De acuerdo con la ontología monadológica de Leibniz, decir que todo ser vivo es imperecedero implica que no existe en sentido estricto la muerte, o, mejor dicho, que ésta es sólo aparente. Leibniz no sólo va a sostener que las mónadas no pueden perecer por medios naturales, sino también que aquello que llamamos muerte no implica la separación del cuerpo y el alma. En el presente trabajo de investigación pretendo realizar un comentario crítico al §89, I de sus Essais de (...) Théodicée, uno de los pasajes emblemáticos en los que el hannoveriano desarrolla la distinción entre dos formas de subsistencia. (shrink)

A través de esta entrevista a Alejandro Vigo, un referente obligado para quien desea profundizar en el pensamiento de autores como Kant, Aristóteles, Husserl o Heidegger, exploramos los puntos de encuentro entre estas tradiciones, a fin de esclarecer la relación entre identidad práctica, virtud y sentido. Esta entrevista a Alejandro Vigo, además de permitirnos explorar parte de su itinerario intelectual, nos da la oportunidad de reflexionar sobre los alcances y las limitaciones de las propuestas filosóficas de cada uno de estos (...) autores. (shrink)

Este artículo analiza la teoría butleriana de los actos performativos y su crítica a las teorías substancialistas o esencialistas del género a la luz de la teoría leibniziana de la acción intencional con el objetivo de mostrar que no podemos disociar la performatividad de la intencionalidad ni, en consecuencia, de una comprensión práctica de la identidad personal. Para lograr este objetivo, realizo tres cosas: en primer lugar, un análisis de la teoría del género y la noción de “performatividad” de Butler (...) desde su crítica a las teorías naturalistas o esencialistas del género; en segundo, confronto su teoría de la performatividad con la teoría leibniziana de “acción intencional” y su noción de “agencia moral”; en tercer lugar, esbozo dos conclusiones: 1) solo podemos hablar de performatividad en términos de intencionalidad, y 2) hablar de actos performativos no implica disociar el género de nuestra identidad personal. (shrink)

This research aims to analyses Leibniz’ Monadologic Ontology and his theory of expression as opposed to those readings of Leibniz’ work that define monads as isolated entities that lack that all possible relation. The analysis will also show that, beyond his notion of Personal Identity, underlies a logic of Otherness able to dialogue with contemporary Personalism. This logic of otherness, if our reading of Leibniz is right, it is especially ostensible in the ‘spirits’, which expressive nature establish not only a (...) systematic bond with the totality of beings that integrate the world, but also a notion of Personal Identity. Such notion allows that otherness acquires a prescriptive character: to place us in other’s situation and thus understand their needs and, through this, acknowledge our place in the cosmos. In order to achieve this we will carry four tasks: first, we will analyze in depth the application of his theory of expression to Monadologic ontology and his notio completa. Second, we will appreciate what implicatures have both for the specific case of spirits, emphasizing the communitarian nature of these rational monads. Third, we will rebuild a Leibnizian theory of Personal Identity and finally, we will compare the results with the main Personalists’ body of thesis. (shrink)

José Manuel Giménez Amaya; Sergio Sánchez Migallón: De la Neurociencia a la Neuroética. Narrativa científica y reflexión filosófica, Pamplona: EUNSA 2010, 172 pp.

El personalismo, en general, surge como una respuesta en contra del afán moderno de dar validez sólo aquello que es mesurable y empíricamente verificable, i.e., contra la tendencia positivista a olvidar la centralidad de la persona “como creadora y depositaria del sentido de la realidad”. Cara al positivismo imperante del siglo XIX y XX, encontramos la propuesta antropológica de Edith Stein, quien asume el método fenomenológico de su maestro para articular una sólida visión de lo humano, capaz de reivindicar su (...) dignidad constitutiva. El presente libro del profesor Rubén Sánchez, en este sentido, nos permite no sólo reparar en el recorrido intelectual que realizó la filósofa de Breslau para consolidar su antropología, sino también sumergirnos, en palabras de Gonzáles Di Pierro, en “todos los niveles de este personalismo steiniano”. Se trata, pues, de un texto que, sin menoscabo de la hondura y complejidad del pensamiento de Stein, nos permite ahondar en su propuesta antropológica desde un lenguaje sencillo y accesible para todo público. (shrink)

