Critical congenital heart disease screening is rapidly becoming the standard of care in the United States after being added to the Recommended Uniform Screening Panel in 2011. Newborn screens typically do not require affirmative parental consent. In fact, most states allow parents to exempt their baby from receiving the required screen on the basis of religious or personally held beliefs. There are many ethical considerations implicated with allowing parents to exempt their child from newborn screening for CCHD. Considerations include the (...) treatment of religious exemptions in our current legal system, as well as medical and ethical principles in relation to the rights of infants. Although there are significant benefits to screening newborns for CCHD, when a parent refuses for religious or personal beliefs, in the case of CCHD screening, the parental decision should stand. (shrink)

Suppose that it is metaphysically possible that the mereological fusion of all contingent states of affairs has a cause. Whatever the nature of the state of affairs that causes such mereological fusion, it should be metaphysically necessary because, otherwise, it could be part of the mereological fusion it causes. It is possible, then, that there is at least one necessary state of affairs. This state of affairs is a causal relatum, so it must include at least one concrete necessary object. (...) But if something is possibly necessary, then it is necessary because it is not metaphysically contingent whether something is necessary or doesn't. Then, it results that it is metaphysically necessary that there is, at least, a concrete necessary object. This work presents and discusses this argument. (shrink)

Imaginative pretend play is often thought of as the domain of young children, yet adults regularly engage in elaborated, fantastical, social-mediated pretend play. We describe imaginative play in adults via the term “pretensive shared reality;” Shared Pretensive Reality describes the ability of a group of individuals to employ a range of higher-order cognitive functions to explicitly and implicitly share representations of a bounded fictional reality in predictable and coherent ways, such that this constructed reality may be explored and invented/embellished with (...) shared intentionality in anad hocmanner. Pretensive Shared Reality facilitates multiple individual and social outcomes, including generating personal and group-level enjoyment or mirth, the creation or maintenance of social groups, or the safe exploration of individual self-concepts (such as alternative expression of a players sexual or gender identity). Importantly, Pretensive Shared Reality (both within the specific context of table-top role-playing games, and other instances) are primarily co-operative and co-creative. We draw on multiple examples, and focus on Table-Top Role Playing games (TTRPG) – and specifically, the most popular and enduring table-top role-playing games, Dungeons & Dragons (D&D) – as a primary example of such play. Our conception of “pretensive shared reality” links the widespread existence and forms of adult imaginative play to childhood pretense, places it within a developmental and evolutionary context, and argues that pretensive shared realities – which underpin many forms of imaginative culture – are an important topic of study unto themselves, and may be utilized to provide methodological insight into a variety of psychological domains. (shrink)

It is argued that instantiation, i.e. the relation between particular objects and properties (conceived as universals or tropes) is indeed an ontologically robust relation. The relation of instantiation is required to explain the difference between a state of affairs of, for example, a being F, and the mereological fusion [ a + F]. If instantiation is a true relation, then Bradley’s Regress ensues. It is argued, nevertheless, that the regress cannot be taken as a reason to reject the existence of (...) instantiation or to reject the existence of properties as entities numerically different from particular objects to which the properties should be related. All the nominalist alternatives suffer from similar regresses. Bradley’s Regress should, therefore, be addressed head-on. After dismissing all the applicable ways in which an infinite regress may be deemed vicious, it is argued that Bradley’s Regress is — in a sense — harmless. (shrink)

This article includes a study about the preface of Moreh ha-Moreh, a philosophical commentary on Guide for the Perplexed written by Sem Tob ibn Falaquera at the end of XIIIth century. In this introduction Sem Tob ibn Falaquera defends Maimonides and his works. In addition, he exposes his opinion about different subjects, like the nature, the determining factors and limits of philosophical labour or the harmony between reason and faith.

Malgré l’avènement de la figure de l’acteur créateur au tournant des XIXe et XXe siècles, les procédés de copie, d’imitation et de réactivation constituent une part non négligeable des outils convoqués dans les exercices spécifiques au jeu. Cette persistance, qui trouve son origine dans le _Paradoxe sur le comédien_ de Diderot, se lit et se décline tout au long de l’histoire des théories du jeu, dans le recours fréquent à un modèle, dont le type varie. C’est cette double continuité, celle (...) des procédés de copie et du modèle dans les théories du jeu auxquelles s’adossent des pratiques et dont découlent des modes de fabrication, qui a nourri une expérimentation pédagogique pratique au sein de La Manufacture – Haute École des Arts de la Scène de Lausanne. Les ateliers élaborés pour les étudiant.e.s consistant à mettre en œuvre ces trois opérations, à leur proposer une histoire sensible, c’est-à-dire éprouvée, du jeu de l’... (shrink)

