In this urbane and witty book, Ronald de Sousa disputes the widespread notion that reason and emotion are natural antagonists.

Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; belief-like states, by contrast, (...) are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, troth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

The word "truth" retains, in common use, traces of origins that link it to trust, truth, and truce, connoting ideas of fidelity, loyalty, and authenticity. The word has become, in contemporary philosophy, encased in a web of technicalities, but we know that a true image is a faithful portrait; a true friend a loyal one. In a novel or a poem, too, we have a feel for what is emotionally true, though we are not concerned with the actuality of events (...) and characters depicted. To have emotions is to care about certain things: we can wonder whether those things are really worth caring about. We can wonder whether our passions reflect who we are, and whether they constitute fitting responses to the vicissitudes of life. So there are two aspects to emotional truth: how well an emotion reflects the threats and promises of the world, and how well it reflects our own individual nature. That is the starting point of this book, which looks first at the analogies and disanalogies between strict propositional truth and a looser, "generic" sense of truth. As applied to emotions, generic truth is closer to those original meanings: as in a portrait's fidelity or friend's loyalty. Taken in this sense, the notion of emotional truth opens up large vistas on areas of life essential to our existence as social beings, and to our concerns with beauty, morality, love, death, sex, knowledge, desire, coherence, and happiness. Each of those topics illustrates some facet of the dominant theme of the book: the crucial but often ambivalent role of our emotions in grounding and yet also sometimes undermining our values. Emotions act, in holistic perspective, as ultimate arbiters of values where different and independently justified standards of value compete. (shrink)

Os acontecimentos políticos do século XX, tais como o totalitarismo, fizeram Arendt indagar sobre o sentido da política, originando, assim, a categoria de condição humana. Ao tomarmos como ponto de partida a vida ativa, vemos que a pluralidade, categoria que fundamenta a ação, manifesta-se em meio ao espaço público. O campo da política é o da pluralidade, sendo que nele é necessário a liberdade que é a própria condição da política e, assim sendo, o espaço público torna-se a esfera acolhedora (...) de ambas. Portanto, a política jamais pode ser vista e entendida no singular, mas no plural, pois é na pluralidade dos homens onde a mesma surge em meio ao espaço público. Assim, temos como objetivo demonstrar a importância do espaço público como lugar de aparência da política, buscando na obra “A condição humana” as ferramentas argumentativas que nos auxiliarão a alcançar o mote da presente pesquisa. (shrink)

The article surveys lesbian culture and movement in Slovenia. Both are coinciding with media representations of lesbianism and lesbian visual arts, the latter beginning with the shocking exhibition ‘Obscene Women’ by Austrian photographer Krista Beinstein in 1986. The international lesbian exhibition ‘Lesbian Conne Xions’, which visited the Slovenian capital of Ljubljana in October 2000, represented images of lesbians in a very broad and realistic spectrum, in contrast with the asexual lesbian photographs by unknown authors in the Slovenian main-stream press and (...) in accordance with the depictions of lesbians in Slovenian lesbian press. The photographs from ‘Lesbian Conne Xions’ were, like Beinstein's exhibition, not very well accepted; even some lesbians argued that some of the photos, especially those of gender-benders, did not represent real and everyday lesbian life but rarities and odd exceptions. But lesbian life in general, far from being an ‘ordinary’ Slovenian lifestyle, may easily become unrecognizable to lesbians themselves and obscured by the dominant culture. (shrink)

Masculinity and femininity can both be freely defined through the spectrum of certain characteristics, points of view, features, expectations, and explanations linked to the behavioural traits of masculine and feminine individuals. Those are socially constructed dimensions that explain the male and female status, alongside the position of the sexes within societies. The aim of this study is to re-examine the extent to which culture and cultural context impact the shaping of male and female individuals, as well as the ways through (...) which those influences take place. The relationships between the culturally established set of categories, such as those for gender identification in individuals, are referred to as “human taxonomy”, or “cultural classification”. Hence, the norms, regulations, stances, behaviours, conduct, and, ultimately, the expectations of individuals in a sociocultural environment greatly depend on the relations between mannature-culture. In that context, this paper elaborates on different socio-anthropological theoretic concepts revolving around the creation of masculinity and femininity while emphasizing the historical and contemporary d. (shrink)

