In this paper we propose a mechanism in the brain for supporting consciousness. We leave open the question of the origin of consciousness itself, although an acausal origin is suggested since it should mesh with the proposed quasi-acausal network dynamics. In particular, we propose simply that fixed-point attractors, such as exemplified by the simple deterministic Hopfield network, correspond to conscious moments. In a sort of dual to Tononi's Integrated Information Theory, we suggest that the "main experience" corresponds to (...) a dominant fixed point that incorporates sub-networks that span the brain and maximizes "relatedness." The dynamics around the dominant fixed point correspond in some parts of the system to associative memory dynamics, and to more binding constraint satisfaction dynamics in other areas. Since the memories that we are familiar with appear to have a conscious origin, it makes sense that a conscious moment itself corresponds in effect to what amounts to memory recollection. Furthermore, since Hopfield-like networks are generative, a conscious moment can in effect be seen as a living, partially predicted memory. Another primary motivation for this approach is that alternative states can be naturally sensed, or contrasted, at the fixed points. (shrink)

A fair amount of recent scholarship has been concerned with correcting a supposedly wrong, but wide-spread, assessment of the consequences of the empirical falsification of Bell-type inequalities. In particular, it has been claimed that Bell-type inequalities follow from “locality tout court” without additional assumptions such as “realism” or “hidden variables”. However, this line of reasoning conflates restrictions on the spatio-temporal relation between causes and their effects (“locality”) and the assumption of a cause for every event (“causality”). It thus fails to (...) recognize a substantial restriction of the class of theories that is falsified through Bell-type inequalities. (shrink)

Amongst the entities that have been created by human agents, and can be changed by human agents, besides concrete particulars, such as tables and chairs, our intuitions suggest that there are repeatables—entities that can each have multiple concrete instances. And since there is reason to think that repeatables are acausal, there is reason to think that that there are entities that are created, changeable, repeatable and acausal. Then again, it might be supposed that if an entity is created (...) then it is causal, and that if an entity is changed then it is causal. It is argued here that these suppositions are insufficiently motivated to undermine the case for the existence of entities that are created, changeable, repeatable and acausal. (shrink)

This book is parapsychological study of the meaningful coincidence of events, extrasensory perception, and similar phenomena.

Jung was intrigued from early in his career with coincidences, especially those surprising juxtapositions that scientific rationality could not adequately explain. He discussed these ideas with Albert Einstein before World War I, but first used the term "synchronicity" in a 1930 lecture, in reference to the unusual psychological insights generated from consulting the I Ching. A long correspondence and friendship with the Nobel Prize-winning physicist Wolfgang Pauli stimulated a final, mature statement of Jung's thinking on synchronicity, originally published in 1952 (...) and reproduced here. Together with a wealth of historical and contemporary material, this essay describes an astrological experiment Jung conducted to test his theory. Synchronicity reveals the full extent of Jung's research into a wide range of psychic phenomena. This paperback edition of Jung's classic work includes a new foreword by Sonu Shamdasani, Philemon Professor of Jung History at University College London. (shrink)

En su artículo titulado Weimar Culture; Causality and Quantum Theory,1918-1927: Adaptation by German Physicists to a Hostile IntellectualEnvironment, Paul Forman intentó dibujar una historia de la vieja mecánicacuántica según la cual la influencia cultural de la época resultó determinanteen la introducción, aceptación y asimilación de la acausalidad en esta teoría.Estas afirmaciones conocidas como las tesis de Forman, son puestas enperspectiva historiográfica, es decir, desde el panorama ofrecido por lastensiones propias de la historiografía y la filosofía de la ciencia contemporá-nea se (...) perfila su importancia. Se argumenta que el dilema del determinismoes central en esta discusión y finalmente se presenta una breve revisióncrítica de las tesis de Forman revelando sus principales debilidades. (shrink)

Indeed, this is the first serious book-length study of the subject by a philosopher of science.

Focusing on spacetime singularities, Earman engages with a host of foundational issues at the intersection of science and philosophy, ranging from the big bang to the possibility of time travel.

