The paper aims to address the following two questions: what kind of discourse is that which attempt to found or defend the autonomy or the boundaries of a discipline? Why do such discourses tend to turn into normative, dogmatic-excommunicating discourses between disciplines, schools or scholars? I will argue that an adequate answer may be found if we conceive disciplines as dogmatics, where such discourses often take the form of a discourse on the foundation of a discipline, a foundation in the (...) name of which the scholar speaks and with which he/she entertains an identity relationship. To this purpose I will re-examine the methodological discourses of (and debates between) Pareto, Croce and Einaudi on the demarcation issue between philosophy, economics and value-judgments as highly instructive to understand such issues. (shrink)

Philosophical Disputations at the University of Tartu 1632-1710: Boundaries of a Discipline.

The paper argues that one of the reasons the suppression of scientific dissent during the Covid pandemic has been so severe was because the dominant scientific Covid narrative has been turned into a political myth, i.e. a narrative mobilizing groups in support of key moral values. Taking the example of Covid vaccination, I show the key values with which it became linked in Czechia. Questioning vaccination came to be seen as endangering these values, which made scientific dissent appear as particularly (...) dangerous. I further analyse how this schematic discourse dealt with “free-vax” scientists, who were not against Covid vaccination as such but only against its blanket application. I show that their discreditation was mainly carried out by various fact-checking NGOs or social media influencers, who attempted to delegitimize them not by scientific arguments but rather by associating them with more dubious groups of social actors, or labelling their views as “disinformation”. This discrediting strategy was largely successful, but it also had some undesirable social and political backfire effects, in that it pushed some of the free-vaxxers out of the liberal democratic mainstream and forced them to seek alliance with more anti-systemic segments of the population in attempts at political resistance. (shrink)

How should political power and influence be allocated in democratic systems? That is, roughly, the core of the boundary problem in democratic theory. As of late, some authors have begun paying increased attention to the methodological aspects of this dispute. This paper attempts to make a twofold contribution to this ‘methodological turn’. On the one hand, it identifies and analyzes five desiderata of a successful principle of democratic inclusion. Any such principle, I argue, must be grounded in a clearly (...) identifiable set of values, must provide a clear standard of inclusion, must specify the relevant modalities of inclusion, must provide sound bridging principles, and must be extensionally adequate. In the first half of the paper, these desiderata are developed and critically scrutinized. On the other hand, I also extract three lessons from the previous discussion. First, that a unique answer to the boundary problem (i.e. one grounded in one single principle) is unlikely. Second, that a satisfactory answer to the boundary problem need not necessarily appeal, as some have argued, to distinctively democratic values. And third, that intuitions about political exclusion (i.e. those requiring or permitting the exclusion of some individuals) should be treated with special caution. (shrink)

An extended version of Gieryn's notion of ‘boundary-work’, supplemented with insights of Thomas Goodnight, is used to represent the central role of rhetoric in disputes on the boundary of science and the public. From a study of the Tarasoff-case it is shown that the rhetorical process of turning obstacles into resources works to move the boundary between a science and the law. It is concluded that rhetorical scholars can and must play a part in the resolution (...) of boundary disputes and that concrete case-studies of boundary-work may deepen criticism of argument. (shrink)

Disputes over territory are a major contributing factor to the disruption of international relations. We believe that a cumulative, integrated, and continuously updated resource providing information about such disputes in an easily accessible form would be of benefit to intelligence analysts, military strategists, political scientists, and also to historians and others concerned with international disputes. We propose an ontology-based strategy for creating such a resource. The resource will contain information about territorial disputes, arguments for and against (...) claims pertaining to sovereignty, proffered evidence for such claims, political and military motives (overt or hidden), and associated conflicts. Our approach is designed to address several issues surrounding the representation of geopolitical conflict, including the tracking and individuation of disputes and the validation of disseminated information. (shrink)

This paper addresses the problem of disputed cultural practices within liberal, deliberative democracies, arguing against the currently dominant view, advocated by Susan Okin among others, that such problems represent a fundamental tension between two liberal values: gender equality and cultural autonomy. Such an approach, I argue, requires the state to render normative judgements about conceptions of the good life, something which is both arbitrary and unfair in societies characterised by reasonable pluralism. Disputed practices, I claim, are defined by the existence (...) of reasonable disagreement over their legitimacy, which means they need to be resolved in a way that abstains from morally evaluating the religious or cultural doctrines of the group in question. The paper therefore articulates a cost-based approach to such problems. The cost-based approach focuses our conceptual attention on the sorts of publicly identifiable costs that any state decision will have on the various parties to a dispute. By restricting itself to public reasons, this method thereby avoids arbitrarily privileging certain conceptions of the good at the expense of others when determining the boundaries of reasonable pluralism. (shrink)

