This article addresses the fiduciary issues raised by the current practice of plan fiduciaries of not only disclaiming any fiduciary responsibility for brokerage window investments, but also abdicating any role (fiduciary or otherwise) in assessing even the general suitability of those investments for a retirement plan, and concludes that the practice is in plain and notorious violation of what ERISA requires of fiduciaries.

The well-being of generations yet to come must necessarily be an important concern for the present. As an extension of Rawls’ ‘just savings’ principle, one of the arguments for sustainable development is that of intergenerational equity—the idea that future generations must have the same access to natural resources as the present generation. In this article, I attempt to reconcile the divergent positions of the shareholder and stakeholder primacy debate by proposing that directors—acting for the corporation—should preserve intergenerational equity. Three arguments (...) are presented in course of this proposition. Firstly, corporations are perpetual in nature and their continuing existence is predicated upon the ability of individual owners to transfer their ownership. Second, directors have a higher fiduciary duty to the corporation and future shareholders, over that of present shareholders. Finally, in order to safeguard the interests of future shareholders, corporations must necessarily strive to preserve the natural and social environments upon which the future of the corporation and the wealth of future shareholders depend. (shrink)

The well-being of generations yet to come must necessarily be an important concern for the present. As an extension of Rawls’ ‘just savings’ principle, one of the arguments for sustainable development is that of intergenerational equity—the idea that future generations must have the same access to natural resources as the present generation. In this article, I attempt to reconcile the divergent positions of the shareholder and stakeholder primacy debate by proposing that directors—acting for the corporation—should preserve intergenerational equity. Three arguments (...) are presented in course of this proposition. Firstly, corporations are perpetual in nature and their continuing existence is predicated upon the ability of individual owners to transfer their ownership. Second, directors have a higher fiduciary duty to the corporation and future shareholders, over that of present shareholders. Finally, in order to safeguard the interests of future shareholders, corporations must necessarily strive to preserve the natural and social environments upon which the future of the corporation and the wealth of future shareholders depend. (shrink)

“What is a poet? An unhappy person who conceals profound anguish in his heart but whose lips are so formed that as sighs and cries pass over them they sound like beautiful music.” These opening lines from Kierkegaard's Either/Or signify a tragic state of affairs because the poet brings joy to others and yet experiences no joy himself. In a similar vein, consider the child prodigy—Bobby Fischer, Shirley Temple, Mozart. Although there is no question that these children were gifted, there (...) is some debate about how happy their childhoods were. There are benefits to just “being a kid,” and it is not clear that these individuals had that opportunity. (shrink)

A critical issue for the future growth and impact of socially responsible investment (SRI) is whether institutional investors are legally permitted to engage in it – in particular whether it is compatible with the fiduciary duties of trustees. An ambitious report from the United Nations Environment Programme’s Finance Initiative (UNEP FI), commonly referred to as the ‘Freshfields report’, has recently given rise to considerable optimism on this issue among proponents of SRI. The present article puts the arguments of the (...) Freshfields report into some further both empirical and critical perspective, however, and suggests that its findings do not call for very much optimism. The general argument is that while the understanding of fiduciary duty outlined by the Freshfields report seems to allow institutional investors to at least sometimes take some social or environmental considerations into account, the support it gives for SRI is notably contingent and, furthermore, it rules out exactly the kind of SRI which proponents of social responsibility and environmental sustainability should hold in highest regard – proactive cases and socially effective investment strategies. If SRI is to become an important force for corporate social responsibility through its adoption by institutional investors, then, it is suggested that legal reform is needed. (shrink)

Socially responsible investing identifies the fiduciary duty and liability for financial advisors serving individual and institutional clients when consulting in the SRI space. This article first discusses the role of a fiduciary emerging from both a legal and an ethical basis. Further, the special aspects of maintaining fiduciary duty and minimizing fiduciary liability are described as they relate to SRI. A number of recommendations are discussed: legal, ethical, and practice. This study argues that prudence focuses more (...) on the process of decisions rather than their outcomes, as measured exclusively by rate of return. (shrink)

The American Journal of Bioethics, Volume 12, Issue 8, Page 13-15, August 2012.