For much of this century, philosophers hoped that Einstein’s general theory of relativity would play the role of physician to philosophy. Its development would positively influence the philosophy of methodology and confirmation, and its ontology would answer many traditional philosophical debates—for example, the issue of spacetime substantivalism. In physics, by contrast, the attitude is increasingly that GTR itself needs a physician. The more we learn about GTR the more we discover how odd are the spacetimes that it allows. Not only (...) does GTR permit singularities, naked and clothed, but it allows time travel, topology change, and event and particle horizons, to name but a few of these oddities. Rather than revel in the riches of the theory, however, many physicists seek to rule out one or more of the above “pathologies” on the grounds that they are “physically unreasonable.” Thus contemporary researchers hawk various “cures” for the “illnesses” of GTR: among them, Chronology Protection to ensure against time travel, Cosmic Censorship for naked singularities, Inflation for horizons, and so on. The physics of these illnesses and cures, and the problems they engender, are the source of much controversy in the physics literature. Philosophers have largely neglected it. But clearly the subject needs philosophers of physics to determine whether the patient is genuinely ailing, and if so, to sift the real antidotes from the snake oil. (shrink)

We articulate the problems posed by the quantum liar experiment (QLE) for backwards causation interpretations of quantum mechanics, time-symmetric accounts and other dynamically oriented local hidden variable theories. We show that such accounts cannot save locality in the case of QLE merely by giving up “lambda-independence.” In contrast, we show that QLE poses no problems for our acausal Relational Blockworld interpretation of quantum mechanics, which invokes instead adynamical global constraints to explain Einstein–Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) correlations and QLE. We make the (...) case that the acausal and adynamical perspective is more fundamental and that dynamical entities obeying dynamical laws are emergent features grounded therein. (shrink)

This dissertation may be conveniently divided into four principal parts. Following a brief overview of the dissertation as a whole , in the first part , I examine several fundamental problems that are peculiar to extant theories of autonomy and free agency. In the second part , I introduce and defend a basic version of the Theory of Middle Freedom---a unified, composite, acausal theory of free agency. I argue that this theory's virtues include its providing inter alia a method (...) for resolving the demarcation problem, a satisfactory solution to the problem of identification, a novel account of action control in an indeterminist framework, a plausible account of compatibilist free action, and a way of unifying within a single conceptual framework the three dominant theories of free agency that are found in the historical and contemporary philosophical literature, viz. simple indeterminism, agent-causal libertarianism, and compatibilism. In the third part , I outline the rudiments of a non-standard theory of counterpossibles by which the basic Theory of Middle Freedom may be extended. Then, in the fourth part , I apply both the basic theory and this extended theory to outstanding problems in philosophical theology involving the nature of divine freedom, the existence of evil, and the metaphysics of divine providential governance. I conclude by making some brief closing remarks. (shrink)

We investigate Kerr–Newman black holes in which a rotating charged ring-shaped singularity induces a region which contains closed timelike curves (CTCs). Contrary to popular belief, it turns out that the time orientation of the CTC is oppo- site to the direction in which the singularity or the ergosphere rotates. In this sense, CTCs “counter-rotate” against the rotating black hole. We have similar results for all spacetimes sufficiently familiar to us in which rotation induces CTCs. This motivates our conjecture that perhaps (...) this counter-rotation is not an accidental oddity particular to Kerr–Newman spacetimes, but instead there may be a general and intuitively comprehensible reason for this. (shrink)

Quantum theorists silently slaughter cats in tightly closed boxes. For matters of consistency, general relativists prefer family affairs instead. They travel back in time to murder their grandfathers before they themselves were born. John Earman’s new book brings good news for the elder generation: Grandfathers do not figure so prominently in a critical account of general relativity that any such experiment will ever pass an ethics commission.

General theories are reductionist explications of apparently independent facts. Here, in reviewing the literature, I develop a GT to simplify the cluttered landscape of cancer therapy targets by revealing they cluster parsimoniously according to only a few underlying principles. The first principle is that targets can be only exploited by either or both of two fundamentally different approaches: causality-inhibition, and ‘acausal’ recognition of some marker or signature. Nonetheless, each approach must achieve both of two separate goals, efficacy and selectivity (...) ; if the mechanisms are known, this provides a definition of rational treatment. The second principle is target fragmentation, whereby the target may perform up to three categoric functions, potentially mediated by physically different target molecules, even on different cell types, or circulating freely. This GT remains incomplete until the minimal requirements for cure, or alternatively, proof that cure is impossible, become predictable. A reductionist General Theory of Cancer Targets is presented, proposing that all good targets are based either on causality-inhibition, or recognition; essential tasks emerge differently in each case. Sophisticated hybrids may provide additional benefit. General theory analysis, including target fragmentation concepts, provides deeper insights into therapeutic mechanisms. (shrink)

