Source [1] Andrew E. P. Mitchell, Federica Galli, Sondra Butterworth. (2023). Editorial: Equality, diversity and inclusive research for diverse rare disease communities. Front. Psychol., vol. 14. doi:10.3389/fpsyg.2023.1285774. "It is also important to recognize that certain mental health disorders are classified as rare conditions and have their own cultural concepts of distress, as defined in the DSM-5 (American Psychiatric Association, 2013)" and require “equal attention and support for individuals and their families, both physically and emotionally”. [1].

The amount of content, both on and offline, to which people in reasonably affluent nations have access has increased to the point that it has raised concerns that we are now suffering from a harmful condition of ‹information overload.’ Although the phrase is being used more frequently, the concept is not yet well understood – beyond expressing the rather basic idea of having access to more information than is good for us. This essay attempts to provide a philosophical explication (...) of the concept of information overload and is therefore what philosophers call ‹conceptual analysis’ – a task that, along with normative ethical analysis, is distinctive to Anglo-American style analytic philosophy. I will begin with an analysis of the atomic concepts expressed by the terms ‹information’ and ‹overload’ and then attempt to give a philosophical explanation of the concept of information overload that more precisely identifies exactly what the condition amounts to. (shrink)

The conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts purports to give physicalists a way of understanding phenomenal concepts that will allow them to (1) accept the zombie intuition, (2) accept that conceivability is generally a good guide to possibility, and yet (3) reject the conclusion that zombies are metaphysically possible. It does this by positing that whether phenomenal concepts refer to physical or nonphysical states depends on what the actual world is like. In this paper, I offer support for the Chalmers/Alter (...) objection that the conditional analysis fails to accommodate the true zombie intuition, and develop a new and far more powerful argument against the conditional analysis. I argue that, as stated, the conditional analysis is radically incomplete. But when fully fleshed out, the analysis becomes viciously circular. The only way to avoid this circularity is to adopt a species of analytic functionalism, on which it’s a priori that phenomenal concepts refer to the state (perhaps physical, perhaps nonphysical) that actually plays so-and-so functional role. While this rigidified analytic functionalism is coherent, it is highly unattractive, running contrary to both the intuitions that motivate functionalism and the intuitions that motivated the conditional analysis. (shrink)

SummaryIn the first part of the paper necessary conditions for the rationality of the notions of belief, knowledge, and assumption are given: Among the different conditions it is stressed that one needs two different concepts of belief, one such that if someone knows something he also believes it, the other exclusive such that if someone knows something he need not to believe it and if he believes it he does not yet know it. Another important point is that deductive infallibility (...) has to be rejected as not being a property of human rationality. Similarly it is not a property of human rationality to know all logical true statements.The second chapter offers a deductive system which meets these and additional conditions of human rationality. The third chapter contains the semantics of the deductive system.RésuméDans le premier chapitre ľauteur énumére des conditions nécessaires à la rationalité des concepts croire, savoir et admettre. Entre autres, il relève qu'il faut distinguer au moins deux concepts croire, qui satisfont ľun àľénoncé: quand quelqu'un sait quelque chose, il la croit aussi, ľautre plus exclusif à: quand quelqu'un sait quelque chose, il n'a pas besoin de la croire et quand quelqu'un la croit , il ne la sait pas . Un autre point très important est que ľinfaillibilité déductive doit être rejetée comme n'appartenant pas à la rationalité humaine. Idem pour la connaissance de tous les énoncés logiquement vrais.Le deuxième chapitre décrit un système déductif qui remplit ces conditions de rationalité . Le troisième, la sémantique de ce système.ZusammenfassungIm ersten Kapitel werden notwendige Bedingungen für die Rationalität der Begriffe Glauben, Wissen und Annehmen gegeben: Unter anderem wird hervorgehoben, dass minde‐stens zwei verschiedene Begriffe von Glauben nötig sind; einmal so, dass gilt: wenn einer etwas weiss, dann glaubt er es auch, und dann auch im exklusiven Sinn: wenn einer etwas weiss, dann braucht er es nicht zu glauben und wenn einer etwas glaubt, dann weiss er es nicht. Ein anderer sehr wichtiger Punkt ist, dass deduktive Infallibilität (d.h. dass man von dem. (shrink)