Augustyn Jakubisiak (1884-1945), Polish priest, philosopher and theologian, undertook polemics with Jan Łukasiewicz, whom he knew personally. A dispute concerning the so-called logistics (mathematical logic) and its relationship with philosophy developed between the two. The most important arguments were laid out, primarily in the following works: in the case of Jakubisiak, in the book From Scope to Content and in the case of Łukasiewicz, in the texts Logistics and Philosophy and In the Defense of Logistics. Jakubisiak criticized logistics for its (...) anti-metaphysical, anti-theological and anti-religious attitude, which was based on neo-positivist philosophy, and led, in consequence to atheism. He also claimed that one should focus on what is concrete, avoiding idealization and abstraction (meaning the content of concepts, not their scope). Łukasiewicz defended logistics claiming that it possesses its own methods based on intellect, and is also an area of independent knowledge (but not completely detached) from philosophy, due to the fact it can consider the most important philosophical problems such as finiteness and infinity. This dispute, as the researchers identified, basically concerned the reduction of philosophy to the study of language (analytic philosophy) and initiated one of the most important discussions concerning the relationship between philosophy and logic. This debate was crucial because it also concerned questions related to fundamental metaphysical issues (naturalism – supranaturalism, rationalism – irrationalism) and epistemological issues (realism – idealism, boundaries and structure of cognition). (shrink)

The ArgumentConflicts between scientists over credit for their discoveries are conflicts, not merely in, but of science because discovery is not a historical event, but a retrospective social judgment. There is no objective moment of discovery; rather, discovery is established by means of a hermeneutics, a way of reading scientific articles. The priority conflict between Roger Guillemin and Andrew Schally over the discovery of the brain hormone, TRF, serves as an example. The work of Robert Merton, Thomas Kuhn, Augustine Brannigan, (...) and Grygory Markus shows that scientists read scientific articles by means of the application of a set of pragmatic rules that subtend the normative requirements of what counts as a scientific discovery. In other words, there is a hermeneutics of science, but it is internal to that form of life. Recategorization of priority conflicts has an impact on our view of scientific controversy generally. The impact is the revision of the boundary lines of scientific controversy and the further specification of its fine-structure. (shrink)

The microstructures of cryogenically ball-milled Cu were investigated by high-resolution electron microscopy. It was found that the grain-size reduction is a dislocation-controlled continuous process which consists of the formation of small-angle grain boundaries , a gradual increase in misorientations as a result of accumulation of more dislocations and, finally, the formation of large-angle GBs. The GBs were generally curved, wavy or faceted, and heavily strained, which are typical characteristics of nanostructured materials. In addition, extrinsic dislocations were found in many GBs, (...) indicating that most are in a high-energy non-equilibrium configuration, which is consistent with observations in equal-channel angular pressing processed Cu, Ni, and Al-Mg, repetitive corrugation and straightening processed Cu and room-temperature ball-milled Cu. These results support a still-disputed concept that GBs in nanostructured metals processed by severe plastic deformation are mostly in non-equilibrium states. (shrink)

A wide range of previous research has pointed out important interactional features of televised political interviews including the cooperative dimensions to encounters between interviewers and interviewees and the extent to which news interviews differ to everyday conversation. Drawing upon an analysis of 29 televised political interviews broadcast in the UK, this article seeks to build on such work. A preliminary quantitative inspection of the data suggested that a sizeable minority of interviewee responses `hearably' challenged the prior interviewer turn. A conversation (...) analytic approach to the turn-response pairs suggested that whilst a wide range of interviewer turns were potentially vulnerable to such problematizing moves - the challenges made were often boundaried. That is, in making challenges, interviewees typically refrained from developing them in highly personalized terms; they often raised them in passing and, in cases where the interviewee refused to cooperate with interviewers, they typically did so by producing a justification. Further analysis suggested that both interviewers and interviewees did not take the steps to ward off disagreement commonly found in everyday conversation - instead both interviewer and interviewee seemed to orientate to the normality of disagreement. This picture of `boundaried but normalized' challenge was made sense of in terms of different preference structures to those found in everyday talk in which both interviewee and interviewer were understood as skilfully orientating to the normativity of challenges whilst safeguarding the interview structure itself. (shrink)

What is the definition of life? Artificial life environments provide an interesting test case for this classical question. Understanding what such systems can tell us about biological life requires negotiating the tricky conceptual boundary between virtual and real life forms. Drawing from Wittgenstein’s analysis of the concept of a game and a Darwinian insight about classification, I argue that classifying life involves both causal and pragmatic elements. Rather than searching for a single, sharp definition, these considerations suggest that life (...) is a cluster concept with fuzzy boundaries and that there are multiple legitimate ways to make the notion precise for different scientific purposes. This pluralist, realist account avoids unnecessary border disputes by emphasizing how science negotiates such questions in relation to theory and evidence. I also discuss several objections to this approach, including a “moral hesitation” some have to allowing broader application of the concept of life to include artificial life. (shrink)

This article presents a case study of a recent controversy over the use of computed tomography as a diagnostic technology in South Korean hospitals. The controversy occurred in the wake of a series of conflicts in the late twentieth century over the legitimate placement of healing practices, medicinal substances, and medical technologies within Korea’s separate “Western Medicine” and “Korean Medicine” systems of health care and pharmaceutical distribution. The controversy concerned an attempt to use hi-tech imaging technology—the epitome of modern medicine—in (...) a clinic that maintains a strong ideological attachment to Korean healing traditions. A close study of this dispute, based on interviews, participant observation, and documentary analysis, showed that discursive positions taken about the translatability of medical technologies changed with the context of dispute, and did not reflect a stable epistemic boundary between rival medical paradigms. (shrink)