Most discussions of fiduciary duty focus on medical decision-making, but that is not the only context in which the concept is important. Investment advisers have fiduciary duties to their clients: in this essay, we address those duties. Many advisers refuse to help their clients with ‘socially responsible’ investment plans, for a variety of reasons, among which are fiduciary concerns. We argue that the reasons generally given not to pursue a religious, environmental, or social investment strategy are mistaken, (...) and, most importantly, that an investment adviser’s fiduciary duties may be met while providing such alternatives to clients. (shrink)

A critical issue for the future growth of socially responsible investment (SRI) is to what extent institutional investors such as pension funds can be persuaded to engage in it. This paper considers attempts at justifying such engagement stemming from a range of (re-)interpretations of the fiduciary duties owed by pension funds to their beneficiaries, and thereby develops a hypothesis concerning the most effective political or legal remedy. Previous commentary suggests that fiduciary duty either already mandates SRI for pension (...) funds, or at least can be made to do so rather easily. In contrast with this, however, this paper finds that none of the considered interpretations is able to justify engagement on social and environmental issues across the board. Indeed, the problem to some extent seems rooted in the very concept of fiduciary duty. The paper is relevant to current attempts at justifying SRI through reinterpretations of fiduciary duty, provided mainly by legal scholars and practitioners. By addressing the more philosophical issue of how far the concept of fiduciary duty can be “stretched” to accommodate SRI (a project of conceptual rather than legal clarification), it provides an evaluation of the contemporary debate which is independent of squabbles about existing law. The paper shows that there are conceptual limits to attempts at redefining fiduciary duty. But this does not mean that pension funds' engagement in SRI is unjustified or unjustifiable more generally. A more promising way to legally mandate SRI may be through what is dubbed independent social and environmental obligations. (shrink)

The United States Constitution is, in form and fact, a kind of fiduciary instrument, and government officials acting pursuant to that document are subject to the background rules of fiduciary obligation that underlie all such documents. One of the most basic eighteenth-century fiduciary rules was the presumptive rule against subdelegation of discretionary authority. The rule was presumptive only; there were recognized exceptions that permitted subdelegation when it was specifically authorized by the instrument of agency, when it was (...) validated by custom or tradition, and when it was necessary for accomplishment of the agent’s authorized purposes. To what extent might that third exception justify broad subdelegation of legislative authority by Congress to administrative agencies? Part of the answer, which is beyond the aims of this essay, depends on ascertaining the nature of the job entrusted to Congress under the Constitution, which means ascertaining the scope of Congress’s delegated powers. Another part of the answer depends on the extent to which expertise can and may serve as justification for entrusting others with tasks with which one has previously been entrusted. What would a responsible fiduciary approach to expertise—whether for purposes of advice or subdelegation—look like in the modern administrative state? The answer requires a careful examination of the idea of expertise and how it can be applied, and misapplied, in modern governance. This essay offers only the briefest introduction to that problem by trying to frame the questions that responsible fiduciaries need to ask before subdelegating authority. Such questions include: (1) What are the limits of the principal’s own knowledge? (2) What reason is there to think that gaps in that knowledge can, even in principle, be filled by experts? (3) Will application of expert knowledge lead in any particular instance lead to better decisions, given the ubiquitous problem of second-best? and (4) Have you picked the right experts, and will they actually apply expertise rather than using their claim to expertise as a cover for pursuing other goals? These questions in the context of the modern administrative state are just one aspect of a broader problem of nonexperts trying to evaluate—both before and after the fact—the work product of experts. (shrink)

The practice of official apology has a fairly poor reputation. Dismissed as ‘crocodile tears’ or cheap grace, such apologies are often seen by the public as an easy alternative to more punitive or expensive ways of taking real responsibility. I focus on what I call the role-playing criticism: the argument that someone who offers an apology in public cannot be appropriately apologetic precisely because they are only playing a role. I offer a qualified defence of official apologies against this (...) objection, considering them through the lens of fiduciary duties. This focus draws our attention to formal or impersonal relationships that are nevertheless normatively rich, capable of sustaining trust, concern, and care. At the same time, I highlight several pitfalls for fiduciary apologisers, including the tension between apology as a mode of truth telling and the duty of confidentiality. I consider whether the fiduciary apologiser, in reflecting on her fiduciary obligations, has ‘one thought too many’ for genuine apology, and argue that the issue of mixed motives is not limited to fiduciary contexts, cautioning against excessive idealism in our conception of apology. I conclude with some reflections on possible conflicts between fiduciary obligations and the conscientious desire to apologise. (shrink)

The 'business judgement rule ' requires corporate directors only to act with honesty and reasonable care in the interest of shareholders. A stronger ' fiduciary ' duty is required where one party requires protection from another. This paper argues that where corporations take risks with the environment, directors are fiduciaries. Stakeholders are in that case the general public, future generations and other species, which have not voluntarily accepted risk and cannot limit liability. Recognition of fiduciary duty in such (...) cases is consistent with recent trends in the law of equity. It would require all economic activities to move from open to closed systems. (shrink)

