In the formal semantics based on modern type theories, common nouns are interpreted as types, rather than as predicates of entities as in Montague’s semantics. This brings about important advantages in linguistic interpretations but also leads to a limitation of expressive power because there are fewer operations on types as compared with those on predicates. The theory of coercive subtyping adequately extends the modern type theories and, as shown in this paper, plays a very useful role in making (...) type theories more expressive for formal semantics. It not only gives a satisfactory solution to the basic problem of ‘multiple categorisation’ caused by interpreting common nouns as types, but provides a powerful formal framework to model interesting linguistic phenomena such as copredication, whose formal treatment has been found difficult in a Montagovian setting. In particular, we show how to formally introduce dot-types in a type theory with coercive subtyping and study some type-theoretic constructs that provide useful representational tools for reference transfers and multiple word meanings in formal lexical semantics. (shrink)

Coercive subtyping offers a general approach to subtyping and inheritance by introducing a simple abbreviational mechanism to constructive type theories. In this paper, we study coercion completion in coercive subtyping and prove that the formal extension with coercive subtyping of a type theory such as Martin–Löf's type theory and UTT is a conservative extension. The importance of coherence conditions for the conservativity result is also discussed.

In this paper we propose a way to deal with natural language inference by implementing Modern Type Theoretical Semantics in the proof assistant Coq. The paper is a first attempt to deal with NLI and natural language reasoning in general by using the proof assistant technology. Valid NLIs are treated as theorems and as such the adequacy of our account is tested by trying to prove them. We use Luo’s Modern Type Theory with coercive subtyping as the formal (...) language into which we translate natural language semantics, and we further implement these semantics in the Coq proof assistant. It is shown that the use of a MTT with an adequate subtyping mechanism can give us a number of promising results as regards NLI. Specifically, it is shown that a number of inference cases, i.e. quantifiers, adjectives, conjoined noun phrases and temporal reference among other things can be successfully dealt with. It is then shown, that even though Coq is an interactive and not an automated theorem prover, automation of all of the test examples is possible by introducing user-defined automated tactics. Lastly, the paper offers a number of innovative approaches to NL phenomena like adjectives, collective predication, comparatives and factive verbs among other things, contributing in this respect to the theoretical study of formal semantics using MTTs. (shrink)

Background: Mentalizing, the mental capacity to understand oneself and others in terms of mental states, has been found to be reduced in several mental disorders. Some studies have suggested that eating disorders may also be associated with impairments in mentalizing. The aim of this work is to investigate the possible presence of mentalizing subtypes in a sample of patients with EDs.Method: A sample of patients with eating disorders completed a battery of measures assessing mentalization and related variables, including the Reflective (...) Functioning Questionnaire, the Difficulties in Emotion Regulation Strategies, the Interpersonal Reactivity Index. Clinicians rated patients in relation to imbalances in different dimensions of mentalization to prementalizing modes and attachment style by using the Mentalization Imbalances Scale, the Modes of Mentalization Scale, and the Adult Attachment Questionnaire. A latent profile analysis was conducted to test the possible presence of different subgroups. MANOVA was used to test the possible differences between the four mentalizing profiles in relation to emotion dysregulation, empathy, and adequate and impairments in mentalizing.Results: The latent profile analysis suggested the presence of four different profiles in relation to impairments in the dimensions of mentalization: affective/self/automatic imbalances, external imbalance, cognitive/self/automatic imbalances, and cognitive/other/automatic imbalances. Patients belonging to profile 1 are characterized by the prevalence of affective mentalization that overwhelms the capacity to reflect on mental states with an imbalance on the self-dimension; profile 2 patients are excessively focused on the external cues of mentalization; profile 3 patients are characterized by an over-involvement on the cognitive and self-facets of mentalization, with an impairment in adopting the other mind perspective; and profile 4 patients have similar impairments compared to profile 3 patients but with an excessive focus on others and deficits in self-reflection. These profiles were heterogeneous in terms of EDs represented in each group and presented significant differences on various variables such as attachment style, emotion dysregulation, empathy, interpersonal reactivity, and reflective function. This study represents, so far, the first work that confirms the presence of different mentalizing patterns in ED patients.Conclusions: ED patients can be classified in relation to impairments in different dimensions of mentalization above and beyond ED diagnosis. (shrink)