The status of risk factors and disease remains a disputed question in the theory and practice of medicine and healthcare, and so does the related question of delineating disease boundaries. I present a framework based on Bernard Lonergan’s account of emergent probability for differentiating (1) generically distinct levels of systematic function within organisms and between organisms and their environments and (2) the methods of functional, genetic, and statistical investigation. I then argue on this basis that it is possible to understand (...) disease in terms of biological or higher intra-level dysfunction, risk factors—including genetic risk factors—in terms of statistical inter-level conditioning of a given stage or developmental sequence of systematic functioning, and the empirical boundaries of disease in terms of the limits of both functional categorization (from an epistemic standpoint) and upper-level integration of lower-level processes and events (from an ontological standpoint). (shrink)

The paper delves into manuscript sources connected with various disputations held at Prague University from around 1390 to 1420 and singles out a set of hitherto unknown quaestiones dealing with the nature of the human intellect and its relation to the body. Prague disputations from around 1400 arguably offer a unique vantage point on late medieval anthropological issues, since they encompass an entanglement of numerous doctrinal influences from Buridanian De anima commentaries to John Wyclif’s theories. The paper delineates several conceptual (...) tensions regarding the nature of the intellect, e.g., between materialism (entailed by the emphasis on the intellect’s inherence in the body) and personal immortality. It presents several strategies Prague masters employed to overcome these tensions. For example, an anonymous participant of the 1409 quodlibet develops the Buridanian distinction between the rationally demonstrable materialist tendency and the indemonstrable “catholic truth” about the intellect both inhering in and separable from the body. On the other hand, Wyclif’s adherents (Jacob of Mies and another anonymous master) postulate an immortal spirit hypostatically united to each human being beside the human soul educed from the potency of the matter. Yet, the boundaries between the doctrinal standpoints in question seem permeable, whereby a rigid definition of antagonistic groups in late medieval Prague intellectual milieu (e.g., Buridanians vs Wycliffites) is rendered ineffective. (shrink)

ArgumentThe experimental development of a therapeutic serum against diphtheria between 1891 and 1894 was characterized by a scientific competition that pitted Emil Behring from the Institute for Infectious Diseases in Berlin against Émile Roux and Elie Metschnikoff from the Pasteur Institute in Paris. In general, their competition can be regarded as an extension of the fundamental differences that separated the research schools of Robert Koch and Louis Pasteur. However, to characterize the competition for a diphtheria-serum as “national rivalry” fails to (...) account adequately for the mutual adoption of experimental practices by the Berlin and Parisian protagonists, whose contributions to the development of a therapeutic serum were intertwined in complex ways. Nor can it be characterized as “cooperation,” given their fierce public disputes over scientific concepts and the fact that these disputes also shaped the peculiarities of the experimental procedures in Berlin and Paris. A close analysis reveals a complex picture of the dynamic interaction between the conceptual and experimental activities of Behring, Roux, and Metschnikoff – interaction that defined as well as bridged the “French” and “Prussian” experimental systems of diphtheria-serum research. (shrink)

This article examines two disputes within sex and gender movements, using them to think through inclusion/exclusion processes, the place of such explosions in the construction of collective identity, and the gendered nature of social movements. Literatures on collective identity emphasize the ways boundary negotiation reinforces the solidarity necessary for collective action and note benefits of solid boundaries, yet downplay the role of internal conflict in the making of collective identities. The cases examined here both involved the explicit expulsion (...) of some “members”: the North American Man/boy Love Association from the International Lesbian and Gay Association, and transsexuals from the Michigan Womyn's Music Festival. An incongruence between practical participation and symbolic exclusion suggests that internal movement debates are best understood as public communications, depending heavily on the communicative environment. Finally, these stories raise questions about the gendered nature of collective identity construction in social movements more generally. (shrink)

Recent evidence suggests that historical boundary precedents play a central role in the outbreak, character, and long-term consequences of territorial disputes. The institutional theory of borders holds promise in explaining why leaders find old borders to be attractive as new borders. However, the mechanisms that link historical precedents to territorial claims and their consequences are not fully specified in the extant literature. I argue that there are three key arguments that can explain why boundary precedents are associated (...) with subsequent disputes: ease of justification, perpetual conflict over territories of particular value, and persistent coordination around old borders. I argue that the coordination mechanism is essential to understanding the connections between historical boundary precedents and territorial disputes. (shrink)

