, a brain-generated simulation. There is remarkable similarity between this account and ideas found in and developed by German neo-Kantians in the mid-nineteenth century. Some of the neo-Kantians eventually came to have doubts about the cogency and internal consistency of the representationalist framework they were operating within. In (...) this paper, I will first argue that some of these concerns ought to be taken seriously by contemporary proponents of predictive coding. After having done so, I will turn to phenomenology. As we shall see, Husserl’s endorsement of transcendental idealism was partially motivated by his rejection of representationalism and phenomenalism and by his attempt to safeguard the objectivity of the world of experience. This confronts us with an intriguing question. Which position is best able to accommodate our natural inclination for realism: Contemporary neuro-representationalism or Husserl’s transcendental idealism? (shrink)

Niche construction refers to the activities of organisms that bring about changes in their environments, many of which are evolutionarily and ecologically consequential. Advocates of niche construction theory (NCT) believe that standard evolutionary theory fails to recognize the full importance of niche construction, and consequently propose a novel view of evolution, in which niche construction and its legacy over time (ecological inheritance) are described as evolutionary processes, equivalent in importance to natural selection. Here, we subject NCT to critical evaluation, in (...) the form of a collaboration between one prominent advocate of NCT, and a team of skeptics. We discuss whether niche construction is an evolutionary process, whether NCT obscures or clarifies how natural selection leads to organismal adaptation, and whether niche construction and natural selection are of equivalent explanatory importance. We also consider whether the literature that promotes NCT overstates the significance of niche construction, whether it is internally coherent, and whether it accurately portrays standard evolutionary theory. Our disagreements reflect a wider dispute within evolutionary theory over whether the neo-Darwinian synthesis is in need of reformulation, as well as different usages of some key terms (e.g., evolutionary process). (shrink)

A burgeoning policy shift from neo-liberal economics is underway, with leadership by presidential candidate Dennis Kucinich (D-Ohio). His platform positions stem in part from his negative experiences with neo-liberalism when he was Mayor of Cleveland more than 30 years ago. Although his response as Mayor was based on confrontation politics, examples of community-based economies built on collaborative planning, ownership, and management have since become more widely known. We can now show that the successful Grameen Bank and the Mondragon Cooperatives were (...) constructed on principles consistent with Integral Science. (shrink)

The neo-Lockean justification of the highly unequal distribution of income in capitalist societies is based upon two key premises: that people are the rightful owners of their labor and talents, and that the external world was, in the state of nature, unowned, and therefore up for grabs by people, who could rightfully appropriate parts of it subject to a ‘Lockean proviso.’ The argument is presented by Nozick. Counter-proposals to Nozick’s, for the most part, have either denied the premise that people (...) should morally be viewed as the owners of their talents, or have challenged Nozick’s Lockean proviso.Rawls, and to a more limited extent Ronald Dworkin, deny self-ownership. As Rawls writes: ‘…the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset … The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society.’ Behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, those who deliberate about justice are deprived of knowledge about characteristics whose distribution is morally arbitrary. In Dworkin’s proposal for resource egalitarianism, agents calculate the insurance policy they would hypothetically ask for, were they denied knowledge of what talents they will draw in the birth lottery. Compensation for unequal talents is, according to Dworkin, properly made by taxing and transferring income according to the way it would have been distributed as a consequence of such insurance. Dworkin’s veil of ignorance is thin, because agents in the appropriate posture for deliberating about income distribution know their preferences and attitudes toward risk, but not their talents. For both Rawls and Dworkin, the self-ownership premise is challenged by constructing a veil of ignorance in which people are deprived of knowledge of certain personal characteristics, knowledge of which would bias their opinions, from a moral viewpoint. (shrink)

The neo-Darwinian paradigm, focusing on natural selection of genes responsible for differential adaption, provides the foundation for explaining evolutionary processes. The modern synthesis is broader, however, focusing on organisms rather than on gene transmissions per se. Yet, strands of current biology argue for further supplementation of Darwinian theory, pointing to nonbiotic drivers of evolutionary development, for example, self-organization of physical structures, and the interaction between individual organisms, groups of organisms, and their nonbiotic environments. According to niche construction theory, when organisms (...) and groups develop, they not only adapt to their environments but modify their environments, creating new habitats for later generations. Insofar as ecological niches persist beyond the lifecycle of individual organisms, an ecological inheritance system exists alongside genetic inheritance. Such ecological structures may even facilitate the development of a cultural inheritance system, as we see in humans. The article discusses theological perspectives of such new developments within holistic biology. (shrink)