The author demonstrates that despite of belonging to different philosophical traditions C.G. Jung and N.O. Lossky concluded that everything in the Universe is connected by some fundamental acausal principle. This connecting principle cannot be described by means of classical spatial-temporal paradigm. Jung names such principle ‘synchronicity’, Lossky – ‘gnoseological coordination’. According to Jung, synchronicity is a modern interpretation of the ancient idea of sympathy, which is most fully and consistently represented in G.W. Leibniz’s doctrine of the pre-established harmony. The (...) key parameters of synchronicity are its spaceless and timeless nature. This fact, as Jung suggested, allows give a rational explanation of parapsychological phenomena. Like Jung, Lossky relied on Leibniz’s ideas. However, in spite of the fact that the principle of gnoseological coordination also describes the acausal type of connection and makes it possible to explain parapsychological phenomena, its character is somewhat different from synchronicity. As the author shows, these differences are due to the fact that Jung was largely based on Kant's transcendentalism and took into account the difference between thing-in-itself and phenomena, while Lossky consistently stood on intuitivism. -/- В статье демонстрируется, что, несмотря на принадлежность к разным философским традициям, К.Г. Юнг и Н.О. Лосский пришли к похожим выводам об акаузальном характере взаимодействия всего сущего на фундаментальном уровне, который не может быть описан в привычных пространственно-временных параметрах. Для обозначения подобного акаузального вида связи Юнг вводит термин «синхронистичность», Лосский – термин «гносеологическая координация». По мнению Юнга, синхронистичность является современной интерпретацией древней идеи симпатии, которая наиболее полно и последовательно представлена в учении Г.В. Лейбница о принципе предустановленной гармонии. Ключевыми параметрами синхронистичности является её внепространственный и вневременной характер, что, как полагал Юнг, позволяет дать рациональное объяснение парапсихологическим феноменам. Как и Юнг, Лосский во многом опирался на идеи Лейбница. Однако, несмотря на то, что принцип гносеологической координации также описывает акаузальный вид связи и позволяет объяснить парапсихологические феномены, его характер несколько отличается от синхронистичности. Как показывает автор статьи, различия эти обусловлены тем, что Юнг в большей степени основывался на трансцендентализме и дискурсивизме Канта и принимал во внимание различие между вещами в себе и феноменами, в то время как Лосский последовательно выстраивал интуитивистскую систему. В заключении даётся ответ на вопрос, зачем Юнгу и Лосскому потребовалось постулирование акаузальных принципов связи. (shrink)

The legitimacy of going back to the classical view of God’s action in the world based on the list of causes and understanding of chance in the works of Aristotle and Aquinas – in the context of contemporary science – seems to depend on whether there is a space for causal analysis within the current models of scientific explanation. This article offers a brief account of the path leading to negation and rediscovery of the importance of causality in scientific explanation (...) and reintroduces the semicausal position of the prominent philosopher of science, Mario Bunge, who treats causation as one of several categories of determination. The diversity of the categories he lists finds analogy in the commonly accepted pluralist approach to the search of the model which adequately describes the practice of scientific research. What is more, the same diversity of the categories of determination opens the way back to the classical Aristotle’s fourfold account of causation and his understanding of chance. This fact allows us, in turn, to defend the contemporary version of the classical notion of divine action against the accusation of methodical error in the form of imposing the notion of the ancient categories of causality on the results of contemporary scientific research, which notion, as some maintain, has little in common with the models of explanation currently accepted in natural sciences. (shrink)

Many philosophers posit abstract entities – where something is abstract if it is acausal and lacks spatio-temporal location. Theories, types, characteristics, meanings, values and responsibilities are all good candidates for abstractness. Such things raise an epistemological puzzle: if they are abstract, then how can we have any epistemic access to how they are? If they are invisible, intangible and never make anything happen, then how can we ever discover anything about them? In this article, I critically examine epistemological objections (...) to belief in abstract objects offered by Paul Benacerraf, Colin Cheyne and Hartry Field. (shrink)

In this paper, I explore anomalous dualism about consciousness, a view that has not previously been explored in any detail. We can classify theories of consciousness along two dimensions: first, a theory might be physicalist or dualist; second, a theory might endorse any of the three following views regarding causal relations between phenomenal properties (properties that characterize states of our consciousness) and physical properties: nomism (the two kinds of property interact through deterministic laws), acausalism (they do not causally interact), and (...) anomalism (they interact but not through deterministic laws). I suggest that a kind of anomalous dualism, nonreductive anomalous panpsychism, promises to offer the best overall answer to two pressing issues for dualist views, the problem of mental causation and the mapping problem (the problem of predicting mind-body associations). (shrink)

A recent proposal by Norton (2003) to show that a simple Newtonian system can exhibit stochastic acausal behavior by giving rise to spontaneous movements of a mass on the dome of a certain shape is examined. We discuss the physical significance of an often overlooked and yet important Lipschitz condition the violation of which leads to the existence of anomalous nontrivial solutions in this and similar cases. We show that the Lipschitz condition is closely linked with the time reversibility (...) of certain solutions in Newtonian mechanics and the failure to incorporate this condition within Newtonian mechanics may unsurprisingly lead to physically impossible solutions that have no serious metaphysical implications. ‡I thank Steven Savitt of the Philosophy Department at the University of British Columbia for drawing my attention to the Lipschitz condition, and Alexei Cheviakov of the Mathematics Department at the University of British Columbia for useful discussions. †To contact the author, please write to: Department of Philosophy, University of British Columbia, Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z1, Canada; e-mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

