Condicionada por el modo económico de cada formación social, la pintura ha participado -y no en menor medida- de la adaptación; sus imágenes rectoras han dado cuerpo y forma a los engranajes ideológicos, y su valor funcional se ha reconducido a la mera relación fetichista; de esta manera, en el instante en que hay pintura, deja de haberla propiamente. Por otro lado, el arte tiene por condición autonomía y libertad, y en el artista no es decisiva la conciencia armónica, puesto (...) que carece de libertad, puesto que está en dialéctica con la realidad social, éste interviene en su transformación. El presente artículo intenta dar cuenta cómo la vida y la obra de John Singer Sargent remiten a dicha naturaleza antinómica, que nos hace recordar la idea y la realidad, de la propia libertad. Palabras clave: fetichismo, transformación, arte, artista, naturaleza. (shrink)

This study investigates the relationship between mental health and emotional intelligence among senior high school students in a public school. Thus, the study employed a correlational design to measure the relationship between mental health and emotional intelligence among 152 Grade 12 senior high school students in a public school. Hence, to measure the study’s variables - Mental Health Inventory and Emotional Intelligence Scale (EIS) were utilized. Based on the inferential statistics, the r coefficient of 0.32 indicates a low positive correlation (...) between the variables and a p-value of 0.00, indicating a significant relationship between the respondents' mental health and emotional intelligence. Implications and recommendations were discussed in the study. (shrink)

Este artículo aborda dos temáticas de la novela La muerte es una vieja historia de Hernán Rivera Letelier: la construcción de la identidad de la mujer pentecostal y el uso de la música tanto en el templo como en la vida de un fiel pentecostal. En el primer apartado abordamos tres aspectos del primer tema relacionados con la mujer pentecostal: la inteligencia social y cognitiva, la corporalidad y sensualidad, y la violencia sexual. En el segundo apartado hacemos referencia a la (...) importancia que tiene la música en los templos y la vida cotidiana de los pentecostales, que en la novela se refleja en las anécdotas y experiencias que se cuentan de la protagonista, la hermana Tegualda. (shrink)

People generally accept that there is causation by omission—that the omission of some events cause some related events. But this acceptance elicits the selection problem, or the difficulty of explaining the selection of a particular omissive cause or class of causes from the causal conditions. Some theorists contend that dependence theories of causation cannot resolve this problem. In this paper, we argue that the appeal to norms adequately resolves the selection problem for dependence theories, and we provide novel experimental evidence (...) for it. (shrink)

In having an experience one is aware of having it. Having an experience requires some form of access to one's own state, which distinguishes phenomenally conscious mental states from other kinds of mental states. Until very recently, Higher-Order (HO) theories were the only game in town aiming at offering a full-fledged account of this form of awareness within the analytical tradition. Independently of any objections that HO theories face, First/Same-Order (F/SO) theorists need to offer an account of such access to (...) become a plausible alternative. My aim in this paper is twofold. In the first place, I wish to widen the logical space of the discussion among theories of consciousness by offering a distinction, orthogonal to that between F/SO and HO theories, between what I will call 'Self-Involving' (SI) and 'Mental-State-Involving' (MSI) theories and argue in favor of the former one. In the second place, I will present the basics of a characterization of such a Self-Involving theory in Same-Order terms. (shrink)

Low‐back pain can be invalidating physically as well as mentally. Despite professional help to treat and prevent low‐back pain, the pain often persists, and so do the problems related to low‐back pain. An intervention that made it possible for a significant part of patients with low‐back pain to improve health and well‐being raised the question: Why was it possible to help some and not others? The aim of the present paper was to achieve a deeper understanding of factors patients experienced (...) as helpful in professional support related to low‐back pain. This was explored using a hermeneutic‐phenomenological approach while analysing 20 interviews with patients with low‐back pain purposively chosen interviews conducted in relation to the intervention. An analysis was made using Ricoeur's interpretation theory. Data on both positive and negative experiences were read and reflected upon. We found that healthcare professionals’ adoption of a narrative approach facilitating the patient's perspective was perceived as helpful. Patients experienced this as being taken seriously; an experience that could be explained at a deeper, more nuanced level using Heidegger's philosophy. Facilitating the patient's perspective was conditional not only on the professional obtaining access to the patient's perspective but also on understanding and acknowledging the patient's existence. The challenge for healthcare professionals in this respect is to bridge the gap between the consultation's fact‐focused concern with the medical implications of low‐back pain and the patient's concern with the implications low‐back pain has for his or her personal identity and life. Listening to the patient's perspective in itself supports the subjective recovery process, while also supporting the quality of patient‐centred support and strengthening the patient's trust in its helpfulness. (shrink)

