Recent studies have shown that pharmacological treatment may have an impact on aggressive and impulsive behavior. Assuming that these results are correct, would it be morally acceptable to instigate violent criminals to accept pharmacological rehabilitation by offering this treatment in return for early release from prison? This paper examines three different reasons for being skeptical with regard to this sort of practice. The first reason concerns the acceptability of the treatment itself. The second reason concerns the ethical legitimacy of making (...) offers under coercive conditions. The third relates to the acceptability of the fact that those criminals who accepted the treatment would be exempted from the punishment they rightly deserved. It is argued that none of these reasons succeeds in rejecting this sort of offer. (shrink)

Many theorists have expressed the view that current or future applications of neurotechnology may prompt serious ethical problems in terms of privacy. This article concerns the question as to whether involuntary neurotechnological mind reading can plausibly be held to violate a person’s moral right to mental privacy. It is argued that it is difficult to specify what a violation of a right to mental privacy amounts to in a way that is consistent with the fact that we usually regard natural (...) mind reading as morally unproblematic. (shrink)

Over the past decade the use of closed circuit television (CCTV) as a means of crime prevention has reached unprecedented levels. Though critics of this development do not speak with one voice and have pointed to a number of different problems in the use of CCTV, one argument has played a dominant role in the debate, namely, that CCTV constitutes an unacceptable violation of people’s right to privacy. The purpose of this paper is to examine this argument critically. It is (...) suggested that the argument is hard to sustain. (shrink)

This volume contains work by the very best young scholars working in Applied Ethics, gathering a range of new perspectives and thoughts on highly relevant topics, such as the environment, animals, computers, freedom of speech, human enhancement, war and poverty. For researchers and students working in or around this fascinating area of the discipline, the volume will provide a unique snapshot of where the cutting-edge work in the field is currently engaged and where it's headed.

Is it morally acceptable to instigate criminal offenders to participate in rehabilitative treatment by offering treatment in return for early release from prison? Some theorists have supported such treatment schemes by pointing to the beneficial consequences that follow from the treatment. Others have suggested that the schemes are unacceptably coercive, which implies that consent becomes an illusion. This paper argues that the discussion—with clear parallels to debates of other healthcare treatment offers in medical ethics—has adopted a too narrow focus. By (...) failing to consider the question as a penal theoretical problem, the arguments—both by proponents and critics of coercive treatment—become premature. (shrink)

Whether it is morally acceptable to offer rehabilitation by CNS-intervention to criminals as a condition for early release constitutes an important neuroethical question. Bomann-Larsen has recently suggested that such interventions are unacceptable if the offered treatment is not narrowly targeted at the behaviour for which the criminal is convicted. In this article it is argued that Bomann-Larsen’s analysis of the morality of offers does not provide a solid base for this conclusion and that, even if the analysis is assumed to (...) be correct, it still does not follow that voluntary rehabilitation schemes targeting behaviour beyond the act for which a criminal is convicted are inappropriate. (shrink)

The use of risk assessment tools has come to play an increasingly important role in sentencing decisions in many jurisdictions. A key issue in the theoretical discussion of risk assessment concerns the predictive accuracy of such tools. For instance, it has been underlined that most risk assessment instruments have poor to moderate accuracy in most applications. However, the relation between, on the one hand, judgements of the predictive accuracy of a risk assessment tool and, on the other, conclusions concerning the (...) justified use of such an instrument in sentencing practice, is often very unclear. The purpose of this paper is to examine this relation. More precisely, it is argued that the relation between predictive accuracy and the question as to whether a new risk assessment tool should be introduced in sentencing practice is highly complicated. For instance, there may be cases in which a new risk assessment tool is more accurate than those currently in use, but should nevertheless not be introduced; and conversely, where a new tool is less accurate, but where its introduction instead of current tools would be morally preferable. (shrink)

Predictive Sentencing addresses the role of risk assessment in contemporary sentencing practices. Predictive sentencing has become so deeply ingrained in Western criminal justice decision-making that despite early ethical discussions about selective incapacitation, it currently attracts little critique. Nor has it been subjected to a thorough normative and empirical scrutiny. This is problematic since much current policy and practice concerning risk predictions is inconsistent with mainstream theories of punishment. Moreover, predictive sentencing exacerbates discrimination and disparity in sentencing. Although structured risk assessments (...) may have replaced 'gut feelings', and have now been systematically implemented in Western justice systems, the fundamental issues and questions that surround the use of risk assessment instruments at sentencing remain unresolved. This volume critically evaluates these issues and will be of great interest to scholars of criminal justice and criminology. (shrink)

Most people (including moral philosophers), when faced with the fact that some of their cherished moral views lead up to the Repugnant Conclusion, feel that they have to revise their moral outlook. However, it is a moot question as to how this should be done. It is not an easy thing to say how one should avoid the Repugnant Conclusion, without having to face even more serious implications from one's basic moral outlook. Several such attempts are presented in this volume. (...) This is the first volume devoted entirely to the cardinal problem of modern population ethics, known as 'The Repugnant Conclusion'. This book is a must for (moral) philosophers with an interest in population ethics. (shrink)

According to the discontinuity view we can have a (lower) pleasure which, no matter how often a certain unit of it is added to itself, cannot become greater in value than a unit of another (higher) pleasure. All recent adherents of this view seem to rely basically on the same sort of reasoning which is referred to here as the preference test. This article presents three arguments, each of which indicates that the inference from the preference test to the discontinuity (...) view is not conclusive. (shrink)

According to the main argument in favour of the practice of racial profiling as a low enforcement tactic, the use of race as a targeting factor helps the police to apprehend more criminals. In the following, this argument is challenged. It is argued that, given the assumption that criminals are currently being punished too severely in Western countries, the apprehension of more criminals may not constitute a reason in favour of racial profiling at all.

