Apperception and conscientia in Leibniz’s monadological ontology

Veritas – Revista de Filosofia da Pucrs 43:49-67 (2019)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Resumen El objetivo principal de este artículo es analizar la distinción leibniziana entre apercepción sensible y consáentia a la luz de su ontología monadológica, con la intención de esclarecer las diferencias constitutivas entre los tres tipos de mónadas que Leibniz postula, esto es, entre las mónadas simples, las meras almas y los espíritus. Con esto, además de argumentar en contra de la concepción estándar de la apercepción, la cual termina por confinarla al caso específico de los espíritus, sitúo la propuesta del hannoveriano entre dos lecturas contemporáneas: por un lado, aquella que comprende la apercepción como un acto de orden superior reflexivo, esto es, una percepción de la percepción; y, por otro lado, aquella que, al distinguir entre apercepción sensible y consáentia, privilegia una teoría de primer orden para hablar de la primera, reservando los actos reflexivos para la segunda. Aunque la evidencia textual es más afín con la segunda, hay elementos de la primera que permiten matizarla.The main aim of this article is to analyze Leibniz’s distinction between sensitive apperception and ‘conscientia’ through his monadological ontology, with the intention of lighten the constitutive differences between the three types of monads that Leibniz state, that is, between bare monads, souls and spirits. By proving this, my approach not only argues against the standard conceptions of Leibniz's notion of apperception, which ends attributing apperception only to the specify case of spirits, but it abo places the Hanoverian proposal between two contemporary lectures: on one side, an approach that understand apperception as a high order reflexive act, that is, a perception of a perception; on the other side, an approach that distinguishes sensible apperception from ‘conscientia’ in order to privilege a first order theory for the first one, reserving the reflective acts only for the second. Even when the textual evidence is closer to the last one, there are some elements of the first approach that allow us to improve it.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,202

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Percepções, Sensações e Apercepções em Leibniz.Edgar Marques - 2016 - Revista Portuguesa de Filosofia 72 (2-3):299-320.
News from Australia.Udo Thiel - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4:16-16.
News from Australia.Udo Thiel - 1994 - The Leibniz Review 4:16-16.
Leibniz on consciousness and self-consciousness.Rocco J. Gennaro - 1999 - In Chalres Huenemann & Rocco J. Gennaro (eds.), New Essays on the Rationalists. Oxford University Press. pp. 353--71.

Analytics

Added to PP
2019-09-13

Downloads
11 (#1,070,627)

6 months
4 (#678,769)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?