The concept of intention is widely thought to involve a confidence condition of some sort, a condition that specifies certain beliefs that one must either have or lack if one intends to do something. Two of the most common formulations of this condition are the following: (i) A intends to X only if A believes that they (probably) will X; and (ii) A intends to X only if A does not believe that they (probably) will not X. A third, (...) much weaker formulation can also be considered: (iii) A intends to X only if A does not believe that it is highly unlikely that they will X. In this article I report on a series of experiments that indicate that ordinary speakers of English do not apply the concepts of intention and belief in accordance with any of the foregoing hypotheses. These experimental results provide empirical evidence against the idea that there is a confidence condition in the concept of intention. (shrink)

This essay examines the Brazilian deforestation debate to explicate the beginnings of a post-modern theory of argumentation. Modernist argumentation reflects two distinct approaches, found in the deforestation controversy. The first approach, ‘universal minimilization,’ presumes that the survival of humanity is sufficient grounds upon which to base argument. The alternative, ‘strategic manipulation,’ results in argument being employed as a technical device to advance one's interest. In place of the modernist approach, we offer an ecocentric theory of argumentation. This conception calls for (...) individuals to set aside differences in values to sustain humanity but at the same time to be sensitive to differences in costs and benefits that accrue from common efforts to persons differently situated. Additionally, this view operates with a tacit working assumption that environmental questions are not discrete entities to be evaluated separately. Rather, people must act collectively on a range of interconnected issues to ensure survival. (shrink)

It is often thought that the test for whether an indicative conditional is assertible is to first suppose the antecedent and then check to see if the consequent is probable on that supposition. Call this procedure the “Ramsey Test”. Some influential accounts of indicative conditionals hold that the Ramsey Test works because indicative conditionals are used to express a high credence in the consequent conditional on the antecedent. In this paper I will argue that a different expressivist account, (...) one inspired by Brandom can handle a wider range of phenomena. In particular, it does a better job explaining how conditionals function in modus tollens arguments. I will end by discussing how the account proposed here goes beyond Brandom’s own work on logic and hermeneutics. Of particular importance is the role played by a conversational common ground, distinct from the commitments of the interpreter and interpreted. (shrink)

Toutes les idéologies recouvrent-elles une égale meéonnais-sance de la réalité?Le terme d' «idéologie », brandi comme arme idéologique, vise « une doctrine fondée sur des idées sans rapport avec les faits réels ». Ce système transmissible de rapports ne se rapporte plus lui-même à la réalité: celle-ci peut être subsumée sous ses concepts organisés en dogmes, elle ne peut plus ou n'a jamais pu être reconnue. L'adversaire de l'idéologie se donne pour tâche de faire reconnaître «la » réalité en découvrant (...) les réalités qu'il estime essentielles, en même temps qu'il en dénonce la mécon-naissance chez l'idéologue. L'idéologie attaquée constituant l'idéolo-gie typique, toutes les idéologies ne font à ses yeux que reproduire cette méconnaissance radicale: l'une n'a pas plus de valeur de vérité qu'une autre, elles recouvrent toutes une égale absence de rapports avec le réel. Elles sont toutes aveugles au même titre et ne reconnaissent pas davantage cet aveuglement que la réalité qu'elles ignorent. (shrink)

John Hawthorne (2002), David Braddon-Mitchell (2003), and Robert Stalnaker (2002), almost simultaneously but independently, developed a physicalistic argument which depends on such two conditional analyses: (1) If we experience dualistic pain, zombies are possible; (2) If our world is physicalistic, zombies are impossible. Hawthorne assumes that only an oracle will tell us which conditional is the case. From this setting, he concludes that zombies are conceivable butimpossible. I first show that Hawthorne actually fails in deriving neither the conceivability (...) of zombies nor their impossibility. Next, I argue that Hawthorne’s reasoning entails an absurdity that any entity like God, whose existence is controversial, will be conceivable but impossible. (shrink)

Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. (...) I argue that this strategy fails. The considerations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in support of their analysis in fact do no such thing. Further, their main argument for the analysis is self-defeating: exactly similar reasoning would undermine the view it is meant to establish. Finally, on closer inspection the conditional analysis is incompatible with the zombie intuition. Thus, not only is the analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intuition’s plausibility indicates that the analysis is incorrect. I also suggest that the allure of the conditional-analysis strategy may derive from a questionable view about what explaining the intuition would require. (shrink)

