White, Christensen, and Feldman have recently endorsed uniqueness, the thesis that given the same total evidence, two rational subjects cannot hold different views. Kelly, Schoenfield, and Meacham argue that White and others have at best only supported the weaker, merely intrapersonal view that, given the total evidence, there are no two views which a single rational agent could take. Here, we give a new argument for uniqueness, an argument with deliberate focus on the interpersonal element of the thesis. Our argument (...) is that the best explanation of the value of promoting rationality is an explanation that entails uniqueness. (shrink)

This paper explores the disruptive impact of digitization on cultural heritage preservation, focusing on the challenges posed by intellectual property rights, access, and enforcement. It emphasizes the need to balance innovation and preservation in the digital landscape, addressing issues such as copyright complexities, the commodification of cultural knowledge, and the Western-centric bias in policy shaping. By fostering global cooperation, cultural sensitivity, and public awareness, we will aim at achieving an inclusive and sustainable approach to safeguarding our diverse cultural heritage in (...) the digital era. (shrink)

How many individuals are present where we see a pregnant individual? Within a substance ontological framework, there are exactly two possible answers to this question. The standard answer—two individuals—is typically championed by scholars endorsing the predominant Containment View of pregnancy, according to which the foetus resides in the gestating organism like in a container. The alternative answer—one individual—has recently found support in the Parthood View, according to which the foetus is a part of the gestating organism. Here I propose a (...) third answer: a pregnant individual is neither two individuals nor one individual but something in between one and two. This is because organisms are better understood as processes than as substances. With a special focus on the Parthood View, I explain why a Process View of pregnancy, according to which a pregnant individual is a bifurcating hypercomplex process, surpasses the substance ontological approaches. (shrink)

This article focuses on both daily forms of weakness of will as discussed in the philosophical debate and psychopathological phenomena as impairments of decision making. We argue that both descriptions of dysfunctional decision making can be organized within a common theoretical framework that divides the decision making process in three different stages: option generation, option selection, and action initiation. We first discuss our theoretical framework, focusing on option generation as an aspect that has been neglected by previous models. In the (...) main body of this article, we review how both philosophy and neuropsychiatry have provided accounts of dysfunction in each decision-making stage, as well as where these accounts can be integrated. Also, the neural underpinnings of dysfunction in the three different stages are discussed. We conclude by discussing advantages and limitations of our integrative approach. (shrink)

This study focuses on a third-party perspective of idiosyncratic deals. More specifically, we look into the differential judgments co-workers make about i-deals in their work environment, as well as their reactions. Based on equity theory, we examine to what extent the content of the i-deal and the work context explain co-worker judgments regarding i-deal fairness in addition to subsequent voice behavior. A vignette study with 1988 respondents shows that when i-deals are considered distributively unfair, co-workers try to restore equity through (...) voice behavior, thereby making the i-deal less effective. Furthermore, i-deals spark more distributive injustice perceptions and voice behavior in a highly interdependent work context. Finally, on average, financial bonuses were considered most distributively unfair and, thus, trigger more voice behavior. These results have important implications for i-deal literature as they uncover the criteria that co-workers use to judge i-deals and shape their reactions. (shrink)

RésuméDans cet article, nous examinons le projet d'une critique de la raison historique mené par Wilhelm Dilthey et l'accusation d'historicisme portée contre lui par Heinrich Rickert. En comparant leurs tentatives respectives d'offrir un fondement philosophique aux sciences humaines, nous montrons que Dilthey et Rickert, en dépit de leurs divergences, convergent vers une réinterprétation productive de l'historicisme et conduisent à une reconfiguration de la relation entre philosophie et histoire. Cet article analyse trois implications théoriques et pratiques de l'historicisme : la mise (...) en valeur du particulier, le caractère historiquement situé du sujet connaissant et la primauté de la conscience historique. (shrink)