This paper argues that since the last decades of the twentieth century the discipline of modern finance has directed fiduciaries to act "rationally"—that is, in the sole financial interest of their funds--downplaying the effects of their investments on others. This approach has deemphasized a previous, more "reasonable" interpretation of fiduciary duty that drew on a conception of prudence characterized by wisdom, discretion and intelligence—one that accounts to a greater degree for the relationship between one's investments and their effects on (...) others in the world. The reasonable approach allows fiduciaries to a greater degree to assess the objective well-being of beneficiaries, to recognize fundamental sources of investment reward in the economy, and to fulfill their obligations to allocate benefits impartially between current and future generations. Reason and rationality can work in a complementary fashion to make investment long-term in its perspective and beneficial to society and the economy as well as to specific funds or portfolios. Determining how to accomplish this challenging task is part of the obligation of fiduciaries as they seek to realize the full potential of the investment assets entrusted to their care. (shrink)

College and university academic deans must comply with two sets of professional regulations. As faculty members, they must adhere to their institution's internally generated code of ethics. As administrators and agents of their institution, they must meet the fiduciary duties of diligence and loyalty. Both sets of regulations are similar in the obligations they impose on a dean, the degree of care they demand of a dean in the execution of those obligations, the nature of a breach of those (...) obligations by a dean, the procedures by which the breach of an obligation is addressed, and the remedies available to the institution against a dean following a breach. Colleges and universities should develop and publish both an ethics code and a fiduciary code. Both sets of regulations, however, should avoid common shortcomings. Ethics codes should not be too specific or too general, overly simplistic or highly complex, or outstripped by the rapidly changing world of academia. A codification of fiduciary duties should avoid the problems of poor definition or ambiguity. Developing an institutional code of professional responsibility that incorporates both ethical and fiduciary responsibilities would provide an academic dean with a more comprehensive benchmark for professional expectations and responsibilities. The interplay between the two sets of complementary regulations would further clarify the professional expectation of an academic dean and may also ameliorate some of the shortcomings inherent in an ethics code. (shrink)

Higher education institutions are mining and analyzing student data to effect educational, political, and managerial outcomes. Done under the banner of “learning analytics,” this work can—and often does—surface sensitive data and information about, inter alia, a student’s demographics, academic performance, offline and online movements, physical fitness, mental wellbeing, and social network. With these data, institutions and third parties are able to describe student life, predict future behaviors, and intervene to address academic or other barriers to student success (however defined). Learning (...) analytics, consequently, raise serious issues concerning student privacy, autonomy, and the appropriate flow of student data. We argue that issues around privacy lead to valid questions about the degree to which students should trust their institution to use learning analytics data and other artifacts (algorithms, predictive scores) with their interests in mind. We argue that higher education institutions are paradigms of information fiduciaries. As such, colleges and universities have a special responsibility to their students. In this article, we use the information fiduciary concept to analyze cases when learning analytics violate an institution’s responsibility to its students. (shrink)

>With assets of over US$1.0 trillion and growing, public pension funds in the United States have become a major force in the private sector through their holding of equity positions in large publicly traded corporations. More recently, these funds have been expanding their investment strategy by considering a corporations long-term risks on issues such as environmental protection, sustainability, and good corporate citizenship, and how these factors impact a companys long-term performance. Conventional wisdom argues that the fiduciary responsibility of (...) the pension funds trustees must be solely focused on their beneficiaries and, therefore, their investment criteria must be based strictly on narrowly defined financial measures. It is also asserted that well-established financial measurements of corporate performance already include long-term risk assessment through discounted present value of future flow of earnings. Consequently, all other criteria are contrary to the best interest of the pension funds beneficiaries. In this paper, we assert that, contrary to conventional wisdom, pension funds, and for that matter other mutual funds, must be concerned with the long-term survival and growth of corporations. These measures are generally referred to socially responsible investing (SRI) and when applied to corporations, it is termed socially responsible corporate conduct (SRCC). We demonstrate that current measurement of future risk assessment invariably understates, and quite often completely overlooks, these long-term risks because of the inherent bias towards short-run on the part of financial intermediaries whose compensation depends greatly on short-term results. Furthermore, there is ample evidence to suggest that these intermediaries have been engaging in self-serving practices and thus failing in their duties to serve their clients, i.e. pension funds, best interests. Because of their large holdings in the total market as well as individual companies, these funds cannot easily divest from poorly performing companies without destabilizing the companies stock and overall markets. Hence, they must opt for a strategy of emphasizing investment criteria that encourage companies to take into account long-term aspects of their operations in terms of their impact on environment, sustainability, and community welfare, to name a few. We argue that an exclusionary, and even a primary, focus on short-term financial criteria is no longer a viable option. It also calls for the pension funds to encourage greater transparency and accountability of the entire corporate sector through improved corporate governance. Thus socially responsible investing practices are not merely discretionary and desirable activities; they are a necessary imperative, which both the corporations and public pension funds, and other large institutional holders, will ignore at serious peril to themselves. Finally, the paper considers some of the recent developments where corporations have been responding to these challenges and how their actions might be strengthened through greater disclosure and transparency of corporate activities. It also makes recommendations for the pension funds to support further research in creating new measurement standards that further refine the concept of socially responsible investing as a necessary ingredient of long-term corporate survival and growth in the context of a changing economic, environmental and socio-political dynamic. (shrink)