This article reviews the research of “top rebirth scientist” Ian Stevenson on spontaneous past-life memory cases, focusing on three key problems with Stevenson’s work. First, his research of entirely anecdotal case reports contains a number of errors and omissions. Second, like other reincarnation researchers, Stevenson has done no controlled experimental work on such cases; yet only such research could ever resolve whether the correspondences found between a child’s statements and a deceased person’s life exceed what we might find by chance. (...) Finally, the best reincarnation research should at least meet the standards met by typical empirical research, but Stevenson’s methodology does not even meet the standards expected of third- or fourth-year college students. -/- 1. How Controlled Experimental Work is Possible -- 2. The Anecdotal Record - 2.1 Reincarnation and Biology - 2.2 The Imad Elawar Case -- 3. Conclusion. (shrink)

The logic of (commutative integral bounded) residuated lattices is known under different names in the literature: monoidal logic [26], intuitionistic logic without contraction [1], H BCK [36] (nowadays called by Ono), etc. In this paper we study the -fragment and the -fragment of the logical systems associated with residuated lattices, both from the perspective of Gentzen systems and from that of deductive systems. We stress that our notion of fragment considers the full consequence relation admitting hypotheses. It results that this (...) notion of fragment is axiomatized by the rules of the sequent calculus for the connectives involved. We also prove that these deductive systems are non-protoalgebraic, while the Gentzen systems are algebraizable with equivalent algebraic semantics the varieties of pseudocomplemented (commutative integral bounded) semilatticed and latticed monoids, respectively. All the logical systems considered are decidable. (shrink)

It is often claimed that a minimal form of self-awareness is constitutive of our conscious experience. Some have considered that such a claim is plausible for our ordinary experiences but false when considered unrestrictedly on the basis of the empirical evidence from altered states. In this paper I want to reject such a reasoning. This requires, first, a proper understanding of a minimal form of self-awareness – one that makes it plausible that minimal self-awareness is part of our ordinary experiences. (...) I will argue that it should be understood as Perspectival First-Person Awareness : a non-conceptual identification-free self-attribution that defines the first-person perspective for our conscious experience. I will offer a detailed characterization of PFP-Awareness in semantic and epistemological terms. With this tool in hand, I will review the empirical literature on altered states. I will focus on psychedelics, meditation and dreams, as they have been claimed to present the clearest cases in favor of a radical disruption of self-awareness. I will show that the rejection of the idea that minimal self-awareness is constitutive of our experience on the basis of this evidence is unfounded, for two main reasons. First, although there are good grounds to think that some forms of self-awareness that typically accompany our ordinary experiences are compromised, they do not support the claim that PFP-Awareness is absent. Secondly, the reports that could make us think of a radical disruption of self-awareness are most probably due to a confirmation bias – and hence we should mistrust them – derived from the expectations and metaphysical views of their subjects. (shrink)

The term theodicy was coined by the philosopher Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) and is inherent in the question of how evil can exist if an intrinsically good God guides everything. The publication of this oeuvre initiated intense philosophical and theological discourse in the subsequent centuries, during which many issues that bare upon human well-being were articulated. Also, Leibniz’s rational approach to the relationship between God and evil raised a number of issues related to the topic of belief. This topic has (...) entangled discourses on theodicy with a long-lasting debate on beliefs, which goes back to Antiquity. Recently, a paradigm-shift shed new light on the understanding of belief. Science has begun to address the neurophysiological mechanisms of the processes that underpin belief formation, modulation, and change. The term credition was coined in order to capture and reflect this new and innovative understanding of the fluidity of beliefs and believing. This paper presents various features of a pattern of interrelationships between well-being, theodicy, and credition. (shrink)

