Controversies over the innateness of cognitive processes, mechanisms, and structures play a persistent role in driving research in philosophy as well as the cognitive sciences, but the appropriate way to understand the category of the innate remains subject to dispute. One venerable approach in philosophy and cognitive science merely contrasts innate features with those that are learned. In fact, Jerry Fodor has recently suggested that this remains our best handle on innateness.

This paper proposes a revision of our understanding of causation that is designed to address what Hartry Field has suggested is the central problem in the metaphysics of causation today: reconciling Bertrand Russell’s arguments that the concept of causation can play no role in the advanced sciences with Nancy Cartwright’s arguments that causal concepts are essential to a scientific understanding of the world. The paper shows that Russell’s main argument is, ironically, very similar to an argument that Cartwright has put (...) forward against the truth of universal laws of nature. The paper uses this insight to develop an account of causation that does justice to traditional views yet avoids the arguments of Russell. (shrink)

Griffiths and Machery contend that the concept of innateness should be dispensed with in the sciences. We contend that, once that concept is properly understood as what we have called 'closed process invariance', it is still of significant use in the sciences, especially cognitive science.

Alison Gopnik and her collaborators have recently proposed a bold and intriguing hypothesis about the relationship between scientific cognition and cognitive development in childhood. According to this view, the processes underlying cognitive development in infants and children and the processes underlying scientific cognition are _identical_. We argue that Gopnik’s bold hypothesis is untenable because it, along with much of cognitive science, neglects the many important ways in which human minds are designed to operate within a social environment. This leads to (...) a neglect of _norms_ and the processes of _social_ _transmission_ which have an important effect on scientific cognition and cognition more generally. (shrink)

Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one’s intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology (e.g., Nisbett et al. 2001) has shown systematic cognitive differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases (...) (Weinberg et al. 2001). In light of these findings on cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and the paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Whose New American Poetry? Anthologizing in the NinetiesMarjorie Perloff (bio)In the two-year span 1993–94, no fewer than three major poetry anthologies appeared that featured the poetry of what has been called “the other tradition”—the tradition inaugurated thirty-five years ago by Donald M. Allen’s New American Poetry: 1945–1960. These three anthologies are, in order of publication, Eliot Weinberger’s American Poetry since 1950: Innovators and Outsiders, Paul Hoover’s Postmodern American (...) Poetry, and Douglas Messerli’s From the Other Side of the Century. A New American Poetry 1960–1990. 1 In 1994, moreover, there were two other large anthologies of alternate poetries by “younger” poets, 2 these two in the tradition of Ron Silliman’s In The American Tree: Language, Poetry, Realism and Douglas Messerli’s earlier ‘Language’ Poetries: An Anthology. They are Peter Gizzi, Connell McGrath, and Juliana Spahr’s two-volume anthology called Writing from the New Coast, 3 and Dennis Barone and Peter Ganick’s The Art of Practice: 45 Contemporary Poets.Five volumes, then, of the “new” alternate poetries. And a sixth—this time a real blockbuster—is in progress: Jerome Rothenberg and Pierre Joris’s two-volume Poems for the Millennium: The University of California Book of Modern and Postmodern Poetry, which differs from all of the above by covering poetry and poetics of the entire twentieth century and from around the world. The first volume of Poems for the Millennium, From Fin-de-Siècle to Negritude (1995), takes us from such “forerunners” of Modernism as Blake, Hölderlin, Dickinson, and Rimbaud through the Futurisms, Dada, Surrealism, and Objectivism, along with complex “galleries” of individual poets, while the second—and sure to be more controversial—volume (1997) brings us up to the global present.A new avant-garde thus seems to be in the making—indeed, oxymoronic as it may sound, a new avant-garde consensus. Yet the countercanonizing of the recent anthologies is not without its own aporias. What these are is my subject here.The Modest OppositionMy starting point is that of the avant-garde anthologists themselves: Donald Allen’s New American Poetry of 1960. From the vantage point of 1995, the most startling thing about the Allen anthology—still acknowledged by all later anthologists as the fountainhead of radical American poetics—is its modesty. The New American Poetry runs to 454 pages, including statements of poetics, biographical notes, and a short bibliography; it contains forty-four poets, all of them having come to prominence in the period between 1945 (the [End Page 104] end of World War II) and 1960 (the date of publication). The four-page preface opens as follows:In the years since the war American poetry has entered upon a singularly rich period. It is a period that has seen published many of the finest achievements of the older generation: William Carlos Williams’ Paterson, The Desert Music and Other Poems, and Journey to Love; Ezra Pound’s The Pisan Cantos, Section: Rock-Drill, and Thrones; H. D.’s later work culminating in her long poem Helen in Egypt; and the recent verse of E. E. Cummings, Marianne Moore, and the late Wallace Stevens. A wide variety of poets of the second generation, who emerged in the thirties and forties, have achieved their maturity in this period: Elizabeth Bishop, Edwin Denby, Robert Lowell, Kenneth Rexroth, and Louis Zukofsky, to name only a few very diverse talents. And we can now see that a strong third generation, long awaited but only slowly recognized, has at last emerged.[xi]Note that Allen introduces the “new” American poetry, not as an “alternative” to anything else but as the successor of two preceding generations. He does not quarrel about the Moderns: if Eliot isn’t included in the above list, it is because he had stopped writing lyric poetry after Four Quartets and had turned to the theater. The cited second generation, moreover, is more “diverse” (Allen’s word) here than it will ever be again in the anthologies: Bishop and Denby, Lowell and Rexroth and Zukofsky. And the third generation, presumably following in the footsteps of the first and second, is now said to... (shrink)