In Derek Parfit's original formulation the Repugnant Conclusion is characterized as follows: “For any possible population of at least ten billion people, all with a very high quality of life, there must be some much larger imaginable population whose existence, if other things are equal, would be better even though its members have lives that are barely worth living” (Parfit 1984). The Repugnant Conclusion highlights a problem in an area of ethics which has become known as population ethics . The (...) last three decades have witnessed an increasing philosophical interest in questions such as “Is it possible to make the world a better place by creating additional happy creatures?” and “Is there a moral obligation to have children?” The main problem has been to find an adequate theory about the moral value of states of affairs where the number of people, the quality of their lives, and their identities may vary. Since, arguably, any reasonable moral theory has to take these aspects of possible states of affairs into account when determining the normative status of actions, the study of population ethics is of general import for moral theory. As the name indicates, Parfit finds the Repugnant Conclusion unacceptable and many philosophers agree. However, it has been surprisingly difficult to find a theory that avoids the Repugnant Conclusion without implying other equally counterintuitive conclusions. Thus, the question as to how the Repugnant Conclusion should be dealt with and, more generally, what it shows about the nature of ethics has turned the conclusion into one of the cardinal challenges of modern ethics. (shrink)

Should an adolescent offender be punished more leniently than an adult offender? Many theorists believe the answer to be in the affirmative. According to the diminished culpability model, adolescents are less mature than adults and, therefore, less responsible for their wrongdoings and should consequently be punished less harshly. This article concerns the first part of the model: the relation between immaturity and diminished responsibility. It is argued that this relation faces three normative challenges which do not allow for easy answers (...) and which are still widely ignored in the comprehensive discussion of the diminished culpability model. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is to direct attention to a challenge—referred to as the threshold challenge —facing a non-absolutist retributivist view on international criminal justice. It is argued, on the one hand, that this challenge constitutes a practically pertinent problem for the retributivist approach to the punishment of mass crimes and, on the other, that it is very hard to imagine any principled way of meeting this challenge.

A traditional overall distinction between the various versions of retributive theories of punishment is that between positive and negative retributivism. This article addresses the question of what positive retributivism – and thus the obligation to punish perpetrators – implies for a society in which the state has many other types of obligation. Several approaches to this question are considered. It is argued that the resource priority question constitutes a genuine and widely ignored challenge for positive retributivist theories of punishment.Send article (...) to KindleTo send this article to your Kindle, first ensure [email protected] is added to your Approved Personal Document E-mail List under your Personal Document Settings on the Manage Your Content and Devices page of your Amazon account. Then enter the ‘name’ part of your Kindle email address below. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Find out more about sending to your Kindle. Note you can select to send to either the @free.kindle.com or @kindle.com variations. ‘@free.kindle.com’ emails are free but can only be sent to your device when it is connected to wi-fi. ‘@kindle.com’ emails can be delivered even when you are not connected to wi-fi, but note that service fees apply. Find out more about the Kindle Personal Document Service.Retributivism and ResourcesVolume 25, Issue 1JESPER RYBERG DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000271Your Kindle email address Please provide your Kindle [email protected]@kindle.com Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Dropbox To send this article to your Dropbox account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Dropbox. Retributivism and ResourcesVolume 25, Issue 1JESPER RYBERG DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000271Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Send article to Google Drive To send this article to your Google Drive account, please select one or more formats and confirm that you agree to abide by our usage policies. If this is the first time you use this feature, you will be asked to authorise Cambridge Core to connect with your account. Find out more about sending content to Google Drive. Retributivism and ResourcesVolume 25, Issue 1JESPER RYBERG DOI: https://doi.org/10.1017/S0953820812000271Available formats PDF Please select a format to send. By using this service, you agree that you will only keep articles for personal use, and will not openly distribute them via Dropbox, Google Drive or other file sharing services. Please confirm that you accept the terms of use. Cancel Send ×Export citation Request permission. (shrink)

A vcry important question raised by Dcrck Parfit in the part 0i` Reasons and Persons which dcals with population ethics is how t0 compare thc future outcomes 0i` those policies which differ in thc way they afTcct population growth} Such comparisons arc complicated by the fact that thcsc 0utcomcs may differ not only in thc avcragc Icvcls 0f well-being they gcncratc but also in thc identity and number 0i` thc persons who cxist.