In contemporary societies there is a continuous process of creation and destruction of ethics. Shared norms are fuzzy, as actors tend to share core principles but interpret them differently. In this paper we analyse three cases of ethical dispute in the agri-food sector by employing the distinction between matters of fact and matters of concern proposed by Bruno Latour. We further suggest that ethics in the agri-food industry should be considered in relation to collective goals such as sustainability and social (...) justice. To expand the role of ethics it is necessary to broaden the view on who is responsible and how for the manifold challenges faced in food production, distribution and consumption. We contend that reflections on the relationship between ethics and sustainability must go beyond an anthropocentric approach and also consider the welfare of non-human nature. Our study suggests that the boundary between politics and ethics is fluid and governing institutions have a role to play in ethicisation of food systems along with industry and civil society. Any resolution of matters of concern is neither innocent, nor impartial. Ethical responses to food system challenges are rather to be established through dialogue and alignment of ethical practices. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:113 HUME ON LIBERTY, NECESSITY AND VERBAL DISPUTES Although Hume's discussion "Of Liberty and Necessity" in Section VIII of the first Enquiry has become a paradigm of compatibilism with respect to the issue of free will and determinism, it is not without its perplexing features. For instance, it is far from clear how Hume's arguments and illustrations help to establish his claim that "The same motives always produce (...) the same actions: The same events follow from the same causes." Nor is it obvious that Humean liberty is reconcilable with Humean causation or constant conjunction, or that the latter takes the sting out of determinism and makes the case for compatibilism more plausible. In this paper I want to examine a further, perhaps related, perplexing feature of Hume's discussion, namely, his contention that the dispute concerning liberty and necessity has been a merely verbal one. Although perhaps portions of the dispute may turn "merely upon words" as Hume contends, still it seems extreme to claim that the "whole controversy" is of this nature. I shall begin by examining the notion of a merely verbal dispute as it is discussed by Hume in other parts of his philosophy, and shall isolate three conditions for such a dispute. I shall then show why the dispute over liberty and necessity as presented in the Enquiry fails to meet these conditions. I want to suggest that there is a tension between Hume's psychological account of particular mistaken beliefs or natural illusions and his views about particular verbal disputes involving these beliefs. Even if this tension can be eased or eliminated, it will not make the dispute about liberty and necessity verbal. 114 Before we can hope to assess Hume's claim that the dispute about liberty and necessity is a merely verbal one, we must be clear on what hé understands by such a dispute. Fortunately, the notion is discussed in each of his four most important philosophical works — the Treatise, the two Enquiries and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion. Perhaps the most detailed discussion is found in the Appendix to the second Enquiry, where Hume examines an apparent disagreement discovered in a comparison of various natural languages over the question of whether particular personal qualities are virtues or rather talents (and the corresponding question of whether other qualities are vices or rather defects). In contending that the disagreement is merely verbal, Hume has two important things to say. First, he notes that "I do not find that in the English, or any other modern tongue, the boundaries are exactly fixed between virtues and talents, vices and defects, or that a precise definition can be given of the one as contradistinguished from the other." (E 313) Secondly, he states, "...it is no wonder that languages should not be very precise in marking the boundaries between virtues and talents, vices and defects; since there is so little distinction made in our internal estimation of them." (E 314) Hume goes on to point out that the sentiments which arise from the contemplation of qualities that are designated virtues are similar to those which arise from the contemplation of qualities which in some languages are designated talents. (E 316) 115 The preceding comments suggest an account of the nature of verbal disputes along the following lines. In a verbal dispute there is an underlying agreement about specific impressions, perceptions or experiences of objects. Thus, in the case of the dispute about whether specific qualities are talents or virtues, this would include the fact that the qualities elicit a similar feeling of approval for Hume whether they are designated in one way or the other. Moreover, Hume's comment about the lack of a clear distinction between "virtue" and "talent" implies that the terms express or refer to ideas that are compatible, that is, both of which can apply to a given object. Hence, there can be instances of qualities which fall under both designations. Given the underlying "factual" agreement between the parties to the dispute and given the compatibility of ideas, it would seem that for Hume in a verbal dispute there is no real disagreement between them and neither party is mistaken. Consequently... (shrink)

In this discipline-redefining book, Elizabeth T. Hurren maps the post-mortem journeys of bodies, body-parts, organs, and brains, inside the secretive culture of modern British medical research after WWII as the bodies of the deceased were harvested as bio-commons. Often the human stories behind these bodies were dissected, discarded, or destroyed in death. Hidden Histories of the Dead recovers human faces and supply-lines in the archives that medical science neglected to acknowledge. It investigates the medical ethics of organ donation, the legal (...) ambiguities of a lack of fully-informed consent and the shifting boundaries of life and re-defining of medical death in a biotechnological era. Hurren reveals the implicit, explicit and missed body disputes that took second-place to the economics of the national and international commodification of human material in global medical sciences of the Genome era. This title is also available as Open Access. (shrink)

In the spirit of the discussion in Daniel Kolak’s I Am You: The Metaphysical Foundation for Global Ethics, I consider the way in which divisions that we usually think of as borders between distinct people occur within a single life. Starting with the dispute between constructionist and non-constructionist views of persons, I argue for a view that places the unity of persons in the dynamic generated by simultaneously taking a constructionist and non-constructionist view of oneself. In order to unify ourselves (...) as agents we need to treat past and future selves as others, but to motivate this endeavor we need to think of ourselves as temporally extended agents, and so identify with past and future selves. Understanding this dynamic illuminates the structure of our agency and the unity of the self. (shrink)

Conflicts of interest. None to report. Despite widespread acceptance in the United States of neurological criteria to determine death, clinicians encounter families who object, often on religious grounds, to the categorization of their loved ones as “brain dead.” The concept of “reasonable accommodation” of objections to brain death, promulgated in both state statutes and the bioethics literature, suggests the possibility of compromise between the family’s deeply held beliefs and the legal, professional and moral values otherwise directing clinicians to withdraw medical (...) interventions. Relying on narrative to convey the experience of a family and clinical caregivers embroiled in this complex dilemma, the case analyzed here explores the practical challenges and moral ambiguities presented by the concept of reasonable accommodation. Clarifying the term’s meaning and boundaries, and identifying guidelines for its clinical implementation, could help to reduce uncertainty for both health care professionals and families and, thereby, the incremental moral distress such uncertainty creates. (shrink)