Higher-order thought theories of consciousness attempt to explain what it takes for a mental state to be conscious, rather than unconscious, by means of a HOT that represents oneself as being in the state in question. Rosenthal Consciousness and the self: new essays, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2011) stresses that the way we are aware of our own conscious states requires essentially indexical self-reference. The challenge for defenders of HOT theories is to show that there is a way to explain (...) the required reference-fixing mechanisms that is compatible with the theory. According to Rosenthal, the reference to oneself as such is grounded in the disposition to identify the individual the HOT refers to as the individual who has that HOT. I argue that this leads to a vicious infinite regress on the more than plausible assumption that our cognitive capacities are limited. This leaves such theories without a foundation, since self-reference is thought essential to consciousness. (shrink)

Cognitive theories claim, whereas non-cognitive theories deny, that cognitive access is constitutive of phenomenology. Evidence in favor of non-cognitive theories has recently been collected by Block and is based on the high capacity of participants in partial-report experiments compared to the capacity of the working memory. In reply, defenders of cognitive theories have searched for alternative interpretations of such results that make visual awareness compatible with the capacity of the working memory; and so the conclusions of such experiments remain controversial. (...) Instead of entering the debate between alternative interpretations of partial-report experiments, this paper offers an alternative line of research that could settle the discussion between cognitive and non-cognitive theories of consciousness. Here I relate the neural correlates of cognitive access to empirical research into the neurophysiology of dreams; cognitive access seems to depend on the activity of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. However, that area is strongly deactivated during sleep; a period when we entertain conscious experiences: dreams. This approach also avoids the classic objection that consciousness should be inextricably tied to reportability or it would fall outside the realm of science. (shrink)

can prevent non-contact interactions in Newtonian collision mechanics. The proposal is weakened by the apparent arbitrariness of what will be shown as the requirement of only an odd number of sets of some ex nihilo-created self-exciting particles. There is, however, an initial condition such that, without the ex nihilo self-exciting particles, either there is a contradictory outcome, or there is a non-contact configuration law, or there are odds versus evens indeterminacies. With the various odds versus evens arbitrarinesses and other such (...) difficulties, there seems to be an ontological unsatisfactoriness in the speed-unbounded Newtonian collision system. Introduction Taking self-excitations very seriously A problematic initial condition Another alternative. (shrink)

The traditional approach in cognitive sciences holds that cognition is a matter of manipulating abstract symbols followingcertain rules. According to this view, the body is merely an input/output device, which allows the computationalsystem—the brain—to acquire new input data by means of the senses and to act in the environment following its com-mands. In opposition to this classical view, defenders of embodied cognition (EC) stress the relevance of the body inwhich the cognitive agent is embedded in their explanation of cognitive processes. (...) From a representationalist frameworkregarding our conscious experience, in this article, I will offer a novel argument in favor of EC and show that cognitionconstitutively—and no merely causally—depends upon body activity beyond that in the brain. In particular, I will arguethat in order to solve the problem derived from the empirical evidence in favor of the possibility of shifted spectrum,representationalist should endorse the view that experiences concern its subject: the content of experience isde se.Ishow that this claim perfectly matches the phenomenological observation and helps explaining the subjective characterof the experience. Furthermore, I argue that entertaining this kind of representation constitutively depends on bodilyactivity. Consequently, insofar as cognition depends on consciousness, it is embodied. (shrink)

This paper suggests that an ontologically reductionist view of nature which also accepts the completeness of causality at the level of physics can support (1) the blissful transfiguration of the moral, (2) mystical release from standard ego-identification, and (3) psycho-physical transformation cultivated through meditative practice. This mystical naturalism provides the basis for a thicker, more vigorous institutional religious life, including religious life centred around meditation practices, personalist meanings, and the theology of incarnation, than current proposals for strongly naturalist religions allow.

This book brings together previously unpublished work which looks at issues concerning the foundations and applications of a prominent branch of virtue epistemology: “performance-based epistemology”. The chapters in Part I examine some foundational issues in the conceptual framework of PBE: the relations between apt success and luck; the connection between aptness and a safety condition for knowledge; the fallibility of competences; the kind of reliability needed for knowledge and justification; the nature of epistemic agency; and some ways of enriching the (...) basic conceptual framework of PBE. The chapters in Part II discuss the application of PBE to outstanding problems in contemporary epistemology, such as the nature of a priori intuition; internalist objections to epistemic externalism; the roles that epistemic agency is meant to play in the acquisition of knowledge; the value of second-order reflection; the nature of some epistemic incompetences; and the problem of epistemic circularity. (shrink)

