Receiving a diagnosis of autism in adulthood can be a life changing event, impacting identity, relationships, and mental health. A lack of post-diagnostic support has been highlighted by autistic adults, their allies, clinicians, and service providers. It can be a source of distress for autistic adults, reinforcing feelings of social isolation and rejection. Peer support could be a cost-effective, flexible, and sustainable model to provide community-based support for autistic adults. However, there is little research on the value of peer support, (...) despite calls from the autistic community. This qualitative study explored autistic experiences and needs post-diagnosis, identifying specific ways that peer support may benefit them, and exploring the limitations of peer support. Twelve autistic adults who had all received an autism diagnosis in adulthood completed a semi-structured interview focussing on the diagnostic experience, post-diagnostic support needed and provided, engagement with the autistic community, and post-diagnostic peer support. Thematic analysis of interview transcripts resulted in four themes: Mismatch in support needed and provided; Community connection; Flexible and personalised support; and Sustainability. Participants indicated that peer support may be a useful mechanism to support autistic adults’ post-diagnosis and offers unique opportunities not available through other support channels. Though informal peer support exists, it could be more sustainable and effective if well-supported and funded. (shrink)

This article shows the success of local cultural adaptation strategies in communicating the gospel to people of the Nias ethnicity in North Sumatra, Indonesia. This adaptation is the name Lowalangi, the name of the god of the pre-Christian era, to become the name of God, the creator and saviour of the world incarnated in the person of Jesus Christ. As a result, the use of this name was not limited to a translation process. Still, the whole concept of divinity for (...) the Nias people was transferred and transformed into a Christian understanding. They know him as Lowalangi, have faith in him and pray to him in that name. The author uses a comparative analysis with other places in Indonesia. The author tries to establish parallelism with methods used elsewhere, assuming that the methods used tend to be the same. Contribution: Churches and Christians in Nias are strengthened in their beliefs by praying and mentioning Lowalangi’s name, which imparts the same faith quality as the biblical use of God’s personal name. This adaptation can be a strategy for introducing the gospel in missiology and church planting in response to local culture as a wealth that cannot be negated. This research also has implications for the sociology of religion regarding the relationship between tradition and religious practice. (shrink)

Charting a "middle way" between the extremes represented by Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne, Garth Hallett explores the thesis that if belief in other minds is rational and true (as it surely is), so too is belief in God. He makes a strong case that when this parity claim is appropriately restricted to a single, sound other-minds belief, belief in God and belief in other minds do prove epistemically comparable. This result, and the distinctive path that leads to it, (...) will interest students and scholars in philosophy of religion and theology. (shrink)

Charting a "middle way" between the extremes represented by Alvin Plantinga and Richard Swinburne, Garth Hallett explores the thesis that if belief in other minds is rational and true, so too is belief in God. He makes a strong case that when this parity claim is appropriately restricted to a single, sound other-minds belief, belief in God and belief in other minds do prove epistemically comparable. This result, and the distinctive path that leads to it, will interest students and (...) scholars in philosophy of religion and theology. (shrink)

