Conceptual change and its connection to the development of new seien tific theories has reeently beeome an intensively discussed topic in philo sophieal literature. Even if the inductive aspects related to conceptual change have already been discussed to some extent, there has so far existed no systematic treatment of inductive change due to conceptual enrichment. This is what we attempt to accomplish in this work, al though most of our technical results are restricted to the framework of monadic languages. We (...) extend Hintikka's system of inductive logic to apply to situations in which new concepts are introduced to the original language. By interpreting them as theoretica1 concepts, it is possible to discuss a number of currently debated philosophical and methodological problems which have previously escaped systematic and exact treatment. For instance, the role which seientific theories employing theoretical con cepts may play within inductive inference can be studied within this framework. From the viewpoint of seientific realism, sueh a study gives outlines for a theory of what we call hypothetico-induetive inference. Some parts of this work which are based on Hintikka's system of in ductive logic are fairly technical. However, no previous knowledge of this system is required, but, in general, acquaintance with the basic ideas of elementary logic and probability theory is suffieient. This work is part of a project, originated by Professors Jaakko Hintikka and Raimo Tuomela, concerning the role of theoreticalconcepts in science. (shrink)
A theoretical term gets its meaning from a set of meaning-constitutive or 'analytic' sentences of the relevant theory. The meanings of theoretical terms may change when the theories change. After a discussion of Kant and Frege, I propose a broadly Quinean view of analyticity, without adopting Quine's meaning skepticism. A sentence of a given theory in a certain language is called analytic if revising the theory so that this sentence is lost entails the abandonment of the given linguistic (...) (alternatively, of the given theoretical) framework. This solution to the problem of defining analyticity is rooted in intuitive judgements of the members of a linguistic community about the identity of languages or theories. (shrink)
Self psychology provides a theoretical framework for understanding the psychology of the animal hoarder. The following ideas from self psychology can be applied to animal hoarders and their animals to gain insight into the nature of the bond between them: 1) animals can serve a crucial selfobject function, such as cohesion, for hoarders, regardless of the actual, objective reality of the state of the animals; 2) the concept of archaic vs. mature selfobject functioning elucidates how hoarders are stuck in (...) self-centered, archaic forms of relating with little empathic capacity; 3) the merger selfobject relationship allows hoarders to see animals as being one with them; and 4) disavowal and the vertical split explain how hoarders can live with animal suffering and be apparently oblivious to it. Similarities between self psychology and attachment theory are discussed. (shrink)
This portion of the essay concludes a two-part paper, Part I of which appeared in an earlier issue of this Journal. Part II begins with a careful study of the quantum description of real experiments in order to motivate a proposal that two distinct quantum theoretical measurement constructs should be recognized, both of which must be distinguished from the concept of preparation. The different epistemological roles of these concepts are compared and explained. It is then concluded that the (...) only possible type of "quantum measurement theory" is one of little metaphysical interest and that quantum measurement seems problematical only when viewed from an overly narrow classical perspective. (shrink)
The overall purpose of this paper is to clarify the physical meaning and epistemological status of the term 'measurement' as used in quantum theory. After a review of the essential logical structure of quantum physics, Part I presents interpretive discussions contrasting the quantal concepts observable and ensemble with their classical ancestors along the lines of Margenau's latency theory. Against this background various popular ideas concerning the nature of quantum measurement are critically surveyed. The analysis reveals that, in addition to (...) internal mathematical difficulties, all the so-called quantum theories of measurement are grounded in unjustifiable, classical presuppositions. (shrink)
In this paper we develop an inferential account on the meaning and reference of theoreticalconcepts in physics, mainly based on the pragmatic notion of ‘inferential validity’. Firstly, we distinguish between empirical meaningfulness and theoretical significance as two different modes of meaning, wherein the former depends on consistently encoding experimental values, as proposed by Chang, and the latter on being semantically coherent with other concepts. Secondly, we argue that each of these contributions to the validity of (...) inferences imports a causal and representational mechanism of reference-fixing, respectively. Finally, we will rely on entropy concepts as our case study. (shrink)
Decision theory elucidates, in more ways than one, the, concept of rational behavior under imperfect knowledge of the consequences. On the other hand, the generally accepted concept of rationality refers to the end-means relation. This relation is not translatable into the language of decision theory. Consequently, the latter's claim to have defined in a general way rationality of behavior appears not to be valid.