Resumen El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar la distinción leibniziana entre apercepción sensible y consáentia a la luz de su ontología monadológica, con la intención de esclarecer las diferencias constitutivas entre los tres tipos de mónadas que Leibniz postula, esto es, entre las mónadas simples, las meras almas y los espíritus. Con esto, además de argumentar en contra de la concepción estándar de la apercepción, la cual termina por confinarla al caso específico de los espíritus, sitúo la propuesta (...) del hannoveriano entre dos lecturas contemporáneas: por un lado, aquella que comprende la apercepción como un acto de orden superior reflexivo, esto es, una percepción de la percepción; y, por otro lado, aquella que, al distinguir entre apercepción sensible y consáentia, privilegia una teoría de primer orden para hablar de la primera, reservando los actos reflexivos para la segunda. Aunque la evidencia textual es más afín con la segunda, hay elementos de la primera que permiten matizarla.The main aim of this article is to analyze Leibniz’s distinction between sensitive apperception and ‘conscientia’ through his monadological ontology, with the intention of lighten the constitutive differences between the three types of monads that Leibniz state, that is, between bare monads, souls and spirits. By proving this, my approach not only argues against the standard conceptions of Leibniz's notion of apperception, which ends attributing apperception only to the specify case of spirits, but it abo places the Hanoverian proposal between two contemporary lectures: on one side, an approach that understand apperception as a high order reflexive act, that is, a perception of a perception; on the other side, an approach that distinguishes sensible apperception from ‘conscientia’ in order to privilege a first order theory for the first one, reserving the reflective acts only for the second. Even when the textual evidence is closer to the last one, there are some elements of the first approach that allow us to improve it. (shrink)

El presente trabajo de investigación tiene por objetivo reconstruir la noción de identidad práctica tanto en Aristóteles como en Leibniz, a fin de mostrar en qué medida el hannoveriano es deudor del Estagirita y en qué medida se distingue una propuesta de la otra. Para lograr esto hacemos dos cosas: por un lado, analizamos la noción aristotélica de praxis y de agencia moral a la luz de su noción de habituación; por otro lado, damos cuenta de la dimensión práctica que (...) el hannoveriano adscribe a su noción de identidad personal, a partir de sus nociones de conscientia y cualidad moral. -/- The purpose of this research is to reconstruct the notion of practical identity in both Aristotle and Leibniz in order to show to what extent, the Hanoverian is indebted with Aristotle and to what extent one proposal can be distinguished from the other. To achieve this we do two things: on the one hand, we analyze the Aristotelian notion of praxis and moral agency trough his notion of habituation; on the other hand, we notice the practical dimension that Leibniz assigns to his notion of personal identity, based on his notions of conscientia and moral quality. (shrink)

El objetivo principal del presente trabajo de investigación es esclarecer el papel de la alteridad y el reconocimiento en Leibniz, tanto en su lógica de la alteridad y su teoría de la justicia universal, como en su fundamentación ontológica en la naturaleza expresiva y composible de los espíritus. Para lograr este objetivo, he dividido esta investigación en dos partes: en la primera parte busco mostrar en qué medida la alteridad y el reconocimiento son indispensables para comprender la filosofía práctica del (...) hannoveriano; mientras que en la segunda busca analizar la naturaleza expresiva y composible de los espíritus, a fin de articular una incipiente fundamentación ontológica de la moral leibniziana. (shrink)