Fear is a social phenomenon that develops in people facing a crisis, such as a pandemic. For instance, the entire world is currently exposed to Covid-19 pandemic, causing great fear. In the Bible, Jesus’ disciples were terrified of sinking in their boat during a storm. Although these two scenarios are different, the response is the same. Fear produces stress and anxiety disorders when not appropriately managed. This paper examines the causes of fear and how they can be addressed. Specifically, the (...) study involves determining the cause of fear and proposing a strategy based on Hope, as described by Erich in the book Revolution of Hope which positively correlates with building fortitude and endurance. Surrendering or persisting is a dialectical choice, though theology fear does not give chances. Instead, Humans only survive by depending on God. This research was involved literature reviews by utilizing reference sources, including books, journal articles, and other scientific content. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:36 Feminist Studies 45, no. 1. © 2019 by Feminist Studies, Inc. Sonny Nordmarken Queering Gendering: Trans Epistemologies and the Disruption and Production of Gender Accomplishment Practices Those who are deemed “unreal” nevertheless lay hold of the real, a laying hold that happens in concert, and a vital instability is produced by that performative surprise. —Judith Butler, Gender Trouble Beginning in the 1960s, scholars began to theorize gender (...) as a contextually specific process rather than a universal category reflecting an essential pre-discursive sex. Two interrelated traditions developed: a discursive approach, which theorized gender as performative, and an interactionist approach, which investigated the interactional achievement of gender. For Judith Butler, “what we take to be an internal essence of gender is manufactured through a sustained set of acts, posited through the gendered stylization of the body.”1 Gender is therefore performative : it is a series of effects produced through the repetition and citation of stylized acts, which are named via and thus produced through discourse ; discourse also produces the defining limits of subjects.2 Candace West and Don Zimmerman theorized gender as a “routine, methodical, 1. Judith Butler, Gender Trouble, 10th anniversary ed. (New York: Routledge, 1999), xv. 2. Butler, Gender Trouble; Judith Butler, Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993); Judith Butler, Undoing Gender (New York: Routledge, 2004). Sonny Nordmarken 37 and recurring accomplishment” produced in social interaction.3 They observed how, in the relational process of “doing gender,” social actors display gender, presenting an appearance to others, who attribute gender by interpreting this appearance. In this article, I investigate how actors interactionally challenge and construct discursive structures in order to contribute to scholarship that analyzes the role language plays in such interactions.4 Following Sandy Stone, who suggests that transsexuals are not a class, nor a third gender, but a genre, “a set of embodied texts,” who, through their interpretation, might potentially disrupt dichotomous sexuality and gender categories, I examine the spaces in which the discursive and the interactional merge to investigate how gender minorities, as simultaneous subjects, texts, social actors, and cultural workers, queer hegemonic gender practices.5 I argue that members of trans linguistic communities and gender nonconforming individuals queer the normative gender process in two ways: by productively linguistically communicating third-person gender pronouns and by disruptively inhibiting gender’s hegemonic attribution. Lal Zimman has made parallel observations, explaining linguistic gender self-determination practices as a new cultural phenomenon, focusing on terminology for types of gendered persons, grammatical gender forms (i.e., pronouns), and lexical items that relate to embodied sex.6 My analysis builds on Zimman’s observations using sociological, performance 3. Candace West and Don H. Zimmerman, “Doing Gender,” Gender & Society 1, no. 2 (1987): 126. 4. For example, see Mimi Schippers, “Recovering the Feminine Other: Masculinity, Femininity, and Gender Hegemony,” Theory and Society 36, no. 1 (2007): 85–102. 5. Sandy Stone, “The Empire Strikes Back: A Posttranssexual Manifesto,” in Body Guards: The Cultural Politics of Gender Ambiguity, ed. Julia Epstein and Kristina Straub (New York: Routledge, 1991), 296. The term “gender minorities ” encompasses individuals identifying with gender identity terms other than those they were assigned and individuals with gender nonconforming appearance. 6. See Lal Zimman, “Transgender Language Reform: Some Challenges and Strategies for Promoting Trans-affirming, Gender-Inclusive Language,” Journal of Language and Discrimination 1, no. 1 (2017): 84–105; Lal Zimman, “Trans People’s Linguistic Self-Determination and the Dialogic Nature of Identity,” in Representing Trans: Linguistic, Legal, and Everyday Perspectives, ed. Evan Hazenberg and Miriam Meyerhoff (Wellington, New Zealand: Victoria University Press, 2017). 38 Sonny Nordmarken studies and performativity frameworks to theorize these practices. By approximating new gender pronoun-attribution norms that bring a trans queer paradigm to life in interactions and by disregarding their perceptions of each other’s bodies, actors accomplish gender pronouns linguistically, override hegemonic gender attribution norms, and reorganize gender accountability. These practices institutionalize a new interpretive frame and accountability structure through which social actors create and recognize a variety of gender expressions, identities, and pronouns, reworking performativity to produce gender minorities as subjects. I argue that this gendering-queering is a form of disidentificatory gender accomplishment. In addition, I... (shrink)

Since its first publication in 1961 E.H. Carr's What is History? has established itself as the classic introduction to the subject. Ranging across topics such as historical objectivity, society and the individual, the nature of causation, and the possibility of progress, Carr delivered an incisive text that still has power to provoke debate today. For this fortieth anniversary reissue, Richard J. Evans has written an extensive new introduction that discusses the origins and the impact of the book, and assesses its (...) relevance in the age of the 21st century postmodernism and epistemological anxiety. (shrink)