This essay attempts to describe the neo-Lamarckian atmosphere that was dominant in French biology for more than a century. Firstly, we demonstrate that there were not one but at least two French neo-Lamarckian traditions. This implies, therefore, that it is possible to propose a clear definition of a (neo)Lamarckian conception, and by using it, to distinguish these two traditions. We will see that these two conceptions were not dominant at the same time. The first French neo-Lamarckism (1879–1931) was structured by (...) a very mechanic view of natural processes. The main representatives of this first period were scientists such as Alfred Giard (1846–1908), Gaston Bonnier (1853–1922) and Félix Le Dantec (1869–1917). The second Lamarckism – much more vitalist in its inspiration – started to develop under the supervision of people such as Albert Vandel (1894–1980) and Pierre-Paul Grassé (1895–1985). Secondly, this essay suggests that the philosophical inclinations of these neo-Lamarckisms reactivated a very ancient and strong dichotomy of French thought. One part of this dichotomy is a material, physicalist tradition, which started with René Descartes but developed extensively during the 18th and 19th centuries. The other is a spiritual and vitalist reaction to the first one, which also had a very long history, though it is most closely associated with the work of Henri Bergson. Through Claude Bernard, the first neo-Lamarckians tried to construct a mechanical and determinist form of evolutionary theory which was, in effect, a Cartesian theory. The second wave of neo-Lamarckians wanted to reconsider the autonomy and reactivity of life forms, in contrast to purely physical systems. (shrink)

The paper addresses a problem for the unification of quantum physics with the new Aristotelianism: the identification of the members of the category of substance. I outline briefly the role that substance plays in Aristotelian metaphysics, leading to the postulating of the Tiling Constraint. I then turn to the question of which entities in quantum physics can qualify as Aristotelian substances. I offer an answer: the theory of thermal substances, and I construct a fivefold case for thermal substances, based on (...) the irreversibility of time, the definition of thermodynamic concepts, spontaneous symmetry breaking, phase transitions, and chemical form. (shrink)

The neo-Lockean justification of the highly unequal distribution of income in capitalist societies is based upon two key premises: that people are the rightful owners of their labor and talents, and that the external world was, in the state of nature, unowned, and therefore up for grabs by people, who could rightfully appropriate parts of it subject to a ‘Lockean proviso.’ The argument is presented by Nozick. Counter-proposals to Nozick’s, for the most part, have either denied the premise that people (...) should morally be viewed as the owners of their talents, or have challenged Nozick’s Lockean proviso.Rawls, and to a more limited extent Ronald Dworkin, deny self-ownership. As Rawls writes: ‘…the difference principle represents, in effect, an agreement to regard the distribution of natural talents as a common asset … The naturally advantaged are not to gain merely because they are more gifted, but only to cover the costs of training and education and for using their endowments in ways that help the less fortunate as well. No one deserves his greater natural capacity nor merits a more favorable starting place in society.’ Behind the Rawlsian veil of ignorance, those who deliberate about justice are deprived of knowledge about characteristics whose distribution is morally arbitrary. In Dworkin’s proposal for resource egalitarianism, agents calculate the insurance policy they would hypothetically ask for, were they denied knowledge of what talents they will draw in the birth lottery. Compensation for unequal talents is, according to Dworkin, properly made by taxing and transferring income according to the way it would have been distributed as a consequence of such insurance. Dworkin’s veil of ignorance is thin, because agents in the appropriate posture for deliberating about income distribution know their preferences and attitudes toward risk, but not their talents. For both Rawls and Dworkin, the self-ownership premise is challenged by constructing a veil of ignorance in which people are deprived of knowledge of certain personal characteristics, knowledge of which would bias their opinions, from a moral viewpoint. (shrink)