Cosmopolitanism is currently one of the most prominent topics in the social sciences and humanities, and a key concept for understanding globalization. This collection of essays, featuring a line-up of leading international scholars, argues that most work on cosmopolitanism uses a normative model, rather than fully interrogating the issue empirically, comparatively and globally. This ambitious and ground-breaking collection will push the boundaries of the debate on cosmopolitanism into new areas, opening up new lines of inquiry and analysis that will have (...) an impact on the study of globalization and global process for years to come."--Publisher's website. (shrink)

Affective disposition theory explains well the process of enjoying hero narratives but not the appeal of narratives featuring antiheroes. Recent antihero studies suggest that character identification and moral disengagement might be important factors in the enjoyment of such fare. The current study builds on this work. A sample of 101 self-identified fans and nonfans of the television series 24 viewed a condensed version of Season 1, providing evaluation of various protagonist perceptions, moral judgments, and emotional responses to the narrative, as (...) well as overall enjoyment. As expected, fans reported greater liking of the protagonist and greater enjoyment. But more importantly, regression analyses illuminated key differences between the groups in terms of the factors predicting enjoyment, providing a clearer picture of how we enjoy antihero narratives. (shrink)

Solidarität ist einer der zentralen normativen Begriffe in Zeiten der Corona-Pandemie. Vor dem Hintergrund der philosophischen Debatte um Solidarität wird eine Heuristik entlang der Unterscheidung einer sozial-, politisch-philosophischen und ethischen Perspektive vorgeschlagen. Anhand dieser Heuristik wird der gegenwärtige gesellschaftliche Diskurs um Solidarität in der Pandemie rekonstruiert, analysiert und kritisiert. Solidarität, so die These, wird in Corona-Zeiten auf ihre soziale Dimension enggeführt, was einerseits zur Mobilisierung von Gemeinschaften und der Eindämmung der Pandemie führt, andererseits aber auch zu Schließungen und Exklusionen nach (...) innen und außen. Indem Politik als evidenzbasierte und alternativlose Technik etabliert wird, vollzieht sich eine fortschreitende Entpolitisierung, durch die soziale Ungleichheit sowohl lokal als auch global oft unhinterfragt reproduziert wird. Demgegenüber diskutiert der Beitrag mit Rückgriff auf Arendts Begriff des Politischen ein alternatives Verständnis von Solidarität in Zeiten der Pandemie. Dieses baut auf sozialer Relationalität auf und kritisiert eine mechanistische Logik des Politischen. Mit Arendt werden die Pluralität, das kritische Denken und der Neuanfang als zentrale Elemente des Politischen angesichts von Krisen betont. Dadurch wird das Konzept der Solidarität um eine politische Dimension erweitert und ein produktiver Umgang mit den gegenwärtigen Schließungen und Exklusionen in der Corona-Pandemie vorgeschlagen. Schließlich können die durch die Pandemie offenkundiger gewordenen Krisen des Kapitalismus und Liberalismus reflektiert und das Politische als ein offen-diskursiver Raum jenseits eng gefasster Grenzen neu gedacht werden. (shrink)

The ethical behavior prevalent in an organization often determines business success or failure. Much research in the business context has scrutinized ethical behavior, but there are still few insights into its roots; this study furthers this line of inquiry. In line with identity work theory, we examine how employees’ identification with a family business shapes internal ethical decision-making processes. Because it is individuals who engage in decision-making—be it ethical or not—our research perspective centers on the individual level. We followed an (...) inductive, qualitative approach and conducted interviews with 19 employees in seven family businesses. We found that individuals engage in identity work when they identify as individual family firm employees and when they identify with the perceived characteristics of the family firm. These processes of identification, in turn, influence how employees cope with ethical situations. Our findings contribute to ethics and family business research, as well as to identity theory. (shrink)