The global environmental crisis and resulting disasters today have threatened life in general, especially human life. According to Fritjof Capra, one feasible solution to this global environmental crisis is to build sustainable human communities based on what he calls ecological literacy. Ecological literacy itself stands for our ability to understand the principles of organization common to all living systems and is used as a guideline for creating sustainable human communities. Capra underlines the need to redesign our communities, including our educational (...) communities, business communities, political communities and all aspects of our daily life, so that the principles of ecology become principles of all our human communities. For Capra, the implementation of such a sustainable society is possible to achieve through the so-called eco-design, which is both scientifically and technically feasible. Nonetheless, the success of the major project to develop a sustainable eco-literate society does not simply depend on the individual awareness of eco-literacy. It also depends on the political will of the government to issue public policies—including legislation—to force all stakeholders to act in accordance with, and based on, ecoliteracy. Keywords: Ecological literacy, ecological principles, sustainable human community, eco-design, sautopoesis dissipative systems, natural capital. Abstrak: Krisis dan bencana lingkungan hidup global telah mengancam kehidupan pada umumnya, termasuk kehidupan manusia. Menurut Fritjof Capra, salah satu solusi untuk mengatasi krisis dan bencana lingkungan hidup global itu adalah dengan membangun masyarakat manusia yang berkelanjutan berdasarkan apa yang disebutnya sebagai melek ekologi, yaitu kemampuan kita untuk memahami prinsip-prinsip pengorganisasi yang berlaku pada semua sistem kehidupan dan menggunakannya sebagai pedoman dalam menciptakan masyarakat yang berkelanjutan. Capra sangat menekankan perlunya merancang ulang komunitas-komunitas kita, termasuk komunitas pendidikan, komunitas bisnis, komunitas politik, dan seluruh kehidupan kita sehari-hari, agar prinsip-prinsip ekologis tersebut diwujudkan sebagai prinsip dari komunitas-komunitas tersebut. Bagi Capra, implementasi dari masyarakat berkelanjutan seperti itu dapat dicapai melalui apa yang disebutnya sebagai rancang bangun ekologis (eco-design) yang secara ilmiah dan teknis sangat layak diterapkan. Hanya saja, keberhasilan proyek besar membangun masyarakat berkelanjutan berdasarkan melek ekologi ini tidak hanya bergantung pada kesadaran moral individu akan melek ekologi di atas. Keberhasilan proyek besar itu juga sangat bergantung pada kemauan politik pemerintah untuk mengeluarkan kebijakan publik—termasuk undang-undang—guna memaksa semua pemangku kepentingan untuk bertindak sesuai dengan dan berdasarkan kesadaran ekologis tadi. Kata-kata Kunci: Melek ekologi, prinsip-prinsip ekologi, masyarakat berkelanjutan, rancang bangun ekologis, sistem autopoesis disipatif, modal alam. (shrink)

This paper treats some of the issues raised by Putnam's discussion of, and claims for, quantum logic, specifically: that its proposal is a response to experimental difficulties; that it is a reasonable replacement for classical logic because its connectives retain their classical meanings, and because it can be derived as a logic of tests. We argue that the first claim is wrong (1), and that while conjunction and disjunction can be considered to retain their classical meanings, negation crucially does not. (...) The argument is conducted via a thorough analysis of how the meet, join and complementation operations are defined in the relevant logical structures, respectively Boolean- and ortholattices (3). Since Putnam wishes to reinstate a realist interpretation of quantum mechanics, we ask how quantum logic can be a logic of realism. We show that it certainly cannot be a logic of bivalence realism (i.e., of truth and falsity), although it is consistent with some form of ontological realism (4). Finally, we show that while a reasonable explication of the idealized notion of test yields interesting mathematical structure, it by no means yields the rich ortholattice structure which Putnam (following Finkelstein) seeks. (shrink)

In a very famous analysis and panegyric of the philosopher, Plato claimed that he is a man magnificent in mind and the spectator of all time and all existence. These are great words, and words made venerable by ancient repute and centuries of citation. Unfortunately, however, like many such utterances they can only be regarded as hyperbolic and rhetorical; and in an age that, failing in inspiration and fecundity of intuition, seeks at least to be precise, thay must suffer limitation. (...) For the lumen siccum of reason shows that the phrase “all time” involves a contradiction, and that the human mind, by nature limited both in amplitude and in profundity. (shrink)

