In 1931, writing in a personal journal, Wittgenstein enumerated the names of those thinkers whom he deemed to have been his most important intellectual influences. He makes the strong claim that these are thinkers whose seminal ideas he has taken over, further elaborated and incorporated into his own work. Here are the names he lists in their order of appearance: Boltzmann, Hertz, Schopenhauer, Frege, Russell, Kraus, Loos, Weininger, Spengler, Sraffa. At the time of the first publication of this list in (...) Culture and Value, those familiar primarily with the most widely read and influential writings on Wittgenstein and his philosophical influences, Norman Malcolm's Memoir and Toulmin and Janik's Wittgenstein's Vienna, would most likely have been surprised by the inclusion of Spengler's name. His is the only one on the list that does not appear in either book. Every other thinker named is not only mentioned as an influence on Wittgenstein in one or the other work, but some of the purported details of that influence are offered. And the appearance of Spengler's name is doubly surprising, given the relatively low esteem in which his work is generally held. Of the others listed, perhaps only Weininger fails to emerge as a respected figure. (shrink)

Do Wittgenstein's late philosophical writings represent a religious point of view? There is a good deal of evidence—including a number of Wittgenstein's own avowals—for an affirmative answer. Against this, there is the stark fact that Wittgenstein's late philosophical writings never directly discuss questions of God and religion. So, if they do represent a religious viewpoint, a correct account of it would, it seems, need to address subtleties and hidden tendencies. While a number of philosophical authors have offered such accounts, nothing (...) resembling a consensus has so far emerged. (shrink)

College and university academic deans must comply with two sets of professional regulations. As faculty members, they must adhere to their institution's internally generated code of ethics. As administrators and agents of their institution, they must meet the fiduciary duties of diligence and loyalty. Both sets of regulations are similar in the obligations they impose on a dean, the degree of care they demand of a dean in the execution of those obligations, the nature of a breach of those obligations (...) by a dean, the procedures by which the breach of an obligation is addressed, and the remedies available to the institution against a dean following a breach. Colleges and universities should develop and publish both an ethics code and a fiduciary code. Both sets of regulations, however, should avoid common shortcomings. Ethics codes should not be too specific or too general, overly simplistic or highly complex, or outstripped by the rapidly changing world of academia. A codification of fiduciary duties should avoid the problems of poor definition or ambiguity. Developing an institutional code of professional responsibility that incorporates both ethical and fiduciary responsibilities would provide an academic dean with a more comprehensive benchmark for professional expectations and responsibilities. The interplay between the two sets of complementary regulations would further clarify the professional expectation of an academic dean and may also ameliorate some of the shortcomings inherent in an ethics code. (shrink)

This book focuses on the fascinating connection between Wittgenstein and Oswald Spengler and in particular the acknowledged influence of Spengler's Decline of the West. His book shows in meticulous detail how Spengler's dark conception of an ongoing cultural decline resonated deeply for Wittgenstein and influenced his later work. In so doing, the work takes into account discussions of these matters by major commentators such as Malcolm, Von Wright, Cavell, Winch, and Clack among others. A noteworthy feature of this book is (...) its attempt to link Wittgenstein's cultural concerns with his views on religion and religious language. DeAngelis offers a fresh and original interpretation of the latter. (shrink)

Brian R. Clack’s An Introduction to Wittgenstein’s Philosophy of Religion is intended not only as a contribution to its thorny subject but also as an introductory text that is accessible to undergraduate philosophy students. To his credit, Clack negotiates the difficulties inherent in his task with considerable care and skill. He makes good decisions about what to discuss. He reaches careful conclusions that are defensible and, given the book’s brevity, reasonably well defended. Although I have found much to disagree with (...) in this book, I would commend it as a worthy addition to the literature. (shrink)

Paul Stanistreet's Hume's Scepticism and the Science of Human Nature seeks to address its subject matter at a level somewhere between that of an introductory text and an original, scholarly contribution to Hume scholarship. Stanistreet states that the book is written "with the general reader or beginning student of Hume in mind." At the same time, he says.

In Social Practices—A Wittgensteinian Approach to Human Activity and the Social, Theodore R. Schatzki undertakes two interrelated projects. First, he seeks to articulate a program for the proper understanding of human social phenomena whose fundamental notion is that of a social practice. Second, he seeks to show that the approach he recommends is latent in the late philosophy of Ludwig Wittgenstein. It is clear that Schatzki regards Wittgenstein's work as both inspirational and fundamentally correct. Nonetheless, he seeks to go beyond (...) what he finds in Wittgenstein: "I acknowledge that what I will write is not explicitly found in Wittgenstein's remarks. My account is an attempt at creative interpretation, which draws out from a thinker's writings a position that is not officially presented there. I make no apologies for this procedure." This is reasonable enough. There are, however, some facets of Schatzki's purportedly Wittgensteinian analysis which, I believe, are much too "creative," in this sense. Not only do they go beyond what Wittgenstein presents, but they are pretty clearly antithetical to the spirit and substance of Wittgenstein's thought. (shrink)