Abstract.The author gives a short survey of the different methods which have been proposed to deal with the logic of norm sentences on the basis of logical systems of descriptive language: deontic logic, logic of norms as an isomorphism of propositional logic, restriction of logical relations to the propositional content of norm sentences, transformation of norms into sanction sentences, preference interpretation of norm sentences, double interpretation of ought‐sentences and the use of the descriptive interpretation as a tool for establishing the (...) logic of norms, proposition about norms in the place of normative logic, the logic of admissible worlds, postulates addressed to the rational lawgiver and technical ought as a substitute for nor‐mological considerations. A critical analysis of these attempts may prove them inappropriate, but it is not sufficient to prove the impossibility of any method of founding normative logic on systems of a descriptive language. Therefore the author adds a general consideration on the chances of such approaches. (shrink)

Übereinstimmend mit Körner versteht der Autor unter 'praktischer Philosophie' die Gesamtheit der handlungsbezogenen Disziplinen. 'Handlung' ist informationsgelenktes Verhalten eines Subjektes. Der Handlungsbegriff wird durch den handlungsbestimmenden Informationsverarbeitungsprozeß charakterisiert. Handlungstheoretische Analysen erfordern eine erkenntnismäßig differenzierte Semantik. Der Begriff der Handlung setzt die Existenz von Handlungsspielräumen voraus. Der Autor kritisiert die Unterscheidung von kognitivem und präskriptivem Sollen und zeigt, daß Normsätze einer gegebenen Bedeutung in verschiedenen pragmatischen Funktionen verwendet werden können. Es werden die Begriffe 'Normenlogik' und 'deontische Logik' einander gegenübergestellt. Die Standardsysteme (...) der deontischen Logik sind keine geeignete Basis für die normativen Disziplinen. Der Autor fordert die Ausarbeitung einer genuinen Normenlogik, in der Sollsätzen eine primäre und Darfsätzen nur eine sekundäre Rolle zukommt. (shrink)

Übereinstimmend mit Körner versteht der Autor unter 'praktischer Philosophie' die Gesamtheit der handlungsbezogenen Disziplinen. 'Handlung' ist informationsgelenktes Verhalten eines Subjektes. Der Handlungsbegriff wird durch den handlungsbestimmenden Informationsverarbeitungsprozeß charakterisiert. Handlungstheoretische Analysen erfordern eine erkenntnismäßig differenzierte Semantik. Der Begriff der Handlung setzt die Existenz von Handlungsspielräumen voraus. Der Autor kritisiert die Unterscheidung von kognitivem und präskriptivem Sollen und zeigt, daß Normsätze einer gegebenen Bedeutung in verschiedenen pragmatischen Funktionen verwendet werden können. Es werden die Begriffe 'Normenlogik' und 'deontische Logik' einander gegenübergestellt. Die Standardsysteme (...) der deontischen Logik sind keine geeignete Basis für die normativen Disziplinen. Der Autor fordert die Ausarbeitung einer genuinen Normenlogik, in der Sollsätzen eine primäre und Darfsätzen nur eine sekundäre Rolle zukommt. (shrink)