Este artigo tem como objetivo ilustrar as contribuições de Edith Stein para a Psicologia a partir de uma pesquisa empírica que buscou compreender o processo formativo dos moradores de uma região periférica de Salvador. Para tanto, apresenta os resultados de uma análise, baseada na obra Contribuições à fundamentação filosófica da Psicologia e das Ciências do Espírito, que ilustra o percurso individual de três participantes da pesquisa. A análise possibilita identificar cinco vivências comuns que marcam o processo de transformação dos sujeitos, (...) orientados por um projeto pessoal. Exemplifica, deste modo, a contribuição da fenomenologia de Edith Stein para a Psicologia no sentido de não reduzir a pessoa aos desafios do contexto em que vive ou aos condicionamentos psicofísicos aos quais está submetida, mas a enxergá-la na sua inteireza, discriminando as diferentes naturezas de vivências e o seu modo singular de viver, com a potência que ele contém. (shrink)

[Ronald de Sousa] Taking literally the concept of emotional truth requires breaking the monopoly on truth of belief-like states. To this end, I look to perceptions for a model of non-propositional states that might be true or false, and to desires for a model of propositional attitudes the norm of which is other than the semantic satisfaction of their propositional object. Those models inspire a conception of generic truth, which can admit of degrees for analogue representations such as emotions; (...) belief-like states, by contrast, are digital representations. I argue that the gravest problem-objectivity-is not insurmountable. /// [Adam Morton ] It is accuracy rather than truth itself that is valuable. Emotional truth is a dubious though attractive notion, but emotional accuracy is much easier to make sense of. My approach to accuracy goes via an account of what makes a story accurate. Stories can be accurate but not true, and emotions can be accurate whether or not they are true. The capacity for emotional accuracy, for emotions that fit a person's situation, is an aspect of emotional intelligence, which is as important an aspect of rational human agency as the intelligent formation of beliefs and desires. (shrink)

The standard approach to the core phenomenology of thought insertion characterizes it in terms of a normal sense of thought ownership coupled with an abnormal sense of thought agency. Recently, Fernández (2010) has argued that there are crucial problems with this approach and has proposed instead that what goes wrong fundamentally in such a phenomenology is a sense of thought commitment, characterized in terms of thought endorsement. In this paper, we argue that even though Fernández raises new issues that enrich (...) the topic, his proposal cannot rival the version of the standard approach we shall defend. (shrink)

Resenha do livro The Ethics of Environmentally Responsible Health Care.

The aim of this study was to investigate significant differences in the mean scores for the Caring Behaviors Inventory between first-year and third-year nursing students. There were two sample groups: group A comprised 117 first-year nursing students and group B included 49 third-year nursing students (n = 166). All participants were from one Slovenian university. Data were collected by questionnaire and ana- lysed using SPSS v. 17.0. Independent sample t-tests were used for the comparison of means for each item in (...) both groups. The results showed that the students in group B (third year) often agreed more significantly with Caring Behaviors Inventory items than the students in group A (first year). Principles of right action indicate how nurses must behave in order to provide good nursing care. Nursing educators can prepare students through demonstrations of their own behaviour in practice. (shrink)

Abstract: In a previous article in this journal, Daniel Kelly, Stephen Stich, Kevin Haley, Serena Eng and Daniel Fessler report data that, according to them, foster scepticism about an association between harm and morality existent in the Turiel tradition ( Kelly et al. , 2007 ). This article challenges their interpretation of the data. It does so by explicating some methodological problems in the Turiel tradition that Kelly et al. themselves in a way inherit and by drawing on new evidence (...) coming from a partial replication of their research. (shrink)

Our self-concept is how we see ourselves in our minds. The goal of this research was to discover any significant differences in the dimensions of self-concept between clinical nurses employed in an intensive care unit in Slovenia and Slovenian women from the general population, who represented the control group. The research included 603 women aged 20—40 years (mean 29.94; standard deviation ±6.0) who had a high-school education. To determine the differences between the groups statistically we used one-way analysis of variance. (...) The results revealed that clinical nurses had a more positive self-concept than members of the control group. Self-concept is very important in nursing because it is closely connected to the existing value system of individuals and their behaviour. Self-concept gives nurses a sense of how they use their abilities and how they perform in relation to patients. (shrink)

