Donald VanDeVeer probes the moral complexities of the question: under what conditions is it permissible to intervene invasively in the lives of competent persons--for example, by deception, force, or coercive threat--for their own good? In a work with broad significance for law, public policy, professional-client relations, and private interactions, he presents a theory of an autonomy-respecting" paternalism. Originally published in 1986. The Princeton Legacy Library uses the latest print-on-demand technology to again make available previously out-of-print books from the distinguished backlist (...) of Princeton University Press. These editions preserve the original texts of these important books while presenting them in durable paperback and hardcover editions. The goal of the Princeton Legacy Library is to vastly increase access to the rich scholarly heritage found in the thousands of books published by Princeton University Press since its founding in 1905. (shrink)

This essay supposes that the question of what treatment of animals is morally acceptable cannot be decided in any straightforward way by appeals to 'equal consideration of interests' or to animal rights. Instead it seeks to survey a variety of proposals as to how we ought to adjudicate interspecific conflicts of interests - proposals that are both 'speciesist' and 'non-speciesist' in nature. In the end one proposal is defended as the most reasonable one, and is claimed to provide a partial (...) basis for developing an adequate theory of interspecific justice. In the course of this argument the challenge posed by radical critics of current treatment of animals (e.g. Tom Regan and Peter Singer) is considered. The schema of a theory developed here partly supports and partly conflicts with positions they have defended. Regarding the latter point it proposes a non-anthropocentric basis for discounting the interests of sentient animals. (shrink)

We may think of principles which purport to fairly and reasonably adjudicate conflicting claims among human beings as principles of justice. To identify such principles John Rawls investigates what principles would be chosen by rational, self-interested persons who are ignorant of certain features of themselves which might be taken into account to promote their own advantage. The impartial viewpoint obtained by participants in a modified “original position” might be used, to identify principles which would reasonably and fairly adjudicate conflicting claims (...) among sentient creatures, i.e., human beings and animals. In what follows I attempt to sketch the beginnings of such a strategy, some reasons for exploring it, and conjecture as to a few of its implications for current disputes about the treatment of animals. (shrink)

Book reviewed in this article: The Social Dimensions of AIDS: Method and Theory. By Douglas A. Feldman & Thomas M. Johnson AIDS: Ethics and Public Policy. By Christine Pierce and Donald VanDeVeer.

This essay explores the plausibility of attempting to justify the imposition of risk on young children, in the course of therapeutic treatment or nontherapeutic research, by an appeal to proxy consent. In particular, Richard McCormick's reliance on this type of defense is examined and rejected, and an alternative basis for determining the justifiability of such treatment is partially sketched – one which avoids any attempt to ‘construct’ consent on the part of the child. CiteULike Connotea Del.icio.us What's this?

The problem of ascertaining whether there is a justification for the imposition of suffering and premature death on nonhuman animals is important in itself. Examination of the problem also promises to force philosophers to rethink widespread assumptions about what is proper treatment of less than normal human beings, the basis for attributing rights to humans, the value of life, the “intrinsic worth of all human beings,” and certain egalitarian principles. In what follows my primary concern will concern the justification of (...) imposing suffering on animals. In particular I shall try to sort out and examine some arguments set forward by Tom Regan in a recent essay. (shrink)

In a recent trial in the United States a physician was convicted of manslaughter during the performance of a hysterotomy on a woman pregnant from twenty to twenty eight weeks. Some members of the jury, in their deliberations, were much impressed by seeing a photograph of a fetus of about the same age. The experience apparently provided some jurors with reason to conclude that the fetus which did die during or immediately after the hysterotomy was a human being or a (...) person or, at least, was so like a child that the killing of it was prohibited by the law of homicide. If being a human being is not the same as being a pre-natal progeny of homo sapiens, it is difficult to understand how one could “tell by looking” whether the fetus is a human being. But the sight of a fetus of twenty weeks or longer does, I think, tempt us to think that from a moral standpoint we ought to extend the same treatment to such fetuses, or virtually the same, as we extend to newborn babies and young children. The visual similarities between middle or late stage fetuses and newborn babies is striking. (shrink)

In a recent trial in the United States a physician was convicted of manslaughter during the performance of a hysterotomy on a woman pregnant from twenty to twenty eight weeks. Some members of the jury, in their deliberations, were much impressed by seeing a photograph of a fetus of about the same age. The experience apparently provided some jurors with reason to conclude that the fetus which did die during or immediately after the hysterotomy was a human being or a (...) person or, at least, was so like a child that the killing of it was prohibited by the law of homicide. If being a human being is not the same as being a pre-natal progeny of homo sapiens, it is difficult to understand how one could “tell by looking” whether the fetus is a human being. But the sight of a fetus of twenty weeks or longer does, I think, tempt us to think that from a moral standpoint we ought to extend the same treatment to such fetuses, or virtually the same, as we extend to newborn babies and young children. The visual similarities between middle or late stage fetuses and newborn babies is striking. (shrink)

Stressing the importance of understanding the grounds and the consequences of ethical or normative decision making, this collection of classic essays compiled by Pierce and VanDeVeer, examines disputes surrounding animals, ecosystems, the land, and their own proper place in the ongoing network of lives on this planet. A central question is "how can we live lives that are both personally satisfying but which are also ecologically sound and responsible?".