Mammalian neural cells contain at least two forms of brain spectrin: brain spectrin (240/235) which is located primarily in the axons and presynaptic terminals of neurons, and brain spectrin (240/235E) which is found in the cell bodies, dendrites and postsynaptic terminals of neurones. Brain spectrin (240/235E) is also found in certain glial cell types. Antibodies against red blood cell spectrin detect only brain spectrin (240/235E), while antibodies against brain spectrin isolated from axonal and synaptic membranes detect brain spectrin (240/235). Previous (...) apparent discrepancies in the literature concerning brain spectrin localization at the light microscope level were undoubtedly due to different laboratories detecting distinct brain spectrin subtypes, based on the particular antibody being utilized for immunohistochemistry. In this review we (1) discuss the data supporting the presence of at least two distinct subtypes of mammalian brain spectrin, (2) explain how these results reconcile previous discrepancies concerning the localization of spectrin within neural cells, and (3) suggest the future implications of these findings. (shrink)

There are three lines of argument in defence of coercive treatment of patients with mental disorders: arguments regarding (1) societal interests to protect others, (2) the patients' own health interests, and (3) patient autonomy. In this paper, we analyse these arguments in relation to an idealized case, where a person with a mental disorder claims not to want medical treatment for religious reasons. We also discuss who should decide what in situations where patients with mental disorders deny treatment on (...) seemingly rational grounds.We conclude that, in principle, coercive treatment cannot be defended for the sake of protecting others. While coercive actions can be acceptable in order to protect close family and others, medical treatment is not justified for such reasons but should be given only in the interest of patients. Coercive treatment may be required in order to promote the patient's health interests, but health interests have to waive if they go against the autonomous interests of the patient. We argue that non-autonomous patients can have reasons, rooted in their deeply-set values, to renounce compulsory institutional treatment, and that such reasons should be respected unless it can be assumed that their new predicaments have caused them to change their views. (shrink)

Coercive Care: The Ethics of Choice in Health and Medicine asks probing and challenging questions regarding the use of coercion in health care and social services. This book combines philosophical analysis with comparative studies of social policy and law in a large number of industrialized countries and proposes an ideal of judicial security on a global scale.

Coercive Care asks probing and challenging questions regarding the use of coercion in health care and the social services. The book combines philosophical analysis with comparative studies of social policy and law in a large number of industrialized countries.

Is it morally acceptable to instigate criminal offenders to participate in rehabilitative treatment by offering treatment in return for early release from prison? Some theorists have supported such treatment schemes by pointing to the beneficial consequences that follow from the treatment. Others have suggested that the schemes are unacceptably coercive, which implies that consent becomes an illusion. This paper argues that the discussion—with clear parallels to debates of other healthcare treatment offers in medical ethics—has adopted a too narrow focus. (...) By failing to consider the question as a penal theoretical problem, the arguments—both by proponents and critics of coercive treatment—become premature. (shrink)

In this response piece, I argue that the ‘coercive paternalism’ that Sarah Conly endorses in her book Against Autonomy veers towards a back-door perfectionism. Although Conly points out that coercive paternalism does not mandate the imposition of alien values upon us in the same way that perfectionism does, I argue that coercive paternalism might yet impose an alien weighting of our own values; this, I suggest, means that coercive paternalism remains perfectionist in spirit, if not in (...) letter. I go on to concede to Conly that coercive paternalism might be warranted in preventing actions that threaten health and that are only carried out on the basis of cognitive error. However, I conclude by claiming that we must take great care about what we presume that people are consuming only on the basis of cognitive error. More specifically, I suggest that it is crucial that we avoid defining our terms in such a manner that it becomes impossible for agents to choose some action that poses a risk to their health without them being accused of making a cognitive error in weighing their values in that way. (shrink)