The Supreme Court decision in Cruzan reaffirmed the power of the states to set procedural standards for due process regarding the individual's exercise of his liberty interest. As a result, to effect an autonomous decision to refuse treatment when one becomes incompetent requires an affirmative articulation by means of an advance directive. This article argues against simplified advance directives in that they fail to enhance individual liberty and responsibility and fail to provide physicians with needed information. A model protective (...) advance directive is advocated with direction to terminate personal and health insurance payments for health care that is not desired by the patient. Keywords: advanced directive, affirmative articulation, Cruzan, fiduciary trust CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this? (shrink)

How should we respond to patients who do not wish to take on the responsibility and burdens of making decisions about their own care? In this paper, we argue that existing models of decision-making in modern healthcare are ill-equipped to cope with such patients and should be supplemented by an “appointed fiduciary” model where decision-making authority is formally transferred to a medical professional. Healthcare decisions are often complex and for patients can come at time of vulnerability. While this (...) does not undermine their capacity, it can be excessively burdensome. Most existing models of decision-making mandate that patients with capacity must retain ultimate responsibility for decisions. An appointed fiduciary model provides a formalized mechanism through which those few patients who wish to defer responsibility can hand over decision-making authority. By providing a formal structure for deferring to an appointed fiduciary, the confusions and risks of the informal transfers that can occur in practice are avoided. Finally, we note how appropriate governance and law can provide safeguards against risks to the welfare of patients and medical professionals. -/- . (shrink)

A recent literature applies economic reasoning to restrict corporate social responsibility (CSR) to profitable opportunities. The underlying theory of the firmassumes widespread public company ownership and a net positive contribution to social welfare in relatively unfettered markets. This modern economic approach posits strict fiduciary responsibility of agents. Management, in this fiduciary role, should have no CSR discretion beyond the requirements of minimalist laws and customary ethics. Any profitable CSR option can be undertaken. Any unprofitable CSR action (...) is defined as discretionary altruism prohibited to fiduciary agents and recommended against for shareowners acting through the corporate form. The modern economic position shifts all unprofitable social issues into the sphere of public policy—which is then influenced by business on the basis of economic self-interest. There are two points of relaxation in this position. First, a firm may need to practice prudential altruism to forestall more costly action by governments and stakeholders. Second, management must consider productivity effects of employee sentiments about social issues and stakeholders. (shrink)

This article argues that considerations of moral psychology support the traditional stringency of the rule according to which fiduciaries who get involved in a potential conflict of interest shall be stripped of all their gains. The application of the rule, regardless of good faith on the part of the fiduciary, is being contested by courts and academia alike. The article is focused on the ‘deterrence’ justification for the rule, and argues that its unusual strictness should be read as a (...) response to a substantial risk of conscious-silencing self-deception. Given the knowledge gap between them, the principal is very much dependent on the fiduciary's personal integrity but, in the grip of self-deception, the fiduciary's inner checks break down so that manipulative transactions are approved as harmless ones. Two distinctive features of the fiduciary relationship increase the chances that even a professional and virtuous fiduciary will be moved by self-deception to misapprehend the harm which a conflict of interest might cause to the principal: first, the wide discretion in the application of the fiduciary's duty to specific situations; and, second, the power gap between the fiduciary and the principal which enhances the temptation to exploit the fiduciary's position. This risk can only be averted by the more stringent version of the rule, as it is only by preventing the fiduciary from ever considering the legitimacy of a specific conflict of interest that we can hinder the process of reflection which is so prone to being subverted by self-deception. (shrink)

Fiduciary duty is not restricted merely to the property of shareholders but includes ethical obligations to a wider constituency stakeholders in terms of power. Several approaches to corporate social responsibility (CSR) are considered in terms of their respective orientations to the external world. Robert Greenleaf's notion of "service to others" or "servant-leadership" is considered as a case of the fifth level approach to CSR. An historical perspective offers a precedent for reclaiming corporate charter grants as a means for (...) reinstating the corporation's responsibilities to the wider community. Two propositions are offered to help us revision corporations in ways that would enable their total service obligations to all constituencies. (shrink)

