The quantum state of a d-dimensional system can be represented by a probability distribution over the d 2 outcomes of a Symmetric Informationally Complete Positive Operator Valued Measure (SIC-POVM), and then this probability distribution can be represented by a vector of $\mathbb {R}^{d^{2}-1}$ in a (d 2−1)-dimensional simplex, we will call this set of vectors $\mathcal{Q}$ . Other way of represent a d-dimensional system is by the corresponding Bloch vector also in $\mathbb {R}^{d^{2}-1}$ , we will call this set of (...) vectors $\mathcal{B}$ . In this paper it is proved that with the adequate scaling $\mathcal{B}=\mathcal{Q}$ . Also we indicate some features of the shape of $\mathcal{Q}$. (shrink)

In the discussion at hand I have attempted to pave the way for such a treatment of the principle of contradiction. In a number of respects it seems to me worthwhile to relate my critical exposition to Aristotle's train of thought. Indeed, every critique must be raised against something substantial, otherwise it generally becomes the critic's leisurely game with his own cerebral phantasies. Now Aristotle's intuitions regarding the principle of contradiction are, for the most part and clear down to the (...) present day, the usual and traditional ones; and arguments for and against the principle can be found together in the Stagirite in greater completeness than in any one modern textbook of logic. My investigation will proceed with the Aristotelian text at hand and with regard to the results of symbolic logic. The most important results shall be sketched very briefly in the following. (shrink)

Is it a mistake to use "true" or "false" in certain contexts? White sets the stage for dealing with this issue by laying out a field of usages. He develops his position by characterizing and criticizing contemporary treatments of these data, moving rapidly from case to case. His numerous summaries and conclusions, obviously based on a wider view of the material than is presented in the text, may leave the uninitiated alternately puzzled, bristling, or suspicious. While White's data are expressed (...) clearly, the goal of his arguments and his organizational principles are frequently less apparent. White's discussions of fiction and modality are of particular historic interest. Here we find Frege and Russell arguing about whether they can argue about the King of France. We meet with Aristotle's ancient problem of the future naval battle, witness latter-day skirmishes over the nature of moral language, and find Leibniz, Hume, and Kant debating the logic of necessity and contingency. Are there really different types of truth which correspond with different modalities and existence presuppositions, as White seems to assume? This question, harking back to books 5 and 6 of Plato's Republic, is passed over by White in his usage-oriented quest for the sense of "truth." Truth will suit both student and researcher alike and is to be recommended for its breadth of concern and for its 18 pages of bibliography.--M. D. P. [[sic]]. (shrink)

Lucas plays off his understandings of the problem of freedom and Gödel's Theorem, concluding that, "... a human being cannot be represented by a logistic calculus and therefore cannot be described completely in terms of physical variables, all of whose values are completely determined by the conjunction of their values at some earlier time". Lucas approaches the problem of freedom from the perspective of a computer programmer. His argument is as follows. Men can construct a logistic calculus, L, of which (...) Gödel's theorem is a theorem. Gödel's theorem is known-by-men-to-be-true, which is a fact. Facts have ontological status. Any attempt to represent this fact by a definite description must result in an infinite regress of meta-L's, for a Gödel theorem can be constructed in any meta-L powerful enough to show that Gödel's theorem is a theorem of L. Accordingly, men can do something which cannot be represented within L; men are therefore undeterminable. Lucas's position amounts to a rethinking of Fichte's position, set in the metaphor of meta-mathematical logic. However, whereas Fichte concluded that a man can choose to posit that he is free, and thereby make himself free, Lucas concludes that all men are free since some men know that Gödel's theorem is true. One question suggested by Lucas's argument is ontological, and another is epistemological. First, what is the ontological status of facts? Secondly, what is the distinction between knowing-that-p and showing-that-p? Ultimately, Lucas's demonstration pivots on equating the-completeness-of-L with knowing-the-completeness-of-L. It remains to be shown that that which is capable of knowing-that-p is governed in the act of knowing-that-p by the conditions which determine p.--M. D. P. [[sic]]. (shrink)

Presenilin‐1 (PS1) is thought to regulate cell differentiation and survival by modulating the Notch signaling pathway. Mutations in PS1 have been shown to cause early‐onset inherited forms of Alzheimer's disease (AD) by a gain‐of‐function mechanism that alters proteolytic processing of the amyloid precursor protein (APP) resulting in increased production of neurotoxic forms of amyloid β‐peptide. The present article considers a second pathogenic mode of action of PS1 mutations, a defect in cellular calcium signaling characterized by overfilling of endoplasmic reticulum (ER) (...) calcium stores and altered capacitive calcium entry; this abnormality may impair synaptic plasticity and sensitize neurons to apoptosis and excitotoxicity. The calcium signaling defect has also been documented in lymphocytes, suggesting a contribution of immune dysfunction to the pathogenesis of AD. A better understanding of the calcium signaling defect resulting from PS1 mutations may lead to the development of novel preventative and therapeutic strategies for disorders of the nervous and immune systems. BioEssays 23:733–744, 2001. © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Inc. (shrink)