Since the late 1980s, in defiance of Sri Lanka’s major monastic fraternities and the government, Buddhist women and men have begun to organize across distinctions of national boundary and Buddhist tradition to reinstate a defunct bhikkhun? ordination lineage for renunciant women. Drawing on fieldwork from the winter of 2015–16, this article considers some of the strategies by which Sri Lanka’s bhikkhun?s and their supporters constitute the burgeoning lineage as both legitimate and necessary for the continued health and vitality of (...) an otherwise ailing Buddhist s?sana. I argue that Sri Lanka’s bhikkhun?s engage in highly-visible forms of adherence to vinaya rules and social expectations for ideal monastic behavior set against a popular discourse about the laxity of male renunciants. Such engagement is both political and soteriological; while it is aimed at fulfilling legitimizing gendered expectations of women’s piety, it is expressed primarily in terms of the eradication of personal and societal suffering through forms of practice that accord with the ideal of a pious monastic. Thus, in contrast to discourses which locate bhikkhun?s as subjects whose presence weakens the s?sana’s duration and strength, in this new discourse Sri Lanka’s bhikkhun?s become virtuous agents of social service and moral restoration. The article concludes by identifying emerging connections between this discourse and an alreadygendered xenophobic Buddhist nationalism. (shrink)

In a recent line of cases, senior judges in the UK have been called upon to adjudicate in complaints over the failure of health and local authorities to meet the welfare needs of citizens. Local authorities claimed that the disputes had been precipitated by a lack of resources allocated by central government to meet local demand. This article examines the role of the courts in resolving a fundamental tension between central government policy of financial cost-cutting on the one hand (...) and welfarist principles embodied in legislation for the delivery of public services on the other. Questions are raised about the relevance and appropriateness of rights-based adjudication in welfare needs contexts and about the reluctance of courts to intervene in the resolution of resource allocation disputes even where fundamental rights, particularly in areas such as health, community care, and education where notions of rights are inextricably bound up with use of financial resources. These key cases have arisen prior to the implementation of the Human Rights Act 1998. Where relevant, the likely impact of the Act on welfare needs disputes is considered. (shrink)

Pragmatics is the study of the role of context in communication. This chapter discusses experimental research in pragmatics. It provides clarity on pragmatics by contrasting the role of context in communication with the role of sentence meaning. There is some disagreement about which communicative effects are due to which thing, so there is some disagreement as to where to draw the boundary between semantics and pragmatics. The chapter considers a rich experimental research project in pragmatics, which has developed primarily (...) within linguistics and psychology over the course of the last several decades in response to the boundary disputes. Finally, it talks about a more nascent experimental research project, which, building upon insights from psychology, aims towards understanding survey pragmatics. These two projects are discussed and attention is paid to the methods unique to each project and the philosophical and linguistic underpinnings they share in common. (shrink)

This paper argues that professionals who make boundary-related decisions should be guided by relationship-based practice. In our roles as service users and professionals, drawing from our lived experiences of professional relationships, we argue we need to move away from distance-based practice. This includes understanding the boundary stories and narratives that exist for all of us – including the people we support, other professionals, as well as the organisations and systems within which we work. When we are dealing with (...) professional boundary issues, we should centre relationship-building skills that are central to many other aspects of our work. Skills that foster relationships at all levels – between professionals, service users, and services – need to be revalued. Our final recommendation is to create, develop, and foster safer spaces within and outside of organisations, as well as inter-professionally, for the discussion and exploration of boundary-related issues and practice. We are interested in hearing from those with experiences of being marginalised by boundaries so that they can inform a reshaping of our collective ideas around boundary related practices. To foster relationship-based practices in organisations, we have outlined several recommendations here; however, we recognize that these do not go far enough, and that collective action is needed to inform systemic change. (shrink)

Re-framing discussion of the question, “What is law?“ in terms of the contexts in which the whole question makes sense allows us to see that jurisprudence is about boundary disputes concerning law – that is about what should count as law – and about responses to attacks on the value of law. Concern for these two issues constitutes the boundary challenge perspective. The boundary challenge perspective not only allows us fully to escape essentialism about law, it (...) also provides us with a better understanding of the relationship between the activity of discussing what should count as law and the activity of specifying the law in particular circumstances. The boundary challenge perspective provides a better explanation of that relationship than positivism or natural law. It allows discussion of change and resistance to change without significantly weakening the distinction between “is” and “ought”. It might also form the basis for further historical and sociological studies of law. (shrink)

Contemporary changes in the domain of knowledge production are usually seen as posing significant challenges to ‘the University’. This paper argues against the framing of the university as an ideal-type, and considers epistemic gains from treating universities as assemblages of different functions, actors and relations. It contrasts this with the concept of ‘unbundling’, using two recent cases of controversies around academics’ engagement on social media to show how, rather than having clearly delineated limits, social entities become ‘territorialised’ through boundary (...) disputes. The conclusion extends this discussion to the production of knowledge about social objects in general. (shrink)

Re-framing discussion of the question, “What is law?“ in terms of the contexts in which the whole question makes sense allows us to see that jurisprudence is about boundary disputes concerning law – that is about what should count as law – and about responses to attacks on the value of law. Concern for these two issues constitutes the boundary challenge perspective. The boundary challenge perspective not only allows us fully to escape essentialism about law, it (...) also provides us with a better understanding of the relationship between the activity of discussing what should count as law and the activity of specifying the law in particular circumstances. The boundary challenge perspective provides a better explanation of that relationship than positivism or natural law. It allows discussion of change and resistance to change without significantly weakening the distinction between “is” and “ought”. It might also form the basis for further historical and sociological studies of law. (shrink)