When Johannes Hevelius’ Selenographia, sive Lunae descriptio (Selenography, or A Description of The Moon) was printed in 1647, its rich paratext featured a portrait epigram and a collection of nine Neo-Latin poems praising the first book of the Danzig (Gdańsk) astronomer. The present article examines these ten poems as a place where Hevelius’ authority as an author and astronomer is being constructed, focusing on the fictionalized and fictional relationships between Hevelius and other authorities depicted in the text. In a sort (...) of kaleidoscope, the poems relate Hevelius to prominent astronomers like Galileo and Copernicus, to Columbus, the paragon of the discoverer, to figures from ancient myth, and even, in the form of anagrams, to his own name. Moreover, they highlight Hevelius’ personal qualities as an astronomer, as a member of the realm of literature, and as a citizen of Danzig. The image of the author that emerges from the poems asserts Hevelius’ place in the public space of literature and fashions him into an authoritative figure at the threshold of his text. (shrink)

The style of arithmetic in the treatises the Neo-Pythagorean authors is strikingly different from that of the "Elements". Namely, it is characterised by the absence of proof in the Euclidean sense and a specific genetic approach to the construction of arithmetic that we are going to describe in our paper. Lack of mathematical sophistication has led certain historians to consider this type of mathematics as a feature of decadence of mathematics in this period [Tannery 1887; Heath 1921]. The alleged absence (...) of originality in these works has also given grounds to believe that “the arithmetic presented in these works derives substantially from an ancient, primitive stage of Pythagorean arithmetic” and to use them as “an index of the character of arithmetic science in the 5th century” [Knorr 1975]. In this paper, we take Nicomachus’ Introduction to Arithmetic for point of departure, because it is the richest and most well organised treatise representing this tradition. However, we also take into account the works of other Neo-Pythagorean authors. We are going to show that the Neo-Pythagorean arithmetic might have been developed in a natural, self-contained manner as a simple theory of counting over a domain of concrete initial objects, designated by fixed signs. This approach can be comfortably realised without appealing to assumptions of axiomatic character, but relying upon some ‘genetic’ constructions intented to be carried out by means of the designated entities. (shrink)

This article proposes to discuss the role of music within confucian philosophy as a whole and within neo-Confucian philosophy in particular. The discussion includes a consideration of the construction of chinese music; philosophical correlations drawn between musical elements and features of both macrocosm and microcosm; musical aesthetics in the confucian and neo-Confucian philosophical systems; and affinities between the nature of music and the broader outlook of confucian and neo-Confucian philosophy. The suggestion is made that these affinities help to explain the (...) prominent role of music in these two philosophical schools. (shrink)

The Oslo "peace process" changed the modalities of the occupation, but not the basic concept. Shortly before joining the Ehud Barak government, historian Shlomo Ben-Ami wrote that "the Oslo agreements were founded on a neo-colonialist basis, on a life of dependence of one on the other forever". He soon became an architect of the US-Israel proposals at Camp David in 2000, which kept to this condition. At the time, West Bank Palestinians were confined to 200 scattered areas. Bill Clinton and (...) Israeli prime minister Barak did propose an improvement: consolidation to three cantons, under Israeli control, virtually separated from one another and from the fourth enclave, a small area of East Jerusalem, the centre of Palestinian communications. The fifth canton was Gaza. It is understandable that maps are not to be found in the US mainstream. Nor is their prototype, the Bantustan "homelands" of apartheid South Africa, ever mentioned. No one can seriously doubt that the US role will continue to be decisive. It is crucial to understand what that role has been, and how it is internally perceived. The version of the doves is presented by the editors of the New York Times, praising President Bush's "path-breaking speech" and the "emerging vision" he articulated. Its first element is "ending Palestinian terrorism" immediately. Some time later comes "freezing, then rolling back, Jewish settlements and negotiating new borders" to allow the establishment of a Palestinian state. If Palestinian terror ends, Israelis will be encouraged to "take the Arab League's historic offer of full peace and recognition in exchange for an Israeli withdrawal more seriously". But first Palestinian leaders must demonstrate that they are "legitimate diplomatic partners". (shrink)

In The Construction of Logical Space, Agustín Rayo defends trivialism, according to which number-involving truths are trivially equivalent to other, non-number-involving truths; picturesquely, ‘I have five fingers on my hand’ and ‘the number of fingers on my hand is five’ express the same fact, but carved up in different ways. A single fact thus has multiple structures. I distinguish two ways this might go: on the deflationary picture, facts get their structures from our linguistic practices, while on an inflationary picture, (...) facts have multiple structures independently of language. I argue that Rayo’s view is best interpreted as deflationary. Thus interpreted, it blocks off an attractive solution to the old problems of intensionality. I further argue a that a semi-deflationary variant of Rayo’s view can make use of the attractive solution—but it thereby sacrifices the supposed mathematical benefits of trivialism. (shrink)