A pesar de que los filósofos modernos se caracterizan por ser versados en muchas disciplinas y ciencias, pocos son los intelectuales que, como Leibniz, logran formular una comprensión del mundo en la que cada una de estas disciplinas se articula con las demás. Esto hace que la propuesta filosófica y científica del hannoveriano, a diferencia de otras propuestas filosóficas de la modernidad, sea lo suficientemente compleja y robusta como para responder muchas problemáticas contemporáneas. Dada la amplia diversidad de temáticas que (...) aborda Leibniz a lo largo de su vida, sin embargo, el presente libro pretende reflexionar tan sólo sobre los alcances de algunas de estas problemáticas, las cuales se encuentran divididas en cinco grupos o ejes temáticos.El primer grupo de textos, así, aborda problemas relacionados con su metafísica y su caracterización dinámica del mundo. El segundo comprende aquellos textos relacionados con lógica, argumentación y filosofía del lenguaje, mientras que en el tercero se hace alusión a su caracterización de la belleza cara a su noción de orden y armonía. En el cuarto grupo nos encontramos una serie de textos que exploran la relación entre su propuesta filosófica y otras disciplinas, tales como las ciencias naturales, la literatura y la psicología. Finalmente nos encontramos con aquellos textos relacionados con su filosofía práctica, en particular con sus escritos sobre jurisprudencia y filosofía política. (shrink)

En este trabajo realizo un examen crítico del reciente libro de Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo sobre la crítica de Aristóteles a la teoría platónica de las Ideas. El libro de Di Camillo es un trabajo muy serio cuya lectura recomiendo ampliamente. Sin embargo, considero que cuatro de las principales tesis que la autora defiende tienen varias dificultades y mi objetivo aquí es presentar argumentos detallados en contra de ellas: la interpretación de la distinción entre argumentos más y menos rigurosos del (...) tratado Sobre las Ideas; la tesis de que la separación es el blanco esencial de las críticas aristotélicas a las Ideas; la interpretación de las opciones que Platón tiene para responder al argumento del tercer hombre, y la tesis de que la separación de las Ideas debe entenderse como homonimia. In this paper I examine Silvana Gabriela Di Camillo's recent book on Aristotle's criticisms of Plato's theory of Ideas. Di Camillo's book is a very serious work that I highly recommend. Nevertheless, I consider that four of the main theses that the author defends face several difficulties and my aim here is to offer detailed arguments against them: the interpretation of the distinction between more and less accurate arguments of the treatise On Ideas; the thesis that separation is the essential target of Aristotle's criticisms against Plato's Ideas; the interpretation of the options available to Plato to reply to the third man argument; and the thesis that the separation of Ideas should be understood as homonymy. (shrink)

Resumen: El presente trabajo pretende analizar algunos de los postulados principales de la ontología vitalista de Leibniz, en especial su noción de máquina natural y su propuesta monadológica, con la finalidad de demostrar la viabilidad en su pensamiento de una teoría de la acción. Se divide en tres partes: la primera examina la estructura compleja de las máquinas naturales, a partir de la cual se puede observar una composición dual de la acción; a partir de esto, la segunda parte distingue (...) tres tipos de mónadas con la intención de perfilar la posibilidad de una agencia racional; y, finalmente, la tercera parte ofrece algunas conclusiones relevantes para su teoría de la acción, como el papel de la percepción en el proceso de elección y el intelectualismo leibniziano, entre otros.: This paper aims to analyze key postulates of Leibniz’s vitalist ontology, with a special emphasis on his conception of a natural machine and his monadological proposal. It is divided into three sections: first I analyze the complex structure of natural machines, from which a twofold composition of action can be reckoned; hence, the second section identifies three kinds of monads, with the purpose of devising the possibility of rational agency; finally, the third section draws some relevant conclusions for Leibniz’s account of action, as the place of perception in the process of choice and Leibnizian intellectualism, among others. (shrink)

I present an argument proving that there are no fundamental facts, which is similar to an argument recently presented by Mark Jago for truthmaker maximalism. I suggest that this argument gives us at least some prima facie, defeasible reason to believe that there are no fundamental facts.