This paper aims to investigate the extent of anti-corruption reporting by ASEAN companies and examine whether coercive factors influence the level of disclosure. The authors adopt indicators from the Global Reporting Initiative version 4.0 to measure the extent of anti-corruption disclosures in 117 companies’ reports. Informed by a coercive isomorphism tenet drawn from the institutional theory, the authors propose that several institutional factors influence the extent of their voluntary disclosures. The findings reveal that a large degree of variability (...) difference between the average levels of anti-corruption disclosure in Thailand and the Philippines. The dependence on government tenders and foreign ownership are associated with the level of disclosure. Surprisingly, the United Nation Global Compact membership is not a significant determinant of anti-corruption reporting. This signifies that the membership in the international initiative does not correspond to individual company’s commitment to disclose anti-corruption information. In spite of significant efforts undertaken by global organizations to combat corruption, the level of anti-corruption disclosure is significantly different among the four countries under study. The disclosure of sensitive information such as the confirmed incidences of corruption cases requires careful consideration by the top management as it is subjected to legal implications and reputational risks. Thus, impression management can complement the coercive pressure in explaining the level of anti-corruption reporting. This study is among the first studies which explores the association between coercive factors and the level of anti-corruption disclosure in ASEAN region. (shrink)

This paper is a critique of coercive theories of meaning, that is, theories (or criteria) of meaning designed to do down ones opponents by representing their views as meaningless or unintelligible. Many philosophers from Hobbes through Berkeley and Hume to the pragmatists, the logical positivists and (above all) Wittgenstein have devised such theories and criteria in order to discredit their opponents. I argue 1) that such theories and criteria are morally obnoxious, a) because they smack of the totalitarian linguistic (...) tactics of the Party in Orwell’s 1984 and b) because they dehumanize the opposition by portraying them as mere spouters of gibberish; 2) that they are profoundly illiberal since if true, they would undermine Mill’s arguments for free speech; 3) that such theories are prone to self-contradiction, pragmatic and otherwise; 4) that they often turn against their creators including what they were meant to exclude and excluding what they were meant to include; 5) that such theories are susceptible to a modus tollens pioneered by Richard Price in his Review Concerning the Principle Questions of Morals(1758); and 6) that such theories are prima facie false since they fail to ‘predict’ the data that is it their business to explain (or, in the case of criteria, fail to capture the concept that they allegedly represent). The butcher’s bill is quite considerable: some of Hobbes, a fair bit of Locke, half of Berkeley, large chunks of Hume, Russell's Theory of Types, verificationism in its positivist and Dummettian variants, much of pragmatism and most of Wittgenstein - all these have to be sacrificed if we are to save our souls as philosophic liberals. (shrink)

Malaysian corporations have to disclose corporate social responsibility, and a typical genre for disclosure is CSR reports. These reports incorporate other discourses which indicate the presence of interdiscursivity. The article examines interdiscursivity in Malaysian CSR reports. It selects the CSR reports of 10 major corporations and pursues an interdiscursive analysis which involves four sequential stages. CSR reports contain discourses of public relations, sustainability, strategic management, compliance and financial accounting. Although the discourses are often multisemiotic, language maintains primacy in content, while (...) image tends to exemplify or simplify content. These discourses constitute an interdiscursive profile, and it has central and auxiliary discourses. The central discourse is public relations discourse, and it promotes corporations helping and not harming society. The auxiliary discourses are sustainability, strategic management, compliance and financial accounting discourses, and these discourses mitigate the promotional focus. Interdiscursivity enables the primarily promotional CSR reports to not seem overtly promotional. The choice of discourses is probably influenced by coercive, mimetic and normative reasons. These discourses enhance the reliability of CSR reports because their disclosure is anchored to various CSR aspects, international or reporting practices and professional domains. Interdiscursivity helps to build stakeholders’ confidence in disclosure and, therefore, in corporations. It joins other functions in CSR reports to convey corporations as agents of positive social change. The article also probes the relationship between interdiscursivity and intertextuality and advances a matrix of intertextual–interdiscursive use. (shrink)

Thaler and Sunstein advocate 'libertarian paternalism'. A libertarian paternalist changes the conditions under which people act so that their cognitive biases lead them to choose what is best for themselves. Although libertarian paternalism manipulates people, Thaler and Sunstein say that it respects their autonomy by preserving the possibility of choice. Conly argues that libertarian paternalism does not go far enough, since there is no compelling reason why we should allow people the opportunity to choose to bring disaster upon themselves if (...) sometimes they will make the wrong decision. She defends 'coercive paternalism'. The present paper argues that errors in reasoning are not due only to cognitive biases. People also make errors because they have an insufficient level of general intelligence. Intelligence is distributed on a continuum. Those who fall on higher levels of the continuum have greater abilities, in certain contexts, to reason about both their own and others' interests. Coercive paternalism may sometimes be appropriate to prevent less intelligent people from engaging in self-destructive behavior due to errors of reasoning. (shrink)