The issue of this paper is the extent to which historicism excludes metaphysics in the contemporary revival of American philosophical pragmatism. I have isolated three types of neo-pragmatism: philosophical, theological, and religious. My theisis is that religious pragmatism is a dialectical compromise between theological pragmatism and philosophical pragmatism. William Dean is correct that Rorty’s commitment to human solidarity implies a metaphysics, for human solidarity is valuable only because natural reality is so harsh. Jeffrey Stout, though, is correct that theistic naturalism (...) is “relevant but redundant,” for God is identical to creative natural experiences. Religious pragmatism is an unjustly neglected alternative in this contemporary revival of classical pragmatism. It is a union of the naturalistic conception of religion from theological pragmatism and the non-theistic metaphysics of philosophical pragmatism. By preserving what is true in each type of pragmatism, religious pragmatism makes constructive dialogue possible. (shrink)

In the contemporary epistemological debate on social reality, characterized by the crisis of post-modern theories and the emergence of new forms of realism, are there any approaches not acknowledging some specific ontological character to the construction of social objects? The question is apparently rhetorical, but the implication of this problem are not obvious. In the sociological literature the opposition between reality and construction is not clearly defined. Sometimes it is considered a dichotomy, in other situations the synthesis of alternative theses (...) in a dialectical horizon. The more systematic attempt considers reality and construction as analytical macro-dimensions where the relation between social ontology and epistemology operates. From this stance, the acknowledgement of the role of social construction in a wider realist horizon is the true overtaking of postmodern philosophy. If it is true that facts exist beyond representations, it is also true that representations themselves have a specific effect on reality, who continually re-structures itself around specific relations of emergent power. Stating that reality is socially constructed is an evident limit of postmodern theories. On the other hand, stating that only facts exist constitute an impoverishment of realism and its replacement in neo-positivism. Social phenomena are real because they are based on specific properties of the inter-subjective construction of social reality. This thesis represents the revitalization of an advanced, anti-positivistic realism and the definition of the specificity of social objects. The aim of this essay is to search for a specific place of construction within the development of realist social ontology. (shrink)

This paper from the dilemma of the modern super-g to re-read and judge the angle of the Chinese New Scholasticism. Western modern legislation based on human subjectivity, emphasizing human reason, and who constructed the appearance of culture. In which, with the appearance of the main building through rational, manipulation of power, domination of others and otherness, creating a solid all embarrassed, defects clusters. Neo-Confucian emphasis on human subjectivity and for the reconstruction of Chinese philosophy and laid a priori basis for (...) China's modernization, but ignoring the dimension of otherness, especially those who ignore the people he's the ultimate open. Contemporary Neo-Confucian philosophy as a subject, "benevolence" as the self-love and not to speak of ethics and practice, not easy to overcome the dilemma of modernity. By comparison, Catholic scholars of contemporary China, especially Chinese New Scholastic Philosophy, in the process of integration of Chinese culture, emphasizes the human spirit to live straight, but still trying to maintain the relationship of ultimate otherness. Although they used the interpretation of the Christian faith, not necessarily the history of Chinese philosophy, the image, but their efforts to point out that Chinese culture and Chinese philosophy about human nature has not of intrinsic dimension beyond, and to promote and practice of true humility has , Love and Love of ethics, is indeed precious. Philosophy they create, from the ontology, cosmology, human nature, ethics, training Jilun point of view, the plight of modern super-g. Due to space limitations, this article cite Yu Bin , Lo Kuang , Li Zhen three to illustrate their ideas into practice and how can the life of the plight of the modern super-g. This paper re-reads and re-assesses the development of 'Chinese Neo-Scholasticism in terms of its potential to overcome the malaise of modernity, which has been caused by the self-enclosure of human subjectivity, the culture of representations, impoverishment of human reason, and the tendency towards domination by the will to power that characterize Modernity. Different from it, Modern New Confucianism keeps itself to the self-enclosed human subjectivity, without the love for many others, with their strong discourse and weak praxis, and therefore still belongs to modernity and is unable to overcome its malaise. In comparison, Chinese Neo-Scholasticism, in its attempt of synthesis with Chinese philosophy, is open to God, to all things in the universe, to other people, and to love them in their life praxis, it does not allow the self-enclosure of human nature. Even it what they interpret is not necessarily the historical image of Chinese philosophy, their effort in keeping irreducible human nature's openness to God arid many others is very significant today. The philosophical system they build, containing diverse dimensions such as ontology, cosmology, theory of human nature, ethics, theory of self-cultivation, philosophy of culture and philosophy of education ... etc., and their actualization of 'their ideas in their life praxis, indeed offer a way of life and thinking that is capable of 'overcoming the malaise of modernity. This paper will take Cardinal Yu Bin, Archbishop Lo Kuang and Mgr. Gabriel Li, and their theories and life praxis as examples of analysis. (shrink)