In this paper I will present three arguments (based on the notions of constitution, metaphysical reality, and truth, respectively) with the aim of shedding some new light on the structure of Fine’s (2005, 2006) ‘McTaggartian’ arguments against the reality of tense. Along the way, I will also (i) draw a novel map of the main realist positions about tense, (ii) unearth a previously unnoticed but potentially interesting form of external relativism (which I will label ‘hyper-presentism’) and (iii) sketch a novel (...) interpretation of Fine’s fragmentalism (which I contrast with Lipman’s 2015, 2016b, forthcoming). (shrink)

Grounding contingentism is the doctrine according to which grounds are not guaranteed to necessitate what they ground. In this paper I will argue that the most plausible version of contingentism is incompatible with the idea that the grounding relation is transitive, unless either ‘priority monism’ or ‘contrastivism’ are assumed.

According to Composition is Identity, a whole is literally identical to the plurality of its parts. According to Mereological Nihilism, nothing has proper parts. In this note, it is argued that Composition is Identity can be shown to entail Mereological Nihilism in a much more simple and direct way than the one recently proposed by Claudio Calosi.

What is the relation between parts taken together and the whole that they compose? The recent literature appears to be dominated by two different answers to this question, which are normally thought of as being incompatible. According to the first, parts taken together are identical to the whole that they compose. According to the second, the whole is grounded in its parts. The aim of this paper is to make some theoretical room for the view according to which parts ground (...) the whole they compose while being, at the same time, identical to it. (shrink)

In Christianity, Otherization and Contemporary Politics, Roberto E. Alejandro argues that the identity politics of the American far-left follow an identity paradigm established by early Christian thinkers, and warns that such politics may incline towards the same violence Christianity succumbed to once imbued with political power.

In The Crucifixion and Resurrection of Freddie Gray, Roberto E. Alejandro argues that confessional commitments related to race, society, and structure dominated the interpretation of Gray’s death, stripping the man and his significance from a grieving, impoverished community.

The idea of fairness lies at the heart of the concept of justice proposed by political philosopher John Rawls, a concept that liberals have often invoked to defend the welfare state. In The Limits of Rawlsian Justice political theorist Roberto Alejandro challenges the assumptions that Rawls set out to defend his position. While other opponents of Rawls have attempted to offer an alternative to his concept of justice as fairness, Alejandro instead examines Rawls from within his own writings, testing (...) Rawls's assumptions on the basis of those assumptions themselves. As a result, Alejandro shows that Rawls's idea of justice as fairness is fraught with inner tensions, exposed to utilitarian dangers, and far from being the coherent model Rawls promised. Alejandro concludes that Rawls's notion of justice-as-fairness preserves the status quo, overlooks the realities of inequalities in today's society, and is inherently conservative. As a theoretical paradigm, it is exhausted. He urges that we acknowledge the limits of Rawlsian justice both as a defense of the welfare state and as the basis of a just society. (shrink)

Fine (2005, 2006) has presented a ‘trilemma’ concerning the tense-realist idea that reality is constituted by tensed facts. According to Fine, there are only three ways out of the trilemma, consisting in what he takes to be the three main families of tense-realism: ‘presentism’, ‘(external) relativism’, and ‘fragmentalism’. Importantly, although Fine characterises tense-realism as the thesis that reality is constituted (at least in part) by tensed facts, he explicitly claims that tense realists are not committed to their fundamental existence. Recently, (...) Correia and Rosenkranz (2011, 2012) have claimed that Fine’s tripartite map of tense realism is incomplete as it misses a fourth position they call ‘dynamic absolutism’. In this paper, I will argue that dynamic absolutists are committed to the irreducible existence of tensed facts and that, for this reason, they face a similar trilemma concerning the notion of fact-content. I will thus conclude that a generalised version of Fine’s trilemma, concerning both fact-constitution and fact-content, is indeed inescapable. (shrink)