A clinical trial on mitochondrial replacement therapy is currently being conducted and if this technique proves effective, National Health Service England will fund MRT through the highly specialised services funding stream. This paper considers whether MRT should be publicly funded by the NHS. Given the current financial pressure the NHS is experiencing, a comprehensive discussion is essential. There is yet to be a thorough discussion on MRT funding, perhaps because this is a small-scale issue and presumed to be covered by (...) the HSS budget. However, the source of funding has not been confirmed due to the trial’s incompletion. Upon its completion, reasoned decisions need to be made over the allocation of scarce NHS resources. It is therefore important to consider the following arguments in advance. Three arguments given against NHS funding of MRT will be evaluated. The first argument against NHS funding examines the HSS overspending its budget in an underfunded NHS, suggesting funding must be carefully reprioritised. Second, the ethical issue of allowing public access to a technique with insufficient evidence behind it will be explored. The final point considers the option of privately funding MRT and how this would affect the treatment’s development. After illustrating the weaknesses of such arguments, it will be concluded that MRT should be funded by the NHS. (shrink)

L’objet de cet article est de chercher à dissiper le flou dont souffre le concept d’afición dans le champ du flamenco. L’une des raisons de ce flou est que le concept d’afición s’avère porteur des mêmes ambiguïtés que celui d’amateurisme. On commence alors par rappeler les deux thèses dominantes au sujet de l’afición : une première l’assimile à la passion, une deuxième en fait un mélange de passion et de respect. On montre cependant les limites communes à ces deux thèses (...) : à savoir, un sensualisme qui réduit l’afición à un mode de relation exclusivement sensoriel, sensible et émotionnel au flamenco, et un purisme qui masque l’hybridité des pratiques. On en vient ensuite à recenser les quelques typologies qui ont pu être établies pour rendre compte de la réalité complexe et variée qu’est l’afición. Mais au constat relativiste auquel elles conduisent, on oppose finalement la construction d’une définition prototypique de l’afición. Celle-ci apparaît comme une tendance à éprouver la passion pour un art tendant à exprimer lui-même la passion, soit ce qu’on peut appeler une passion au carré. (shrink)

Business Ethics, the Environment &Responsibility, Volume 33, Issue 3, Page 392-415, July 2024.

Context can determine whether a given gene acts as an oncogene or a tumor suppressor. Deubiquitinating enzymes (DUBs) regulate the stability of many components of the pathways dictating cell fate so it would be expected that alterations in the levels or activity of these enzymes may have oncogenic or tumor suppressive consequences. In the current review we survey publications reporting that genes encoding DUBs are oncogenes or tumor suppressors. For many DUBs both claims have been made. For such “double agents,” (...) the effects of gain or loss of function will depend on the overall status of a complex of molecular signaling networks subject to extensive crosstalk. As the TGF‐β paradox makes clear context is critical in cell fate decisions, and the disconnect between experimental findings and patient survival outcomes can in part be attributed to disparities between culture conditions and the microenvironment in vivo. Convincing claims for oncogene or tumor suppressor roles require the documentation of gene alterations in patient samples; survival curves are alone inadequate. (shrink)

Rawls considers the sense of justice as one of the conditions essential for the stability of a well-ordered society. This book interrogates the nature of this moral sense and tests its capacity to found a "realistic utopia", drawing on philosophical critics and the social sciences.

Dans cet article, nous cherchons à penser les enjeux philosophiques et politiques de l’application des méthodes interprétatives en histoire de la philosophie politique. À partir d’une étude de l’interprétation de Machiavel développée par Quentin Skinner, nous interrogeons la relation entre l’exposition théorique de sa méthodologie et son application effective à la pensée machiavélienne. Dans un premier temps, nous exposons les fondements du contextualisme skinnérien, en insistant d’une part sur sa critique des méthodes orthodoxes en histoire des idées, et d’autre part, (...) sur sa conception de l’intentionnalité d’un auteur du passé et sur la relation étroite entre théorie politique et vie politique qu’elle présuppose. Dans un second temps, nous analysons la mise en œuvre de cette méthode à partir du cas Machiavel, en illustrant les résultats féconds ainsi que les limites d’une telle théorie interprétative. Nous terminons par une analyse critique du projet politique qui sous-tend l’application de cette herméneutique. La thèse défendue est que la relation entre la dimension méthodologique et la dimension proprement politique de l’entreprise skinnérienne est marquée par une certaine tension. D’un côté, Skinner affirme que l’historien ne peut, et ne doit, retirer de leçons intemporelles de l’étude des auteurs du passé; la notion même de continuité entre les époques – l’idée d’une « grande Tradition » – serait un leurre. De l’autre, il critique la conception négative de la liberté mise de l’avant par des auteurs tels que John Rawls ou Isaiah Berlin, et propose une vision renouvelée du républicanisme qui puiserait à la source machiavélienne et permettrait de réconcilier liberté individuelle et participation citoyenne. En explorant tour à tour ces deux volets et l’articulation parfois problématique entre les deux, nous interrogeons la nature de cette équivoque entre les visées méthodologiques de Skinner en tant qu’historien des idées et son propos en tant que théoricien politique. (shrink)