Standard statistical measures of strength of association, although pioneered by Pearson deliberately to be acausal, nowadays are routinely used to measure causal efficacy. But their acausal origins have left them ill suited to this latter purpose. I distinguish between two different conceptions of causal efficacy, and argue that: 1) Both conceptions can be useful 2) The statistical measures only attempt to capture the first of them 3) They are not fully successful even at this 4) An alternative definition (...) more squarely based on causal thinking not only captures the second conception, it can also capture the first one better too. (shrink)

It has long been recognized that a local hidden variable theory of quantum mechanics can in principle be constructed, provided one is willing to countenance pre-measurement correlations between the properties of measured systems and measuring devices. However, this ‘conspiratorial’ approach is typically dismissed out of hand. In this article I examine the justification for dismissing conspiracy theories of quantum mechanics. I consider the existing arguments against such theories, and find them to be less than conclusive. I suggest a more powerful (...) argument against the leading strategy for constructing a conspiracy theory. Finally, I outline two alternative strategies for constructing conspiracy theories, both of which are immune to these arguments, but require one to either modify or reject the common cause principle. Introduction The incompleteness of quantum mechanics Hidden variables Hidden mechanism conspiracy theories Existing arguments against hidden mechanisms A new argument against hidden mechanisms Backwards-causal conspiracy theories Acausal conspiracy theories Conclusion. (shrink)

Are judgements and wishes reallybrain events (or brain states) which will be affirmedby a completed scientific account of how humanbehavior is caused? Materialists, other thaneliminativists, say Yes. But brain events do notcause muscle contractions, hence bodily movements,directly. They do so, if at all, by triggeringintermediate causes, viz. firings in motor nerves. Soit is crucial, this paper argues, whether they arecharacterized as biological events –performances of naturally-selected-for operations – orinstead as complex microphysical events. ``Acauses B, B causes C, so A causes (...) C'' is defensible forbiological brain events, but fails for microphysical ones. (shrink)

It has been suggested that certain problems may be unsolvable because of the mind's cognitive structure, but we may wonder what problems, and exactly why. The ultimate origin of the universe and the mind-body problem seem to be two such problems. As to why, Colin McGinn has argued that the mind-body problem is unsolvable because any theoretical concepts about the brain will be observation-based and unable to connect to unobservable subjective experience. McGinn's argument suggests a requirement of imagability -- an (...) observation basis -- for physical causal explanation that cannot be met for either of these problems. Acausal descriptions may be possible but not the causal analyses that provide the greatest explanatory satisfaction, a psychological phenomenon that seems tied to the strength of the underlying observation basis but is affected by other factors as well. (shrink)

We investigate the applicability of Hegerfeldts arguments on Quantum nonlocality in Quantum Electrodynamics following the work of Prigogine, Pronko, Petrosky, Ordonez and Karpov. We demonstrate the appearance of nonlocal effects at the level of quantum states. We show, however that the expectation values of some observables spread causally. Therefore the measurement of the nonlocality is questionable. We investigate an approach to classical measurement and conclude that the classical measurement cannot detect the “acausal” effects of the non-locality.

Merleau-Ponty’s appropriation of Gestalt theory in The Structure of Behavior is central to his entire corpus. Yet commentators exhibit little agreement about what lesson is to be learned from his critique, and provide little exegesis of how his argument proceeds. I fill this exegetical gap. I show that the Gestaltist’s fundamental error is to reify forms as transcendent realities, rather than treating them as phenomena of perceptual consciousness. From this, reductivist errors follow. The essay serves not only as a helpful (...) guide through parts of The Structure of Behavior for newcomers, but also offers a corrective to recent trends in philosophy of mind. Such influential commentators as Hubert Dreyfus, Taylor Carmen, and Evan Thompson have, I argue, risked serious misunderstanding of Merleau-Ponty’s view, by mistakenly treating “circular causality” as central to Merleau-Ponty’s own acausal view of forms. -/- [The version archived at Philpapers is closer to the author's preferred format. Formatting requirements in the published version make the section/subsection hierarchy needlessly difficult to follow. There are some changes to content in the published version. Please cite only the published version.]. (shrink)

Amid all the talk about the "Collective Unconscious" and other sexy issues, most readers are likely to miss the fact that C.G. Jung was a good Kantian. His famous theory of Synchronicity, "an acausal connecting principle," is based on Kant 's distinction between phenomena and things-in-themselves and on Kant 's theory that causality will not operate among thing-in-themselves the way it does in phenomena. Thus, Kant could allow for free will among things-in-themselves, as Jung allows for synchronicity. Next to (...) Kant, Jung is close to. (shrink)

