Some important ideas in Kelsen's Pure Theory of Law can be traced back to Kantian tradition, which has been very influential in Kelsen's thought, particularly in his early period. Among them we find the distinction between two radically different worlds (the world of facts and the world of norms), the normativity of legal science and the idea of validity as a binding force, based on the famous doctrine of the basic norm. These tenets and, especially, the use of a normative (...) concept of validity prove to be incompatible with Kelsen's positivistic programme of a value‐free legal science. The science of law cannot state that legal norms are obligatory or binding without trespassing the limits of Kelsen's ideal of a legal science; on the other hand, it is possible to define the concept of a legal system without resorting to the basic norm. So, if Kelsen is to be regarded as a consequent positivist, the Kantian ingredients of his theory must be rejected and the descriptive concept of validity as membership must be substituted for the normative notion of validity as a binding force. (shrink)

In this article I revisit the relationship between Immanuel Kant and the Marquis De Sade, following not Jacques Lacan but Pierre Klossowski. In the process I suggest that Sade's work is marred by a series of antinomies that prevent him from stating a pure practical libertine reason and leave his view purely theoretical.

This paper is a critical study of Kant’s antinomy of saving faith. In the first section, I sketch aspects of Kant’s philosophical account of sin and atonement that help explain why he finds saving faith problematic from the moral point of view. I proceed in the next section to give a detailed exposition of Kant’s remarkable antinomy and of his proposal for resolving it theoretically. In the third and final section, I argue that alternative ways of resolving the antimony both (...) respond to the deepest of Kant’s moral concerns and comport better with the traditional Christian conviction that saving faith can have for its object the historical individual Jesus Christ. (shrink)

An aim of all of the management of healthcare systems is the smooth provision of services. A great deal of effort is put into ensuring processes will obtain this ideal – the well‐run system. The central argument in this paper is that these processes result in a system that perpetrates violence and coercion on its clients and workers. This violence is structural and personalizing in its effects. Moreover, time and effort is taken away from the actual work of the system (...) for its management. Under such managerialist control, the idea of chaos and the need to ensure order are used to fuel an apparatus that takes the focus from other aspects of the system such as the power relations that keep the system as it is. In such an ordering, the clinical audit is promoted as a method to ensure order by keeping ahead of, or removing the potential for chaos. In using Žižek's ideas about violence it is possible to identify how efforts and attempts to correct the system are doomed to fail just as they hide how nurses' enrolment in the service of the system leads to alienation and subjectification. A central aim of this paper is to rethink how power and implicit violence are practised in such processes. To overcome the inherent violence of the audit culture, this paper suggests an interruption of audit cultures with a promotion of more radical positions for nursing practice and clinically based research. The hope is to recalculate and interrupt how nurses are to operate in the management structures that organize healthcare. (shrink)

The problem of the article is based on a long tradition of studying the category ‘antinomy‘ in the history of philosophy from antiquity until the early twentieth century. Antinomical thinking has particular importance for the spiritual life in the 20th century. The author draws attention to the fact that, for example, in the poetry of Thomas Stern Eliot antinomies and paradoxes are of philosophical and religious nature especially in then dealing with questions of reaching the Truth by rational way exclusively. (...) The basic material for studies are the works of modern Russian poets Olesya Nikolaeva, Sergei Kruglov, Timur Kibirov, Olga Sedakova and Helen Schwartz. It is shown how moral and philosophical themes and descriptions of the spiritual lives of the characters associated with the interpretation of ideas of compositions in the form of antinomies. The idea of the influence of the antinomies of thinking on aesthetics and system of images of Russian poets verses is justified. Article reveals the originality of each of the poets whose poems are analyzed in the work. The author concludes that modern poetry gives traditional antinomies personal psychological nature, but at the same time, problems and poetics of paradox are in tune with thinking of twentieth century as a whole - with its disastrous spirit, full of doubt and contradiction. (shrink)

This is a philosophical investigation of the nature of the limits of thought. Drawing on recent developments in the field of logic, Graham Priest shows that the description of such limits leads to contradiction, and argues that these contradictions are in fact veridical. Beginning with an analysis of the way in which these limits arise in pre-Kantian philosophy, Priest goes on to illustrate how the nature of these limits was theorised by Kant and Hegel. He offers new interpretations of Berkeley's (...) master argument for idealism and Kant on the antimonies. He explores the paradoxes of self reference, and provides a unified account of the structure of such paradoxes. The book concludes by tracing the theme of the limits of thought in modern philosophy of language, including discussions of the ideas of Wittgenstein and Derrida. (shrink)