Zombies make trouble for physicalism. Intuitively, they seem conceivable, and many take this to support their metaphysical possibility – a result that, most agree, would refute physicalism. John Hawthorne (2002) [Philosophical Studies 109, 17–52] and David Braddon-Mitchell (2003) [The Journal of Philosophy 100, 111–135] have developed a novel response to this argument: phenomenal concepts have a conditional structure – they refer to non-physical states if such states exist and otherwise to physical states – and this explains the zombie intuition. (...) I argue that this strategy fails. The considerations Hawthorne and Braddon-Mitchell adduce in support of their analysis in fact do no such thing. Further, their main argument for the analysis is self-defeating: exactly similar reasoning would undermine the view it is meant to establish. Finally, on closer inspection the conditional analysis is incompatible with the zombie intuition. Thus, not only is the analysis incapable of explaining the intuition: the intuition’s plausibility indicates that the analysis is incorrect. I also suggest that the allure of the conditional-analysis strategy may derive from a questionable view about what explaining the intuition would require. (shrink)

The amount of content, both on and offline, to which people in reasonably affluent nations have access has increased to the point that it has raised concerns that we are now suffering from a harmful condition of ‹information overload.’ Although the phrase is being used more frequently, the concept is not yet well understood – beyond expressing the rather basic idea of having access to more information than is good for us. This essay attempts to provide a philosophical explication (...) of the concept of information overload and is therefore what philosophers call ‹conceptual analysis’ – a task that, along with normative ethical analysis, is distinctive to Anglo-American style analytic philosophy. I will begin with an analysis of the atomic concepts expressed by the terms ‹information’ and ‹overload’ and then attempt to give a philosophical explanation of the concept of information overload that more precisely identifies exactly what the condition amounts to. (shrink)

Preference is a basic notion in human behaviour, underlying such varied phenomena as individual rationality in the philosophy of action and game theory, obligations in deontic logic (we should aim for the best of all possible worlds), or collective decisions in social choice theory. Also, in a more abstract sense, preference orderings are used in conditional logic or non-monotonic reasoning as a way of arranging worlds into more or less plausible ones. The field of preference logic (cf. Hansson [10]) (...) studies formal systems that can express and analyze notions of preference between various sorts of entities: worlds, actions, or propositions. The art is of course to design a language that combines perspicuity and low complexity with reasonable expressive power. In this paper, we take a particularly simple approach. As preferences are binary relations between worlds, they naturally support standard unary modalities. In particular, our key modality ♦ϕ will just say that is ϕ true in some world which is at least as good as the current one. Of course, this notion can also be indexed to separate agents. The essence of this language is already in [4], but our semantics is more general, and so are our applications and later language extensions. Our modal language can express a variety of preference notions between propositions. Moreover, as already suggested in [9], it can “deconstruct” standard conditionals, providing an embedding of conditional logic into more standard modal logics. Next, we take the language to the analysis of games, where some sort of preference logic is evidently needed ([23] has a binary modal analysis different from ours). We show how a qualitative unary preference modality suffices for defining Nash Equilibrium in strategic games, and also the Backward Induction solution for finite extensive games. Finally, from a technical perspective, our treatment adds a new twist. Each application considered in this paper suggests the need for some additional access to worlds before the preference modality can unfold its true power.. (shrink)

In this paper I argue against the thesis defended by Michael Giudice, who claims that it is possible to provide a concept of law by determining the necessary conditions of its essence. My main thesis is: 1) that this goal can exclusively be reached with certain kind of concepts: those satisfying what I propose to call:“Golden Standard of Concepts with Necessary Conditions” and 2) that the concept of “Law” is not such a concept. Therefore I defendmethodological pluralism (...) in opposition to methodological monism embraced by some contemporary legal philosophers.Resumen:En este artículo contiendo la tesis defendida por Michael Giudice en la cual sostiene que es posible elaborar un concepto de derecho mediante la determinación de las propiedades necesarias de su esencia. Mis tesis principales son: 1) que sólo para cierto tipo de conceptos puede alcanzarse ese objetivo y 2) que el concepto de “Derecho” no es uno de ellos. Defiendo un pluralismo metodológico contra el monismo metodológico suscrito por algunos filósofos del derecho contemporáneos. (shrink)

A recent strategy for defending physicalism about the mind against the zombie argument relies on the so-called conditional analysis of phenomenal concepts. According to this analysis, what kinds of states our phenomenal concepts refer to depends crucially on whether the actual world is merely physical or not. John Hawthorne, David Braddon-Mitchell and Robert Stalnaker have claimed, independently, that this analysis explains the conceivability of zombies in a way consistent with physicalism, thus blocking the zombie argument. Torin Alter has recently (...) presented three arguments against the conditional analysis strategy. This paper defends the conditional analysis strategy against Alter’s objections. (shrink)

It is proposed to analyze the unity of scientific knowledge in terms of its structure-nominative reconstruction. -/- .