ABSTRACT This article examines the discursive practices of coercive persuasion deployed by Nigeria’s Minister of Information and Communications to justify the rebranding Nigeria campaign as a policy designed for value reorientation of the citizenry in the wake of the country’s image crisis both domestically and internationally. Sampling data from select addresses and interviews of the country’s chief image maker during the campaign, the study analyses some discourse structures and strategies in the public discourse, drawing theoretical insights from van Dijk’s (...) Critical Epistemic Discourse Analysis to re-examine and re-interpret meaning in relation to knowledge claims in the organised persuasive communication. The article demonstrates that there is artful management of information and construction of knowledge in the persuasive discourse largely to present an institutional version of reality in re/telling Nigeria’s national identity narratives. The study concludes that the rhetorical means of controlling the discourse and managing the minds of the audience typify leadership practices of knowledge construction to achieve policy dominance given certain norms and conventions of nation branding practices. (shrink)

“Committing a crime might render one morally liable to certain forms of medical intervention”, claims Thomas Douglas, who stated in this context that “compulsory uses of medical correctives could in principle be justified.” This article engages critically with his and other arguments on the use of coercive neurocorrectives for criminal offenders. First, the rehabilitation assumption that includes—for coercive neurocorrectives to work as an alternative to incarceration—that rehabilitation is the “only goal” of criminal punishment is criticized. Additionally this article (...) engages with the theoretical difficulty of solely rehabilitative approaches, and discusses why it is unfortunate to design neurocorrectives so as to be particularly harmful in order to imagine administering them as being a punishment. Second, until we know more about specific neurocorrectives, we are well advised not to undermine the most important objection against coercive neurocorrectives, namely offenders’ human rights. This article argues that the use of coercive neurocorrectives would particularly violate Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights which guarantees as an absolute right that “[n]o one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment”, and finally holds that a still weak human right to mental integrity and self-determination should fundamentally come first. (shrink)

Concepts such as ‘coercion’ and ‘inducement’ are often used within bioethics without much reflection upon what they mean. This is particularly so in research ethics where they are assumed to imply that payment for research participation is unethical. Wertheimer and Miller advance our thinking about these concepts and research ethics in a significant way, specifically by questioning the possibility of genuine offers ever being coercive. This commentary argues that they are right to question this assumption, however, more needs to (...) be said about the plausible coercive offer cases and to explain the normativity of these cases. (shrink)

I argue that it can be morally permissible to coerce people into doing what is good for their own health. I discuss recent initiatives in New York City that are designed to take away certain unhealthy options from local citizens, and argue that this does not impose on them in unjustifiable ways. Good paternalistic measures are designed to promote people's long-term goals, and to prevent them from making short-term decisions that interfere with reaching those, and New York's attempts to ban (...) the sale of sugary drinks larger than 16 ounces and the use of trans fats fall within those parameters. Given our tendency to cognitive bias, we need help in making choices that truly instantiate our values. (shrink)

In this article, we evaluate the capacity of liberal egalitarianism to rebut what we call the libertarian challenge of charity. This challenge states that coercive redistributive taxation is neither needed nor justified, since those who endorse redistribution can give charitably, and those who do not endorse redistribution cannot justifiably be coerced. We argue that contemporary developments in liberal political thought render liberalism more vulnerable to this libertarian challenge. Many liberals have, in recent years, sought to recast liberalism such that (...) it is more hospitable to cultural, religious, and ethnic diversity. This move has resulted in increased support for the claim that liberalism should be understood as a political rather than comprehensive doctrine, and that liberal institutions should draw their legitimacy from agreements made among members of an appropriately conceived deliberative community, rather than from controversial liberal principles like individual autonomy. We argue that, while this move may indeed make liberalism more compatible with cultural diversity, it also makes it more vulnerable to the libertarian challenge of charity. Not all versions of liberalism are troubled by the challenge, but those that are troubled by it are increasingly dominant. We also discuss G.A. Cohen's claim that liberal equality requires an ‘egalitarian ethos’ and argue that, if Cohen is right, it is difficult to see how there can be an adequate response to the libertarian challenge of charity. In general, our argument can be summarised as follows: the more that liberalism is concerned accurately to model the actual democratic wishes and motivations of the people it governs, the less it is able to justify coercively imposing redistributive principles of justice. (shrink)