With assets of over US$1.0 trillion and growing, public pension funds in the United States have become a major force in the private sector through their holding of equity positions in large publicly traded corporations. More recently, these funds have been expanding their investment strategy by considering a corporation's long-term risks on issues such as environmental protection, sustainability, and good corporate citizenship, and how these factors impact a company's long-term performance. Conventional wisdom argues that the fiduciary responsibility of (...) the pension funds' trustees must be solely focused on their beneficiaries and, therefore, their investment criteria must be based strictly on narrowly defined financial measures. It is also asserted that well-established financial measurements of corporate performance already include long-term risk assessment through discounted present value of future flow of earnings. Consequently, all other criteria are contrary to the best interest of the pension funds' beneficiaries. In this paper, we assert that, contrary to conventional wisdom, pension funds, and for that matter other mutual funds, must be concerned with the long-term survival and growth of corporations. These measures are generally referred to "socially responsible investing" and when applied to corporations, it is termed "socially responsible corporate conduct." We demonstrate that current measurement of future risk assessment invariably understates, and quite often completely overlooks, these long-term risks because of the inherent bias towards short-run on the part of financial intermediaries whose compensation depends greatly on short-term results. Furthermore, there is ample evidence to suggest that these intermediaries have been engaging in self-serving practices and thus failing in their duties to serve their clients', i.e. pension funds', best interests. Because of their large holdings in the total market as well as individual companies, these funds cannot easily divest from poorly performing companies without destabilizing the companies' stock and overall markets. Hence, they must opt for a strategy of emphasizing investment criteria that encourage companies to take into account long-term aspects of their operations in terms of their impact on environment, sustainability, and community welfare, to name a few. We argue that an exclusionary, and even a primary, focus on short-term financial criteria is no longer a viable option. It also calls for the pension funds to encourage greater transparency and accountability of the entire corporate sector through improved corporate governance. Thus socially responsible investing practices are not merely discretionary and desirable activities; they are a necessary imperative, which both the corporations and public pension funds, and other large institutional holders, will ignore at serious peril to themselves. Finally, the paper considers some of the recent developments where corporations have been responding to these challenges and how their actions might be strengthened through greater disclosure and transparency of corporate activities. It also makes recommendations for the pension funds to support further research in creating new measurement standards that further refine the concept of socially responsible investing as a necessary ingredient of long-term corporate survival and growth in the context of a changing economic, environmental and socio-political dynamic. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest serve as a cipher for a radical rupture in the Flexnerian paradigm of medicine, and they can only be addressed if we recognize that health care is now practiced by institutions, not just individual physicians. By showing how "appropriate utilization of services" or "that which is medically indicated" is a function of socioeconomic factors related to institutional responsibilities, I point toward an administrative and organizational ethic as a needed component for addressing conflicts of interest. The argument is (...) developed by reviewing three important books. First, I consider Mark Rodwin's attempt to configure the economic structures of medicine so that classical fiduciary and scientific ideals can be fostered. Second, I consider E. Haavi Morreim's attempt to modify the classical ideals in order to account for new economic realities. Finally, by considering essays in a recent volume on conflicts of interest edited by Spece, Shimm, and Buchanan, I argue for a constructive dialectic between the approaches of Rodwin and Morreim. In order to properly address conflicts of interest, there must be a radical reassessment of medicine that accounts for the interrelation between scientific, ethical, and economic concerns. Until institutions come into view and professional ethics is developed to account for their role, legitimate interests and obligations of diverse parties cannot be harmonized. (shrink)

In his 2014 paper entitled “Reason, Rationality and Fiduciary Duty”, Lydenberg ventures into the field of the moral and political philosophy dealing with distributive justice in search of fresh perspectives on fiduciary duty. Simply by doing this, Lydenberg makes the very important contribution of drawing a little more attention to the potential that this huge field of study might have in relation to understanding socially responsible investment. There are however difficulties with Lydenberg’s paper. I describe three in particular (...) that I believe warrant critical attention. The first emerges out of Lydenberg’s treatment of the central concepts of reasonableness and rationality. The second lies in his apparent suggestion that at some earlier time fiduciary duty was somehow more generally other-considering than it is today. And finally, the third is associated with the place that impartiality occupies in Lydenberg’s storyline, and the implications of this in terms of his call for a reconciliation between reasonableness and rationality. This critical scrutiny clarifies theoretical and practical implications of the transition Lydenberg is suggesting. In doing this, it makes the realization that what Lydenberg is attempting is more than likely nothing short of resolving “The fundamental problem of ethics and politics” in the specific context of fiduciary action. (shrink)

A critique of Milton Friedman's thesis that corporate executives have a fiduciary responsibility not to pursue socially desirable goals at the expense of profitability. The author argues that even under a libertarian conception of the nature of corporate property, Friedman's thesis does not follow. In particular, an executive's decision to prize "socially responsible behavior" above profit maximization does not necessarily violate the contractual rights of dissenting stockholders. Whether executives have obligations to refrain from such behavior depends entirely on (...) the content of the contract which actually exists between stockholders and executives. After an examination of the body of legal precedent which informs the content of that contract, the author concludes that there are clearly recognizable circumstances in which executives may legitimately pursue corporate altruism at the expense of profits, stockholder protestations notwithstanding. Since this contractual relationship with management is one in which stockholders have voluntarily engaged, libertarians have no grounds for complaining that the behavior of such executives constitutes a form of theft of the stockholders' property. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine the notion of accountability and its historical evolution in health care. Using medical mistakes and adverse patient outcomes as my focus, I examine the interests served by particular models of accountability and argue for a model of collective fiduciary responsibility in U.S. health care today.