As products of the "new biotechnology," genetically modified organisms have provoked a wide-ranging risk debate on potential harm, especially from herbicide-tolerant crops. In response to this legitimacy problem, the European Community adopted precautionary legislation, which left open the definition of environmental harm. When the U.K. proposed Europe-wide market approval of a herbicide-tolerant oilseed rape, the proposal encountered dissent from some countries and environmentalist groups. Further debate on normative judgments became necessary to implement the precaution ary legislation. In dispute were several (...) regulatory boundaries—of administrative re sponsibility, causality, acceptability, and evidence. The boundary disputes expressed divergentframings of biotechnological risk, each with its implicit model of the socionatu ral order. In this way, the disputes can illuminate the sorts of risk framings that have already become embedded and standardized in other regulatory sectors. (shrink)

This is a collection of nine papers dealing with the topic of reporting on beliefs and other attitudes, and in particular with the issue of the semantics-pragmatics boundary dispute which is the core topic of research in the field.

ABSTRACT Greek historical accounts of ancient eclipses were an important, if peculiar, focus of scientific attention in the nineteenth century. Victorian-era astronomers tried to correct the classical histories using scientific methods, then used those histories as data with which to calibrate their lunar theories, then rejected the histories as having any relevance at all. The specific dating of these eclipses—apparently a simple exercise in celestial mechanics—became bound up with tensions between scientific and humanistic approaches to the past as well as (...) with wider social debates over the power and authority of science in general. The major figures discussed here, including G. B. Airy, Simon Newcomb, and T. H. Huxley, argued that the critical question was whether science could speak authoritatively about the past. To them, the ability of science to talk about the past indicated its power to talk about the future; it was also the fulcrum of fierce boundary disputes among science, history, and religion. (shrink)

ABSTRACT Greek historical accounts of ancient eclipses were an important, if peculiar, focus of scientific attention in the nineteenth century. Victorian-era astronomers tried to correct the classical histories using scientific methods, then used those histories as data with which to calibrate their lunar theories, then rejected the histories as having any relevance at all. The specific dating of these eclipses—apparently a simple exercise in celestial mechanics—became bound up with tensions between scientific and humanistic approaches to the past as well as (...) with wider social debates over the power and authority of science in general. The major figures discussed here, including G. B. Airy, Simon Newcomb, and T. H. Huxley, argued that the critical question was whether science could speak authoritatively about the past. To them, the ability of science to talk about the past indicated its power to talk about the future; it was also the fulcrum of fierce boundary disputes among science, history, and religion. (shrink)

Several criticisms exist surrounding the philosophical method of conceptual analysis in legal theory, but three have become particularly prominent in the last two decades. First, there are those who argue that the sheer diversity of types of law renders the pursuit of a single, overarching concept of law absurd. Second, there are those who suppose that engagement in con ceptual analysis cannot resolve boundary disputes about the concept of law, which was the very purpose of conceptual analysis in (...) the first place. And third, there are those who argue that conceptual analysis, as a general philosophical method, relies on a deeply flawed epistemology which has for a long time now been discredited. In this article I shall present each of these categories of challenges in turn (section I) before providing an assessment of their overall impact (sections II and III).Resumen:Existen varias críticas en cuanto al método de análisis conceptual en la teoría jurídica, pero tres de ellas han cobrado especial relevancia en las últimas dos décadas. Primero tenemos la crítica de quienes sostienen que la mera diversidad de tipos de derecho hace que la búsqueda de un único concepto supremo sea absurda; en segundo lugar, tenemos a quienes suponen que el involucrarse en una tarea de análisis conceptual no soluciona disputas en los límites acerca del concepto de derecho, tarea que por cierto es la que tiene que resolver el análisis conceptual; y finalmente, tenemos a quienes argumentan que el análisis conceptual, como método filosófico en general, descansa sobre una epistemología fallida, la cual por cierto tiene tiempo desacreditada. En este artículo voy a hacer una exposición de estas tres categorías de críticas al análisis conceptual, (esto en la sección I), y posteriormente evaluaré el impacto general que las mismas han tenido (en las secciones II y III). (shrink)

Globalization cannot be stopped nor denied. Sometimes it may have not only a positive impact but also a negative one, as rivalry among nations may ensue. Economic and political rivalry leads to break up of the conducive environment of political security. Unresolved territorial claims and boundary disputes may become triggering factors. Superpowers’ interference may had to the conflict. The purpose of this article is to explain the possibilities of building up trust in peaceful and democratic One Asia Community (...) by systematically and effectively introducing educational programs to enhance awareness of cultural differences, teach conflict resolution techniques, and promote an ideal of ethical responsibility and unselfishness. (shrink)