Recientemente, son muchos los trabajos que han aparecido en el área de la psicología y de la ciencia cognitiva con el propósito de analizar las maneras de razonar y las capacidades intelectuales de sujetos diagnosticados como autistas. Tal es el caso de una investigación de McKenzie, Evans y Handley. Nosotros revisamos en este trabajo su investigación y sostenemos que contiene problemas metodológicos. Así, tratamos de mostrar cuáles son dichos problemas y proponemos la estructura que, a nuestro juicio, deberían tener experimentos (...) futuros en la misma línea y con el mismo objetivo. Recurrimos, igualmente, al concepto de neurodiversidad para apoyar nuestro enfoque y para defender que los resultados de McKenzie, Evans y Handley pueden ser interpretados de diversas maneras y en función de distintos marcos teóricos. Recently, many papers have been presented in the area of cognitive science and psychology in order to analyze modes of reasoning and intellectual abilities in individuals diagnosed as autistic. Such is the case of a research by McKenzie, Evans and Handly. In this paper, I review that research and argue that contains methodological problems. So, I try to show what these problems and hold that future experiments in the same way and with the same objective should be another structure. I focus equally on the concept of neurodiversity to support my approach and hold the outcomes presented by Mckenzie, Evans and Handly can be interpreted in different ways and according to various theoretical approaches. (shrink)

The traditional concept of propositional knowledge as justified true belief (JTB), even when modified, typically in its justification condition, to avoid Gettier-typecounterexamples, remains subject to a variety of criticisms. The redefinition proposed here puts pressure more specifically on the concept of truth as redundant in light of and inaccessible beyond the most robust requirements of best justification. Best-J is defined as justification for believing in a proposition’s truth where there is no better countermanding justification for believing instead the (...) proposition’s negation. A pragmatic perspective argues that truth is unnecessary and unattainable as a condition of knowledge beyond the requirement for practically attainable best justified belief. The key argument with respect to the eliminability of the truth condition in favor of a properly tailored justification condition is that there is nothing we do or can do in trying to satisfy the truth condition for knowledge beyond considering the epistemic merits of the justification that a believer accepts in coming to believe that the proposition is true. (shrink)

There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to (...) carry the discussion forward by addressing a range issues underdeveloped in A Study of Concepts. Georges Rey raises global questions about the project of SoC. Answerability, Quinean challenges and the relations between my approach and covariation or ‘locking’ theories are amongst the problems he raises. The comments of David Papineau are at an intermediate level of generality. He poses questions about the subject-matter of a theory of concepts, and rejects my critique of teleological theories of content. He is also dissatisfied with my account of the relations between actual thought and the normative properties of concepts. I will consider that issue at some length. Jane Heal considers my elaboration of the approach for a specific concept, that of belief. I will take the topics in that order. (shrink)

In this paper we extend Wittgenstein’s notion of family resemblance to translation, interpretation, and comparison across traditions. There is no need for universals. This holds for everyday concepts such as green and qing 青, philosophical concepts such as emotion and qing 情, as well as philosophical categories such as form of life and dao 道. These notions as well as all other concepts from whatever tradition are family resemblance concepts. We introduce the notion of quasi-universal, which connects family resemblance concepts (...) from a limited number of traditions. The possibility and necessity of extending family resemblance concepts across traditions dissolves the false antinomy of universalism versus relativism. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to provide an account of the conception of perception by way of a discussion of the conditions which may have to be satisfied for that concept to have an application. There is included, therefore, a discussion not only of perceptual experience but of the part played in perception by such things as conceptual understanding, belief, imagination, attention and activity. Although there is some reference to psychological work in the field of perception the main approach (...) is philosophical in an analytical style. Nevertheless, the book tends to eschew large gestures in the philosophy of mind, favouring an attention to detail in a way which some might describe as phenomenological. The author has written much about perception in the past and the book might be characterized as summing up a lifetime of thinking about the subject. (shrink)

In this essay I will defend a novel version of the indexical view on proper names. According to this version, proper names have a relatively sparse truth-conditional meaning that is represented by their rigid content and indexical character, but a relatively rich use-conditional meaning, which I call the (contextual) constraint of a proper name. Firstly, I will provide a brief outline of my favoured indexical view on names in contrast to other indexical views proposed in the relevant literature. (...) Secondly, two general motivations for an indexical view on names will be introduced and defended. Thirdly, I will criticize the two most popular versions of the indexical view on names: formal variable accounts and salience-based formal constant accounts. In the fourth and final section, I will develop my own use-conditional indexical view on names in three different steps by confronting an initial version of this view with three different challenges. (shrink)

In this brief note I show how to model conceptual change, logical learning, and revision of one's beliefs in response to conditional information such as indicative conditionals that do not express propositions.