The subject on which I am to address you this evening is one which, though it is of fundamental importance both for philosophy and for practice, cannot but present the gravest difficulties for such treatment as falls within the limits of this occasion. Philosophical problems are always difficult, but those of ultimate metaphysics are in this respect egregious. For the simplifications that are open to the scientific phenomenologist who can rest content with a spatiotemporal world, or to the analyst who (...) concentrates on the objective content with which the human understanding most conspicuously concerns itself, are not open to the metaphysician. He must meet the full complexity of things: not limiting himself to their appearances as objects within human experience, nor to a reflective analysis of their objective content, but taking them as they must be in themselves in order that they may appear as they empirically and reflectively do appear for the special cognitive faculties of man. I ask, therefore, for your patience and attention as I try first of all to lead you into, and then, as I hope, out of, the metaphysical labyrinth. For what I have to describe is something of a metaphysical adventure, or, if you like, a metaphysical ghoststory, in which the ghosts assume such reality as to make the solid things “give up the ghost”—which is just as it should be in a good ghost-story! (shrink)

Prima facie knowledge is an ineradicable monster. Conceived as a relation of a mind to objects extrinsic to it, it is chimerical: for knowledge, as such, is of the real , i.e. of things as they are in se ; but the prima facie form of knowledge precludes this. Its object is a thing apprehended ab extra , i.e. as referred to a subject to which it is extrinsic. To seek to escape this impasse either by making the object intrinsic (...) to the subject, or the subject a function of the object, is to reject the prima facie character of knowledge as a relation of compresent terms. The incoherence of prima facie knowledge is that its object must be both extrinsic and intrinsic to mind—extrinsic as independently real, intrinsic as known—yet can be neither : not extrinsic since thus its inseitas is occulted, not intrinsic since thus truth is mere appearance. And this chimaera becomes a monster because knowledge is also ineradicable. We cannot know that knowledge is impossible; and, though we may be in doubt about its extancy, that very doubt is epistemic in form. It is our acceptance of the demands of knowledge that lies at the basis of our doubt; and this applies not only to legitimate doubt about the extancy of knowledge, but also to chimerical doubt about its possibility. Doubt is an inchoation of knowledge, which is thus ineradicable. (shrink)

This panel study assessed changes in ethical ideology and beliefs about the societal function of media over the course of undergraduate communication education in Singapore. First, students' agreement with the ethical principles of truth telling, independence, and accountability increased. Second, change in agreement with the ethical principle of minimizing harm was negatively related to change in justification of contentious newsgathering methods. Third, belief that the media should function as a watchdog increased and that it should serve national development decreased. Change (...) in these variables was inversely correlated. We relate these findings to global contexts and make recommendations for curriculum development. (shrink)

Is practical reason a cognitive faculty? Do practical judgments make claims about a subject matter that are appropriately assessed in terms of their agreement with that subject matter? According to Kantians like Christine Korsgaard, the answer is no. To think otherwise is to conflate the theoretical and the practical, the epistemic and the ethical. I am not convinced. In this paper, I motivate my skepticism through examination of the very figure who inspires Korsgaard’s rejection of cognitivism: Kant. For as I (...) read him, Kant does not construe the distinction between theoretical and practical reason in terms of a distinction between cognitive and non-cognitive faculties but in terms of two distinct applications of a single faculty of reason, which is through-and-through cognitive. Thus, practical, no less than theoretical, reason cognizes a subject matter, and so practical, no less than theoretical, reason is straightforwardly subject to familiar epistemic standards of truth, warrant, and knowledge. Of course, even if I am right about Kant, this does not show that Korsgaard is wrong about reason; and I will offer no direct argument against her position here. Nonetheless, I believe that reflection on Kant’s true view, with its careful treatment of and respect for both the practicality and rationality of reason, should perhaps lead us to rethink what it means to be a rationalist in ethics. (shrink)