Summary This article concerns the identity and role of the C. Helvidius Priscus who is named in CIL IX, 2827 as an arbiter ex compromisso in a boundary dispute. After examining the inscription itself, I proceed to examine the implications of the mechanism of arbiter ex compromisso in the Roman judicatory system, and the possibility of a high-ranking Roman serving in such a role. The seemingly discrepancy between a high-ranking Roman and the role of a land surveyor is resolved (...) hereby by juxtaposing it twice: once with the precedent of high-ranking surveyors in the agrarian bill of Rullus; and secondly, by reading it in the context of locatio conductio operis contracts. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Ideas 62.1 (2001) 81-98 [Access article in PDF] Leonor de Cáceres and the Mexican Inquisition Margaret Mott Introduction: The Family and the Times The Carvajál family, well-known to historians of colonial Mexico, achieved its enduring status largely through the records of the Mexican Holy Office. 1 The governor, Luis de Carvajál, after becoming embroiled in a boundary dispute with the Viceroy of New (...) Spain, was denounced as a Judaizer in 1589. He was eventually cleared of the crime of Judaizing, of performing Jewish rituals while pretending to be Catholic, but was sent to prison for one year for having concealed his Judaizing relatives from the authorities. He died while serving out his prison sentence. Many of the rest of his family, whom he brought over from Spain as part of the privileges of his office, were condemned as judaizantes pertinaz, persistent Judaizers. In the auto de fe of 8 December 1596 the governor's sister Francisca Núñez de Carvajál and four of her adult children were, in the language of the Holy Office, "relaxed to the secular arm for burning." Francisca's daughter, Mariana, was spared the stake in 1596 because she was deemed to have lost her senses. Once she regained them, she, too, was condemned as a persistent Judaizer and died in the auto de fe of 25 March 1601.From all accounts the Carvajál family was used by the Holy Office as a warning to the crypto-Jewish community of New Spain. Even Stephen Greenleaf, known for his balanced accounts on the Mexican Inquisition, 2 describes the persecution [End Page 81] of the Carvajáls as a "Counter Reformation tact," concluding that "the Holy Office wanted to use the Carvajáls as an example to the Jewish community of Mexico." 3 Yet more was at issue here than just a display of the naked power. The questions the inquisitors posed and the rhetoric they used suggest something beyond flexing a coercive muscle in front of the crypto-Jewish population of colonial Mexico.Not all members of the Carvajál family perished in the flames of so-called Counter Reformation intolerance. One of Francisca's sons, a Dominican monk, was able to maintain his commitment to his order even after being convicted of concealing his heretic relatives from the authorities. A son-in-law, Antonio Diaz de Cáceres, was reconciled after paying what biographer Martin A. Cohen considered an "unusually light" penalty, a public abjure de vehementia and a fine of a thousand Castilian ducats. Cohen explains this unusual pardon in terms of political intrigue. "Because he was a man of esteem and had served the king on several occasions," wrote Cohen, Antonio was spared the lash. 4 Yet political favors were not the only consideration. Francisca's granddaughter (and Antonio's daughter) Leonor de Cáceres, who was nine at the time of the first auto de fe, was reconciled along with her father in the auto de fe of 1601. Although she was fourteen at the time of her trial, much of the evidence concerns events that took place in her childhood, before the age of reason. Rather than a "Counter Reformation tact," her trial reflects some of the Catholic reforms of the sixteenth century, a time in Spanish political and social thought when natural law arguments for education and evangelization were on the ascendant.The term Counter Reformation implies an entrenched position against any efforts of reform. "Counter Reformation," writes historian John O'Malley, "expressed the quintessence of Catholicism, which was reaction and repression." 5 Counter Reformation underscores intolerance and obscures the radical reforms of the times (for which reason O'Malley offers the more neutral term, Early Modern Catholicism). In actuality sixteenth-century Catholicism was a time of both unification and universality, of shoring up the papacy and experimenting with evangelical techniques. Balanced against the heightened authority of the Vatican were the educational experiments of the Jesuits. 6 Alongside the racist arguments in support of the encomendero system was a very... (shrink)

Democracy has been a flawed hegemony since the fall of communism. Its flexibility, its commitment to equality of representation, and its recognition of the legitimacy of opposition politics are all positive features for political institutions. But democracy has many deficiencies: it is all too easily held hostage by powerful interests; it often fails to advance social justice; and it does not cope well with a number of features of the political landscape, such as political identities, boundary disputes, and (...) environmental crises. Although democracy is valuable it fits uneasily with other political values and is in many respects less than equal to the demands it confronts. In this volume prominent political theorists and social scientists present original discussions of such central issues. Democracy's Values deals with the nature and value of democracy, particularly the tensions between it and such goods as justice, equality, efficiency, and freedom. (shrink)

Disputes over territory are among the most contentious in human affairs. Throughout the world, societies view control over land and resources as necessary to ensure their survival and to further their particular life-style, and the very passion with which claims over a region are asserted and defended suggests that difficult normative issues lurk nearby. Questions about rights to territory vary. It is one thing to ask who owns a particular parcel of land, another who has the right to reside (...) within its boundaries and yet another to determine which individuals or groups have political rights of citizenship, sovereignty, and self-determination within it. It must also be asked how these rights—if ‘rights’ is the correct term—are acquired. When attention turns to the territorial rights of communities, national groups or states, sovereignty is the principal concern. Within international law, de facto power over a territory, say, of occupying forces or trustees, is insufficient to possess or acquire sovereignty (Brownlie, 1990, p. 111). The central conceptions underlying modern democratic thought are that sovereignty over a politically demarcated territory is vested in the resident population, and that governmental authority is derived from the consent of that population. It is simple enough to identify the latter with the citizenry of a state, but demographic and political flux makes this a loose criterion. States come and go, and sometimes a territory is stateless. Also, large-scale demographic shifts during upheavals and peacetime immigrations change the assessments of who belongs where. Does everyone residing in a place at a particular time have a right to share in its governance then? What about illegal immigrants? Presumably, sovereignty rests with the established population or.. (shrink)

