Abstract

To prepare the reader for Schiller’s ideal of freedom, Miller devotes his first chapter to an examination of Kant’s conception of moral freedom. Miller contends that Kant in the Critique of Pure Reason was already concerned with establishing the foundation for moral freedom, and he rejects Heine’s interpretation that the Critique of Practical Reason was an afterthought, a hastily added supplement written to ease Kant’s moral conscience by compensating for the first Critique. Miller observes that it appears that Kant did not hold to his beliefs because of evidence, but rather sought evidence for his beliefs—in this case evidence for his abiding belief in moral freedom. To demonstrate Kant’s intention to defend moral freedom even in the first Critique, he appeals first to Kant’s claim there that freedom cannot be saved if appearances are things-in-themselves, and then to his efforts to develop the distinction between phenomena and noumena so as to allow for the exercise of moral freedom. Thus, by referring natural causality to phenomena and free causality to noumena, Kant in the first Critique had demonstrated the possibility of moral freedom in his resolution of the third antimony. Then too, in the first Critique the failure of speculative reason to trace effects to an original cause suggested the idea of a free intelligible cause operating outside the series of cause and effect. Also, already in the first Critique Kant had introduced the idea of a ‘will’ which resists the tendency of man’s sensuous inclinations to determine his actions. Furthermore, Miller reminds us that Kant in the second Critique makes frequent references to his theory of knowledge which he regards as important also for practical reason and freedom, and that Kant in the preface to the second Critique proclaims that the idea of freedom ‘forms the keystone of the whole building of a system of pure, even of speculative reason …’. Miller endorses the notion that Kant’s consistent aim was to preserve the ‘proper dignity’ of the idea of freedom by removing it from the field of possible knowledge.