Background and Aims: The COVID-19 pandemic has led to radical and unexpected changes in everyday life, and it is plausible that people’s psychophysical health has been affected. This study examined the relationship between COVID-19 related knowledge and mental health in a Croatian sample of participants.MethodsAn online survey was conducted from March 18 until March 23, 2020, and a total of 1244 participant responses were collected. Measures included eight questions regarding biological features of the virus, symptoms, and prevention, the Hospital Anxiety (...) and Depression Scale, and Optimism-Pessimism Scale. According to the answers given on the questions on COVID-19 related knowledge, participants were divided in two groups: informed and uninformed on each question. They were then compared in the expressed levels of anxiety, depression, pessimism, and optimism. Full vs. partial mediation models with optimism/pessimism as a mediator in the relationship between anxiety/depression and the accuracy of responses for questions about handwashing and ways of transmission were estimated.ResultsParticipants who responded correctly on the question about handwashing had higher levels of anxiety, depression, and pessimism than those participants whose answer was incorrect, while participants who answered correctly on the question about the percentage of patients who develop serious breathing problems had higher levels of depression than those who answered incorrectly. Lower levels of anxiety and pessimism were observed in the participants who answered correctly about ways of transmission. Higher levels of pessimism were found in participants who scored incorrectly on questions about the efficiency of antibiotics, most common symptoms, and the possibility of being infected by asymptomatic carriers. Higher levels of knowledge about handwashing were predicted by higher levels of anxiety and pessimism. Higher levels of knowledge about ways of transmission were predicted by lower levels of anxiety and lower levels of pessimism. The examined relationships between anxiety/depression and knowledge were mediated by pessimism.ConclusionThe findings of this study suggest that knowledge about COVID-19 may be useful to reduce anxiety and depression, but it must be directed to the promotion of health behaviors and to the recognition of fake news. (shrink)

In this paper we review some properties of fuzzy observables, mainly as realized by commutative positive operator valued measures. In this context we discuss two representation theorems for commutative positive operator valued measures in terms of projection valued measures and describe, in some detail, the general notion of fuzzification. We also make some related observations on joint measurements.

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative (...) accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

An account and development of Arthur Murphy's Theory of Practical Reason and its application to contemporary moral problems. Chapter II gives a schematic account of Murphy's theory of normative discourse. Chapter III contrasts this theory with other theories and approaches. The author justly remarks that "Murphy's intent has been primarily to restore proper balance among considerations that play a role in practical discourse and to steer clear of the pitfalls which would impair or diminish the effectiveness of reason in human (...) actions." Chapter IV deals with "the contemporary erosion of practical reason and critique of existentialistic [[sic]] ethics." Chapter V contains an interesting discussion of Murphy's conception of developing and dynamic self as responsible agent. It gives recognition to the moral self as basic condition that underlies the activity of practical justification. The final chapter undertakes practical applications of the theory expounded. The monograph is a good exposition and defense of Murphy's important contribution to contemporary moral philosophy.--A. S. C. (shrink)

Sic effata et osculis hiantibus filium diu ac pressule saviata proximas oras reflui litoris petit, plantisque roseis vibrantium fluctuum summo rore calcato ecce iam profundi mans sudo resedit vertice, et ipsum quod incipit velle, set statim, quasi pridem praeceperit, non moratur marinum obsequium: adsunt Nerei filiae chorum canentes et Portunus caerulis barbis hispidus et gravis piscoso sinu Salacia et auriga parvulus delphini Palaemon….

Sic effata et osculis hiantibus filium diu ac pressule saviata proximas oras reflui litoris petit, plantisque roseis vibrantium fluctuum summo rore calcato ecce iam profundi mans sudo resedit vertice, et ipsum quod incipit velle, set statim, quasi pridem praeceperit, non moratur marinum obsequium: adsunt Nerei filiae chorum canentes et Portunus caerulis barbis hispidus et gravis piscoso sinu Salacia et auriga parvulus delphini Palaemon….