Do Hume and Kant hold strongly divergent views about the causal principle, viz. the principle that every event or change of state in nature must have a cause? It has traditionally been held that they do, and on the ground that while Hume claims that there is no justification for the principle’s acceptance, Kant claims that the principle can be shown to be necessary for the possibility of experience. However, I argue that, on Hume’s account of how we come to (...) believe in the existence of external objects, it is not possible for us to perceive any external object that is changing its state randomly or acausally. Accordingly, Hume is no position to deny that the causal principle can be justified, given he acknowledges, like Kant, that we do believe ourselves capable of perceiving events, or changes of state, in nature. Equally, Kant is no position to claim to have answered Hume’s scepticism about the causal principle given he acknowledges, like Hume, that the objects of the senses are, in reality, merely appearances and not things in themselves. (shrink)

In classical electrodynamics, electromagnetic effects are calculated from solution of wave equation formed by combination of four Maxwell’s equations. However, along with retarded solution, this wave equation admits advanced solution in which case the effect happens before the cause. So, to preserve causality in natural events, the retarded solution is intentionally chosen and the advance part is just ignored. But, an equation or method cannot be called fundamental if it admits a wrong result (that violates principle of causality) in addition (...) to the correct result. Since it is the Maxwell’s form of equations that gives birth to this acausal advanced potential, we rewrite these equations in a different form using the recent theory of reaction at a distance (Biswaranjan Dikshit, Physics essays, 24(1), 4-9, 2011) so that the process of calculation does not generate any advanced effects. Thus, the long-standing causality problem in electrodynamics is solved. (shrink)

Proponents of two axioms of biological evolutionary theory have attempted to find justification by reference to nonequilibrium thermodynamics. One states that biological systems and their evolutionary diversification are physically improbable states and transitions, resulting from a selective process; the other asserts that there is an historically constrained inherent directionality in evolutionary dynamics, independent of natural selection, which exerts a self-organizing influence. The first, the Axiom of Improbability, is shown to be nonhistorical and thus, for a theory of change through time, (...) acausal. Its perception of the improbability of living states is at least partially an artifact of closed system thinking. The second, the Axiom of Historically Determined Inherent Directionality, is supported evidentially and has an explicit historical component. Historically constrained dynamic populations are inherently nonequilibrium systems. It is argued that living, evolving systems, when considered to be historically constrained nonequilibrium systems, do not appear improbable at all. Thus, the two axioms are not compatible. Instead, the Axiom of Improbability is considered to result from an unjustified attempt to extend the contingent proximal actions of natural selection into the area of historical, causal explanations. It is thus denied axiomatic status, and the effects of natural selection are subsumed as an additional level of constraint in an evolutionary theory derived from the Axiom of Historically Determined Inherent Directionality. (shrink)

This wide ranging discourse covers many disciplines of science and the human condition in an attempt to fully understand the manifestation of time. Time's Paradigm is, at its inception, a philosophical debate between the theories of 'Presentism' and 'The Block Model', beginning with a pronounced psychological analysis of 'free will' in an environment where the past and the future already exist. It lays the foundation for the argument that time is a cyclical, contained progression, rather than a meandering voyage into (...) infinity, bringing into question the validity of a commensurate 'Big Bang'. Following, the proposal widens to encompass physics. It tackles clock rates and time dilation, acausality and the nuisance of a universal clock, and demonstrates that conscious consideration creates the present moment - time's flow - separating the solid state past and future whose reality is devoid of space. Arguments relating to Quantum Physics theory, including the Uncertainty Principle and a Superposition of States, lend credibility to key areas involving cognitive awareness. It is posited that defined points in time and space prohibit progress in linear models for progression. Thus motile paradoxes can be resolved with the absence of infinities; temporal perception, it is concluded, being the result of uncertainty. Time's Paradigm takes the bold step of asking us to consider a tangible dimension of time, representing an intimate extension of our three, known spatial dimensions. Chaos theory is briefly introduced leading to the configuration of a fractal fourth dimension of time whose assumption demands only one direction of flow. Further, it asks whether our universe is expanding or contracting. It considers the simple physics of bodies contracting in a fourth dimension of time (UC), and how that marries comfortably with standard scientific models such as Special Relativity. The rate at which matter is contracting in the universe is illustrated in a reduction factor of 1.618... coinciding with Fibonacci's Ratio and countering Time Dilation. Lastly the more complex aspects of relativistic velocities are tackled together with the conundrum of Zero Velocity and The Speed of Light being attributes of the same event in Cyclical Space-Time, and ultimately, the prospect of superluminal velocities by interaction with parallel time-zones in a multi-layered block universe. (shrink)