It is important to note that certain mental health disorders are classified as rare conditions, and they have their own ‘cultural concepts of distress’ as defined in the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fifth Edition (DSM 5). Cultural concepts of distress are a recent attempt to understand psychological distress influenced by culture, separate from biomedical diagnoses that require equal attention and support for individuals and their families, both physically and emotionally. [1].

At the turn of the Millennium, the issue of education, especially higher education, its role in state formation and impact on the life of society acquired particular relevance and became a subject of research of not only teachers and historians but also economists, political analysts, psychologists, social scientists and, above all, philosophers (which gave rise to a variety of models and trends in the philosophy of education). In the meantime, there is some lack of fundamental integrative studies into comprehensive educational-managerial (...) and socio-historical, socio-economic and state-political experiences of some developed countries in the implementation of these philosophical and educational paradigms, trends, models and reforming/modernization concepts of higher education and science, to be examined with consideration for similar challenges faced by education and science in Ukraine. Nearly every developed country has wide experience in building up a system of higher education. Results of reviewing such experience may contribute to the development and enrichment of the domestic educational system, afford an opportunity to avoid repeating mistakes and offer new approaches to solving a range of problems in this field. Based on the above, we also believe that it is impossible to pretend to develop a strategy for educational and scientific modernization reforms that deal with challenges of educational and scientific institution of society in management of scientific and educational space (which applies to both a social component of the philosophy of education and the field of educational management) without analyzing the existing models, schools, trends and their classification in the modern philosophy of education. (shrink)

Notice --- Hobbes and Adams as Thucydideans --- Ancient Greece --- Alternative Concepts of the Human Condition --- Medieval Monarchy --- Renaissance Republics --- Founding Fathers --- The Moral Recuperation of Self-Interest --- Other Human Worlds --- Now is the Whimper of Our Self-Contempt --- Culture is the Human Nature.

Les conditions de possession permettant l’individuation des concepts, bien que peu étudiées, constituent l’un des lieux fondamentaux de la polémique opposant les points de vue frégéen et anti-individualiste. Dans cet article, je décris une théorie compatibiliste de la valeur cognitive qui réunit des conditions de possession anti-individualistes et individualistes. Je soutiens que cette approche générale de la compatibilité des explications frégéenne et anti-individualiste de la possession de concepts suffit à mettre en doute l’idée voulant que la déférence et la transparence (...) sont des caractéristiques fondamentales de la valeur cognitive. (shrink)

Climate concepts are crucial to understand the effects of human activity on the climate system scientifically, and to formulate and pursue policies to mitigate and adapt to these effects. Yet, scientists, policymakers, and activists often use different terms such as “global warming,” “climate change,” “climate crisis,” or “climate emergency.” This advanced review investigates which climate concept is most suitable when we pursue mitigation and adaptation goals in a scientifically informed manner. It first discusses how survey experiments and social science (...) reviews on climate frames draw normative recommendations about which terms to use for public climate communication. It is suggested that such normative claims can be refined by including the scientific alongside lay uses of a climate concept, and by using explicit assessment conditions to evaluate how suitable a concept is for formulating mitigation and adaptation goals. Drawing on philosophical theories of conceptual change in science and conceptual engineering, a novel framework with two assessment conditions is introduced and then applied to “global warming,” “climate change,” “climate emergency,” and “climate crisis.” The assessment suggests that currently, “climate crisis” is most suitable to formulate and pursue climate mitigation and adaptation goals. Using this concept promotes the epistemic goals of climate science to a high degree, bridges scientific, political, and activist discourse, and fosters for democratic participation when articulating climate policies. (shrink)