This paper argues that Kierkegaard is not an irrationalist, but a "responsible fideist." Responsible fideism attempts to answer two important philosophical questions: "Are there limits to reason?" and "How can the limits of reason be recognized?" Kierkegaard's account of the incarnation as "the absolute paradox" does not see the incarnation as a logical contradiction, but rather functions in a way similar to a Kantian antimony. Faith in the incarnation both helps us recognize the limits of reason and also to a (...) degree overcomes those limits. /// O artigo defende que Kierkegaard não é um irracionalista, mas antes um "fideísta responsável". Como tal, o "fideísmo responsável" tenta responder a duas questões fllosóficas particularmente importantes: "Existem limites para a razão?" e "Como podem os limites da razão ser reconhecidos?" Na sua interpretação da incarnação como "paradoxo absoluto", Kierkegaard não interpreta a incarnação como uma contradição lógica, mas antes a vê funcionando de um modo similar à antinomia kantiana. Fé na incarnação ajuda-nos não só a reconhecer os limites da razão, mas também nos ajuda, pelo menos até um certo ponto, a ultrapassar estes limites. (shrink)

I argue that incomprehensibility (what the ancient skeptics called acatalepsia) plays a central role in the skepticism of both Bayle and Hume. I challenge a commonly held view (recently argued by Todd Ryan) that Hume, unlike Bayle, does not present oppositions of reason--what Kant called antimonies.

Concerned with topics at the heart of Kant's aesthetics, this provoking reading of The Critique of Judgement focuses on often misunderstood or neglected themes. Starting from the issues of the truth and justifiability of our critical assertions, Anthony Savile develops Kantian theory broadly across the arts, and shows it working with subtlety and rigour in cases as diverse as music and architecture. New light is thrown on the exemplary necessity of our aesthetic pleasures, on the Antimony of Taste, on the (...) distinction between free and dependent beauty, on the supposed idealism of taste, and on the a priori limits of fine art. Eminently subjective material is here given a place in Kant's overall idealism in a sophisticated discussion that will invite the close attention of Kant scholars and aestheticians alike. (shrink)

Le renouveau d'intérêt, parmi les catholiques, pour la réflexion sur le phénomène de la dogmatisation est aisément compréhensible, dû en particulier au choc que fut, à l'époque moderniste, la prise de conscience de la réelle historicité des dogmes. L'œcuméniste catholique ne peut ignorer ces questionnements relatifs à la genèse, à la portée et aux fonctions des dogmes, même s'il ne les prend pas en charge directement et même si sa tâche est de participer à la guérison des ruptures survenues dans (...) la communion ecclésiale. Cependant sa démarche peut avoir un réel intérêt réflexif. Dans le difficile débat épistémologique actuel sur la dogmatisation et sur l'interprétation des dogmes, l'article d'H. Legrand, tout en s'abstenant d'ajouter aux théorisations existantes et en se référant à des interprétations en cours, privilégie l'une d'entre elles comme étude de cas, non sans prendre acte de l'antinomie, souvent vivement perçue, entre la logique œcuménique, si tard venue à la conscience catholique, et la logique dogmatique qui a dominé presque toute l'histoire du christianisme d'Orient et d'Occident.The renewed interest among Catholics in reflecting on the phenomenon of dogmatization is easily understandable. This is especially due to the shock brought about in the modernist period by the realization of the actual historicity of dogmas. Catholic ecumenists cannot ignore these questions about the genesis, scope and functions of dogmas, even if they do not take charge of them directly and their task is rather to help heal the ruptures that have occurred in ecclesial communion. Nevertheless, their approach may be of genuine interest for thought. In today's difficult epistemological debate over dogmatization and the interpretation of dogmas, the article of H. Legrand, while refraining from adding to existing theories and referring to current interpretations, shows a preference for one of them as a case study and notes the often vividly perceived antimony between ecumenical logic, which came only late to Catholic consciousness, and dogmatic logic, which dominated almost the whole history of Western and Eastern Christianity. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to introduce the reader to some intellectual origins of Simone Weil’s philosophy through a summary of and comment on her Lectures on Philosophy given when she was a teacher at a girls’ school at Roanne in the Loire region of central France. The article provides a comment on Simone Weil’s Lectures on Philosophy. There is a brief Introduction followed by a summary of Weil’s life which indicates her various interest as a religious thinker, mystic, (...) anarchist, and political activist and some of the important academic commentaries on these aspects of her life and work. The source of the Lectures on Philosophy edited by her pupil Anne Reynaud-Guérithault is then discussed followed by a detailed summary of and comment on the Lectures themselves. They are grouped under five headings which are considered in turn. These are: The materialist point of view; after the discovery of mind; politics and social theory; ethics and aesthetics; miscellaneous topics and essay plans. There is a further discussion of Simone Weil’s later philosophical thought which shows that what she published reveals classical learning and intellectual quality, but also the several antimonies with which she struggled in her thinking, the two major influences on her thought being Ancient Greece and Christianity. There is a short Conclusion and Bibliography. (shrink)