Ira Brevis furor, said the Latins: anger is a brief bout of madness. There is a long tradition that views all emotions as threats to rationality. The crime passionnel belongs to that tradition: in law it is a kind of “brief-insanity defence.” We still say that “passion blinds us;” and in common parlance to be philosophical about life's trials is to be decently unemotional about them. Indeed many philosophers have espoused this view, demanding that Reason conquer Passion. Others — from (...) Hume to the Emotivists — have appeared to reverse this hierarchy.” But those philosophers who refuse to join in the general denigration of emotion as irrational usually share the presupposition that the role of rationality is limited to the calculation of means. In so far as emotions are concerned with the determination of ends, they remain, on this view, beyond the pale of rationality. Modern decision theorists have worked out schemes to assess the rationality of desires, as well as actions, against the background of beliefs and other desires.1 But these schemes leave no room at all for emotions, except, by implication, as disrupters of the rational process. (shrink)

Emotions can be the subject of moral judgments; they can also constitute the basis for moral judgments. The apparent circularity which arises if we accept both of these claims is the central topic of this paper: how can emotions be both judge and party in the moral court? The answer I offer regards all emotions as potentially relevant to ethics, rather than singling out a privileged set of moral emotions. It relies on taking a moderate position both on the question (...) of the naturalness of emotions and on that of their objectivity as revealers of value: emotions are neither simply natural nor socially constructed, and they apprehend objective values, but those values are multidimensional and relative to human realities. The axiological position I defend jettisons the usual foundations for ethical judgments, and grounds these judgments instead on a rationally informed reflective equilibrium of comprehensive emotional attitudes, tempered with a dose of irony. (shrink)

The Philosophical search for Natural Kinds is motivated by the hope of finding ontological categories that are independent of our interests. Other requirements, of varying importance, are commonly made of kinds that claim to be natural. But no such categories are to be found. Virtually any kind can be termed 'natural' relative to some set of interests and epistemic priorities. Science determines those priorities at any particular stage of its progress, and what kinds are most 'natural' in that sense is (...) always a real and lively scientific question. The general philosophical problem of scientific realism is also real; but between the scientific and the metaphysical, the Problem of Natural Kinds' sits otiose. (shrink)

O objetivo deste artigo é analisar a ética do cuidado de enfermagem no tratamento de pacientes oncológicos. Optou-se pela pesquisa bibliográfica de abordagem qualitativa cuja metodologia foi dividida em etapas. Na primeira etapa, foi realizado um levantamento de artigos publicados, no período de 2000 a 2009, em periódicos do Scielo, utilizando os descritores: saúde/doença, enfermagem, ética do cuidado e oncologia. Esse levantamento culminou com a seleção de 28 artigos, 21 dos quais foram eleitos posteriormente para leitura aprofundada, assim como para (...) utilização no estudo. Na segunda etapa, foram explorados dados do campo, com a transcrição e análise de depoimentos de profissionais da enfermagem sobre a concepção de cuidado bem como de dados sobre pacientes oncológicos, acompanhados no período de 2007 e 2008. A pesquisa e suas exigências protocolares, sob o número CAAE - 0147.0.213.000-10, foi aprovada pelo Comitê de Ética da PUC Minas em 31 de agosto de 2010. O referencial teórico foi composto por autores que discutem o cuidado na perspectiva filosófica e teológica - Boff (2001, 2005 e 2006), Efken (2005) - e autores da área da saúde oncológica, entre eles, Carvalho et al. (2002), Popim & Boemer (2005), Visentin, Labronici & Lenardt (2007) e Araújo et al. (2009). Os resultados evidenciaram o cuidado na enfermagem como princípio ético essencial, assim como a necessidade de investimentos em políticas públicas de saúde no Brasil, que efetivem o trabalho de prevenção, educação e cura do câncer. Palavras-Chave: Saúde/Doença; Enfermagem; Ética do cuidado; Oncologia.The objective of this article is to analyze the nursing care in the treatment of oncology patients. We have opted for bibliographical research of qualitative nature, a methodology divided into stages. In the first stage we gathered articles in a publication called Scielo from 2000 to 2009, which described: health/illness, nursing, ethics of care, and oncology. Through this process the selection of twenty-eight articles was accomplished, however only twenty-one articles were utilized in the production of this study. In the second stage field data were explored, we transcribed and analyzed the statements of nursing professionals on the conception of care and on oncology patients overseen by them in the period of 2007 to 2008. The research protocol and its requirements under the number CAAE - 0147.0.213.000-10, was approved by the Ethics Committee of PUC Minas on August 31, 2010. The theoretical support was provided by authors who discuss care in a philosophical and theological perspective: Boff (2001, 2005, and 2006), Efken (2005); and authors in the field of healthcare, among them Popim & Boemer (2005), Silva et. al , (2005), Souza et al. (2005), Visentin, et al. (2007), and Araújo, et. al. (2008). The results demonstrated the care in nursing as an essential ethical principal, as much as the necessity of investment in public health policies in Brazil, for the effective promotion of cancer prevention, education and cure. Key words : Health/Illness; Nursing; Ethics of Care; Oncology. (shrink)