이 글의 목적은 정치사회적 의미에서의 자유개념에 대한 분석과 그로부터 도출될 수 있 는 현대 사회에 적절한 자유개념을 제안하는 것이다. 이사야 벌린이 자유개념을 소극적 자 유와 적극적 자유로 구별한 후 이 두 자유개념은 대립적, 논쟁적 관계로 이해되었다. 벌린 은 간섭으로부터의 해방을 의미하는 소극적 자유를 옹호하며 적극적 자유의 전체주의적 성격을 비판한다. 왜냐하면 그에 따르면 적극적 자유개념은 자아실현을 목적으로 하며 이 때 개인은 더 큰 전체 속에서 자신을 실현할 수 있고 자신의 삶의 의미를 찾을 수 있다는 전체주의로 나갈 수 있기 때문이다. 그러나 적극적 (...) 자유에 대한 이런 해석에도 불구하고 현대 공동체주의자인 찰스 테일러는 소극적 자유의 형식성을 비판하며 현대 사회에 적극 적 자유의 필요성을 강조한다. 왜냐하면 우리에게 선택의 자유가 주어진다고 하더라도 어 떤 기회를 실질적으로 선택할 우리의 역량이나 조건이 부족하다면 그 기회는 나에게 무의 미하며 따라서 나는 자유롭지 못한 것이기 때문이다. 소극적 자유와 적극적 자유의 이런 논쟁 속에서 이 두 개념을 중재하면서 동시에 사회적, 정치적 관계의 문제점을 새롭게 파악하기 위해 공화주의자들은 비지배적 자유를 제안한다. 비 지배적 자유는 간섭이 아니라 지배나 종속에서의 해방을 추구한다는 점에서 소극적 자유와 다 르며, 해방이라는 개념 안에 특정한 목적에 대한 추구가 포함되지 않는다는 점에서 적극적 자 유와 다르다. 오늘날 간섭이 없지만 자신의 삶이 타인의 힘에 좌우되는 상황에서 비지배적 자 유는 좋은 삶을 위한 필수조건이 아닐 수 없다. 그렇다면 적극적 자유와 비지배적 자유가 실현 되기 위한 조건은 무엇일까? 그리고 이 세 가지 자유개념은 서로 어떤 관계가 있을까? 필자는 자유의 세 개념에 대한 분석과 종합을 통해 오늘날 적절한 자유개념을 모색하고자 한다. (shrink)

There are issues in the theory of concepts about which A Study of Concepts could have said more. There are also some issues about which it would have done well to say something different. The commentators in this symposium have successfully identified a series of issues of one or other of these two kinds, and I am very grateful for their thought and detailed attention. I have learned from reflection on their comments, and I take this opportunity to try to (...) carry the discussion forward by addressing a range issues underdeveloped in A Study of Concepts. Georges Rey raises global questions about the project of SoC. Answerability, Quinean challenges and the relations between my approach and covariation or ‘locking’ theories are amongst the problems he raises. The comments of David Papineau are at an intermediate level of generality. He poses questions about the subject-matter of a theory of concepts, and rejects my critique of teleological theories of content. He is also dissatisfied with my account of the relations between actual thought and the normative properties of concepts. I will consider that issue at some length. Jane Heal considers my elaboration of the approach for a specific concept, that of belief. I will take the topics in that order. (shrink)

The long-term persistence of neurotic symptoms, such as anxiety, poses difficult problems for any psychological theory. An attempt is made to revive the Watson-Mowrer conditioning theory and to avoid the many criticisms directed against it in the past. It is suggested that recent research has produced changes in learning theory that can be used to render this possible. In the first place, the doctrine of equipotentiality has been shown to be wrong, and some such concept as Seligman's “preparedness” is (...) required, that is the notion that certain CS are biologically prepared to be more readily connected with anxiety responses than others. In the second place, the law of extinction has to be amended, and the law of incubation or enhancement added, according to which the exposure of the CS-only may, under certain specified conditions, have the effect of increasing the strength of the CR, rather than reducing it. The major conditions favouring incubation are Pavlovian B conditioning, that is a type of conditioning in which the CR is a drive; a strong UCS, and short exposure of the CS-only. (shrink)

The concept of contextual emergence is proposed as a non-reductive, yet welldefined relation between different levels of description of physical and other systems. It is illustrated for the transition from statistical mechanics to thermodynamical properties such as temperature. Stability conditions are crucial for a rigorous implementation of contingent contexts that are required to understand temperature as an emergent property. It is proposed that such stability conditions are meaningful for contextual emergence beyond physics as well.

Critique of prevailing textbook conception of sufficient conditions and necessary conditions as a truth functional relation of material implication (p->q)/(~q->~p). Explanation of common sense conception of condition as correlative of consequence, involving dependence. Utility of this conception exhibited in resolving puzzles regarding ontology, truth, and fatalism.