Originally delivered at a conference of Marxist philosophers in China, this article examines some links, and some tensions, between business ethics and the traditional concerns of Marxism. After discussing the emergence of business ethics as an academic discipline, it explores and attempts to answer two Marxist objections that might be brought against the enterprise of business ethics. The first is that business ethics is impossible because capitalism itself tends to produce greedy, overreaching, and unethical business behavior. The second is that (...) business ethics is irrelevant because focusing on the moral or immoral conduct of individual firms or businesspeople distracts one’s attention from the systemic vices of capitalism. I argue, to the contrary, that, far from being impossible, business requires and indeed presupposes ethics and that for those who share Marx’s hope for a better society, nothing could be more relevant than engaging the debate over corporate social responsibility. In line with this, the article concludes by sketching some considerations favoring corporations’ adopting a broader view of their social and moral responsibilities, one that encompasses more than the pursuit of profit. (shrink)

Public professionals do not only serve their clients but also – by doing so – the public at large. The state often has a direct grip on their work, through financing, regulation or otherwise. This leads to a deeply felt conflict in contexts where authoritarian, illiberal leadership is widespread. Public professionals then face a moral dilemma: should they resist illiberal pressures by the state, or continue to obey their states? The paper's main question is how this practical dilemma for public (...) professionals should be interpreted. First, it presents a framework to interpret the professional situation, characterising it as a fiduciary relation, which we can understand through the lens of Thomas Hobbes's theory of authorisation/representation. On this theoretical basis, the paper discusses three competing models for understanding the public professional's predicament. The teleological model revolves around loyalty to one's clients. The conscientious professional model which is about loyalty to one's own moral convictions. The constitutional model is about loyalty to constitutional principles. The paper argues in favour of the constitutional model. Standing up against illiberal pressures is best interpreted as a matter of loyalty to the principles of constitutionality that underly the fiduciary relation between citizens and their states. (shrink)

This paper uses the bankruptcy proceedings for Enron to discuss the role of financial institutions in business transactions. Using recent work by Dixit a business transaction is portrayed as a prisoners' dilemma problem between competing firms. The financial institution's role in this world is to provide information and enforce contracts so that the parties to the business deal act cooperatively. This role is recognized in the law under the heading of Fiduciary Responsibility. In the Enron case the bankruptcy (...) examiner has argued that the Tier 1 financial institutions for Enron failed to carry out their fiduciary responsibility. As a result, the examiner has asked a fact finder to subordinate the claims of the Tier 1 financial institutions to other debt holders for Enron. (shrink)

Researchers do not owe their subjects the same level of care that physicians owe patients, but they owe more than merely what the research protocol stipulates. In keeping with the dynamics of the relationship between researcher and subject, they have limited but substantive fiduciary obligations.

This paper examines the shareholder primacy norm as a widely acknowledged impediment to corporate social responsibility and explores the role of business schools in promoting the SPN but also potentially as an avenue for change by addressing misconceptions about shareholder primacy and the purpose of business. We start by explaining the SPN and then review its status under US and UK laws and show that it is not a likely legal requirement, at least under the guise of shareholder value (...) maximization. This is in contrast to the common assertion that managers are legally constrained from addressing CSR issues if doing so is inconsistent with the economic interests of shareholders. Nonetheless, while the SPN might be muted as a legal norm, we show that it is certainly evident as a social norm among managers and in business schools—reflective, in part, of the sole voting rights of shareholders on corporate boards and of the dominance of shareholder theory—and justifiably so in the view of many managers and business academics. We argue that this view is misguided, not least when associated with claims of a purported legally enforceable requirement to maximize shareholder value. We propose two ways by which the influence of the SPN among managers might be attenuated: extending fiduciary duties of executives to non-shareholder stakeholders and changes in business school teaching such that it covers a plurality of conceptions of the purpose of the corporation. (shrink)

. Whether to use privileged information as a basis for a decision to sell stock is the central issue in thiscase. A conflict between a stockbrokers perceived obligations to maximize clients stock values and protect their investments (fiduciary responsibility) and violating Security and Exchange Commission insider trading regulations must be resolved.