A series of experiments tested the hypothesis that very brief exposure to feared stimuli can have positive effects on avoidance of the corresponding feared object. Participants identified themselves as fearful of spiders through a widely used questionnaire. A preliminary experiment showed that they were unable to identify the stimuli used in the main experiments. Experiment 2 compared the effects of exposure to masked feared stimuli at short and long stimulus onset asynchronies . Participants were individually administered one of three continuous (...) series of backwards masked or non-masked stimuli: unreportable images of spiders , clearly visible images of spiders , or unreportable images of trees . Immediately thereafter, they engaged in a Behavioral Avoidance Test with a live, caged tarantula. Exposure to unreportable images of spiders resulted in greater approach towards the tarantula than unreportable neutral images. A post-hoc comparison with clearly visible exposure to these same images approached significance. These effects were maintained at a 1-week follow-up . In Experiment 3 , participants engaged in the BAT 1 week prior to the exposure manipulation in order to provide a baseline measurement of their avoidant behavior, and again immediately after the exposure manipulation. Exposure to unreportable images of spiders reduced avoidance of the tarantula. Similar exposure to trees did not. Implications for the non-conscious basis of fear are discussed. (shrink)

Many research fields concerned with the processing of information contained in human faces would benefit from face stimulus sets in which specific facial characteristics are systematically varied while other important picture characteristics are kept constant. Specifically, a face database in which displayed expressions, gaze direction, and head orientation are parametrically varied in a complete factorial design would be highly useful in many research domains. Furthermore, these stimuli should be standardised in several important, technical aspects. The present article presents the freely (...) available Radboud Faces Database offering such a stimulus set, containing both Caucasian adult and children images. This face database is described both procedurally and in terms of content, and a validation study concerning its most important characteristics is presented. In the validation study, all frontal images were rated with respect to the shown facial expression, intensity of expression, clarity of expression, genuineness of expression, attractiveness, and valence. The results show very high recognition of the intended facial expressions. (shrink)

Theories of reference have been central to analytic philosophy, and two views, the descriptivist view of reference and the causal-historical view of reference, have dominated the field. In this research tradition, theories of reference are assessed by consulting one's intuitions about the reference of terms in hypothetical situations. However, recent work in cultural psychology has shown systematic differences between East Asians and Westerners, and some work indicates that this extends to intuitions about philosophical cases. In light of these findings on (...) cultural differences, two experiments were conducted which explored intuitions about reference in Westerners and East Asians. Both experiments indicate that, for certain central cases, Westerners are more likely than East Asians to report intuitions that are consistent with the causal-historical view. These results constitute prima facie evidence that semantic intuitions vary from culture to culture, and that paper argues that this fact raises questions about the nature of the philosophical enterprise of developing a theory of reference. (shrink)

Rescher charakterisiert die Gesetzesaussage durch a) nomische Notwendigkeit, b) hypothetische Kraft; Gesetzeshaftigkeit sei Bereitschaft zur faktentranszendenten Anwendungeines Allsatzes. Dem wird die These gegenübergestellt, daß die Struktur des nomischen Allsatzes so zu bestimmen ist, daß die faktentranszendente Anwendung durch den Satz begründet erscheint. Dies wird durch einen Allsatz erreicht, der nicht nur über die reale Welt, sondern auch über ein System von Alternativwelten über der realen Welt spricht. Durch den nomischen Allsatz wird gleichzeitig die nomische Notwendigkeit expliziert. Die Begründung der faktentranszendenten (...) Geltung ist gleich stark wie jene der erfahrungszendenten Gehung in der realen Weh. (shrink)