ABSTRACTThe ability of providing an adequate supervenience base for tensed truths may seem to be one of the main theoretical advantages of both the growing-block and the moving-spotlight theory of time over presentism. However, in this paper I will argue that some propositions appear to be as problematic for growing-block theorists as past-directed propositions are for presentists, namely propositions stating that nothing will be the case in the future. Furthermore, I will show that the moving-spotlight theory can adequately address all (...) the main supervenience challenges that can be levelled against A-theories of time. I will, thus, conclude that, at least as far as the supervenience principle is concerned, the moving-spotlight theory should be preferred over both presentism and the growing-block theory. (shrink)

Alejandro offers a theoretical reflection on citizenship as a political category that could make possible a collective identity defined by the citizens' interpretations of traditions and their participation in the public sphere as well as their construction of a hermeneutic historical consciousness. This reflection seeks to pave the way for a vision of citizenship as a space of fluid boundaries within which there is room for diverse and even conflicting understandings of individuality, community, and public identity. Paper edition (unseen), $17.95. (...) Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or. (shrink)

The possibility of changing the past by means of time-travel appears to depend on the possibility of distinguishing the past as it is ‘before’ and ‘after’ the time-travel. So far, all the metaphysical models that have been proposed to account for the possibility of past-changing time-travels operate this distinction by conceiving of time as multi-dimensional, and thus by significantly inflating our metaphysics of time. The aim of this article is to argue that there is an intuitive sense in which past-changing (...) time-travels are metaphysically possible also in one-dimensional time. (shrink)

It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect”, to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition of (...) an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

In this paper I address two important objections to the theory called ‘ Composition as Identity’ : the ‘wall-bricks-and-atoms problem’, and the claim that CAI entails mereological nihilism. I aim to argue that the best version of CAI capable of addressing both problems is the theory I will call ‘Atomic Composition as Identity’ which consists in taking the plural quantifier to range only over proper pluralities of mereological atoms and every non-atomic entity to be identical to the plurality of atoms (...) it fuses. I will proceed in three main steps. First, I will defend Sider’s Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 211–221, 2014) idea of weakening the comprehension principle for pluralities and I will show that :219–235, 2016a) it can ward off both the WaBrA problem and the threat of mereological nihilism. Second, I will argue that CAI-theorists should uphold an ‘atomic comprehension principle’ which, jointly with CAI, entails that there are only proper pluralities of mereological atoms. Finally, I will present a novel reading of the ‘one of’ relation that not only avoids the problems presented by Yi Composition as identity. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp 169–191, 2014) and Calosi :429–443, 2016b, Am Philos Q 55:281–292, 2018) but can also help ACAI-theorists to make sense of the idea that a composite entity is both one and many. (shrink)

I present a ‘stage-theoretical’ interpretation of the supervaluationist semantics for the growing-block theory of time according to which the ‘nodes’ on the branching tree of historical possibilities are taken to be possible stages of the growth of the growing-block. As I will argue, the resulting interpretation (i) is very intuitive, (ii) can easily ward off an objection to supervaluationist treatments of the growing-block theory presented by Fabrice Correia and Sven Rosenkranz, and (iii) is also not saddled by the problems affecting (...) the supervaluationist version of the growing-block theory defended by R. A. Briggs and Graeme A. Forbes. (shrink)

Joseph Keim Campbell has recently criticized Peter van Inwagen's Third Argument against compatibilism for its reliance on the existence of a remote past. In response, Anthony Brueckner has offered a new version of the Third Argument showing that determinism and free will are incompatible for all times t relative to which there is a past . In this paper I argue that although Brueckner's retooled argument fails to prove anything in favour of incompatibilism, its conclusion can be exploited to provide (...) another version of van Inwagen's original argument that doesn't rely on the existence of past times, thus withstanding Campbell's criticism. (shrink)

The aim of this study is to address the “Grounding Grounding Problem,” that is, the question as to what, if anything, grounds facts about grounding. I aim to show that, if a seemingly plausible principle of modal recombination between fundamental facts and the principle customarily called “Entailment” are assumed, it is possible to prove not only that grounding facts featuring fundamental, contingent grounds are derivative but also that either they are partially grounded in the grounds they feature or they are (...) “abysses”. (shrink)