This paper analyzes three contrasting strategies for modeling intentional agency in contemporary analytic philosophy of mind and action, and draws parallels between them and similar strategies of scientific model-construction. Gricean modeling involves identifying primitive building blocks of intentional agency, and building up from such building blocks to prototypically agential behaviors. Analogical modeling is based on picking out an exemplary type of intentional agency, which is used as a model for other agential types. Theoretical modeling involves reasoning about intentional agency in (...) terms of some domain-general framework of lawlike regularities, which involves no detailed reference to particular building blocks or exemplars of intentional agency. Given the contrasting procedural approaches that they employ and the different types of knowledge that they embody, the three strategies are argued to provide mutually complementary perspectives on intentional agency. (shrink)

John King-Farlow's ‘The Positive McTaggart on Time’ brings out extremely important likenesses between ‘abstract’ metaphysicians and ‘concrete’ philosophers of science. These striking similarities illustrate a perennial human quest for Something More Basic than Time, a quest which characterizes not only mystics who rejoice in contradictions but hard-headed philosophers who submit to the rigours of logic. King-Farlow is largely concerned with the McTaggart of 1908 and his motivation for writing ‘The Unreality of Time’. I should like to explore further the surprising (...) bond between the Search for Something Deeper in the later McTaggart of The Nature of Existence and the writings on Time of Hans Reichenbach and Adolf Grünbaum. Reflection on this similarity should enable us better to evaluate the view that our vulgar, if practically useful, assertions about Time's Arrow must be reinterpreted by the wise in terms of chastened logical constructions out of statements about Something Deeper—logical constructions which are alleged, if chaste enough, to be eliminable. (shrink)

Since the inception of the psychology of personality, psychologists have been trying to account for regularities in behavior. The preferred construct has been the personality trait as an inner disposition that directs conduct and which is common to all people. Although found lacking during the 1970s, the search for sources of direction from within has been resurrected in the form of the five-factor theory. According to this approach there are five underling structural factors common to all people and independent of (...) cultural influences—an asocial, ahistorical, biologically based conception. Examination of the theory finds it to be dealing with traits of temperament rather than personality and judges it insufficient on that basis. Rather than conceiving of personality as fixed and universal, it is argued that personality is an adaptation worked out in the cultural and historical context of the individual life. It is further contended that a reconsideration of the personality theory of Gordon Allport will provide a better basis for understanding personality and personality traits specifically. 2012 APA, all rights reserved). (shrink)

The main focus of this essay is to closely engage with the role of scientist-subjectivity in the making of objectivity in Lorraine Daston and Peter Galison’s book Objectivity, and Daston’s later and earlier works On Scientific Observation and The Moral Economy of Science. I have posited four challenges to the neo-Kantian and Foucauldian constructions of the co-implication of psychology and epistemology presented in these texts. Firstly, following Jacques Lacan’s work, I have argued that the subject of science constituted by the (...) mode of modern science suffers from paranoia. It is not the fear of subjectivity interfering with objectivity but the impossibility of knowing the truth of the real that causes paranoia. Here, I have argued that it is not the ethos of objectivity that drives epistemology as Daston and Galison suggest, but the pathos of paranoia. The second challenge builds upon Kant’s own denial that the perfect correspondence between the human will and the moral law is possible. Kant himself thought that an ethical human act is impossible without the component of “pathology.” This questions Daston and Galison’s argument that there is always ethical imperative at the core of epistemic virtue. The third challenge contests the way Daston and Galison take appearance for being in their application of the Foucauldian concept of technologies of the self in modeling the master scientist-self. The fourth challenge questions the notion of the psychological and unconscious in the making of epistemology in Daston’s later and earlier work. Against this background, I aim to make a claim that understanding and disclosing “entities” in the scientific domain presupposes an understanding of “being” in general. My goal is to open up the discussion for an alternative conception of the scientist-subject and thereby an affective and existential formulation of science. (shrink)