ABSTRACTWhile the emergence of a new scientific culture in 16th-century Europe is well known, the role of the actors of the Hispanic New World in this time of renewal of knowledge has long been judged marginal for two reasons: first, because the strong presence of the Inquisition in the Hispanic World has been considered by historians to have been an obstacle for research or scientific innovation; and second, because the discontinuity of the territories of the Hispanic Monarchy and the problem (...) of distances between Spain and the New World have long been interpreted in ways that suggest the marginality and peripheral status of the American colonies. However, some works counterbalance this dismissal and shed new light on the scientific activity of the Hispanic New World. This is the case with the treatise Arte de los Metales, by the secular priest Alvaro Alonso Barba, which would achieve remarkable fame and circulation, and would become a seminal work in the fields of metallurgy and mining until the mid-1700s. The article demonstrates that this treatise also presents ideas that can be traced back to a set of Paracelsian ideas combining alchemy, pharmacopoeia, and medicine, and studies specific examples of these ideas – the description of three fundamental substances as components of all matter, references to Epatica sulfuris, an oil capable of turning silver into gold and curing certain diseases; and the use of antimony – that together testify to the spread of the ideas of Basil Valentine and of Paracelsian influences. From this point of view, Arte de los Metales can be viewed as part of a tradition unexpectedly renewed by the author through many observations based on his own work in Peru and the discoveries he made thanks to alternative techniques. This demonstrates the richness and diversity of knowledge rooted in the New World, and links Alonso Barba’s scholarly activity to some of the great schools of thought that spanned the Early Modern European world. (shrink)

Surely [John R.] Searle must rely on a stable, formal conception of the point of view. He sets Las Meninas on a par with the antimony of the liar and the paradoxes of set theory. But nothing is an antimony or a paradox just because it seems so or just because it is confusing or difficult, even if it seems so to everyone. To deserve such a description, a thing must be, so to speak, intrinsically intractable, not merely resistant when (...) looked at in a particular way. If a man says "I do not believe I am alive," that would be odd, and it would be hard to understand just what he means, and it may even be hard or impossible to believe that he is telling the truth; but there is no antimony. If a man says "I am lying," then we have a primitive version of the antimony of the liar. Given the meaning of this utterance—and nothing else—there is no way to get a grip on it. If what the man says is true, then it's false; if what he says is false, then it's true. Joel Snyder, a practicing photographer, is associate professor of humanities and of art and design at the University of Chicago. His contributions to Critical Inquiry include "Photography, Vision, and Representation," written with Neil Walsh Allen , and "Picturing Vision" . Ted Cohen, associate professor of philosophy at the University of Chicago, has written on language, aesthetics, and taste. His previous contribution to Critical Inquiry, "Metaphor and the Cultivation of Intimacy," appeared in the Autumn 1978 issue. (shrink)

I examine chapters I and II of the Dialectic of Pure Practical Reason from the Critique of Practical Reason, to show that Kant resolved the antimony of practical reason by first giving an accurate representation of the cause of a properly moral act and then recognizing that this accurate representation raised further problems, problems that were anticipated by Rousseau, especially in his Reveries of a Solitary Walker. Rousseau’s reveries allowed Kant to explore, and to some extent overcome, the darker implications (...) of their common understanding of virtue. In the second Critique this takes the form of explaining how one can understand and existentially achieve one’s own satisfaction based on contentment with oneself rather than enjoyment. (shrink)