Traditionally, Kantian ethics has been thought hostile to agents' well-being. Recent commentators have rightly called this view into question, but they do not push their challenge far enough. For they leave in place a fundamental assumption on which the traditional view rests, viz., that happiness is all there is to well-being. This assumption is important, since, combined with Kant’s rationalism about morality and empiricism about happiness, it implies that morality and well-being are at best extrinsically related. Since morality can only (...) make our lives go well by making us happy, and since morality can only make us happy by influencing our sensibility, morality is not its own reward--not really. It is simply the condition for some separate benefit. Drawing on Kant’s underappreciated discussion of self-contentment, an intellectual analog of happiness, I reconstruct an alternative account of morality’s relation to well-being. Morality does make our lives go well--and so is its own reward--not because it makes us happy but because it makes us self-contented. (shrink)

I offer a qualified defence of Kant’s natural teleological argument, that is, his inference from the (un)naturalness of an act to its (im)morality. Though I reject many of Kant’s conclusions, I think the form of argument he uses to support these conclusions is not as wrong-headed as it might at first appear. I consider and answer two objections: first, that the argument is inconsistent with Kant’s moral rationalism; and second, that the argument is inconsistent with post-Kantian developments in science. I (...) argue that both objections rest on a common mistake, namely, the assumption that the account of (human) nature on which Kant’s argument relies is theoretical. On the contrary, the relevant account is practical: informed by science, but not determined by it. Once we appreciate the practical character of Kant’s naturalism, we can see not only that Kant can be a naturalist and a rationalist, but contemporary Kantians can be as well. (shrink)

Understanding Child and Adolescent Behaviour in the Classroom is a vital guide for pre-service and in-service teachers, providing the tools to respond effectively and ethically to child and adolescent behaviour that is of concern. In this innovative book, expert authors offer 'positive rules' that will assist educators in their classroom practice. Key practical issues that are addressed include: • Building a purposeful and emotionally and psychologically positive classroom culture • Recognising and responding to children who present with social, emotional and (...) behavioural difficulties • Using research to inform and enrich classroom practice around student conduct • Working collegially to respond to the social, emotional and/or behavioural needs of individual students, including those needs associated with poor mental health and/or child protection Cutting-edge research from psychology, behavioural science and education is accessibly presented to help develop professional expertise and knowledge in the area of child and adolescent behaviour. (shrink)

According to rationalist conceptions of moral agency, the constitutive capacities of moral agency are rational capacities. So understood, rationalists are often thought to have a problem with feeling. For example, many believe that rationalists must reject the attractive Aristotelian thought that moral activity is by nature pleasant. I disagree. It is easy to go wrong here because it is easy to assume that pleasure is empirical rather than rational and so extrinsic rather than intrinsic to moral agency, rationalistically conceived. Drawing (...) on underappreciated elements of Kant’s moral psychology, I sketch an alternative form of rationalism, according to which moral activity is by nature pleasant because at least some pleasures are by nature rational. (shrink)

My aim in this essay is to reorient our understanding of the Kantian ethical project, especially in relation to its assumed rivals. I do this by considering Kant's relation to eudaimonism, especially in its Aristotelian form. I argue for two points. First, once we understand what Kant and Aristotle mean by happiness, we can see that not only is it the case that, by Kant's lights, Aristotle is not a eudaimonist. We can also see that, by Aristotle's lights, Kant is (...) a eudaimonist. Second, we can see that this agreement on eudaimonism actually reflects a deeper, more fundamental agreement on the nature of ethics as a distinctively practical philosophy. This is an important result, not just for the history of moral philosophy but for moral philosophy as well. For it suggests that both Kantians and Aristotelians may well have more argumentative resources available to them than is commonly thought. (shrink)

This historical study aims to refine understanding of the nature of nursing work. The study focuses on the 1880 crisis at Guy's Hospital in London to examine the nature and meaning of nursing work, particularly the concept of nursing work as many ‘little things.’ In this paper, an examination of Margaret Lonsdale's writing offers an original contribution to our understanding of the ways in which nursing work differs from medical practice. In this way, we use the late-nineteenth-century controversy at Guy's (...) Hospital as a prism through which to examine the contested nature of nursing work. Lonsdale's ideas are corroborated by examination of writings by nurse leaders Florence Nightingale and Eva Luckes. Luckes, in particular, elaborated what was meant by nursing as the performance of a thousand little things, which are specific to nursing work. While physicians had been performing much of what was considered to be nursing work, nurses developed some of these and other interventions into a unique body of work characterized by meticulous attention to significant details. Some implications regarding current nursing practice are discussed. (shrink)