Aulus Gellius records an epigram of the Roman consul Q. Lutatius Catulus :Aufugit mi animus; credo, ut solet, ad Theotimumdeuenit. sic est, perfugium illud habet.quid si non interdixem, ne illunc fugitiuummitteret ad se intro, sed magis eiceret?ibimu' quaesitum. uerum ne ipsi teneamurformido. quid ago? da, Venu', consilium.

Struve's book inspires sympathy both for its thought and its form. The thought tries to "grasp speculatively the mystical experience"; the form, to restore the aphorism, "reflection out of the disorder." As suggested in the title--The Other Draught--something draws our thinking initially out of its confusion. Unable to say what it is, we can only witness that "it draws." The main theme appears thus to be the departure from attained positions: the Other within and behind present things, although present but (...) not a thing, urges readjustment of all re-presentations. Its address claims an answer, first of all astonishment. Struve's challenge is to translate the personal condition of a reply into philosophical discourse. One is not surprised to learn that he has abundantly commented upon Kierkegaard. The experience of the ineffable splinters the system, but a syntax is necessary to keep it from being dumb. The aphorism is the speech of the unspeakable. The main issues of the phenomenological tradition are reinterpreted in maxims of from two words to twenty lines. "The miracle: all that is I can transcend; I can thus be totally alone."--"A definition of man: the living being that can be totally alone."--"Dream is spell. While one is dreaming, one is in a peculiar way spellbound by oneself within oneself."--"To say yes means to pronounce the reality; I say yes to something, that means: I declare it real."--"Shaping of a world: abode."--"I am not myself; the same paradox as: all is not all." Often the reader feels carried back into the German mystical tradition, at other moments, the texts look like a professor's summarizing of Phenomenology for College students--or for a block-almanac. Triviality indeed sometimes threatens. The chapters are always organized around three concepts: "Finitude, imagehood, worldliness."--"Solitude, bareness, openness."--"Forgetfulness, sensuousness, memory...." An appendix gives notes from voyages to Norway and Egypt. These pages describe life abroad as the symbol of the existence itself: torn out of the familiar, thrown into the undisclosable.--The [[sic]] author, whose lectures we have enjoyed in Freiburg, Germany, moves apart from the desire for public recognition. The strange peacefulness of his book, when shipped over to a busy continent, becomes a peaceful stranger amidst noisy struggles for the survival of philosophy.--R. S. (shrink)

An able and clear defense of Bradley's principal theses and the underlying conception of metaphysical enterprise. "This is a book about a metaphysician, about metaphysics, and, most importantly, it attempts to develop elements of a metaphysical position long the lines of what is called Absolute Idealism." The Introduction takes up the Verificationists [[sic]] argument and two recent accounts of metaphysics. Part I devotes ten Chapters to the elucidation and defense of Bradley's conception of reality. It culminates in examining three alternative (...) accounts of "Real". Part II considers "the major philosophical theories of the self in order to defend Bradley's Theory of the self within his metaphysical scheme."--A. S. C. (shrink)

The first question here is the interpretation of line 638. Burges wrote: ‘Constructio sic solvenda est: M. Parmentier in the Budé edition translates, ‘On ne souffre pas quand on n'a nul sentiment de ses maux’, likewise assuming that is doing double work. For this he compares Andromache 706 f., Electra, 383, and Orestes 393. None of these passages is in fact an example of how a negative can negative simultaneously a finite verb and a participle. But in any case, what (...) is the subject of Burges supposed that a line was lost ; Parmentier does not explain his ‘On’. (shrink)

The first question here is the interpretation of line 638. Burges wrote: ‘Constructio sic solvenda est: M. Parmentier in the Budé edition translates, ‘On ne souffre pas quand on n'a nul sentiment de ses maux’, likewise assuming that is doing double work. For this he compares Andromache 706 f., Electra, 383, and Orestes 393. None of these passages is in fact an example of how a negative can negative simultaneously a finite verb and a participle. But in any case, what (...) is the subject of Burges supposed that a line was lost ; Parmentier does not explain his ‘On’. (shrink)

The intellectual journey on which I am about to embark, although not an unusual one in philosophy, may at first seem strange to those who are in the habit of looking to science for the answers to their big questions, including their philosophical questions. For I propose to shed light on the problematic relationship between two things, namely, mental illness and physical illness, by comparing their relationship to the relationship between two other things, namely, a rhyme for the eye—which will (...) be explained shortly for the benefit of anyone unfamiliar with this concept—and a rhyme for the ear. Yet these two pairs of things are not related in any way by subject-matter. In philosophy, however, this sort of deliberate dislocation can be beneficial. As Wittgenstein himself once remarked, ‘A philosophical] problem can be solved only in the right surrounding, we must give the problem a new surrounding, we must compare it to cases we are not used to compare [sic] it with.’. (shrink)