In many judicial systems, confessions are a requirement for criminal conviction. Even if confessions are intrinsically convincing, this might not entirely explain why they play such a paramount role. In addition, it has been suggested that confessions owe their importance to their legitimizing role, explaining why they could be required even when other evidence has convinced a judge. But why would confessions be particularly suited to justify verdicts? One possibility is that they can be more easily transmitted from one individual (...) to the next, and thus spread in the population without losing their convincingness. 360 English-speaking participants were asked to evaluate the convincingness of one of three justifications for a verdict, grounded either in a confession, eyewitnesses, or circumstantial evidence, and to pass on that justification to another participant, who performed the same task. Then, 240 English-speaking participants evaluated the convincingness of some of the justifications produced by the first group of participants. Compared to the other justifications, justifications based on confessions lost less of their convincingness in the transmission process. Modeling pointed to the most common forms the justifications would take as they are transmitted, and results showed that the most common variant of the justification based on a confession was more convincing. (shrink)

Sophie Grace Chappell develops a picture of what philosophical ethics can be like, once set aside from the idealising and reductive pressures of conventional moral theory. Her question is 'How are we to know what to do?', and the answer she defends is 'By developing our moral imaginations'.

Cet ouvrage collectif porte sur la place qu’occupent les femmes dans différentes parties de l’Empire romain d’Orient hellénophone. Il résulte de trois rencontres scientifiques organisées dans le cadre du programme GRECS d’ANIHMA entre 2012 et 2014. Comme l’explique Sophie Lalanne dans son introduction, le volume ne reflète que partiellement le contenu de ces rencontres ; l’éditrice formule d’ailleurs des réflexions intéressantes sur la place de l’histoire des femmes et du genre dans le domain...

The Routledge Handbook of Emergence is an outstanding reference source and exploration of the concept of emergence, and is the first collection of its kind.

Many views rely on the idea that it can never be rational to have high confidence in something like, “P, but my evidence doesn’t support P.” Call this idea the “Non-Akrasia Constraint”. Just as an akratic agent acts in a way she believes she ought not act, an epistemically akratic agent believes something that she believes is unsupported by her evidence. The Non-Akrasia Constraint says that ideally rational agents will never be epistemically akratic. In a number of recent papers, the (...) Non-Akrasia Constraint has been called into question. The goal of this paper is to defend it... for the most part. (shrink)

Mental causation has been a hotly disputed topic in recent years, with reductive and non-reductive physicalists vying with each other and with dualists over how to accommodate, or else to challenge, two widely accepted metaphysical principles—the principle of the causal closure of the physical domain and the principle of causal non-overdetermination—which together appear to support reductive physicalism, despite the latter’s lack of intuitive appeal. Current debate about these matters appears to have reached something of an impasse, prompting the question of (...) why this should be so. One possibility well worth exploring is that, while this debate makes extensive use of ontological vocabulary—by talking, for instance, of substances, events, states, properties, powers, and relations—relatively little attempt has been made within the debate itself to achieve either clarity or agreement about what, precisely, such terms should be taken to mean. Hence, the debate has become somewhat detached from broader developments in metaphysics and ontology, which have lately been proceeding apace, providing us with an increasingly rich and refined set of ontological categories upon which to draw, as well as a much deeper understanding of how they are related to one another. In preparing this volume, the editors invited leading metaphysicians and philosophers of mind to reflect afresh upon the problem of mental causation in the light of some of these recent developments, with a view to making new headway with one of the most challenging and seemingly intractable issues in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