Contents: List of Contributors VII; Roberto Poli: Foreword IX-X; Roberto Poli: The Brentano puzzle: an introduction 1; Dallas Willard: Who needs Brentano? The wasteland of philosophy without its past 15; Claire Ortiz Hill: Introduction to Paul Linke's 'Gottlob Frege as philosopher' 45; Paul F. Linke: Gottlob Frege as philosopher 49; John Blackmore: Franz Brentano and the University of Vienna Philosophical Society 1888-1938 73; Alf Zimmer: On agents and objects: some remarks on Brentanian perception 93; Liliana Albertazzi: Perceptual saliences (...) and nuclei of meaning 113; Jan Srzednicki: Brentano and the thinkable 139; Claire Ortiz Hill: From empirical psychology to phenomenology. Edmund Husserl on the 'Brentano puzzle' 151; Serena Cattaruzza: Brentano and Boltzmann: the Schubladenexperiment 169; Karl Schuhmann: Johannes Daubert's theory of judgement 179; Evelyn Dölling: On Alexius Meinong's theory of signs 199; Robin Rollinger: Linguistic expressions and acts of meaning: comments on Marty's philosophy of language 215-225. (shrink)

According to ‘Strong Composition as Identity’, if an entity is composed of a plurality of entities, it is identical to them. As it has been argued in the literature, SCAI appears to give rise to some serious problems which seem to suggest that SCAI-theorists should take their plural quantifier to be governed by some ‘weak’ plural comprehension principle and, thus, ‘exclude’ some kinds of pluralities from their plural ontology. The aim of this paper is to argue that, contrary to what (...) may appear at first sight, the assumption of a weak plural comprehension principle is perfectly compatible with plural logic and the common uses of plural quantification. As I aim to show, SCAI-theorists can simply claim that their theory must be understood as formulated by means of the most ‘joint-carving’ plural quantifier, thus leaving open the possibility of other, less joint-carving, ‘unrestricted’ plural quantifiers. In the final part of the paper I will also suggest that SCAI-theorists should not only allow for singular quantification over pluralities of entities, but also for plural quantification over ‘super-pluralities’ of entities. (shrink)

It has become common, following Stephen Darwall’s “Two Kinds of Respect” (1977), to distinguish between “appraisal respect” and “recognition respect.” I propose, rather, to distinguish between hierarchical and egalitarian respect. The way the two meanings interact and the way they either support or contrast with each other have yet to be made clear. The meanings gathered under the broad rubric of respect can be highlighted by a genealogy that convincingly shows that the hierarchical notion is fundamental and that the definition (...) of an egalitarian meaning is a decisive shift made mainly by the Enlightenment movement, particularly by Kant. Furthermore, the notion of respect is currently being extended beyond persons—to animals, other living beings, and the environment. I argue that we can justifiably do so on the basis of the interaction between the hierarchical and egalitarian notions of respect. (shrink)

In its simplest form, a Spritz is an aperitif made with (sparkling) water and (white) wine. A ‘gunky Spritz’, as I will call it, is a Spritz in which the water and the wine are mixed through and through, so that every proper part of the Spritz has a proper part containing both water and wine. In the literature on the notion of location the possibility of mixtures like a gunky Spritz has been thought of as either threatening seemingly intuitive (...) locative principles, or as requiring the position of multiple primitive locative relations. In this paper I present a new theory of location which assumes as primitive only the notion of pervasive location and show that it can account for the possibility of gunky Spritz in an intuitive and adequate way. (shrink)

Pedro Dorado Montero fue un reconocido catedrático de Derecho Penal de la Universidad de Salamanca desde 1892 a 1919. Sus teorías penales y su pensamiento jurídico fueron muy famosos en su tiempo y le consiguieron reconocimiento internacional, pero su pensamiento filosófico y metafísico permanece desconocido todavía hoy. Este artículo examina los principales temas que han caracterizado el pensamiento de Dorado en torno al problema del Hombre en su dimensión teórica o fundamental: el conocimiento, el yo, la conciencia, la voluntad, el (...) libre albedrío¿. (shrink)