Modern Studies in Philosophy, we are informed on the page facing the title-page, "is a series of anthologies presenting contemporary interpretations and evaluations of the works of major philosophers." The volumes are "intended to be contributions to contemporary debates as well as to the history of philosophy; they not only trace the origins of many problems important to modern philosophy, but also introduce major philosophers as interlocutors in current discussions." In the first of the two volumes on Plato three of (...) the articles chosen by Gregory Vlastos have not appeared elsewhere: Julius Moravcsik, Learning as Recollection; G. E. L. Owen, Plato on Not-Being; David Higgins, Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being. The other studies in Volume One are reprints: R. Robinson and J. D. Denniston, Plato; H. F. Cherniss, The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas; A. Wedberg, The Theory of Ideas; R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Knowledge, Belief and the Forms; R. Robinson, Hypothesis in the Republic; G. Vlastos, Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo; R. E. Allen, Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues; Colin Strang, Plato and the Third Man; J. L. Ackrill, Symplokë eidön; J. L. Ackrill, Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259. In Volume Two Terry Penner, "Thought and Desire in Plato" has not been published before. The others have: Paul Shorey, Plato's Ethics; David Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato's Republic; Raphael Demos, A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?; J. D. Mabbott, Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?; G. Vlastos, Justice and Happiness in the Republic; F. M. Cornford, The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium; R. A. Markus, The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium; Glenn R. Morrow, Plato and the Rule of Law; Wayne A. R. Leys, Was Plato Non-Political?; F. E. Sparshott, Plato as Anti-Political Thinker; Renford Bambrough, Plato's Political Analogies; E. R. Dodds, Plato and the Irrational Soul; W. K. C. Guthrie, Plato's Views on the Nature of the Soul; Harold Cherniss, The Sources of Evil According to Plato; W. J. Verdenius, Plato's Doctrines of Artistic Imitation. Obviously, the above listed articles will be welcome to those debating issues in Plato and to historians of twentieth-century philosophy. There are two difficulties, however. The print is too small in the body of the text and is nearly microscopic in the footnotes and diagrams. Reading thus becomes almost painful. Margins to the left, right, top and bottom of the pages are practically nonexistent. On occasion footnote material is misplaced--for example, the comment on Strang's article as originally published elsewhere should be on p. 184, not on p. 187, of Volume One. But a greater problem is the fact that almost all the articles on metaphysics and epistemology are by linguistic analysts. Vlastos in his introductory remarks admits as much: "Volume One is heavily weighted on the 'analytical' side." He reports the statement of an un-named advocate of conceptual analysis "that these [analytic] methods now enable us to understand Plato better than he was ever understood by anyone in history--better than by any of his own contemporaries, even better than by himself!" He disclaims such euphoria but insists "there is an element of truth in it after all" insofar as analytic tools can alert a student to ambiguity and its consequences in some of Plato's sentences. Hence, "if we come across such sentences in Plato, it would be plainly true to say that we can understand them better than he did and even to add that we can, therefore, understand him better, since we can see both what he meant to say and the logical liabilities of his incautious sentences." All this is true enough, but a warning still is in order. Linguistic analysts tend to read only some of Plato's dialogues and, even within them, to concentrate on some passages only. This is understandable in view of their interests and the capacity of the analytic technique. But that selectivity might lead them to believe that the Plato thus revealed is the complete and authentic Plato, which it is not. Hence, in reading and teaching Plato one must complement language- and concept-analysis with other approaches. Vlastos himself is aware of this necessity : [[sic]] "Once we have made full allowance for what modern semantics and logic can do to make Plato more intelligible and alive for us today, we should be quick to concede that borrowings from this quarter must be used with economy and discretion, and that continuing reliance on older linguistic and historical disciplines is as essential now as it has ever been in the past if the object of our inquiries is Plato himself, instead of some mock-up more pleasing to current taste." One could only wish that Vlastos had fostered that reliance on other disciplines by including articles of that sort among those he actually chose.--L. S. (shrink)