We review the issues of nonseparability and seemingly acausal propagation of information in EPR, as displayed by experiments and the failure of Bell's inequalities. We show that global effects are in the very nature of the geometric structure of modern physical theories, occurring even at the classical level. The Aharonov-Bohm effect, magnetic monopoles, instantons, etc. result from the topology and homotopy features of the fiber bundle manifolds of gauge theories. The conservation of probabilities, a supposedly highly quantum effect, is (...) also achieved through global geometry equations. The EPR observables all fit in such geometries, and space-time is a truncated representation and is not the correct arena for their understanding. Relativistic quantum field theory represents the global action of the measurement operators as the zero-momentum (and therefore spatially infinitely spread) limit of their wave functions (form factors). We also analyze the collapse of the state vector as a case of spontaneous symmetry breakdown in the apparatus-observed state interaction. (shrink)

Multiple simultaneous independent discoveries, so well enunciated by Robert K. Merton in the early 1960s but already discussed for several hundreds of years, is a classic concept in the sociology of science. In this paper, the concept of multiple simultaneous independent errors is proposed, analyzed, and discussed. The concept of Selective Pessimistic Induction is proposed and used to connect MIDs with MIEs. Five types of MIEs are discussed: multiple errors in the interpretation of experimental data or computational results; multiple misjudgments (...) of the value of another’s research results or conclusions; multiple cases of false anticipation of achieving a certain experimental result; multiples of ignoring or omitting relevant precedents; and multiple instances of failure due to a not-yet-conceived scientific concept or principle. Causal MIDs and MIEs are those that can be traced directly to antecedent knowledge. Acausal MIDs and MIEs are those involving a consequential and identifiable leap from antecedent knowledge. Examples of causal and acausal MIEs are provided, mostly but not exclusively from the discipline of chemistry. Comparisons are made between MIDs and MIEs. Topics for future research are discussed and implications of these concepts are proposed. (shrink)

The existence of quantum correlates of consciousness (QCC) is doubtful from a scientific perspective. But even if their existence were verified, philosophical problems would remain. On the other hand, there could be more to QCC than meets the sceptic's eye: • QCC might be useful or even necessary for a better understanding of conscious experience or quantum physics or both. The main reasons for this are: the measurement problem (the nature of observation, the mysterious collapse of the wave function, etc.), (...) ostensibly shared features of quantum phenomena and conscious phenomena (e.g., complementarity, nonspatiality, acausality, spontaneity, and holism) and connections (ontology, causation, and knowledge), the qualia problem (subjectivity, explanatory gap etc.). But there are many problems, especially questions regarding realism and the nature and role of conscious observers; • QCC are conceptually challenging, because there are definitory problems and some crucial ontological and epistemological shortcomings. It is instructive to compare them with recent proposals for understanding neural correlates of consciousness (NCC). QCC are not sufficient for a quantum theory of mind, nor might they be necessary except perhaps in a very broad sense; • QCC are also empirically challenging. Nevertheless, QCC could be relevant and important for the mindbody problem: QCC might reveal features that are necessary at least for behavioral manifestations of human consciousness. But QCC are compatible with very different proposals for a solution of the mind-body problem. This seems to be both advantageous and detrimental. QCC restrict accounts of nomological identity. The discovery of QCC cannot establish a naturalistic theory of mind alone. But there are also problems with QCC in the framework of other ontologies. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:The Argument ofthe Natural History Mark Webb In the NaturalHistoryofReligion Hume claims there are two principal questions concerning religion: one "concerning its foundation in reason," and the other "concerning its origin in human nature." He forthrightly states that his concern here is to determine "[w]hat those principles are, which give rise to the original belief, and what those accidents and causes are, which direct its operation."1 That is to (...) say, his express intentis, via an empirically based study, to determine and elucidate the causal or natural origin of religion—its beliefs and practices. These are among his first remarks. Consider now his very last remarks: The whole is a riddle, an aenigma, an inexplicable mystery. Doubt, uncertainty, suspence of judgment appear the only result ofour most accurate scrutiny, concerning this subject. But such is the frailty of human reason, and such the irresistible contagion of opinion, that even this deliberate doubt could scarcely be upheld; did we not enlarge our view, and opposing one species ofsuperstition to another, set them a quarrelling; while we ourselves, during their fury and contention, happily make our escape, into the calm, though obscure, regions ofphilosophy. (NHR 4:363) These last remarks should strike one as enigmatic: for, given that his purported aim is to offer a naturalistic account ofwhy humans hold religious beliefs, it is strange that he should be content to end in mystery—particularly sosince theworkitselfonersaplausible account ofsuch origins. Still, even ifHume should have felt the project to have failed, what does that have to do with "suspense of judgment," "quarrelling superstitions," and especially his "happy escape"? But of course he is up to much more in the Natural History than he lets on. Indeed,he offersnotonly acausal accountofreligiousbeliefbutamoral critique ofitas well. Why shouldhe doboth in the same work? I suggest that the causal account and the moral critique are intimately connected; and that the work is first and foremost a moral critique intended to sever allegiance to "traditional religion"—traditional theism in general, and Christianityin particular. One aim ofthis paper Volume XVII Number 2 141 MARKWEBB is to offer a unified reading of the Natural History, while the other is to assess the cogency ofHume's project on this reading. To this end we should first situate the Natural History among Hume's other works. It follows the firstEnquiry which addresses inter alia the credibility of "revealed" religion (particularly section 10, "Of Miracles"), and the second Enquiry which advances a naturalistically based morality. It was completed about the time he began the Dialogues, the main contention ofwhich is that natural theology offers minimal if any support for most traditional religious claims. In the Natural History, then, it is reasonable to suppose he is assuming the cogency of his claims against revealed religion, the viability of a naturalistically based morality, and the utter inability of natural theology to ground either traditional religious tenets or morality. The Dialogues in particular illuminate Hume's thought: after concluding that a posteriori arguments offer absolutely no grounds for ascribing the traditional moral attributes to the Deity, Philo goes on to counter Cleanthes' claim—that "[r]eligion, however corrupted, is still better than noreligion atall"2—bycontendingthattraditional religion simply is unessential andeven harmful to the needs ofsociety. Hume advances his causal account because he believes both that traditional religion lacks any basis in reason, and that recourse to a supernatural origin is untenable. And it will become evident in the course of this paper that the Natural History is most accurately understood against the backdrop of his moral theory as expounded in the second Enquiry—indeed the former is an exercise in applied ethics. The Strategy ofthe Natural History The sceptical tone ofmany ofits passages should strike one as out of place. For the scepticism is directed not towards providing a causal account of the origin ofreligious beliefs and practices (the purported aim), but rather towards their plausibility. Yet one might well expect such passages if Hume is assuming that religion has no tenable basis in reason nor for its revelational claims, and that he intends the work to be more than merely a natural history—as indeed he does. Speaking of polytheism and the... (shrink)