The challenges facing the life-worlds of political societies in the Islamic world require a radical shift of perspective that can improve our understanding of the contemporary situation of human rights politics. Not only the classical formulation of secularism, which aims at liberating the public sphere from domination of ‘the sacred’, but also the political-theological approach, which addresses the problems of modernity within the context of a disguised and refurbished dominance of ‘the transcendence’, suffer from and share a basic insufficiency in (...) handling human rights issues. According to these approaches, the basic issue stems from a realignment in relations between logics of the sovereign and the sacred or a redefinition of the position of state against religion. In this article, my object is shifting the scope of discussion concerning the rights beyond this logic of sovereignty by adopting an approach which provides a political ground for discussing the intermingling of religion in the life-world. From my point of view, the first step that should be taken to deepen our understanding of the argument of freedom is to unveil the nature of the sacred within the framework of a power network that longs for control over the whole lives of individuals constituting the society. In this regard, by going beyond the concepts such as fanaticism, fundamentalism or terrorism provided by ‘state mentality’, the significance of lifestyle politics for ‘rights talk’ will become more evident. From this point of view, the detection and critique of a zone of ‘weak citizenship’ constructed through restrictions stemming from the values and norms arising from the perceptions of particular communities organized through family, tradition and justice are essential. Such a critique will pave the way for a radical politicization of lifestyles by way of criteria of the demands for equal respect and dignity. (shrink)

According to W. V. O. Quine's received view, Rudolf Carnap's Der Logische Aufbau der Welt (henceforth Aufbau) is a radical empiricist project that attempts at reducing scientific knowledge to a phenomenalistic basis. In Quine's reading, having a phenomenalistic basis is an essential part of the thesis of the Aufbau. According to Michael Friedman, on the other hand, Aufbau is a neo-Kantian project that is primarily concerned with showing the possibility of objective and unified scientific knowledge. Thus, for Friedman, Carnap's choice (...) of phenomenalistic language is rather circumstantial. In this paper, I argue that both Quine and Friedman focus on two different aspects of the Aufbau, which as I shall suggest were equally significant and essential for Carnap's philosophical outlook at the time he was writing Aufbau. Hence, Aufbau should be appreciated for its truly ambitious objective that comprises both the radical empiricist and the neo-Kantian goals. (shrink)

Professor Margenau's paper presents an analysis of physical theory which has the great merit of exhibiting classical physics and modern quantum mechanics as different aspects of the same epistemological and methodological framework.By maintaining that “there is not a tree and my construct of it, nor a wave length and my construct of it” he is denying that the constructs of ordinary common sense and, a fortiori, the theoretical constructs of the physical sciences denote entities existing independently of our rational manipulation (...) of them. This denial then enables him to treat constructs like “tree” and “electric current” exactly on a par with the Ψ-functions of quantum mechanics not only methodologically but also ontologically. Once this is granted, he has prepared the ground for his synthesis of classical physics with quantum mechanics and is justified in inferring that “In quantum mechanics, then, the basic mode of description has remained unaltered while the rules of correspondence have undergone radical changes.”. (shrink)