Schleiermacher's Copernican revolution in theology is effected through his presentation of the Christian mythos in terms of a phenomenological anthropology of self-consciousness. Moreover, as Niebuhr shows in this apt study of some features of Schleiermacher's theological thinking, the principles which determine the shape of that revolution can be deduced neither from a biblical dogmatics allegedly purified of philosophical presuppositions nor from a philosophy uninformed by theological experience. In the first part of the book, Niebuhr discusses Schleiermacher's little-known work The Christmas (...) Eve: A Dialogue, affording us a picture of the author's starting-point in the experience of a salvation or potentiated self-consciousness which is historically and socially mediated. The subsequent analysis of the lectures on hermeneutics and ethics discloses the object of Schleiermacher's inquiry to be not the supernatural being that posits the cosmos, but the creative Logos indwelling the individual and all men by means of the common, organic media of human existence in which the self both comes to be and comes to create history and culture. Finally, The Christian Faith is reviewed by Niebuhr in terms of the expression it gives to the mature Schleiermacher's theology and christology. The primordial consciousness of being-in-relation reveals the historical, societal, worldly context of the self and the various polarities of the self's existence such that religion emerges as a phenomenon coterminous with man's affective response to the relationships in which the whole of human nature is bound, and theology, the "daughter of religion," becomes the methodology by which the articulation of an affective determination of self-consciousness is achieved. The rigorously pursued explicitation [[sic]] of the forms and determinations of self-consciousness is interpreted by Niebuhr with a penetration and a sympathy at once acute and comprehensive. By giving us a series of insights into Schleiermacher's "thinking in motion," Niebuhr has contributed a cogent testimony to the nineteenth-century theologian's central importance in the fields of hermeneutical theory, philosophical ethics, philosophy of religion and culture, and theology. One would have welcomed a more critical appraisal of Schleiermacher's view of the formal and material compatibility of philosophy and theology, understanding and feeling, inasmuch as the scope of theological inquiry appears to be limited by the boundaries of reason set forth in the ethics, and philosophical anthropology is apparently reduced to a rather sophisticated phenomenology of religious experience. In any case, Niebuhr's scholarly treatment of the material should lead the reader to an informed examination of Schleiermacher's text.--J. M. S. (shrink)

There is a famous saying, whose origin is uncertain, that no good deed goes unpunished. Although not cited by him, this was no doubt the thought that inspired George Mavrodes’s (1986) well-known article “Religion and the Queerness of Morality.” In it he argued that although not logically incoherent, a certain sort of world in which moral obligations existed would be “absurd . . . a crazy world” (Mavrodes 1986, 581). The world he had in mind was what he called “Russellian,” (...) after a notorious passage in Bertrand Russell’s essay “The Free Man’s Worship” (Russell 1903). There, Russell portrayed us as living in a wholly materialistic universe governed by impersonal forces and “accidental collocations of atoms,” with no objective purpose or meaning to existence. The greatest of human achievements would ultimately be buried “beneath the debris of a universe in ruins.” We could only, concluded Russell, safely build the “soul’s habitation” [sic] on a “firm foundation of unyielding despair” (Russell 1903, 32). In such a world, according to Mavrodes, the performance of moral obligations does, at least sometimes, lead to no net Russellian benefit, that is, any benefit to the agent that is possible within a Russellian world. Indeed, such actions sometimes confer a net Russellian loss. “We have,” he says, “moral obligations whose fulfillment will result in a net loss of good to the one who fulfils them” (Mavrodes 1986, 581). That such a world would be “queer,” “crazy” and “absurd,” according to Mavrodes, should only strike those who believe that moral obligations are wholly objective and run deep in the fabric of reality. He does not purport to address the sceptic, the subjectivist, the expressivist, the nihilist or the existentialist. His aim is at those who believe in a rational moral.. (shrink)

This confrontation of analytical psychology with ethics is intended as a philosophical examination of the justification of Jung's and Erich Neumann's claim to have offered in their so-called individuation process the new ethics demanded by the discovery of the psychic reality of the collective unconscious. As a standard of evaluation the author first tries to establish the idea of self-realization as a moral imperative. Aware of the difficulty of finding agreement in matters of ethics, he turns to self-awareness as the (...) source of his ethical principle. Beginning with a discussion of Kant's understanding of moral life, the author recognizes the categorical imperative as an expression of an absolute and universal law of practical reason to be an unsatisfactory representation of subjective morality, and rediscovers in the awareness of the individual law of G. Simmel the evidence of the immediate givenness of our self as a strict moral obligation. The awareness of the self as a moral ideal pre supposes freedom, which, following Sartre's existentialistic [[sic]] understanding, is identified with human reality as such and is found not to allow any kind of determination of human existence; consciousness of impulses implies "original choice," and unconsciousness means abdicated freedom. Compared with the ideal reality of the self and with the conditions of its realization as experienced in immediate awareness, the psychic reality of the individuation process as described in complex psychology lacks every moral qualification. Jung's individuation process does not represent a realization or even a recognition of the self, as the second part of the book attempts to show. A natural process enforced by an archetype of the self, demanding as moral obligations only a conscious awareness of alleged unconscious contents of a collective and personal unconscious in a confrontation of archetypes of the process, and an integration or combination of opposing conscious and unconscious psychic elements, is essentially different from a free and responsible realization of one's individual law in active confrontation with one's own historical situation and reality, and with the moral demands of the physical and social world. Confusing subjective interpretations with objective psychic facts in its doctrine of the archetypes, and morality with mental health in its understanding of the individuation process, analytic psychology is rightly found to ignore decisive aspects of human existence and especially to disregard moral reality as an essential phenomenon of human life.--M. S. (shrink)