This paper concentrates on the possible segregation of indium and gallium and competitive segregation of gallium and indium at atomically flat parallel {111}-oriented Cu-MnO interfaces. The segregation of gallium at Cu-MnO interfaces after introduction of gallium in the copper matrix of internally oxidized Cu-1 at.% Mn could be hardly detected with energy-dispersive spectrometry in a field emission gun transmission electron microscope. After a heat treatment to dissolve indium in the copper matrix, gallium has a weak tendency to segregate, that is (...) 2.5 at.% Ga per monolayer at the interface compared with 2 at.% in the copper matrix. The striking result is that this gallium segregation is observable because it does not occur at the metal side of the interface but in the first two monolayers at the oxide side. Using the same heat treatment as for introducing indium in the sample, but without indium present, gallium segregates strongly at the oxide side of the Cu-MnO interface with a concentration of about 14.3 at.% in each monolayer of the two. In contrast, the presence of gallium has no influence on the segregation of indium towards Cu-MnO interfaces, because the outermost monolayer at the metal side of the interface contains 17.6 at.% In, that is similar to previously found results. This leads to the intriguing conclusions, firstly, that, in contrast with antimony and indium, gallium segregates at the oxide side of the interface and, secondly, that the presence of indium strongly hampers gallium segregation. The results from analytical transmission electron microscopy on gallium segregation are supported by high-resolution transmission electron microscopy observations. (shrink)

Agnosticism has been largely passed over in the literature on Theism. This paper lays out an affirmative case for the agnostic position. Tapping into the classical arguments about the paradoxical qualities of ‘omni’ principles it argues that the agnostic position is ultimately more tenable than either Theism or Atheism. In the first part it regards the paradoxes of omnipotence and their replies strictly logically, declaring them to be true antimonies. In the second part it argues that classic arguments for (...) belief before proof run afoul of additional paradoxes and require the rejection of the most basic logical principles to accept. (shrink)

One’s first impression is that Brouwer’s Continuity Theorem of intuitionistic analysis, that every total, real-valued function of a real variable is continuous, stands in straightforward contradiction to a simple theorem of conventional real analysis, that there are discontinuous, real-valued func­tions. Here we argue that, despite philosophical views to the contrary, first impressions are not misleading; the Brouwer Theorem, together with its proof, presents mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics with an antimony, one that can only be resolved by a close, foundational (...) study of the structure of the intuitive continuum. (shrink)

One’s first impression is that Brouwer’s Continuity Theorem of intuitionistic analysis, that every total, real-valued function of a real variable is continuous, stands in straightforward contradiction to a simple theorem of conventional real analysis, that there are discontinuous, real-valued func­tions. Here we argue that, despite philosophical views to the contrary, first impressions are not misleading; the Brouwer Theorem, together with its proof, presents mathematicians and philosophers of mathematics with an antimony, one that can only be resolved by a close, foundational (...) study of the structure of the intuitive continuum. (shrink)

An ontology's theory of ontic predication has implications for the concomitant predicate logic. Remarkable in its analytic power for both ontology and logic is the here developed Particularized Predicate Logic (PPL), the logic inherent in the realist version of the doctrine of unit or individuated predicates. PPL, as axiomatized and proven consistent below, is a three-sorted impredicative intensional logic with identity, having variables ranging over individuals x, intensions R, and instances of intensions $R_{i}$ . The power of PPL is illustrated (...) by its clarification of the self-referential nature of impredicative definitions and its distinguishing between legitimate and illegitimate forms. With a wellmotivated refinement on the axiom of comprehension, PPL is, in effect, a higher-order logic without a forced stratification of predicates into types or the use of other ad hoc restrictions. The Russell-Priest characterization of the classic self-referential paradoxes is used to show how PPL diagnosis and solves these antimonies. A direct application of PPL is made to Grelling's Paradox. Also shown is how PPL can distinguish between identity and indiscernibility. (shrink)

Agnosticism has been largely passed over in the literature on Theism. This paper lays out an affirmative case for the agnostic position. Tapping into the classical arguments about the paradoxical qualities of ‘omni’ principles it argues that the agnostic position is ultimately more tenable than either Theism or Atheism. In the first part it regards the paradoxes of omnipotence and their replies strictly logically, declaring them to be true antimonies. In the second part it argues that classic arguments for (...) belief before proof run afoul of additional paradoxes and require the rejection of the most basic logical principles to accept. (shrink)

