Abstract

The commons is frequently taken to be a model of democracy. Yet, the problems of overuse and enclosure that plague common-pool resources suggest that democratic norms of inclusion, equality, and pluralism may not be realized in practice. Existing contractarian accounts of the democratic value of the commons tend to assume equality of power and clear boundaries between users and non-users. Alternative accounts that emphasize practices of commoning assume a shared social identity that appears incompatible with pluralism. These accounts provide little insight into how common-pool resource regimes marked by inequalities of power might be democratized for the long-term. In contrast, I argue that the idea of treaty can serve as the basis for a democratic theory of the commons that justifies exclusion of those who would oppress marginalized groups, facilitates polycentric governance, and creates opportunities for deliberation and contestation. I illustrate the argument with reference to disputes over fisheries between the Mi’kmaq, non-Indigenous peoples, and the Canadian state.