I shall briefly evaluate the common claim that ethically acceptable population policies must let individuals to decide freely on the number of their children. I shall ask, first, what exactly is the relation between population policies that we find intuitively appealing, on the one hand, and population policies that maximize procreative freedom, on the other, and second, what is the relation between population policies that we tend to reject on moral grounds, on the one hand, and population policies that use (...) coercive methods such as laws or economic incentives and deterrents, on the other. I shall argue that when changing a population policy, it may be morally desirable to affect people's procreative decisions more rather than less, and that sometimes it may be morally desirable to prefer a population policy that does not maximize procreative freedom to a population policy that does maximize it. I shall also point out that indirect population policies that use incentives and deterrents are not necessarily incompatible with liberal principles. Finally, I try to show what is assumed by those who defend the view that coercive population policies are morally wrong in all circumstances. (shrink)

In 1969 Robert Nozick published the first extensive philosophical analysis of the concept of coercion. His analysis has since generated a great deal of controversy. This dissertation is an attempt to resolve much of the controversy. It begins with a detailed review of recent work on coercion. Based on the lessons learned in this review, a new theory of coercion and its ethics is proposed. The theory identifies the essential features of a coerced choice and distinguishes several senses in which (...) we might say that someone is coerced. By allowing for different senses of coercion with a common core, the theory is able to account for examples that are problematic without losing sight of valuable distinctions. For instance, one particularly controversial group of examples involves offers that appear to be coercive, even when no threat is present. The new theory allows many of these offers to be termed coercive, but not in the same strict sense that is associated with coercive threats. The treatment of the ethics of coercion that is presented in this dissertation is more comprehensive than any previous treatment of the topic. It challenges some commonly held beliefs. Most significantly, it challenges the belief that coercion is in itself a great moral evil. Many instances of coercion involve no moral violation. Immoral instances of coercion are generally immoral, not because of the coercion per se, but because of other morally objectionable features of the situation. The dissertation ends with an application of the new theory of coercion and its ethics to a public policy problem of current interest. (shrink)

Digital mental health can be understood as the in situ quantification of an individual’s data from personal devices to measure human behavior in both health and disease (Huckvale, Venkatesh and Chr...

This article explores the values that should be promoted in civic education for democracy and also how the promotion of values can be non-coercive. It will be argued that civic education should promote the values of reasonableness, mutual respect and fairness, but also that only public, political reasons count in attempting to justify the content of civic education. It will also be argued that the content of civic education may legitimately be broader than this, including but not restricted to (...) the values of autonomy, integrity, magnanimity, truthfulness and generosity. At the same time, if civic education is seen merely as a means to shape and form future citizens, then the promotion of values in civic education will be a coercive imposition on children and young people. If the promotion of values instead is to be non-coercive it must be defended with reasons that children and young people should be able to accept. (shrink)

This book considers coercion within the healing and ethical framework of therapeutic relationships and partnerships at all levels, and addresses the universal ...

This paper argues that there are compelling grounds for thinking that coercive indoctrination can defeat or mitigate moral culpability in virtue of being a form of non-culpable moral ignorance. That is, I defend a two-tier account such that what excuses an agent for a wrongful act is the agent’s ignorance regarding the moral quality of their act; and what excuses the defendant for their ignorance is that coercion or manipulation deprived the defendant of a fair opportunity to avoid that (...) ignorance. I further argue that criminal defense theory would better track moral culpability were it to broaden existing defenses whose desert-base is moral ignorance—such as insanity or mistaken-belief self-defense—to include non-culpable ignorance due to diminished situational control. In this way, criminal law can plausibly recognize a defense of coercive indoctrination without postulating any new categories of defense. (shrink)

Volume 19, Issue 9, September 2019, Page 64-66.