Modern Studies in Philosophy, we are informed on the page facing the title-page, "is a series of anthologies presenting contemporary interpretations and evaluations of the works of major philosophers." The volumes are "intended to be contributions to contemporary debates as well as to the history of philosophy; they not only trace the origins of many problems important to modern philosophy, but also introduce major philosophers as interlocutors in current discussions." In the first of the two volumes on Plato three of (...) the articles chosen by Gregory Vlastos have not appeared elsewhere: Julius Moravcsik, Learning as Recollection; G. E. L. Owen, Plato on Not-Being; David Higgins, Sentence Meaning, Negation, and Plato's Problem of Non-Being. The other studies in Volume One are reprints: R. Robinson and J. D. Denniston, Plato; H. F. Cherniss, The Philosophical Economy of the Theory of Ideas; A. Wedberg, The Theory of Ideas; R. C. Cross and A. D. Woozley, Knowledge, Belief and the Forms; R. Robinson, Hypothesis in the Republic; G. Vlastos, Reasons and Causes in the Phaedo; R. E. Allen, Participation and Predication in Plato's Middle Dialogues; Colin Strang, Plato and the Third Man; J. L. Ackrill, Symplokë eidön; J. L. Ackrill, Plato and the Copula: Sophist 251-259. In Volume Two Terry Penner, "Thought and Desire in Plato" has not been published before. The others have: Paul Shorey, Plato's Ethics; David Sachs, A Fallacy in Plato's Republic; Raphael Demos, A Fallacy in Plato's Republic?; J. D. Mabbott, Is Plato's Republic Utilitarian?; G. Vlastos, Justice and Happiness in the Republic; F. M. Cornford, The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium; R. A. Markus, The Doctrine of Eros in Plato's Symposium; Glenn R. Morrow, Plato and the Rule of Law; Wayne A. R. Leys, Was Plato Non-Political?; F. E. Sparshott, Plato as Anti-Political Thinker; Renford Bambrough, Plato's Political Analogies; E. R. Dodds, Plato and the Irrational Soul; W. K. C. Guthrie, Plato's Views on the Nature of the Soul; Harold Cherniss, The Sources of Evil According to Plato; W. J. Verdenius, Plato's Doctrines of Artistic Imitation. Obviously, the above listed articles will be welcome to those debating issues in Plato and to historians of twentieth-century philosophy. There are two difficulties, however. The print is too small in the body of the text and is nearly microscopic in the footnotes and diagrams. Reading thus becomes almost painful. Margins to the left, right, top and bottom of the pages are practically nonexistent. On occasion footnote material is misplaced--for example, the comment on Strang's article as originally published elsewhere should be on p. 184, not on p. 187, of Volume One. But a greater problem is the fact that almost all the articles on metaphysics and epistemology are by linguistic analysts. Vlastos in his introductory remarks admits as much: "Volume One is heavily weighted on the 'analytical' side." He reports the statement of an un-named advocate of conceptual analysis "that these [analytic] methods now enable us to understand Plato better than he was ever understood by anyone in history--better than by any of his own contemporaries, even better than by himself!" He disclaims such euphoria but insists "there is an element of truth in it after all" insofar as analytic tools can alert a student to ambiguity and its consequences in some of Plato's sentences. Hence, "if we come across such sentences in Plato, it would be plainly true to say that we can understand them better than he did and even to add that we can, therefore, understand him better, since we can see both what he meant to say and the logical liabilities of his incautious sentences." All this is true enough, but a warning still is in order. Linguistic analysts tend to read only some of Plato's dialogues and, even within them, to concentrate on some passages only. This is understandable in view of their interests and the capacity of the analytic technique. But that selectivity might lead them to believe that the Plato thus revealed is the complete and authentic Plato, which it is not. Hence, in reading and teaching Plato one must complement language- and concept-analysis with other approaches. Vlastos himself is aware of this necessity : [[sic]] "Once we have made full allowance for what modern semantics and logic can do to make Plato more intelligible and alive for us today, we should be quick to concede that borrowings from this quarter must be used with economy and discretion, and that continuing reliance on older linguistic and historical disciplines is as essential now as it has ever been in the past if the object of our inquiries is Plato himself, instead of some mock-up more pleasing to current taste." One could only wish that Vlastos had fostered that reliance on other disciplines by including articles of that sort among those he actually chose.--L. S. (shrink)