The volume includes twenty-five research papers presented as gifts to John L. Bell to celebrate his 60th birthday by colleagues, former students, friends and admirers. Like Bell’s own work, the contributions cross boundaries into several inter-related fields. The contributions are new work by highly respected figures, several of whom are among the key figures in their fields. Some examples: in foundations of maths and logic ; analytical philosophy, philosophy of science, philosophy of mathematics and decision theory and foundations of economics. (...) Most articles are contributions to current philosophical debates, but contributions also include some new mathematical results, important historical surveys, and a translation by Wilfrid Hodges of a key work of arabic logic. (shrink)

This volume presents the philosophical and heuristic framework Cantor developed and explores its lasting effect on modern mathematics. "Establishes a new plateau for historical comprehension of Cantor's monumental contribution to mathematics." --The American Mathematical Monthly.

Ask most philosophers for an example of a moral rationalist, and they will probably answer “Kant.” And no wonder. Kant’s first great work of moral philosophy, Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals, opens with a clarion call for rationalism, proclaiming the need to work out for once a pure moral philosophy, a metaphysics of morals. That this metaphysics includes the first principle of ethics, the moral law, is obvious. But what about the second principles, particular moral laws, such as duties (...) of truthfulness, beneficence, etc.? Are these principles metaphysical too? Many have thought not, since they make essential use of empirical and anthropological considerations. I argue otherwise; the second principles are metaphysical and this matters. I do this by taking seriously the metaphysics of the metaphysics of morals—more specifically, by understanding the metaphysics of morals alongside the metaphysics of nature. For, qua metaphysics, both employ a common two-stage methodology, the first stage of which is wholly a priori but the second stage of which is partly empirical. As I explain, appreciating this common methodology sheds new light on how the second principles are to be established, as well as on the reach of Kant’s rationalism. (shrink)

"One of the most impressive pieces of scholarship I have ever encountered."-W. E. Kennick, Amherst College There is nothing in the literature on the Philosophical Investigations comparable to this learned and exhaustive commentary. Offering both information and interpretation, it is a remarkable book that fills a recognized need for a close study of one of the world's major works of philosophy. After a general introduction, Father Hallett divides the text of the Investigations into forty-one units, and then provides an (...) introduction to each section, along with detailed comments on individual paragraphs, statements, and expressions. His use of paragraph numbers in the general introduction and in the sectional introductions permits ready reference downward, for detailed development or illustration of a general observation, or upward, from a particular passage to its wider context. To clarify the philosophical point of Wittgenstein's remarks, Father Hallett makes frequent references to other parts of the Investigations; to Wittgenstein's other writings, both published and unpublished; and to the works which Wittgenstein knew and often had in mind, such as those of Frege, Russell, Moore, James, Augustine, Plato, Schlick, and Kohler. Father Hallett also cites and quotes secondary sources, and he includes an appendix relating Wittgenstein to more than 150 authors, particularly those of his own generation or earlier whom he read, or knew personally, and who are mentioned in this commentary. Written in straightforward and lucid prose, this outstanding book reveals continuities in Wittgenstein's thought over long periods of time. It is an indispensable guide for those preparing courses on the Investigations and a useful tool for students taking those courses. (shrink)

According to many of its advocates, one of the main attractions of Kantian moral philosophy is its metaethical innocence. The most interesting argument for such innocence appeals to Kantians' rationalism. Roughly, if moral action is simply rational action, then we do not need to appeal to anything beyond rationality to certify moral judgment. I assess this argument by reflecting on (dis)analogies between moral and logical forms of rationalism. I conclude that the Kantian claim to metaethical innocence is overstated. Kantians cannot (...) avoid substantial metaethical commitments. Or if they can, it is not their rationalism that explains why this is so. (shrink)

Exploring the Illusion of Free Will and Moral Responsibility is an edited collection of new essays by an internationally recognized line-up of contributors. It is aimed at readers who wish to explore the philosophical and scientific arguments for free will skepticism and their implications.