Wesley Salmon defends an ontic realism that distinguishes explanatory from descriptive knowledge. Explanatory knowledge makes appeals to (unobservable) theoretical acausal mechanisms. Salmon presents an argument designed both to legitimize attributing truth values to theoretical claims and to justify treating theoretical claims as descriptions. The argument succeeds but only at the price of calling the distinction between explanation and description into question. Even if Salmon's attempts to distinguish causal mechanisms from other mechanisms are successful, the assumed centrality of the appeal (...) to such mechanisms in providing scientific explanations is left open by Salmon's account. (shrink)

Begins with a presentation and elaboration of Benacerraf's epistemic challenge to realism: how can we gain knowledge of an acausal world of non‐spatio‐temporal abstracts? I then outline a theory of perception based in part on neurological theories of Hebb and developmental evidence from Piaget, and I argue in these terms that we can, in fact, perceive sets of medium‐sized physical objects. This account of perception is elaborated into an account of physical and mathematical intuition, faculties that produce various rudimentary (...) beliefs that underlie the simplest physical and set theoretic assumptions. I conclude by comparing and contrasting this epistemology with some controversial passages from Gödel's writings. (shrink)

Traditional scientific views of the conscious self and world we live in are challenged by an unprecedented outburst of emerging new paradigms, theories of consciousness, perceptions of reality, new sciences, new philosophies, epistemologies, and a host of other transformative approaches. This still expanding outburst can be traced, on both logical and chronologic grounds, not to chaos theory, ecology, the new physics, or dozens of other currently ascribed sources, but rather to the cognitive (consciousness) revolution that immediately preceded. These new approaches (...) all share one key feature in common, namely, they all depend, directly or indirectly, upon a refutation and successful overthrow of the long dominant materialist paradigm. This is what was required to shift consciousness from an acausal or "eliminable" status to a functionally indispensable role. Traditional "bottom‐up" micro‐determinism had to be supplemented by a reciprocal, "top‐down" control exerted by mental emergents over lower‐level components. This does not dispose of behaviorism or reductionism, as methodology, but simply incorporates these within a more comprehensive explanatory framework. With the long reign of materialist constraints finally broken, other antireductive views have proliferated but with little regard for what the new paradigm allows. (shrink)

This paper responds to Colin Cheyne's new anti-platonist argument according to which knowledge of existential claims—claims of the form such-tmd-so exist—requires a caused connection with the given such-and-so. If his arguments succeed then nobody can know, or even justifiably believe, that acausal entities exist, in which case (standard) platonism is untenable. I argue that Cheyne's anti-platonist argument fails.