A prominent argument against a market in kidneys is the Argument from Coercion. AfC claims that a market would violate the autonomy of typical suppliers by presenting them with coercive offers. Engaging with Cherry’s response to AfC, this paper argues that while a consistent AfC could be constructed, it would still fail to justify a prohibition of a market. AfC, as fully formulated, only holds if we assume that the state is obligated to provide for the basic needs of (...) its citizens. Once such a state functions ideally, a market ceases to involve coercion, thus making a prohibition redundant. In fact, such a state’s obligation to care for its citizens supports a market in kidneys. On the other hand, if the state is dysfunctional, then while a market could involve coercive offers, a prohibition would not restore, and would present a further constraint on, individual autonomy. (shrink)

A prominent argument against a market in kidneys is the Argument from Coercion. AfC claims that a market would violate the autonomy of typical suppliers by presenting them with coercive offers. Engaging with Cherry’s response to AfC, this paper argues that while a consistent AfC could be constructed, it would still fail to justify a prohibition of a market. AfC, as fully formulated, only holds if we assume that the state is obligated to provide for the basic needs of (...) its citizens. Once such a state functions ideally, a market ceases to involve coercion, thus making a prohibition redundant. In fact, such a state’s obligation to care for its citizens supports a market in kidneys. On the other hand, if the state is dysfunctional, then while a market could involve coercive offers, a prohibition would not restore, and would present a further constraint on, individual autonomy. (shrink)

If a patient complies voluntarily with a certain proposal, we generally regard the treatment as legitimate. But a competent patient may also assent to a certain treatment only because he was compelled to do so. Influences on the formation of his decision may render his choice contrary to his will. It is my aim to focus on these particular forms of coercion which are often neglected in discussions of informed consent.

ObjectiveWe wished to explore Parkinson's disease subtypes by clustering analysis based on the multimodal magnetic resonance imaging indices amplitude of low-frequency fluctuation and gray matter volume. Then, we analyzed the differences between PD subtypes.MethodsEighty-six PD patients and 44 healthy controls were recruited. We extracted ALFF and GMV according to the Anatomical Automatic Labeling partition using Data Processing and Analysis for Brain Imaging software. The Ward linkage method was used for hierarchical clustering analysis. DPABI was employed to compare differences in ALFF (...) and GMV between groups.ResultsTwo subtypes of PD were identified. The “diffuse malignant subtype” was characterized by reduced ALFF in the visual-related cortex and extensive reduction of GMV with severe impairment in motor function and cognitive function. The “mild subtype” was characterized by increased ALFF in the frontal lobe, temporal lobe, and sensorimotor cortex, and a slight decrease in GMV with mild impairment of motor function and cognitive function.ConclusionHierarchical clustering analysis based on multimodal MRI indices could be employed to identify two PD subtypes. These two PD subtypes showed different neurodegenerative patterns upon imaging. (shrink)

The practice of coercive measures in psychiatry is controversial. Although some have suggested that it may be acceptable if patients are a danger to others or to themselves, others committed themselves to eliminate it. Ethical, legal and clinical considerations become more complex when the mental incapacity is temporary and when the coercive measures serve to restore autonomy. We discuss these issues, addressing the conflict between autonomy and beneficence/non-maleficence, human dignity, the experiences of patients and the effects of (...) class='Hi'>coercive measures. We argue that an appeal to respect autonomy and/or human dignity cannot be a sufficient reason to reject coercive measures. All together, these ethical aspects can be used both to support and to reject a non-seclusion approach. The total lack of controlled trials about the beneficial effects of coercive measures in different populations however, argues against the use of coercive measures. (shrink)

The first wave of philosophical work on global justice focused largely on the distribution of economic resources, and on the development or reformation of institutions relevant thereto. More recently, however, the horizon has broadened significantly, to also include a concern with the global spread of the right to live under reasonable legal institutions and representative forms of government (cf. “a human right to democracy”). Thus, while the first wave was focused primarily on international (non-territorial) institutions, later work has also brought (...) critical focus to bear on domestic institutions traditionally assumed to be protected by rights of state sovereignty. This naturally raises the question of whether, when, and how the international community can coercively intervene in issues falling under assumed to fall under domestic jurisdiction. Many theorists of global justice will accept, however reluctantly, that coercive means such as military force may be used (even unilaterally, if necessary) to halt a government’s mass atrocities against its civilian population (so-called “humanitarian intervention”). They are, however, for the most part firmly opposed to the use of military force as a tool to force regime change or democratic reform. I will discuss the viability of this stance along two dimensions: (i) can we draw a morally relevant distinction between humanitarian intervention and regime change policies? (ii) can we draw a morally relevant distinction between the use of military force as a policy tool and the use of other kinds of coercive measures such as economic sanctions? (shrink)