[ES] Gottlob Frege posiblemente era el primer filósofo analítico. La exégesis de su doctrina quedó durante varias décadas restringida casi naturalmente al ámbito de la filosofía analítica y angloparlante. El método que Frege heredó a la filosofía analítica se basa en el análisis abstracto y formal, y la aprehensión de su doctrina se desarrolló bajo el supuesto –tomado casi por autoevidente- que éste método es el único correcto para dar cuenta de los problemas filosóficos más fundamentales, muy particularmente el de (...) desarrollar una teoría de significado. Igualmente se asumía y asume todavía con cierto automatismo que las preocupaciones filosóficas de Frege son fundamentalmente las mismas de la filosofía analítica y las que no caben en este supuesto se desechan fácilmente como anacrónicas o absurdas. Este acercamiento al pensamiento de Frege exclusivamente bajo los supuestos de la filosofía analítica, sus méritos no obstante, no toma en cuenta el ambiente anti-naturalista y neo-kantiano en el cual Frege formó sus convicciones fundamentales. Algunos aspectos contenciosos como, por ejemplo, el principio de contexto, una posible jerarquía de sentidos indirectos o la suposición, casi tácita, de que la doctrina de Frege es una teoría sobre expresiones referenciales, aparecen en una luz diferente si nos damos cuenta de que su intento de construir un sistema es, en cuanto a filosofía, en el fondo una respuesta a problemas que Frege encontró en el sistema de Kant. [EN] Gottlob Frege was quite possibly the first analytical philosopher. For several decades the study of his teachings restricted itself almost naturally to the sphere of analytical and English speaking philosophy. The very method which Frege might have impressed upon analytical philosophy takes off with abstract and formal analysis and the apprehension of his doctrine developed under the assumption –taken to be almost self-evident- that this method is the only one capable of correctly accounting for the most fundamental philosophical problems, especially bringing forth a comprehensive theory of meaning. Hence it was taken for granted with certain automatism that the Frege´s philosophical worries were initially identical in its origins with those of contemporary analytical philosophy and those not amenable to easy adoptions are discharged as absurd anachronisms when viewed against current doctrines. Approaching Fregean thought exclusively under the assumptions of analytical philosophy, while having merit, does not take into account the anti-naturalist and neo-Kantian background which influenced the modelling of Frege’s fundamental convictions. Some contentious aspects like for example the context principle, a possible hierarchy of indirect senses or the almost tacit assumption that Frege’s doctrine is a theory about referential expressions appear in a different light, once we become aware that his attempt at system-construction, as far as it concerns philosophy, is fundamentally an answer to problems which Frege found in Kant’s system. (shrink)

The article is devoted to the analysis of the legal theories of P.I. Novgorodtsev and B.A. Kistyakovsky, based on the moral philosophy of I. Kant in comparison with the psychological theory of law of L.I. Petrazhitsky. The unity of the positions of Novgorodtsev and Kistyakovsky in focusing on the ethical aspects of law, as well as highlighting morality as the highest principle, is revealed. Attention is paid to the disclosure of neo-Kantian motives in the philosophy of law and in the (...) context of the development of the theory of natural law in Russia. The main content of the article is a consistent analysis of Novgorodtsevʼs ideas in their dynamics, compared with the neo-Kantian philosophy of law of Kistyakovsky. It is emphasized that the psychological theory of the source of Petrazhitskyʼs legal relations is in the same intention of thought with the motives of the Russian neo-Kantians, which allows them to be compared in the history of the development of the Russian theory of law. The modern scientific literature is analyzed in order to identify the problem of comparing different approaches in the history of Russian philosophy of law, in which German transcendental philosophy is one of the key foundations. The question of the independence of Russian scientists in the construction of ethical and legal doctrines is actualized, but, at the same time, a single motive is emphasized with the Kantian provision on the need to establish a general civil society on the principles of a developed system of rules and norms. (shrink)