The author outlines his views on the essence of philosophical logic. There are two means of philosophical argumentation: intuition and analysis of the problem situation under examination. Logical intuition can be replaced by improved intuition based on new intellectual constructions. Then the author explains—in opposition to von Wright—the main philosophical traits of his conception of norm logic. The structure of the information processing determining action justifies the application of dichotomous semantics in action theory and in practical philosophy. The theory of (...) action and institutions is based on three anthropological features of man: our capacity of acting, our being a zoon politikon, and our capacity to form institutions. These features determine our ontology, our semantics and the logics of practical thinking. The action‐theoretical approach leads to a formal and finalistic theory of action in which action is not only analysed as an element of the norm content, but as the essential basis of the whole field of practical philosophy. In the frame of this action theory a conception of freedom of will is provided which does not contrast with determinism. The formalism of action is applied in two different problem situations: in action deliberation and in motive interpretation. Jørgensen's dilemma is discussed and overcome by the introduction of a generalised notion of inference. Deontic logic is confronted with the idea of a genuine logic of norms. The main principles of norm logic are discussed and a normative conditional is introduced. Von Wright's conception of a genuine norm logic is confronted with the present author's conception. The author shows that norm‐logical skepticism would be detrimental to analytical jurisprudence. (shrink)

Die analytische Jurisprudenz ist abhängig von der Normenlogik, die bisher keine voll befriedigenden Ergebnisse erzielt hat. Der Autor diskutiert die verschiedenen Wege der Normenlogik und deren Schwierigkeiten, insbesondere weist er nach, daß die normenlogische Deduktion nicht auf der Idee der deontisch perfekten Welten aufgebaut werden kann. Trotz der Grundlagenschwierigkeiten der Normenlogik muß diese als Basis der juristischen Analysen angesehen werden. Neben den inneren Schwierigkeiten der Normenlogik steht die analytische Jurisprudenz vor dem Problem, inwieweit das juristische Denken auf rein logischen und (...) inwieweit es auf rhetorischen Argumentationen fußt. Es wird auch ein Katalog der aktuellen Probleme der analytischen Jurisprudenz vorgelegt. (shrink)

Rescher charakterisiert die Gesetzesaussage durch a) nomische Notwendigkeit, b) hypothetische Kraft; Gesetzeshaftigkeit sei Bereitschaft zur faktentranszendenten Anwendungeines Allsatzes. Dem wird die These gegenübergestellt, daß die Struktur des nomischen Allsatzes so zu bestimmen ist, daß die faktentranszendente Anwendung durch den Satz begründet erscheint. Dies wird durch einen Allsatz erreicht, der nicht nur über die reale Welt, sondern auch über ein System von Alternativwelten über der realen Welt spricht. Durch den nomischen Allsatz wird gleichzeitig die nomische Notwendigkeit expliziert. Die Begründung der faktentranszendenten (...) Geltung ist gleich stark wie jene der erfahrungszendenten Gehung in der realen Weh. (shrink)

Summary The author stresses the fact-transcendent import of knowledge. A non-ontological theory of possibility is given as well as an extensional explication of fact-transcendent and contrary-to-fact conditionals by defining the fact-transcending conditional as an extensional conditional within a field of possibilities over a domain of states of affairs. The theory of fact-transcendent conditionals is used to establish an explication of nomological and quasinomological sentences. Some methodological consequences of this conception are discussed.

Political and juristic enquiry must be conceived of as an action theoretical approach. On the basis of his formal and finalistic action theory as well as his neo‐institutionalist view, the author sketches the role of information in modern democracy. He holds the view that democratic institutions are always in danger of being misused. The complex role of mass media, party propaganda and the detrimental effects of state propaganda are analyzed. The author deals with some general features of information processes in (...) the realm of political practice: Information has to be considered in relation to action; the message by itself does not show whether the information is true; there are two forms of reception of information, active and passive reception. Information processes have a deep influence on personal as well as on political liberty. The intrusion of marketing‐methods of propaganda in political practice is a great danger for democratic life, particularly if realized by the state or central institutions. It can destroy intellectual freedom, which is a prerequisite of discursive democracy. Democracy and human liberty can flourish only in an open society. (shrink)

Once affirmed that a formal and finalistic theory of action is one of the four pillars of neo‐institutionalism, the author introduces the concept of Freedom of action, which is based on two points: the empirical existence of a scope for action and an information process which determine the choice between alternative actions. He then analyzes different versions of determinism and the distinction between descriptive and practical sentences, and concludes that a theory of action based on the information process has to (...) deal with the structures of teleological thought. In this sense he stresses the practical relevance of the plurality of ends, often conflicting with each other. Finally, he explains how formal teleology is used in his theory of action and how this theory provides methodological achievements for jurisprudence.*. (shrink)