E. Dussel builds an ethics involved in the liberation of the victims of a world-system increasingly global. In this paper the contributions that this ethics of liberation does to the necessary project of an intercultural dialogue are studied. This dialogue must begin with a critic of modern reason, which is eurocentric and violent, and it has to be based on a «transmodern» rationality, whose starting point is the afirmation and the recognition of the reason of the Other (the excluded human (...) being). (shrink)

Se ha sostenido tradicionalmente que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas son análogos. Pero, ¿qué es la analogía? Varios filósofos han pensado que la analogía debe ser considerada como una forma de ambigüedad. Argumentamos aquí que los predicados atribuidos a Dios y a las criaturas no son ambiguos o vagos. Siguiendo algunas sugerencias de McDaniel, proponemos una concepción de la analogía donde el fenómeno semántico está asociado con el carácter más o menos natural de la propiedad o (...) propiedades que instancian las entidades que satisfacen el predicado análogo. Un predicado "θ" es análogo si y sólo si, la propiedad Θ, que algo instancia, si y sólo si es θ, es menos natural que cualquier propiedad Ξ tal que todo lo que instancie Ξ, instancia Θ. Además, se requiere que las entidades de las cuales el término análogo es predicado deban ser ontológica o epistémicamente dependientes unas de otras. || It has been traditionally sustained that predicates attributed to God and to the creatures are analogical predicates. But, what is analogy? Several philosophers have thought that analogy should be taken as a form of ambiguity. Here we argue that predicates attributed to God and to creatures are neither ambiguous nor vague. Following some suggestions given by McDaniel, we propose a view of analogy in which the semantic phenomenon is associated with the more or less natural character of the property or properties that the entities that satisfy the analogous predicate instantiate. A predicate "θ" is analogous if and only if the property Θ, which something instantiates, if and only if it is θ, is less natural that any property Ξ so that anything that instantiates Ξ, instantiates Θ. Furthermore, it is required that the entities of which the analogous term is predicated should be either ontologically or epistemically dependent on each other. (shrink)

[EN] Several conceptions of trope bundles have postulated mutual relations of ontological dependence to explain the unity of the bundle. The idea is that a bundle is a plurality of tropes such that each one of them is dependent on any other. A variant of this idea is that there is a ‘nucleus’ of tropes all of them mutually dependent, and there is also a ‘periphery’ or ‘halo’ of tropes that are dependent on the tropes of the nucleus, but the (...) tropes of the nucleus are not dependent on them. There are several theoretical advantages that trope bundles conceived in this way have. A weakness of the position nevertheless is that it requires an equivalence relation of dependence. But it has been normally supposed that dependence is a strict order, i.e. it is relation irreflexive, asymmetric and transitive. Several recent works have put into question this traditional assumption. Those recent criticisms are discussed and it is argued that they are not convincing. Further arguments are presented for the irreflexivity and transitivity of dependence, from which asymmetry follows. Dependence, then, appears to be in fact a strict order. This implies that most forms of nuclear trope bundles are unintelligible. But not all of them, because nuclear tropes with a unique nuclear trope are coherent. [ES] Varias concepciones de cúmulos de tropos han postulado relaciones de dependencia ontológica mutuas para explicar la unidad del cúmulo. La idea es que un cúmulo es una pluralidad de tropos tal que cada uno de ellos es dependiente de cualquier otro. Una variante de esta idea es que hay un ‘núcleo’ de tropos todos ellos mutuamente dependientes y hay también una ‘periferia’ o ‘halo’ de tropos que son dependientes de los tropos del núcleo, pero los tropos del núcleo no son dependientes de ellos. Hay varias ventajas teóricas que tienen los cúmulos de tropos concebidos de este modo. Una debilidad de esta posición, sin embargo, es que requiere una relación de dependencia que sea una relación de equivalencia. Pero se ha supuesto normalmente que la dependencia es un orden estricto, esto es, una relación irreflexiva, asimétrica y transitiva. Varios trabajos recientes han puesto en cuestión este supuesto tradicional. Estas criticas recientes son aquí discutidas y se argumenta que no son convincentes. Se presentan argumentos adicionales para la irreflexividad y la transitividad de la dependencia, de lo que se sigue la asimetría. Entonces, la dependencia resulta ser un orden estricto. Esto implica que la mayoría de las formas de cúmulos nucleares de tropos son ininteligibles. Pero no todos, porque los cúmulos nucleares con un único tropo nuclear son coherentes. (shrink)