Un a d e la s proclama s má s escuchada s e n la s concentracione s de l 15- M e s qu e los ca r go s político s n o no s r ep r esentan . P ar a v eri f ca r s i es e reproch e est á justi f icado , e n este estudi o analizamo s primer o qu é deb e se r l a representació n (...) polític a e n u n Estad o democrático ; a continuación , y par a sabe r s i lo s representante s “no s representan” , no s f ijamos e n l a fo r m a e n qu e ha n sid o el e gidos , e n e l mod o e n e l qu e ejerce n s u funció n y e n las pre r r o gat iv a s que , e n teoría , garantiza n e l ejercici o d e es a función. (shrink)

Anyone, today, with even a slight interest in the methodology of science will be aware of the heated debate which has raged in regard to the thesis of the logical symmetry between explanation and prediction, which is entailed by the hypotheticodeductive account of scientific theory. The symmetry thesis, which received its classical exposition in a well-known article by Hempel and Oppenheim [2], has been subject to a steadily growing criticism by several eminent thinkers. My intention, in this article, is to (...) argue that the current reaction to the Hempel-Oppenheim position, as exemplified by Professors Hanson, Scriven, et al., represents a retrograde movement in the philosophy of science, which, as the number of its converts grows, could undermine the progress, which has been accomplished in the broad tradition that extends from Mach and Poincaré through the Vienna Circle to the present day. Specifically, it is my contention that the aforementioned reaction is symptomatic of a contemporary trend in the direction of irrationalism which, of all branches of philosophy, the philosophy of science should seek to dispel rather than to foster. For the sake of brevity, I propose to focus my remarks wholly on the original widely read article of Hanson on this subject [1]. That I single out this particular source should not be taken to belie the admiration I hold for the masterful scholarship of its author. (shrink)

The well-known distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness has moved away from the conceptual domain into the empirical one, and the debate now is focused on whether the neural mechanisms of cognitive access are constitutive of the neural correlate of phenomenal consciousness. In this paper, I want to analyze the consequences that a negative reply to this question has for the cognitive phenomenology thesis – roughly the claim that there is a “proprietary” phenomenology of thoughts. If the mechanisms responsible (...) for cognitive access can be disentangled from the mechanisms that give rise to phenomenology in the case of perception and emotion, then the same disentanglement is to be expected in the case of thoughts. This, in turn, presents, as I argue, a challenge to the cognitive phenomenology thesis: either there are thoughts with cognitive phenomenology we lack cognitive access to or there are good reasons to doubt that there is such a thing as cognitive phenomenology. I discuss a... (shrink)

Quoting Flaubert through time, Mieke Bal and Michelle Williams Gamaker’s Madame B brings Madame Bovary’s reflections on love and emotions to the present day, in a productive anachronism. Their work produces an intertemporal space where the past is relevant for the present, and the present enables us to understand the past. Intimacy and routine are central in their exploration of Flaubert’s contemporaneity. Those issues are precisely one of the keys in Karl Ove Knausgård’s project of literary autobiography, where he expands (...) narration foreclosing the ellipsis and giving visibility to small things and emotions; a project with some resonances with Munch’s crude-obscene uses of intimacy. This essay explores how both proposals, Bal and Williams Gamaker in film, and Knausgård in literature, can serve us to connect present and past sensibilities and, more than that, demonstrate resistances to the hegemonic discourses of temporality. (shrink)

For a standard Finsler F on a manifold M, the domain is the whole tangent bundle T M and the fundamental tensor g is positive-definite. However, in many cases, these two conditions hold in a relaxed form only, namely one has either a psuedo-Finsler metric or a conic Finsler metric. Our aim is twofold. First, we want to give an account of quite a few subtleties that appear under such generalizations, say, for conic pseudo-finsler metrics. Second, we aim to provide (...) some criteria that determine when a pseudo-Finsler metric F obtained as a general homogeneous combination of Finsler metrics and one-forms is again a Finsler-metric -- or, more precisely, that the conic domain on which g remains positive-definite. Such a combination generalizes the known -metrics in different directions. Remarkably, classical examples of Finsler metrics are reobtained and extended, with explicit computations of their fundamental tensors. (shrink)