A clear statement centering on the ramifications of the thought of Heidegger and Bultman [[sic]] for various theological problems. Macquarrie also discusses Teilhard de Chardin and Karl Rahner in a reasonably sympathetic way. While possibly of use as an accurate introduction to the subject-matter, the book fails to be philosophically or religiously illuminating.--S. A. S.

The author has convinced himself that philosophy is essentially mysterious. "Mystery," we are told, "is clearly [sic!] the outcome of indeterminateness, in knowledge and in being. But it is equally a function of determinateness, since complete indeterminateness is unintelligible, not mysterious at all". The definition is both internally contradictory and circular. Internally contradictory, because two incompatible predicates are being ascribed to one subject of predication. Circular, because the reason given for the presence of one of them in the definition is (...) that its absence would remove what is mysterious--which is just the adjectival form of the definiendum. (shrink)

Excerpt from M. Tulli Ciceronis De Finibus Bonorum Et Malorum Libri Quinque Duo sunt, opinor, quae lectures a me hoc loco requi rent aut, si non requirent ipsi, rogandi mihi sunt, ut beneuolo animo et adtento accipiaut. Nam primum di ccudam st de horum librorum, quos Cicero de finibus honorum et maiorum scripsit, emendatiolle et enarratione et nninersae opera a me in iis positm ratio sic expli canda, ut, qua in commentariis disperse posita sunt, ea ad suas canssas generation reuocata (...) et intellegi plenius et indicari rectius possint. Quo loco etiam illud ecli cere conabor, ut libertas quaedam et simplicitas indici et orationis, a qua ne hic quidem discedam, merito et necessario adhibita esse uideatur. Deiude, qum de Cice roniani operis forma atque descriptione ncitu digna ui debuntur neque in commentariis aut per excursus carpo sita, conprehendam et ab iis ad ipsos libros lectores nittam. Sed prior illa disputatio, cuius magna pars ad paratns critici ex;>licatione continebitur, quem sua na tura maiorem necessitatem habent quam delectationem in rebus minutis per ambages persequendis, tum molestior fit, quod plus uerhorum consumendum et in eorum co dicum conmemoratione, quos parum nouimus, quam in eorum, quorum plenus asus concessus est. Itaque de precor, ne mea existumetur culpa, qua superiorum st. About the Publisher Forgotten Books publishes hundreds of thousands of rare and classic books. Find more at www.forgottenbooks.com This book is a reproduction of an important historical work. Forgotten Books uses state-of-the-art technology to digitally reconstruct the work, preserving the original format whilst repairing imperfections present in the aged copy. In rare cases, an imperfection in the original, such as a blemish or missing page, may be replicated in our edition. We do, however, repair the vast majority of imperfections successfully; any imperfections that remain are intentionally left to preserve the state of such historical works. (shrink)

The simple concept of a SIC poses a very deep problem in algebraic number theory, as soon as the dimension of Hilbert space exceeds three. A detailed description of the simplest possible example is given.

Schleiermacher's Copernican revolution in theology is effected through his presentation of the Christian mythos in terms of a phenomenological anthropology of self-consciousness. Moreover, as Niebuhr shows in this apt study of some features of Schleiermacher's theological thinking, the principles which determine the shape of that revolution can be deduced neither from a biblical dogmatics allegedly purified of philosophical presuppositions nor from a philosophy uninformed by theological experience. In the first part of the book, Niebuhr discusses Schleiermacher's little-known work The Christmas (...) Eve: A Dialogue, affording us a picture of the author's starting-point in the experience of a salvation or potentiated self-consciousness which is historically and socially mediated. The subsequent analysis of the lectures on hermeneutics and ethics discloses the object of Schleiermacher's inquiry to be not the supernatural being that posits the cosmos, but the creative Logos indwelling the individual and all men by means of the common, organic media of human existence in which the self both comes to be and comes to create history and culture. Finally, The Christian Faith is reviewed by Niebuhr in terms of the expression it gives to the mature Schleiermacher's theology and christology. The primordial consciousness of being-in-relation reveals the historical, societal, worldly context of the self and the various polarities of the self's existence such that religion emerges as a phenomenon coterminous with man's affective response to the relationships in which the whole of human nature is bound, and theology, the "daughter of religion," becomes the methodology by which the articulation of an affective determination of self-consciousness is achieved. The rigorously pursued explicitation [[sic]] of the forms and determinations of self-consciousness is interpreted by Niebuhr with a penetration and a sympathy at once acute and comprehensive. By giving us a series of insights into Schleiermacher's "thinking in motion," Niebuhr has contributed a cogent testimony to the nineteenth-century theologian's central importance in the fields of hermeneutical theory, philosophical ethics, philosophy of religion and culture, and theology. One would have welcomed a more critical appraisal of Schleiermacher's view of the formal and material compatibility of philosophy and theology, understanding and feeling, inasmuch as the scope of theological inquiry appears to be limited by the boundaries of reason set forth in the ethics, and philosophical anthropology is apparently reduced to a rather sophisticated phenomenology of religious experience. In any case, Niebuhr's scholarly treatment of the material should lead the reader to an informed examination of Schleiermacher's text.--J. M. S. (shrink)