Este trabajo analiza los patrones de desambiguación de presuposiciones que se pueden considerar anafóricas y son generadas por partículas indexicales. En contraste con teorías recientes sobre la presuposición que privilegian la información lexical proponemos un análisis perspectivo de la presuposición según el cual la inferencia por defecto sobre este tipo de información hace uso de la perspectiva de los hablantes. En dos estudios exploramos el patrón de desambiguación de oraciones que contienen la palabra ‘también’ en contextos donde se usa el (...) indéxico ‘yo’. Los resultados confirman nuestra hipótesis y se discuten a la luz las principales ideas sobre presuposición y anáfora. A partir de estos resultados sugerimos algunas direcciones futuras de investigación. (shrink)

A new theoretical approach to Aristotelian Logic based on three axioms has been recently introduced. This formalization of the theory allowed for the unification of its uncommunicated traditional branches, thus restoring the theoretical unity of AL. In this brief paper, the applicability of the three AL axioms to Propositional Logic is explored. First, it is shown how the AL axioms can be applied to some simple PL arguments in a straightforward manner. Second, the development of a proof method for PL (...) inspired by the AL axioms is presented. This method mimics the underlying mechanics of the proof method from AL, and offers a complementary alternative to proof methods such as truth trees. (shrink)

In recent decades, Total Quality Management (TQM) has become an important phenomenon in the world of business, but the implications and scope of quality programs are quite different everywhere. Since different explanations have been given, most authors agree that management commitment and leadership are indispensable elements for a successful TQM implementation. Nevertheless, the study of the literature reflects a terminological confusion on this point. The authors of this paper argue that commitment and leadership are not synonymous terms.While committed managers may (...) lead the process of quality using exclusively their formal authority, those who are leaders generate a kind of influence that goes further than that. This paper suggests a multidimensional perception of leadership and upholds that only by considering the ethical dimension of leadership, together with technical and psycho-emotive ones, it is possible to explain more accurately interpersonal influences beyond the scope of power. As an illustrative example of the importance of considering each dimensions, the authors present two case studies of TQM implementation. (shrink)

Hilary Putnam's doctrine of conceptual relativity sustains that there are many different incompatible, yet equivalent, descriptions of what have to be considered "the same" phenomena. This fact is reason to justify the idea that metaphysical realism is wrong and that a better general view of reality should be something like a "pragmatic realism." Putnam sustains further that the different incompatible and equivalent descriptions have to bear the same explanatory virtue. Here it is contended that there seems to be difficulties in (...) construing this requirement in a non-question begging way in an argument designed to show that metaphysical realism should be dismissed. Different descriptions can only be deemed to have the same explanative virtue if our knowledge of, for example, structures in the natural world, seems to be simply a form to "save the phenomena," but this is a characteristic anti-realist thesis that should not be taken for granted in the dialectical setting. (shrink)

The latest philosophy of P. Ricoeur offers the opportunity to articulate an applied ethic responsive to the challenges of our time. This proposal is basically collected in his book The Fair 2, which compilates several works and makes cohesion of core issues of practical philosophy. Published a few years before his death, this work of Paul Ricoeur completes the itinerary of a moral and political philosophy devoted to the theme of justice. Extends and develops the works included in The Fair (...) 1 (Caparrós, Madrid, 1999) and Love and Justice (Caparrós, Madrid, 1993). He starts from an original sense of justice where "the right thing" does not arise as a name or an abstract category, but as a nominalized adjective. This is not an abstract value but a value whose scope, accuracy and sense depends on its realization in the unity of human life. Retrieving the original sense already appeared in the Socratic dialogues of Plato, The Fair describes, defines and fulfils the praxis of justice. This analysis is productive in applied ethics because sets out the "application" in an originative and original way. It is not an activity posterior or outside the foundation, but an exercise of philosophical interpretation and moral creativity. By understanding applied ethics in this way, we findthrough The Fair the central issues of the philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: an anthropology of the capable human being, a hermeneutics of action and imagination, a reconstruction of the history of practical philosophy, and also an ethic of fair distance. This hermeneutics of The Fair as applied ethics is the leitmotif of the three parts of the book: studies, readings and exercises. He continues discussion with the contemporary moral philosophy (Rawls, Taylor, Apel and Habermas), placing it in a new philosophical perspective, for two reasons: First, it broadens the historical horizon retaking the Aristotelian matrix of moral philosophy (prudential wisdom, truth, goodness), and secondly, because Ricoeur opens up unexplored horizons for an personalist and communitarian anthropology in times of globalization (critical solicitude, transculturality, hospitality). We would like to present the creative possibilities offered by this hermeneutical philosophy to think, as Ortega y Gasset says, "at the height of our time". (shrink)