John McMillan's detailed ethical analysis concerning the use of surgical castration of sex offenders in the Czech Republic and Germany is mainly devoted to considerations of coercion.1 This is not surprising. When castration is offered as an option to offenders and, at the same time, constitutes the only means by which these offenders are likely to be released from prison, it is reasonable—and close to the heart of modern medical ethics—to consider whether the offer involves some kind of coercion. However, (...) despite McMillan's seemingly careful consideration of this question, it appears to us that the matter is more complicated than his approach to it suggests.The first thing that adds to the complexity of the discussion concerns the alternative for sex offenders who do not accept the offer of castration. As mentioned, it is likely that these offenders will be kept in prison. McMillan even underlines that they may be detained ‘indefinitely’. And the response report of the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhumane or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to the Czech Government also emphasises—as part of the Czech Criminal Code—the possibility of ‘security detention’ that will last for as long as required for ‘the protection of society’.2 Suppose, …. (shrink)

This special issue of The Journal of Ethics is devoted to ethical considerations of the use of neuroscience in the criminal justice system. In this introduction, an overview is provided of the different topics dealt with in the volume.

When does neuroimaging constitute a sufficiently developed technology to be put into use in the work of determining whether or not a defendant is guilty of crime? This question constitutes the starting point of the present paper. First, it is suggested that an overall answer is provided by what is referred to as the “ideal comparative view.” Secondly, it is—on the ground of this view—argued that the answer as to whether neuroimaging technology should be applied presupposes penal theoretical considerations. Thirdly, (...) it is argued that the retributivist theory of punishment is not well-suited for delivering the sort of theoretical guidance that is required for assessing the desirability of using neuroimaging in the work of the criminal court. (shrink)

This article addresses the question of how multiple offenders – that is, offenders who have committed more than one crime before they are apprehended – should be punished from a retributivist point of view. Two theories are evaluated, both defending the view that there should be a bulk discount for multiple offending. According to the first theory, a bulk discount follows from the idea of a punishment ceiling for types of crimes and the principle of parsimony in punishing. According to (...) the second, the discount follows from a certain view on mercy. However, it is argued that both theories suffer from theoretical flaws and that they are also insufficient in practical terms. That is, they fail to provide a basis for the making of decisions about how multiple -offence cases should be dealt with by the criminal justice system. (shrink)

Much has been written about recidivist punishments, particularly within the area of criminology. However there is a notorious lack of penal philosophical reflection on this issue. This book attempts to fill that gap by presenting the philosopher’s view on this matter as a way of furthering the debate on recidivist punishments.

The aim of this paper is to present some important contributions to ethics, value theory and political philosophy the former members of the Bioethics Research Group have made. The group was established at the University of Copenhagen in 1992 and was formally dissolved in 1997, but the members continued to work in ethics and political philosophy and set up research groups and centres at four Danish universities. Within four research themes, contributions made over the years are described. Research outputs of (...) the group have, in various ways, served to bring studies of ethics and political philosophy originating in Denmark into the wider international research arena. Members of the group have increasingly included empirical approaches in their research and have thereby participated in the more general “empirical turn” in analytic philosophy. Some members of the group can also be said to have participated in a “pluralist turn”. (shrink)

Most people assume that criminal offenders have only been convicted of a single crime. However, in reality almost half of offenders stand to be sentenced for more than one crime. The high proportion of multiple crime offenders poses a number of practical and theoretical challenges for the criminal justice system. For instance, how should courts punish multiple offenders relative to individuals who have been sentenced for a single crime? How should they be punished relative to each other? Sentencing Multiple Crimes (...) discusses these questions from the perspective of several legal theories. This volume considers questions such as the proportionality of the crimes committed, the temporal span between the crimes, and the relationship between theories about the punitive treatment of recidivists and multiple offenders. Contributors from around the world and in the fields of legal theory, philosophy, and psychology offer their perspectives to the volume. A comprehensive examination of the dynamics involved with sentencing multiple offenders has the potential to be a powerful tool for legal scholars and professionals, particularly given the practical importance of the topic and the relative dearth of research about punishment of multiple offense cases. (shrink)

According to the restitutionist view on justice, criminals should compensate their victims for the losses they have suffered as the result of crime. The discussion amongst proponents and critics of restitutionism has, to a large extent, focused on the question as to whether the theory is capable of dealing with many of the complicated challenges that arise within a criminal justice system. However, in this paper it is suggested that the restitutionist theory of justice should be rejected from the very (...) outset. Given an empirical assumption, referred to as the Third Parties Assumption, it is argued that the theory is practically self-defeating in the sense that it cannot be applied without violating its own prescriptions. (shrink)

According to the restitutionist view on justice, criminals should compensate their victims for the losses they have suffered as the result of crime. The discussion amongst proponents and critics of restitutionism has, to a large extent, focused on the question as to whether the theory is capable of dealing with many of the complicated challenges that arise within a criminal justice system. However, in this paper it is suggested that the restitutionist theory of justice should be rejected from the very (...) outset. Given an empirical assumption, referred to as the Third Parties Assumption, it is argued that the theory is practically self-defeating in the sense that it cannot be applied without violating its own prescriptions. (shrink)