Believing rationally is epistemically valuable, or so we tend to think. It’s something we strive for in our own beliefs, and we criticize others for falling short of it. We theorize about rationality, in part, because we want to be rational. But why? I argue that how we answer this question depends on how permissive our theory of rationality is. Impermissive and extremely permissive views can give good answers; moderately permissive views cannot.

Epistemologists often assume that rationality bears an important connection to the truth. In this paper I examine the implications of this commitment for permissivism: if rationality is a guide to the truth, can it also allow some leeway in how we should respond to our evidence? I first discuss a particular strategy for connecting permissive rationality and the truth, developed in a recent paper by Miriam Schoenfield. I argue that this limited truth-connection is unsatisfying, and the version of permissivism that (...) supports it faces serious challenges; so, for mainstream permissivism, the truth problem is still unsolved. I then discuss a strategy available to impermissivists, according to which rationality bears a quite strong connection to truth. I argue that this second strategy is successful. (shrink)

What determines qualitative sameness and difference? This book explores four principal accounts of the ontological basis of properties, including universals, trope theory, resemblance nominalism, and class nominalism, considering the assumptions and ontolological commitments which are required to make each into a plausible account of properties. -/- The latter half of the book investigates the applications of property theory and the different conceptions of properties which might be adopted with these in mind: first, the possibility and desirability of individuating properties, and (...) the distinction between sparse and abundant conceptions of properties; second, the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic properties; third, the relationship between properties and their causal powers, and whether this is necessary or contingent; fourth, the relationship between properties and causation, modality, and laws of nature; finally, whether properties exist objectively, and if they do, what our epistemic position is with respect to such entities. (shrink)