Nothing seems to follow strictly from 'X believes that p'. But if we reinterpret it to mean: 'X can consistently be described as consistently believing p'--which roughly renders, I think, Hintikka's notion of "defensibility"--we can get on with the subject, freed from the inhibitions of descriptive adequacy. But defensibility is neither necessary nor sufficient for truth: it tells us little, therefore, about the concept of belief on which it is based. It cannot, in particular, specify necessary conditions for the consistent (...) ascription of belief--as opposed to rational belief. If there are no such conditions, all belief ascriptions must be treated as atomic: which is implausible. If there are some, they must be settled on before an account of consistency can be complete. The reason is simple: it is that we have beliefs about our own beliefs. A set of first order beliefs is consistent if they can all be true together; but it is a lesson of Moore's paradox that consistency of second-order beliefs requires additional constraints. If someone both believes that p and that he does not believe that p, the propositions he believes might all be true together, yet he is inconsistent. And the characterization of second order consistency will remain incomplete, so long as nothing is said about the consistency of first order belief ascriptions. Suppose someone says and believes: "I am inconsistent: I believe both p and ~p." This is "indefensible": but is it insight, or nonsense? Breast-beating of this sort is guaranteed success: something he believes is bound to be false. But that remains diagnostically frustrating: is he inconsistent because what he said is true, or on the contrary because it is inconsistent? (shrink)

Many theoretical claims about the folk concept of moral responsibility coming from the current literature are indeterminate because researchers do not clearly specify the folk concept of moral responsibility in question. The article pursues a cognitive approach to folk concepts that pays special attention to this indeterminacy problem. After addressing the problem, the article provides evidence on folk attributions of moral responsibility in the case a failed attempt to kill that goes against a specific claim coming from the current literature (...) - that the dimension of causation is part of the structure of the folk concept of moral responsibility. (shrink)

The question What is an individual? goes back beyond Aristotle’s discussion of substance to the Ionians’ preoccupation with the paradox of change -- the fact that if anything changes it must stay the same. Mere reflection on this fact and the common-sense notion of a countable thing yields a concept of a “minimal individual”, which is particular (a logical matter) specific (a taxonomic matter), and unique (an evaluative empirical matter). Individuals occupy space, and therefore might be dislodged. Even minimal individuals, (...) therefore (Strawsonian individual or Aristotelian substance) already contain the potential for competition or conflict. What is added by biology to this basic notion? It emerges from some recent work on the evolution of metazoan animals that individuals as we know them are minimal individuals towhich four features have been added, and which appear to be inseparable: differentiated multicellularity; sexual reproduction; segregation of germ from somatic cells; and obligatory death. Whether or not individuals are to be counted as units of selection, they are not the beneficiaries of natural selection. (shrink)