What is pedagogy, exactly? Merriam-Webster defines it simply as “the art, science, or profession of teaching.” In contemporary academic discourse, however, pedagogy is generally left undefined — with its apparent implicit meanings ranging anywhere from a specific “model for teaching” (e.g., behaviorist or progressivist instruction) to a broadly political philosophy of education in general (most famously, a “pedagogy of the oppressed”). In this paper, Norm Friesen and Hanno Su follow the Continental pedagogical tradition in giving pedagogy a general but explicit (...) definition. They do so by looking at how pedagogy arises both in everyday life and in school as unavoidably ethical activity undertaken primarily for the sake of the young person or child. Such activities, the authors maintain, are structured not so much by processes, methods, and outcomes, but by irresolvable oppositions and the tensions between them. They illustrate this inductively through a series of images and examples — moving gradually from ones involving parenting and early childhood to ones from elementary and secondary schooling. In this way, Friesen and Su show that pedagogy is not so much one or more ideologically focused or evidence-based instructional or psychological approaches to be mastered by a professional or teaching specialist. It is instead an independent but ethically informed practical perspective — one that can (and has) been extended to form a distinctively pedagogical theory and discipline. As such, it is something that is not only a part of our everyday life and culture, but arguably of all human cultures. (shrink)

ArgumentHans Egede (1686–1758), the famous missionary and natural historian in Greenland, was one of very few known Norwegian alchemists. This article seeks to place Egede’s alchemy in the context of the European alchemical tradition by identifying his sources in alchemical literature. Through an analysis of Egede’s account of an alchemical experiment performed by him in 1727, Ole Borch, Johann Joachim Becher, and Michael Sendivogius are identified as his main sources. Egede’s procedure and choice of materials are shown to be based (...) on texts by these authors. The article argues that Egede’s alchemical interest was more pervasive than hitherto understood, through the demonstration of connections between his alchemical studies and his work as a natural historian. Further it is argued that Egede’s alchemy was not unique or anachronistic but exemplifies the continued belief in and practice of transmutational alchemy in Denmark-Norway in the early decades of the eighteenth century. (shrink)

The objective of this paper is to provide a critical analysis of the Kantian notion of freedom (especially the problem of the third antinomy and its resolution in the critique of pure reason); its significance in the contemporary debate on free-will and determinism, and the possibility of autonomy of artificial agency in the Kantian paradigm of autonomy. Kant's resolution of the third antinomy by positing the ground in the noumenal self resolves the problem of antinomies; however, invites an explanatory gap (...) between phenomenality and the noumenal self; even if he has successfully established the compatibility of natural causality and non-natural causality through his transcendental argument. This paper is also devoted to establishing the plausibility of the knowledge claim that Kantian reduction of phenomenality has served half of the purpose of the AI scientists on the possibility of Artificial Autonomous Agency. (shrink)

To prepare the reader for Schiller’s ideal of freedom, Miller devotes his first chapter to an examination of Kant’s conception of moral freedom. Miller contends that Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason was already concerned with establishing the foundation for moral freedom, and he rejects Heine’s interpretation that the Critique of Practical Reason was an afterthought, a hastily added supplement written to ease Kant’s moral conscience by compensating for the first Critique. Miller observes that it appears that Kant did (...) not hold to his beliefs because of evidence, but rather sought evidence for his beliefs—in this case evidence for his abiding belief in moral freedom. To demonstrate Kant’s intention to defend moral freedom even in the first Critique, he appeals first to Kant’s claim there that freedom cannot be saved if appearances are things-in-themselves, and then to his efforts to develop the distinction between phenomena and noumena so as to allow for the exercise of moral freedom. Thus, by referring natural causality to phenomena and free causality to noumena, Kant in the first Critique had demonstrated the possibility of moral freedom in his resolution of the third antimony. Then too, in the first Critique the failure of speculative reason to trace effects to an original cause suggested the idea of a free intelligible cause operating outside the series of cause and effect. Also, already in the first Critique Kant had introduced the idea of a ‘will’ which resists the tendency of man’s sensuous inclinations to determine his actions. Furthermore, Miller reminds us that Kant in the second Critique makes frequent references to his theory of knowledge which he regards as important also for practical reason and freedom, and that Kant in the preface to the second Critique proclaims that the idea of freedom ‘forms the keystone of the whole building of a system of pure, even of speculative reason …’. Miller endorses the notion that Kant’s consistent aim was to preserve the ‘proper dignity’ of the idea of freedom by removing it from the field of possible knowledge. (shrink)