An error theorist about a particular discourse combines the cognitivist thesis that the discourse is truth-apt with the thesis that core statements asserted by the discourse are false. For instance, one is an error theorist about witch discourse if one thinks that witch discourse is truth-apt and that some of the entities and properties quantified over by core statements in the discourse, namely witches and magical powers, do not exist and hence that certain core statements of the discourse are false.
This paper intends to explore the prospects of a realistic view of scientific explanation, according to which the objects and structures occurring in the explanation must have real referents. Theories involving probability either lose their explanatory function or become counter-examples to this view, if real referents of probabilistic notions do not exist. It is argued that such referents can be found for statistical mechanics and quantum mechanics: the overall structure of mass phenomena that renders them capable of irreversible developments and (...) equilibrium states, and the inherent propensities of elementary systems. The present lack of a theoretical connection between these two referents impedes the recognition of the reality of probability in nature. (shrink)
Traditionally, discussion about neuroimaging focuses on methodological improvement and neurobiological findings. In current psychiatric neuroimaging, the research focus broadens and includes concepts such as the self, personality, well-being, and psychiatric disease. This calls for the inclusion of disciplines like psychology and philosophy in a dialogue with neuroscience. Furthermore, it raises the question of how theories from these areas relate to neuroimaging findings: are results generated by objective data independent of theories? Is there an epistemological priority for the theories used (...) for generating hypotheses and for interpreting the results? Or do theoreticalconcepts and neuroimaging data influence each other? In this paper, we will discuss these positions concerning the priority of concepts and data in neuroimaging and provide arguments for an interdependence of concepts and data. An awareness of these considerations may help professionals from the life sciences and humanities as well as laypersons to avoid misunderstandings and oversimplifications. (shrink)
These arguments are fairly well known today. It is interesting to note that v. Kries already knew them, and that they have been ignored by Reichenbach and v. Mises in their original account of probability.2This observation leads to the interesting question why the frequency theory of probability has been adopted by many people in our century in spite of severe counterarguments. One may think of a change in scientific attitude, of a scientific revolution put forward by Feyerabendarian propaganda- and who (...) would deny that Reichenbach was an excellent propagandist!My suggested explanation is the following:J. v. Kries is still a mentalist in the tradition of Descartes and Locke. This can be shown very well from his logic, which he wrote even much later (1916). A mentalist does not pose semantical questions in a proper sense: he rather asks which ideas in the human mind make up a concept. And studying probability in this way, he will find in any case that what is in the human mind is first of all an expectation. Therefore, his analysis of the concept of probability will be centered around the concept of expectation.People tended to approach the problem in quite a different way after the scientific revolution which led from mentalism to lingualism. They tended in many cases to use operationalism and to ask how probabilities are determined in science, if they wanted to clear up the meaning of probability. This new aspect of probability, which was caused by looking at it from a new position or standpoint, suggested it to be the limit of relative frequencies in the first instance. This suggestion was so strong that all objections were ignored, and all counterarguments encountered deaf ears.Of course I have used here an oversimplification. Neither was J. v. Kries untouched by Poincaré's conventionalism, which is essentially a movement leading to the breakdown of mentalism; nor was Reichenbach, when he wrote his thesis in 1915, already a lingualist in any respect.Nevertheless, I think that the lingualist revolution, which took place particularly in mathematics and physics, has also changed the attitude towards probability. It would be interesting to corroborate this thesis by extensive study of the history of science in the late 19th century.Besides this historical aspect of v. Kries' theory, there is a systematic one which should be noticed. Though his theory still has a mentalist outlook, many of v. Kries' statements can be translated into the present lingualist idiom and then become most interesting contributions to the present discussion. We shall then state that for v. Kries probabilities appear first of all in probabilistic