This collection of essays in moral philosophy has as its intended mark of distinction the fact that moral problems of the moment are the themes of the essays. The chapter headings indicate this contemporary concern: Abortion, Sex, Human Rights and Civil Disobedience, Criminal Punishment, Violence and Pacifism, War and Suicide and Death. There are essays by: Paul Ramsey, Philippa Foot, Jonathan Bennett, Thomas Nagel, Sara Ruddick, Richard Wassenstrom, [[sic]] John Rawls, R. M. Dworkin, William Kneale, H. L. A. Hart, J. (...) R. Lucas, Newton Carver, Jan Narveson, G. E. M. Anscombe, R. M. Hare, R. F. Holland, Mary Mothersill. One might well be inclined to agree with the editor's opposition to such philosophizing about morality which abstracts from the moral problems of one's own life. A purely theoretical approach to the study of morality would almost appear contradictory. However, it is necessary to express grave reservations about such a collection of essays as this. While the arguments of the essays are thoughtful and somewhat uncommon, the conclusions of the essays, as a rule, do not differ from "advanced" liberal opinions. In other words, the essays do not challenge students' opinions. The reading of these essays will but confirm the young in their prejudices. The problems the essays are concerned with are real problems; and it is a defect of the book that with the single exception of the chapter on Abortion no real opposing arguments are presented.--J. W. S. (shrink)

There are two major exegetical problems facing the student of Hegel: the precise formal role to be played by the 1807 Phenomenology of Mind within the total system, and the aging content of the second part of the Encyclopaedia, the Philosophy of Nature. There is no doubt as to the role of the Naturphilosophie, it is the exposition of the Absolute Idea in the moment of its self-diremption [[sic]]. But in setting forth the course of this natural moment, Hegel was (...) compelled to rely upon the terminology and data provided by the empirical sciences of the early nineteenth century. This necessary reliance upon what was, in Hegel's day, the "state of the art," has left his present-day followers with the particularly difficult task of not only discerning what Hegel said and meant, but of determining what--in the face of the steady advance of contemporary physical science--yet retains its factual value within that system. This sort of exegesis requires a double expertise, a knowledge of Hegelianism and modern physics. There is, in addition, a danger. The inquisitive Hegelian who would follow Hegel's own dictum regarding the fundamental identity of form and content might well be led to the slippery conclusion that a revision in the empirical content of the Naturphilosophie would necessitate a transformation of the system itself. (shrink)

This article aims to focus on how signatories versus nonsignatories in the U.S. pharmaceutical sector compare with respect to the internal and external stakeholders and principles of the United Nations Global Compact (UNGC). We seek to answer the question: Do signatories to the UNGC walk the talk better than nonsignatories as determined by a variety of published rankings and data? This research presents an innovative approach to the evaluation of UNGC signatories. It uses several objective and independent data sources to (...) assess a matched group of signatories versus nonsignatories in the U.S. pharmaceutical sector. Signatory organizations in the same sector as determined by SIC codes were matched with nonsignatories on variables such as size and number of employees in U.S. pharmaceutical companies. Then both types of organizations were compared on the following data sources: Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies ratings, ratings by external stakeholders, ratings by employees, unionization data, financial measures, and annual reports to shareholders. Using nonparametric testing the research found there are differences between signatories and nonsignatories in the U.S. pharmaceutical sector for some of the external stakeholder measures and no differences were found for the internal stakeholder measures. (shrink)

Annotations to the pedagogical exegesis of Mādhyamika philosophy.