According to a grand narrative that long ago ceased to be told, there was a seventeenth century Scientific Revolution, during which a few heroes conquered nature thanks to mathematics. This grand narrative began with the exhibition of quantitative laws that these heroes, Galileo and Newton for example, had disclosed: the law of falling bodies, according to which the speed of a falling body is proportional to the square of the time that has elapsed since the beginning of its fall; the (...) law of gravitation, according to which two bodies are attracted to one another in proportion to the sum of their masses and in inverse proportion to the square of the distance separating them -- according to his own preferences, each narrator added one or two quantitative laws of this kind. The essential feature was not so much the examples that were chosen, but, rather, the more or less explicit theses that accompanied them. First, mathematization would be taken as the criterion for distinguishing between a qualitative Aristotelian philosophy and the new quantitative physics. Secondly, mathematization was founded on the metaphysical conviction that the world was created pondere, numero et mensura, or that the ultimate components of natural things are triangles, circles, and other geometrical objects. This metaphysical conviction had two immediate consequences: that all the phenomena of nature can be in principle submitted to mathematics and that mathematical language is transparent; it is the language of nature itself and has simply to be picked up at the surface of phenomena. Finally, it goes without saying that, from a social point of view, the evolution of the sciences was apprehended through what has been aptly called the "relay runner model," according to which science progresses as a result of individual discoveries. Grand narratives such as this are perhaps simply fictions doomed to ruin as soon as they are clearly expressed. In any case, the very assumption on which this grand narrative relies can be brought into question: even in the canonical domain of mechanics, the relevant epistemological units crucial to understanding the dynamics of the Scientific Revolution are perhaps not a few laws of motion, but a complex set of problems embodied in mundane objects. Moreover, each of the theses just mentioned was actually challenged during the long period of historiographical reappraisal, out of which we have probably not yet stepped. Against the sharp distinction between a qualitative Aristotelian philosophy and the new quantitative physics, numerous studies insist that Rome wasn't built in a day, so to speak. Since Antiquity, there have always been mixed sciences; the emergence of pre-classical mechanics depends on both medieval treatises and the practical challenges met by Renaissance engineers. It is indeed true that, for Aristotle, mathematics merely captures the superficial properties of things, but the Aristotelianisms were many during the Renaissance and the Early Modern period, with some of them being compatible with the introduction of mathematics in natural philosophy. In addition, the gap between the alleged program of mathematizing nature and its effective realization was underlined as most natural phenomena actually escaped mathematization; at best they were enrolled in what Thomas Kuhn began to rehabilitate under the appellation of the "Baconian sciences," i.e., empirical investigations aiming at establishing isolated facts, without relating them to any overarching theory. Hence, mathematization of nature cannot pretend to capture a historical fact: at most, it expresses an indeterminate task for generations to come. On top of these first two considerations, and against the thesis of the neutrality of the mathematical language, it was urged that mathematics is not "only a language" and that, exactly as other symbolic means or cognitive tools, it has its own constraints. For example, it has been thoroughly explained that the Euclidean theory of proportions both guides and frustrates the Galilean analysis of motion; its shortages were particularly clear with respect to the expression of continuity, which is crucial in the case of motion. Consequently, when calculus was invented and applied to the analysis of motion, it was not a transposition that left things as they stood. Even more clearly than in the case of a translation from one natural language to another, the shift from one symbolic language to another entails that certain possibilities are opened while others are closed. The cognitive constraints imposed by established mathematical theories, as seen in the theory of proportions or calculus, were not the only ones to be studied in relation to mathematization. Certain schemes dependent on the grammar of natural languages, e.g., the scheme of contrariety, or certain symbolic means of representation, e.g. geometrical diagrams and numerical tables, were also subject to such scrutiny. Lastly, it was insisted that, even if we concede the existence of scientific geniuses, mathematics is largely produced by intellectual communities and embedded within social practices. More attention was consequently paid to the forms of communication in given mathematical networks, or to the teaching of the discipline in, for example, Jesuit colleges and universities. The set of mathematical practices specific to specialized craftsmen, highly-qualified experts and engineers began to be studied in its own right. All these reflections may have helped us change our perspectives on the question of mathematization. It seems, however, that they were instead set aside, both because of a general distrust towards sweeping narratives that are always subject to the suspicion that they overlook the unyielding complexity of real history, and because of a shift in our interests. The more obscure and idiosyncratic they are, an alchemist, a patron of the sciences or a lunatic collector is nowadays honored in journals of the history of sciences. As for the general issues involved in the question of mathematization, they are rejected as obsolete, or reserved for specialized journals in the history of mathematics. Consequently, before presenting the essays of this fascicle, I would like to say a few words in favor of a renewed study of the forms of mathematization in the history of the early sciences. (shrink)

Credences, unlike full beliefs, can’t be true or false. So what makes credences more or less accurate? This chapter offers a new answer to this question: credences are accurate insofar as they license true educated guesses, and less accurate insofar as they license false educated guesses. This account is compatible with immodesty; : a rational agent will regard her own credences to be best for the purposes of making true educated guesses. The guessing account can also be used to justify (...) certain coherence constraints on rational credence, such as probabilism. The chapter concludes by discussing some advantages of the guessing account over rival accounts of accuracy. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans la revue Sociologie, N° 4, vol. 4 | 2014. Nous remercions Sophie Dubuisson-Quellier et Marie Plessz de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. Résumé : La théorie des pratiques est un courant d'analyse qui s'est développé en Grande-Bretagne et dans les pays scandinaves dans les années 2000. L'analyse de pratiques de consommation est l'un de ses domaines de prédilection. Se réclamant de Bourdieu et de Giddens, elle s'oppose à la fois aux analyses (...) de la consommation reposant sur (...) - Sociologie – Nouvel article. (shrink)