El Krausismo ha sido considerado como uno de los movimientos más significativo e influyente en la historia del pensamiento español contemporáneo. Originado aparentemente en la elección arbitraria de Sanz del Río, en pocos años adquiere un importante desarrollo en los círculos intelectuales, adquiriendo una notable influencia entre el profesorado de Universidad y de Enseñanza Secundaria. Mariano Arés y Sanz fue el principal representante del movimiento en Salamanca en su dimensión más metafísica. Este artículo, tras reconstruir las líneas generales de su (...) curso de metafísica ofrece sus principales ideas acerca del conocimiento, pieza básica de su pensamiento metafísico. (shrink)

Semen est sanguis Christianorum!—‘the blood of Christians is seed’—writes Tertullian at the end of his Apologeticum. This summing-up has justly become a cornerstone of Christian the...

In this extraordinary contribution to Nietzsche studies, Robert Alejandro offers an original interpretation of Friedrich Nietzsche's philosophy viewed as a complete whole. Alejandro painstakingly traces the different ways in which Nietzsche reconfigured and shifted his analyses of morality and of the human condition, until he was content with the final result: nothing was dispensable; everything was necessary. This is a philosophy of reconciliation--hardly nihilism--and it is a perspective that is not adequately addressed elsewhere in the literature on Nietzsche. Alejandro traces (...) the evolution of Nietzsche's thought by identifying the different layers of his philosophy, expressed in a complex array of stories and historical narratives. Alejandro analyzes the different stories of Nietzsche, places those stories within a tradition of genealogical theorizing, and interprets both the stories and the genealogy in terms of one of Nietzsche's unique features, his use of "historiobiography." According to Alejandro, historiobiography blends the idea of an attunement with all history and one's awareness of this attunement. As a mode of philosophizing, historiobiography allows Nietzsche to view all human history as if it runs through his own life and thoughts. Alejandro argues that Nietzsche deployed three strategies to find relief from his sense of the meaninglessness of life: his magnified concept of what he himself represented in human history, his doctrine of the eternal recurrence, and his philosophy of reconciliation. "I am confident that this book will be considered essential reading for any scholar doing serious research into Nietzsche's thought and its implications.... The author carefully traces the shifts and turns and occasionally the contradictions and dead-ends in the development of Nietzsche's major themes. I have never read an account of Nietzsche's thought as fully and convincingly supported by textual reference as this book. Others will disagree with the author's readings of Nietzsche, that is the nature of scholarship, but I cannot see how they could be ignored." --_Edward Portis, Texas A & M University_ "This is a major work on Nietzsche. Robert Alejandro offers us a reading of Nietzsche's Herculean efforts that Nietzsche scholars and scholars who write about modernity and postmodernity will be unable to ignore. This wide ranging and deep book addresses major issues in cultural history, psychoanalysis, cultural anthropology, and the vast literature on modernity and secularization. I expect this to be a book that generates debate and discussion for years to come." --_Robert Hollinger, Iowa State University_ "Robert Alejandro delivers a rich, lively account of Nietzsche's quest for meaning. By focusing on the theme of _historiobiography_, Alejandro illuminates Nietzsche's bold attempt to place himself at the center of a comprehensive account of the rise and fall of Western civilization. A thoughtful, well-crafted book, written very much in the spirit of Nietzsche himself." --_Daniel Conway, Texas A & M University_. (shrink)

(No abstract is available for this citation).

Despite the differences, there is some convergence between Adam Smith's and Immanuel Kant's theories of moral motivation. Both rely on a peculiar feeling, respect, as the proper source of motive in moral matters. An analysis of Smith's and Kant's conception of respect shows that both recognize that it has a specific normative import and plays a decisive role in morality. This convergence offers some support to the idea that Smith's sentimentalism and Kant's rationalism are compatible, at least as far as (...) moral motivation is at issue. (shrink)