This study examines the extent to which corporate responsibility influences the demand for shares by institutions. The study follows Bushee (Account Rev 73(3):305–333, 1998 ) in categorising institutions as dedicated or transient. The demand for shares is organised according to three factors: a long-term factor, corporate responsibility; a short-term factor, market liquidity; and a time-independent factor, portfolio theory. The rank and importance of the factors for the different types of institutional investor are analysed. For one of two types (...) of dedicated institution, corporate responsibility is as important as portfolio theory in influencing the demand for shares. For all dedicated institutions, corporate responsibility influences the demand for shares more than market liquidity. For two of the three types of transient institution, market liquidity is the most important factor in share selection. For all transient institutions, the least important factor is corporate responsibility. Findings suggest that corporate responsibility positively and significantly influences the demand for shares by dedicated institutions. The discussion considers the extent to which these trends are constitutive of significant shifts in ethicality within the context of institutional investment. Looking at this from within a highly institutionalised Anglo market model, dedicated institutions’ commitment to broader and longer-term concerns could be interpreted as a small but significant step towards a more axiologically informed ethical business practice. Such a form of engagement calls for sensitive attention to a fuller range of features deemed to be relevant to investment decisions, as opposed to more narrow reliance on legislation, codes of practice and fiduciary principles. (shrink)

This paper discusses the normative ethical theory of the business firm advanced principally by William E. Evan and R. Edward Freeman. According to their stakeholder theory, the firm should be managed for the benefit of its stakeholders: indeed, management has a fiduciary obligation to stakeholders to act as their agent. In this paper I seek to clarify the theory by discussing the concept of a stakeholder and by distinguishing stakeholder theory from two varieties of stockholder theory-I call them ‘pure’ (...) and ‘tinged.’ I argue that the distinctive claims of stakeholder theory, as contrasted with tinged stockholder theories, have been inadequately supported by argument. (shrink)

In its recent opinion in Intel v. Sulyma, the U.S. Supreme Court clarified what qualifies as the “actual knowledge” required to trigger ERISA’s three-year statutory period. The Court’s opinion, however, left open whether establishing “actual knowledge” by a plaintiff in one case serves to time-bar otherwise timely suits that challenge subsequent breaches of the same character. This article argues that, under the continuing fiduciary duty analysis that the Court set forth in Tibble v. Edison, such suits should not be (...) deemed untimely. (shrink)

Andrew Carnegie popularized the principles of charity and stewardship in 1899 when he published The Gospel of Wealth. At the time, Carnegie''s ideas were the exception rather than the rule. He believed that businesses and wealthy individuals were the caretakers or stewards of their property holding it in trust for the benefit of society as a whole.One of the most visible ways a business can help a community is through corporate philanthropy. While the courts have ruled that charitable contributions fall (...) within the legal and fiduciary powers of the corporation''s policymakers, some critics have argued that corporate managers have no right to give away company money that does not belong to them and any income earned by the company should be either reinvested in the company or distributed to the stockholders. (shrink)

Milton Friedman has argued that corporations have no responsibility to society beyond that of obeying the law and maximizing profits for shareholders. Individuals may have social responsibilities according to Friedman, but not corporations.When executives make contributions to address social problems in the name of the corporation, they are doing so with other people''s (shareholders'') money. The responsibility of corporate executives is a fiduciary one, to serve as an agent for the corporation''s shareholders, and to uphold shareholders'' trust, (...) which requires executives to maximize the return to their shareholders, who can then, if they choose, contribute their own money to worthy causes. (shrink)

Companies are beginning to recognise the concept of Corporate Social Responsibility as presenting a new business model and an opportunity for building innovative forms of competitive advantage. Boards are instrumental in shaping and overseeing such strategies and active engagement around what it means to be a responsible and responsive enterprise can strengthen the Board's potential as a strategic influence on long-term value creation. Yet many companies align with Friedman's contention that adopting and practising CSR is a distraction from their (...) core obligation, which is to act in their shareholders' best interests. Based on directors' perceptions, the paper examines responses by Boards to socially related aspects of their governance role and reports on their external orientation and receptiveness toward wider social obligations. The findings suggest that these Boards hold a narrow view of their fiduciary duty, which is closer to the shareholder model than the stakeholder approach to corporate governance. (shrink)

Fraudulent financial reporting, financial statements with errors so material as to require restatement, and biased reporting marred by defects such as managed earnings have plagued financial reporting in many countries in recent years. All of those failures are ethics failures that represent breaches of fiduciary duties by individuals who accepted responsibilities but did not fulfill them. The financial reporting system practiced in America is viewed by the parties involved in it as generally satisfactory. However, according to another view, the (...) interests of those primarily and secondarily responsible for those reports conflict with the interests of the intended beneficiaries, or users, of the corporate financial statements. A more realistic view of the actual operation of that reporting system shows that it is fundamentally flawed. Primary responsibility for failures rests with top management and financial management of the reporting corporation who are so strongly motivated to render favorable reports on their stewardship that they neglect their fiduciary responsibilities to investors. Secondary responsibility falls on independent auditors who are so heavily influenced by enterprise management that they, too, fail in carrying out their responsibilities to users of the audited financial statements. Ethics compromises are also found in the performances of academic accountants and members of accounting standards-setting bodies. The conflict between managements interest in reporting its performance in a favorable light and investors interest in decision-useful financial information will always exist and require regulation. However, changes in those regulations and in the basic governance arrangements involving shareholders, management, and auditors could reduce the opportunities and temptations for failures in carrying out fiduciary responsibilities. Most importantly, the close relationships between auditors and management must be loosened in favor of closer relationships between auditors and investors. (shrink)