hypotheses which may or may not be confirmed by empirical data. Therefore, they have a role similar to theoreticalconcepts.3But that is not the only predominant feature of v. Kries' theory. He is approaching objective probability in a way which is quite unfamiliar to present day philosophers or mathematicians. Objective probabilities are connected with other concepts in three different ways. First of all, probabilistic hypotheses are confirmed by empirically found relative frequencies in a finite series of events. Secondly, they serve as an aid for decisions. And finally, there is a third relationship. Probabilities have to be explained by theories which are in many cases not formulated in probabilistic terms themselves. We can try to understand probability in one of the first two ways via their connection to other concepts. That is what is usually done by interpretations in terms of frequencies or decisions. A third approach, however, is to understand the nature of probability by the way probabilities are explained, and that is what v. Kries does. Such an approach does not seem unusual at all. In many cases the nature of a kind of objects is characterized by giving an explanation. If somebody asks what an eclipse of the moon is, we shall answer - as Aristotle already proposed - by giving an explanation of it. Thus it is quite natural to answer a question as to the nature of probability by describing the general type of explanation of probability distributions in natural or social science. The answer given by v. Kries is - as we know today — of limited validity. Quantum mechanical probabilities are not explainable by Spielräume. V. Kries solution, however, is remarkable in one important respect. It accounts for the time direction of objective probabilities, which are always predictive or forward probabilities, while retrodictive or backward probabilities are always subjective. The relation of objective probabilities to time direction is surely of utmost importance for natural philosophy. I do not know of any other philosophical foundation of probability which takes into account this deep-rooted relation. Therefore, v. Kries' interpretation may help us to understand one of the most intricate puzzles of philosophy. It may be nearly one hundred years old, but is by no means out of date. (shrink)
Ordinarily, in mathematical and scientific practice, the notion of a “theory” is understood as follows: (SCT) Standard Conception of Theories : A theory T is a collection of statements, propositions, conjectures, etc. A theory claims that things are thus and so. The theory may be true, and may be false. A theory T is true if things are as T says they are, and T is false if things are not as T says they are. One can make this Aristotelian (...) explanation more precise, as Tarski showed, in the cases where we understand how to give precise logical analyses of theories, by identifying an interpreted language L, Á) in which T may be formulated. Here L is some formalized language and Á is an L-interpretation. One can define the satisfaction relation ⊨, holding between L-sentences j and L-interpretations, and then define the notion L-sentence j is true in L, Á)” as Á ⊨ j”. What is essential about this is that theories are truth bearers . They are bearers of semantic properties. (shrink)
If there is any value in the idea that disease is something other than the mere absence of health then that value must lie in the way that diseases are classified. This paper offers further development of a view advanced previously, the 'contrastive model' of disease: it develops the account to handle asymptomatic disease ; and in doing so it relates the model to a broadly biostatistical view of health. The developments are prompted by considering cancers featuring viruses as prominent (...) causes, since these appear to amount to cases where the prescriptions of the contrastive model could be followed, but aren't. The resulting irrelevance objection claims that the contrastive model is irrelevant to medical science and practice. The paper seeks to rebut the irrelevance objection. (shrink)
Contemporary discussions about practical reason or practical rationality invoke four competing views which can be named as follows by reference to their historical models: Aristotelian, Hobbesian, Kantian and Nietzschean. The subject-matter of this article is a defence of the Kantian conception of practical rationality in the interpretation of discourse theory. At the heart, lies the justification and the application of the rules of discourse. An argument consisting of three parts is pre sented to justify the rules of discourse. The three (...) parts are as follows: a transcen dental-pragmatic argument; an argument which takes account of the maximisation of individual utility and an empirical premise about an interest in correctness. Within the framework of the problem of application, the article outlines a justification of human rights and of the basic institutions of the democratic constitutional state on the basis of discourse theory. (shrink)