El objetivo de este artículo es demostrar que la obra del sociólogo del conocimiento científico Steven Shapin es heredera del debate internismo/externismo. Esa herencia se expresa a través de los intentos que realiza por romper los límites de las dicotomías que fueron construidas en el curso de la controversia en los ámbitos disciplinares de la historia de la ciencia, la sociología de la ciencia y la sociología del conocimiento científico. Abordaremos principalmente las cuestiones concernientes a la relación entre la obra (...) de Shapin de los años noventa y los trabajos de Robert Merton, uno de los pilares del debate.The aim of this paper is to show that the work of the sociologist of scientific knowledge Steven Shapin is inheriting from the internalism/externalism debate. That inheritance is expressed by the attempts that he makes to break the boundaries of the dichotomies, which were built during the dispute in the disciplinary fields of history of science, sociology of science and sociology of scientific knowledge. We will deal with the issues concerning the relation between Shapin’s work during the nineties and Robert Merton’s work, which was one of the pillars of this debate. (shrink)

The commons is frequently taken to be a model of democracy. Yet, the problems of overuse and enclosure that plague common-pool resources suggest that democratic norms of inclusion, equality, and pluralism may not be realized in practice. Existing contractarian accounts of the democratic value of the commons tend to assume equality of power and clear boundaries between users and non-users. Alternative accounts that emphasize practices of commoning assume a shared social identity that appears incompatible with pluralism. These accounts provide little (...) insight into how common-pool resource regimes marked by inequalities of power might be democratized for the long-term. In contrast, I argue that the idea of treaty can serve as the basis for a democratic theory of the commons that justifies exclusion of those who would oppress marginalized groups, facilitates polycentric governance, and creates opportunities for deliberation and contestation. I illustrate the argument with reference to disputes over fisheries between the Mi’kmaq, non-Indigenous peoples, and the Canadian state. (shrink)

A month ago, I bought an iPhone. The iPhone has already taken over some of the central functions of my brain. It has replaced part of my memory, storing phone numbers and addresses that I once would have taxed my brain with. It harbors my desires: I call up a memo with the names of my favorite dishes when I need to order at a local restaurant. I use it to calculate, when I need to figure out bills and tips. (...) It is a tremendous resource in an argument, with Google ever present to help settle disputes. I make plans with it, using its calendar to help determine what I can and can’t do in the coming months. I even daydream on the iPhone, idly calling up words and images when my concentration slips. Friends joke that I should get the iPhone implanted into my brain. But if Andy Clark is right, all this would do is speed up the processing, and free up my hands. The iPhone is part of my mind already. Clark is a connoisseur of the myriad ways in which the mind relies on the world to get its work done. The first part of this marvelous book explores some of these ways: the extension of our bodies, the extension of our senses, and crucially, the use of language as a tool to extend our thought. The second part of the book defends the thesis that in at least some of these cases, the world is not serving as a mere instrument for the mind. Rather, the relevant parts of the world have become parts of my mind. My iPhone is not my tool, or at least it is not wholly my tool. Parts of it have become parts of me. This is the thesis of the extended mind: when parts of the environment are coupled to the brain in the right way, they become parts of the mind. The thesis has a long history: I am told that there are hints of it in Dewey, Heidegger, and Wittgenstein. But no-one has done as much to give life to the idea as Andy Clark. In a series of important books and articles—Being There, Natural-Born Cyborgs, “Magic words: How language augments human computation”, and many others—he has explored the many ways in which the boundaries between mind and world are far more flexible than one might have thought.. (shrink)

The Critique of Practical Reason is traditionally regarded as one of Kant’s central works on practical philosophy. Its structural and stylistic parallels with the Critique of Pure Reason sustain one’s conviction about its fundamental systematic relevance in Kant’s ethics. Nevertheless, the compositional sketch of the system of critical philosophy in the first Critique does not presume any separate critique of reason in its practical use. This inspires to investigate the question of the sense and aim of the critique of practical (...) reason in Kant’s main works of the 1780s. Such an investigation discovers, that the concept of such a critique emerges in Kant’s Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, which intends to find and to establish the supreme principle of pure morals, to supply its full-value deduction and insofar to present a sufficient introduction to the system of moral metaphysics. It is for the purpose of such a deduction, which demonstrates the normative validity and truth of categorical imperatives, that Kant considers a transition to a critique of practical reason necessary. And yet this transition as well as this critique are presumed to take place within the subject field of the Groundwork itself: the main features of the practical critique of reason as described in the Groundwork III are, according to Kant, sufficient for the purpose of justification of critical morality. If, however, the deduction of the moral law given in Groundwork III should fail, no possible future “progress of metaphysics” could compensate this failure, - because this deduction occurs at the «extreme boundary of all practical philosophy”, beyond which lies the realm of moral faith. Kant scholars consider the concepts of the “fact of pure reason” and the doctrine of the highest derivative good as crucial innovations of the second “Critique”. There are however reasons enough to dispute the question as to whether both doctrines really make for an innovation - and for an advance. (shrink)