The aim of this article is to provide an overview of various discourses relevant to developing a construct of collective _phronesis_, from a (neo)-Aristotelian perspective, with implications for professional practice in general and business practice and business ethics education in particular. Despite the proliferation of interest in practical wisdom within business ethics and more general areas of both psychology and philosophy, the focus has remained mostly on the construct at the level of individual decision-making, as in Aristotle’s _Nicomachean Ethics_. However, (...) he also made intriguing remarks about _phronesis_ at the collective level in his _Politics_: remarks that have mostly eluded elaboration. The aim of this article is practical and revisionary, rather than exegetical and deferential, with respect to Aristotle. Nevertheless, just as most of the literature on individual _phronesis_ draws on Aristotle’s exposition in the _Nicomachean Ethics_, the obvious first port of call for an analysis of collective _phronesis_ is to explore the resources handed down to us by Aristotle himself. The lion’s share of this article is, therefore, devoted to making sense of Aristotle’s somewhat unsystematic remarks and the lessons we can draw from them about collective managerial _phronesis_ and business ethics education. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Carnap’s Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism by Alan W. RichardsonRolf GeorgeAlan W. Richardson. Carnap’s Construction of the World. The Aufbau and the Emergence of Logical Empiricism. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Pp. x + 242. Cloth, $49.95.According to the author, the “received view” of Carnap’s Kantian treatise of 1928, Der Logische Aufbau der Welt, promulgated mostly by Quine (10), takes it (...) to be a continuation of Russell’s “external world program,” an attempt at “providing a systematic reduction of empirical discourse generally to discourse involving only sense data” (21). One of Richardson’s aims is to show that this is wrong: while Carnap holds that our knowledge begins in sensation, our “elementary experiences” are not conscious and thus do not obey Russell’s “principle of acquaintance.” While we have no conscious access to the first elements of cognition, logical constructions based on them lead to sense qualities, phenomenal items, and eventually to physical and even cultural objects.These constructions are also meant to solve the problem of objectivity. According to Carnap, individual streams of experience are not comparable at all, but “certain structural properties agree for all streams of experience” (Aufbau §66, 32), a point that Kant had also made: “In the relation between sensations lies something that is generally valid, even though each sensation has only private validity” (Reflection 653).Richardson describes Carnap’s constructions in a couple of well written and accessible chapters (31–91), one of them an overview, the other a discussion of the problem of objectivity. Then comes the “Kantian Problematic,” (92–116), centered on the synthetic a priori. He repeats Michael Friedman’s now familiar but mistaken point that, due to the limitations of Aristotelian logic, Kant could not have formulated simple statements about order structures: “between any two points there lies another” could not be formulated in any logic he knew, and he therefore had to call in pure intuition to handle mathematical constructions. But he could, and in fact did, make just such claims in the vernacular, which was the sole vehicle for the pellucid formulations of the classical theory of the continuum, from Bolzano to Weyerstrass.The next chapter brings us the heart of Richardson’s concerns, which is to establish neo-Kantian antecedents of the Aufbau. There are some biographical details of doubtful merit. The neo-Kantian Bauch is identified as Carnap’s “dissertation director,” and, in a perhaps unconscious slight to Carnap’s intelligence, as “the philosopher from whom Carnap learned what he knew about Kant” (116). Ten years before Carnap had indeed taken a seminar in the Critique of Pure Reason from Bauch, but perusal of the latter’s work does not encourage the thought that he had much to do with the thesis “Der Raum” (1922). In the event, a German ordinarius did not usually have a hand in the construction of a thesis, and often did not even read it. His job was to accept it on behalf of the university. We now know, for example, that Bauch’s teacher Rickert had an assistant evaluate Heidegger’s Habilitationsschrift never reading it himself. (It passed.)Richardson’s reflection on the neo-Kantian project relies mostly on Cassirer. This points to another problem with the Bauch connection. Bauch was a zealous anti-Semite, and did not think much of Cassirer and the Marburg school in general. He gave up the editorship of Kantstudien in 1916 because of the Jewish presence in the Kant Society, and [End Page 179] founded his own group and journal. Carnap nonetheless chose Kantstudien to publish his dissertation, perhaps to put more distance between himself and Bauch. Space does not permit me to cite Bauch’s vicious remarks about Einstein; he could not have guided Carnap through the discussion of physical space in “Der Raum.”I return to Richardson’s reconstruction. According to the neo-Kantian, objective knowledge is found in mathematical physics, not in uninformed experience. He acknowledges that theoretical physics relies on conventions, and that these conventions go beyond mere experience to provide the mathematical structure necessary for objectivity (131). The responses to the problem this poses... (shrink)

Contemporary neo-liberal society is ruled by the market. Davies, Chen and Lentin and Titley show that its objectification and categorization founds a competitive notion of agency that disables subjective construction of self and intersubjective understanding of the world. As the market's rules and norms are set by white patriarchy, its competitive paradigm structurally disadvantages others. Art too is objectified and categorized by neo-liberal institutions, equally embedded in white patriarchal market structures and severely limiting democratic public access to a diverse artistic (...) field, argue hooks, Mercer and Piper. Yet, Piper's artwork shows, art holds emancipatory potential. Defined as transforming experience, its ambiguity provides a structure for constituting agentic subjectivity and intersubjective signification processes, defying objective/objectifying market workings. Photography's specific qualities allow Piper to democratize access to the paradigm she proposes. Her artistic choices may thus found the potential to publicly construct a notion of aesthetic agency as resistance to the neo-liberal market. (shrink)

The philosophy of the modern age begins with two enigmatic figures—Descartes and Bacon. They are steeped in the common spirit of philosophical reform, but view the tasks and the place of metaphysics differently. Bacon thinks that metaphysics should be constructed on the basis of physics and has an applied and empirical character. Descartes believes that physics grows out of a priori metaphysics.