Managers have a unique fiduciary responsibility to shareholders of a firm that implies a set of ethical obligations. At a minimum, managers are required to protect shareholder’s interests when other stakeholders are unaffected by their decision. This ethical imperative has been established in the literature. In cases of conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, the board of directors of the firm has an ethical obligation to shareholders. The structure of the board can affect its ability to fulfill (...) this obligation. Two specific cases where managerial actions have been argued to be unethical are the adoption of classified boards and poison pills. In this study, we empirically analyze the role of board structure in protecting shareholder rights in the specific case of antitakeover provisions. We test this question on a sample of firms whose shareholders have voted to remove antitakeover provisions and find that independent, focused boards are more likely to accede to shareholder resolutions than are less independent boards. Board size is also important and related to other board structures. We draw implications of this finding for future research on the ethics of board governance.What’s really needed is a change in mindset—one that fosters not only a culture of compliance but also a company-wide environment that fosters ethical behavior and decision-making.—William H. Donaldson, SEC Chairman (2004). (shrink)

The paper explores the role of good faith within the traditional theory of fiduciary duty in the lead-up of the Delaware Supreme Court’s Stone ex-rel. AmSouth Bancorporation v. Ritter decision. The enforcement of the director’s liability is discussed concerning the doctrinal controversies concerning inter alia, the reach of the exculpation statute passed after the Smith v Van Gorkon holding. The paper also analyzes the conditions that a Plaintiff must survive a motion to dismiss a claim of director liability; the (...) appropriate standard of review for alleged duty of liability breaches, and the role of good faith within the overall triad of traditional fiduciary responsibilities. Over a decade after this landmark case was decided, there is value in reconsidering whether the Stone judgment lived up to the promise of the Caremark holding and its reformulation of good faith as a judicial device for evaluating director liability in contexts that not do easily fit with the traditional doctrines of duty of care and loyalty. (shrink)

Jake Greenblum and Ryan K Hubbard argue that physicians, nurses, clinical ethicists and ethics committee members should not cite religious considerations when helping patients (or their proxies) make medical decisions. They provide two arguments for this position: The Public Reason Argument and the Fiduciary Argument. In this essay, I show that the Public Reason Argument fails. Greenblum and Hubbard may provide good reason to think that physicians should not invoke their own religious commitments as reasons for a particular medical (...) decision. But they fail to show that it is wrong for physicians to cite the patient’s own religious commitments as reasons for a particular decision. As such, if Greenblum and Hubbard’s thesis is to survive, the Fiduciary Argument (or some unmentioned argument) will have to do the bulk of the work. (shrink)

Medical ethicists conventionally assume that the requirement to employ informed consent procedures is grounded in autonomy. It seems intuitively plausible that providing information to an agent promotes his autonomy by better allowing him to steer his life. However, James Taylor questions this view, arguing that any notion of autonomy that grounds a requirement to inform agents turns out to be unrealistic and self-defeating. Taylor thus contends that we are mistaken about the real theoretical grounds for informed consent procedures. Through analysing (...) Taylor's arguments and showing that they do not stand up to scrutiny, it is possible to defend the view that autonomy is a plausible theoretical basis for informed consent, and to enhance our understanding of the relationship between autonomy and informed consent. (shrink)

Advertising by health care institutions has increased steadily in recent years. While direct-to-consumer prescription drug advertising is subject to unique oversight by the Federal Drug Administration, advertisements for health care services are regulated by the Federal Trade Commission and treated no differently from advertisements for consumer goods. In this article, we argue that decisions about pursuing health care services are distinguished by informational asymmetries, high stakes, and patient vulnerabilities, grounding fiduciary responsibilities on the part of health care providers and (...) health care institutions. Using examples, we illustrate how common advertising techniques may mislead patients and compromise fiduciary relationships, thereby posing ethical risks to patients, providers, health care institutions, and society. We conclude by proposing that these risks justify new standards for advertising when considered as part of the moral obligation of health care institutions and suggest that mechanisms currently in place to regulate advertising for prescription pharmaceuticals should be applied to advertising for health care services more broadly. (shrink)