We argue that causal decision theory is no worse off than evidential decision theory in handling entanglement, regardless of one’s preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. In recent works, Ahmed and Ahmed and Caulton : 4315–4352, 2014) have claimed the opposite; we argue that they are mistaken. Bell-type experiments are not instances of Newcomb problems, so CDT and EDT do not diverge in their recommendations. We highlight the fact that a Causal Decision Theorist should take all lawlike correlations into account, including (...) potentially acausal entanglement correlations. This paper also provides a brief introduction to CDT with a motivating “small” Newcomb problem. The main point of our argument is that quantum theory does not provide grounds for favouring EDT over CDT. (shrink)

This contribution explores Wolfgang Pauli's idea that mind and matter are complementary aspects of the same reality. We adopt the working hypothesis that there is an undivided timeless primordial reality (the primordial 'one world'). Breaking its symmetry, we obtain a contextual description of the holistic reality in terms of two categorically different domains, one tensed and the other tenseless. The tensed domain includes, in addition to tensed time, nonmaterial processes and mental events. The tenseless domain refers to matter and physical (...) energy. This concept implies that mind cannot be reduced to matter, and that matter cannot be reduced to mind. The non-Boolean logical framework of modern quantum theory is general enough to implement this idea. Time is not taken to be an a priori concept, but an archetypal acausal order is assumed which can be represented by a one-parameter group of automorphisms, generating a time operator which parametrizes all processes, whether material or nonmaterial. The time-reversal symmetry is broken in the nonmaterial domain, resulting in a universal direction of time for the material domain as well. (shrink)

It is widely believed that (1) if theological determinism were true, in virtue of God’s role in determining created agents to perform evil actions, created agents would be neither free nor morally responsible for their evil actions and God would not be perfectly good; (2) if metaphysical compatibilism were true, the free-will defense against the deductive problem of evil would fail; and (3) on the assumption of metaphysical compatibilism, God could have actualized just any one of those myriad possible worlds (...) that are populated only by compatibilist free creatures. The primary thesis of this essay is that none of these propositions is true. This thesis is defended by appealing to a recently proposed novel, acausal, composite, unified theory of free action – the Theory of Middle Freedom – that evades the central problems plaguing traditional theories of metaphysical compatibilism. (shrink)

We argue that causal decision theory is no worse off than evidential decision theory in handling entanglement, regardless of one’s preferred interpretation of quantum mechanics. In recent works, Ahmed and Ahmed and Caulton : 4315–4352, 2014) have claimed the opposite; we argue that they are mistaken. Bell-type experiments are not instances of Newcomb problems, so CDT and EDT do not diverge in their recommendations. We highlight the fact that a Causal Decision Theorist should take all lawlike correlations into account, including (...) potentially acausal entanglement correlations. This paper also provides a brief introduction to CDT with a motivating “small” Newcomb problem. The main point of our argument is that quantum theory does not provide grounds for favouring EDT over CDT. (shrink)

The article compares views of C.G. Jung and N.O. Lossky on the nature of time, including in the context of contemporary to them physical theories - quantum mechanics by W. Pauli and relativistic physics by A. Einstein. In particular, the author points to the similarity of ideas of both thinkers that the psyche relativizes time not only subjectively, but also objectively. Jung and Lossky provide this statement with a similar empirical basis, for example, the researches of T. Flournoy, as well (...) as similar theoretical arguments by postulating a fundamental acausal principle of the connection of all things, which is better suited for describing psychic and some physical phenomena than the classical causal explanation. In analytical psychology, such a principle is synchronicity, in hierarchical personalism - gnoseological coordination. Both concepts are genetically related to the G.W. Leibniz idea of pre-established harmony, which was reinterpreted by Jung and Lossky through different worldview foundations. Jung in his reasoning relied on the transcendental idealism of I. Kant, the principle of complementarity and the discoveries of quantum mechanics, Lossky - on intuitivism, the principle of subordination and on his own interpretation of Einsteins theories. Jung comes to the conclusion that the psyche has a timeless character, and Lossky comes to the conclusion that it has a super-temporal character. Jungs timelessness indicates the transcendental nature of psyche and the strive to get away from the classical causal explanation, saving it according to the principle of complementarity only to consider the phenomenal side of being and mainly physical processes. One of the pioneers of quantum mechanics Pauli was of the same opinion in general. Because of there is nothing transcendent in hierarchical personalism, Losskys super-temporality is of a strive to find a deeper basis for occurring in time processes, and, according to the principle of subordination, to include time in the hierarchical structure of the universe, prescribing for it a role of one of the two key forms of psychic and psycho-material processes characteristic of a certain stage of being. (shrink)