William James famously tells us that there are two main goals for rational believers: believing truth and avoiding error. I argues that epistemic consequentialism—in particular its embodiment in epistemic utility theory—seems to be well positioned to explain how epistemic agents might permissibly weight these goals differently and adopt different credences as a result. After all, practical versions of consequentialism render it permissible for agents with different goals to act differently in the same situation. -/- Nevertheless, I argue that epistemic consequentialism (...) doesn’t allow for this kind of permissivism and goes on to argue that this reveals a deep disanalogy between decision theory and the formally similar epistemic utility theory. This raises the question whether epistemic utility theory is a genuinely consequentialist theory at all. (shrink)

Epiphanies is a philosophical exploration of epiphanies, peak experiences, 'wow moments', or ecstasies as they are sometimes called. What are epiphanies, and why do so many people so frequently experience them? Are they just transient phenomena in our brains, or are they the revelations of objective value that they very often seem to be? What do they tell us about the world, and about ourselves? How, if at all, do epiphanies fit in with our moral systems and our theories of (...) how to live? And how do epiphanic experiences fit in with the rest of our lives? These are Sophie Grace Chappell's questions in this ground-breaking new study of an area of inquiry that has always been right under our noses, but remains surprisingly under-explored in contemporary philosophy. (shrink)

"La philosophie d'Emmanuel Levinas est souvent présentée comme une philosophie de l'éthique et fut associée à des notions telles que le visage, autrui ou la responsabilité. Or, ces notions peuvent être comprises à partir d'un primat accordé au temps. Levinas propose en effet une philosophie du temps dans un dialogue avec d'autres pensées (Lavelle, Bergson, Rosenzweig, Husserl, Heidegger). Rappelant combien les premiers écrits de Levinas délivrent une philosophie du sujet et de l'instant, l'ouvrage se propose d'expliquer le développement de cette (...) philosophie et de son éthique à partir de son rapport à la temporalité. Si autrui délivre l'avenir sur le mode du désir, Sophie Galabru montre comment, à partir de 1963, autrui s'aborde chez Levinas comme un passé immémorial et impose la violence des remords et de la culpabilité. C'est donc tout le sens et le rythme du désir qui se trouvent radicalement infléchis."--Page 4 de la couverture. (shrink)

La philosophie doit-elle, aujourd'hui encore, quelque chose à la langue, à la culture et à la pensée grecques? Sophie Klimis, en s’entretenant avec Frank Pierobon, réfléchit sur ces manières de penser et ces nouvelles formes de vie, inventées en Grèce ancienne, conjointement à l’émergence du projet politique de la démocratie. Elle propose un voyage vers ces temps lointains et toujours inspirants, pour en percevoir les ressources, notamment en montrant comment des dispositifs institutionnels et symboliques – dont ceux du choeur (...) dans le théâtre – structurent la Cité et forment ses citoyens. (shrink)

Ce texte a déjà paru dans Arno Böhler, Christian Herzog, Alice Pechriggl , Korporale Performanz, Zur bedeutungsgenerierenden Dimension des Leibes, Bielefeld, Transcript, 2013, S. 87-106. Nous remercions Sophie Klimis de nous avoir autorisé à le reproduire ici. To introduce my speech, I must make three preliminary methodological remarks. The first is that I will express myself in English, which is neither my mother tongue, nor yours. As I have never lived in an English-speaking country, I - Pour une éthique (...) et une politique du rythme – Nouvel article. (shrink)

Philosophical discussion on control has largely centred around control over our actions and beliefs. Yet this overlooks the question of whether we also have control over the reasons for which we act and believe. To date, the overriding assumption appears to be that we do not, and with seemingly good reason. We cannot choose to act for a reason and acting-for-a-reason is not itself something we do. While some have challenged this in the case of reasons for action, these claims (...) seem especially untenable regarding believing for a reason. And extending the scope of control in this way also faces the threat of regress. In the face of this orthodoxy, the present paper argues that we do in fact have control over both believing and acting for a particular reason. It also starts to develop an account of the way in which this would be possible. Given the broad importance of understanding control and agency, this paper bears on a number of topics in epistemology, the philosophy of mind, and ethics. (shrink)