This paper argues that the medical conception of health as absence of disease is a value-free theoretical notion. Its main elements are biological function and statistical normality, in contrast to various other ideas prominent in the literature on health. Apart from universal environmental injuries, diseases are internal states that depress a functional ability below species-typical levels. Health as freedom from disease is then statistical normality of function, i.e., the ability to perform all typical physiological functions with at least typical (...) efficiency. This conception of health is as value-free as statements of biological function. The view that health is essentially value-laden, held by most writers on the topic, seems to have one of two sources: an assumption that health judgments must be practical judgments about the treatment of patients, or a commitment to "positive" health beyond the absence of disease. I suggest that the assumption is mistaken, the commitment possibly misdescribed. (shrink)
We start this paper by arguing that causality should, in analogy with force in Newtonian physics, be understood as a theoretical concept that is not explicated by a single definition, but by the axioms of a theory. Such an understanding of causality implicitly underlies the well-known theory of causal nets and has been explicitly promoted by Glymour. In this paper we investigate the explanatory warrant and empirical content of TCN. We sketch how the assumption of directed cause–effect relations can (...) be philosophically justified by an inference to the best explanation. We then ask whether the explanations provided by TCN are merely post-facto or have independently testable empirical content. To answer this question we develop a fine-grained axiomatization of TCN, including a distinction of different kinds of faithfulness. A number of theorems show that although the core axioms of TCN are empirically empty, extended versions of TCN have successively increasing empirical content. (shrink)
Rudolf Carnap delivered the hitherto unpublished lecture ‘TheoreticalConcepts in Science’ at the meeting of the American Philosophical Association, Paciﬁc Division, at Santa Barbara, California, on 29 December 1959. It was part of a symposium on ‘Carnap’s views on TheoreticalConcepts in Science’. In the bibliography that appears in the end of the volume, ‘The Philosophy of Rudolf Carnap’, edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, a revised version of this address appears to be among Carnap’s forthcoming papers. (...) But although Carnap started to revise it, he never ﬁnished the revision,1 and never published the unrevised transcript. Perhaps this is because variants of the approach to theoreticalconcepts presented for the ﬁrst time in the Santa Barbara lecture have appeared in other papers of his (cf. the editorial footnotes in Carnap’s lecture). Still, I think, the Santa Barbara address is a little philosophical gem that needs to see the light of day. The document that follows is the unrevised transcript of Carnap’s lecture.2 Its style, then, is that of an oral presentation. I decided to leave it as it is, making only very minor stylistic changes—which, except those related to punctuation, are indicated by curly brackets.3 I think that reading this lecture is a rewarding experience, punctuated as the lecture is with odd remarks and autobiographical points. One can almost envisage.. (shrink)
In a paper published in 1939, Ernest Nagel described the role that projective duality had played in the reformulation of mathematical understanding through the turn of the nineteenth century, claiming that the discovery of the principle of duality had freed mathematicians from the belief that their task was to describe intuitive elements. While instances of duality in mathematics have increased enormously through the twentieth century, philosophers since Nagel have paid little attention to the phenomenon. In this paper I will argue (...) that a reassessment is overdue. Something beyond doubt is that category theory has an enormous amount to say on the subject, for example, in terms of arrow reversal, dualising objects and adjunctions. These developments have coincided with changes in our understanding of identity and structure within mathematics. While it transpires that physicists have employed the term ‘duality’ in ways which do not always coincide with those of mathematicians, analysis of the latter should still prove very useful to philosophers of physics. Consequently, category theory presents itself as an extremely important language for the philosophy of physics. (shrink)
As a preliminary to the modern theory of measurement with which this paper is chiefly concerned, it is desirable to review a few of the characteristics and implications of classical physics to illustrate the far reaching changes that have taken place in our conception of nature as the result of the development of quantum mechanics.