Materialism and the Mediated Causation of Behavior

Philosophical Studies 103 (2):165-175 (2001)
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Abstract

Are judgements and wishes reallybrain events (or brain states) which will be affirmedby a completed scientific account of how humanbehavior is caused? Materialists, other thaneliminativists, say Yes. But brain events do notcause muscle contractions, hence bodily movements,directly. They do so, if at all, by triggeringintermediate causes, viz. firings in motor nerves. Soit is crucial, this paper argues, whether they arecharacterized as biological events –performances of naturally-selected-for operations – orinstead as complex microphysical events. ``Acauses B, B causes C, so A causes C'' is defensible forbiological brain events, but fails for microphysical ones.

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Citations of this work

Destruction, alteration, simples and world stuff.Crawford L. Elder - 2003 - Philosophical Quarterly 53 (210):24–38.
The problem of harmonizing laws.Crawford L. Elder - 2001 - Philosophical Studies 105 (1):25 - 41.

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References found in this work

Causes and Conditions.J. L. Mackie - 1965 - American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (4):245 - 264.
The architecture of representation.Rick Grush - 1997 - Philosophical Psychology 10 (1):5-23.
Biofunctions: Two paradigms.Ruth Millikan - 2002 - In Andre Ariew (ed.), Functions. Oxford University Press. pp. 113-143.

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