The tragedy of heterosexuality is this: modern straightness dooms once-hopeful, loving couples to share dull, frustrating, and lonely lives together. After all, men are from Mars, women are from Venus, and what’s a heterosexual to do about it? Against this dismal state of affairs, Jane Ward’s The Tragedy of Heterosexuality offers a scholarly, empathetic intervention from the perspective of queer culture. Ward’s book reveals that the titular tragedy is rooted in the misogynistic ideology permeating straight culture, according to which women (...) are at once objects of desire and derision. In a culture animated by this antimony, women and men are very different creatures and, by the same token, they are bound to struggle... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 44.2 (2006) 321-322 [Access article in PDF] Thomas Holden, The Architecture of Matter: Galileo to Kant. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2004. Pp. x + 305. Cloth $74.00. Most scholars believe that the problem of infinite divisibility that plagued early modern natural philosophy was an entirely mathematical issue and, therefore, resulted from the short-comings of early modern mathematics. Accordingly, advances in geometry, topology and the (...) logic of infinity are often thought to lay this debate to rest, thereby reducing it to some quaint footnote in the history of natural philosophy. Thomas Holden, however, through thorough textual and philosophical analysis, convincingly argues that this debate was more metaphysical in nature than previously supposed. He shows how the various paradoxes concerning the structure of matter stem from two widely-accepted theses central to the new science. The first resulted from the early modern method of applying the principles of geometry to physics. This geometrical method dictated that bodies are metaphysically divisible (m-divisible) in infinitum, because they occupy regions of space that can, at least by the power of God, be subdivided into those parts occupying corresponding sub-regions of space, and those sub-parts into those sub-sub-parts occupying their respective corresponding sub-sub-regions of space in infinitum. The other thesis is that "the parts of material bodies are each concrete existents in their own right" (3). Such actual parts exist prior to any act of division, whereas parts that are only potential would not exist prior to division but only after a divisive act has occurred. Holden argues that the actual parts doctrine was a metaphysical thesis just as fundamental to Enlightenment natural philosophers as the geometrization of matter. Indeed, it is these two theses that came into conflict and gave rise to a plethora of antimonies at the heart of the new science.Holden should be applauded for the skill he employs in challenging the received scholarship. In chapter 1, after some historical and terminological preliminaries, Holden reconstructs several of the more popular paradoxes of material structure found throughout the period's vast literature and successfully shows how these paradoxes would not arise if the problems of material structure were merely mathematical. He shows how the metaphysical doctrine of actual parts gave rise to these difficulties because of its conflict with the assumed geometrical doctrine that extension is infinitely m-divisible. For example, some thought it followed from the actual parts doctrine that there must be an actual infinity of parts, because actual parts exist prior to any process of division and, therefore, in order for both actual parts and infinite m-divisibility to be true, there must be an actual infinity of parts. This raised issues about the intelligibility and piety of an actual infinite as well as issues about equal and unequal infinities, e.g., half an infinite number of parts would still be infinite but half as much as the whole collection of parts. Hence, this and other paradoxes would not arise in the absence of the actual parts doctrine, and so the debate is more metaphysical in nature than previously supposed. [End Page 321]Chapter 2 examines in more detail the actual parts metaphysic and how it leads to tension with infinite m-divisibility. Chapter 3 examines various "short-circuit" arguments designed to undermine the actual parts doctrine. And chapter 4 examines the actual parts doctrine via the argument from composition found in Kant's pre-critical work, Physical Monadology. In chapter 5, Holden briefly examines the potential parts doctrine and how some actual-parts partisans tried to undermine it. It is eventually concluded that actual-parts and potential-parts advocates are at an impasse due to the question-begging nature of their respective arguments. Finally, chapter 6 is "something of an addendum" (74), since it examines a fascinating synthesis of the two conflicting positions, viz. the Kant-Boscovich force-shell atom theory.Given that the book is about material structure, it is a propos that my critical comment is about the structure of the book. It seems... (shrink)