Este artigo apresenta um pouco dos estudos de Roger Bacon sobre Alquimia. Filósofo medieval, Bacon deu sequência à tradição de estudos herméticos. Como parte de uma das ciências especiais, assim como ele a compreendia, a Alquimia teve destaque como elemento importante no seu projeto filosófico-científico. A fim de apresentar um pouco o lugar da Alquimia no corpus baconiano, o texto parte de uma breve exposição da possível origem dessa arte entre os povos da antiguidade oriental e, posteriormente, sua chegada à (...) Europa medieval. Passa-se então a apresentar os ensinamentos alquímicos transmitidos por Bacon; sua compreensão de Alquimia não como magia, mas como ciência positiva, cujos métodos e resultados podiam ser corroborados pela Ciência Experimental; a elaboração de uma breve chave de leitura dos termos alquímicos enviados ao Papa Clemente IV, juntamente com a defesa de que a Alquimia é uma arte hermética e precisa ser preservada da ignorância do homem comum, sendo revelada a quem a mereça em corpo e alma. (shrink)

Constantine the African's significance as the first important translator of medical texts from Arabic into Latin is indisputable due to the fact that his work contributed decisively to the enlargement of medical knowledge in the Latin West. Among his considerable œuvre the translation of al-Maˇgūsī's Kitāb al-Malakī under its Latin title Pantegni, the first real medical compendium in Latin, holds a particularly important position because of its popularity. The Pantegni is divided into the two parts Theory and Practice with ten (...) books each. Yet while the Theorica Pantegni corresponds basically to the Theory in the Kitāb al-Malakī, this is only partly the case for the Practica Pantegni. The content of the differing parts has been put together mainly from other medical texts. The identification of these other medical texts was the aim of some important researches while the last ten years. The aim of this article is to present the sources of the Pantegni, Practica’s third book and to give some indications on the person who made the compilation who – as it seems – wasn't Constantine the African himself. (shrink)

The reappearance of Professor Alasdair MacIntyre's far-ranging and provocative article, ‘Hume on “is” and “ought”’, is the proximate cause of this short excursion to an old, well-scarred, and still fascinating battleground. Re-reading MacIntyre's brilliant offensive thrust led me to review the counter-attacks and diversionary movements that followed its first appearance. They in turn sent me back, inevitably and ultimately, to look again at the cause of this philosophic skirmishing: Section 1 of Part i of Book III of Hume's Treatise of (...) Human Nature, entitled ‘Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason’. The battles of the past have been waged chiefly round the last paragraph of this Section (pp. 469–470 in Selby-Bigge's edition), but my primary concern here is going to be with those ‘reasonings’ that precede the celebrated ‘is-ought’ paragraph. Closer attention to the bulk of Book III, Part i, Section 1, to which ‘reasonings’ Hume says he ‘cannot forbear adding … an observation’ on ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and some selective attention as well to Books I and II of the Treatise, should help to scale down the exaggerated importance attached to the ‘is-ought’ passage. Unless this is done, one runs the risk of permitting a tailpiece to wag the body of the chapter, if not the whole Book ‘Of Morals’. (shrink)

Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for (...) this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework. (shrink)

Compared to other animals, humans appear to have a special motivation to share experiences and mental states with others (Clark, 2006; Grice, 1975), which enables them to enter a condition of ‘we’ or shared intentionality (Tomasello & Carpenter, 2005). Shared intentionality has been suggested to be an evolutionary response to unique problems faced in complex joint action coordination (Levinson, 2006; Tomasello, Carpenter, Call, Behne, & Moll, 2005) and to be unique to humans (Tomasello, 2014). The theoretical and empirical bases for (...) this claim, however, present several issues and inconsistencies. Here, we suggest that shared intentionality can be approached as an interactional achievement, and that by studying how our closest relatives, the great apes, coordinate joint action with conspecifics, we might demonstrate some correlate abilities of shared intentionality, such as the appreciation of joint commitment. We provide seven examples from bonobo joint activities to illustrate our framework. (shrink)

The article aims to identify as the main passions that run through the Hobbesian theoretical corpus. To this end, the exhibition will begin by analyzing the mechanism of the passions founded by the author. Next, it will be highlighted how unbridled passions make peaceful coexistence between individuals unfeasible, establishing a scenario in which conflicts are inevitable. Two passions will be analyzed in more detail: vainglory and fear. After emphasizing that the Hobbesian man tends naturally to his own benefit, to competition (...) and to domination, representing a threat to the other, it will be pointed out how the State asserts itself as the necessary that aims to discipline like passions. This part of the argument will analyze as desirable passions for the maintenance of civil life, with emphasis on hope, the desire for comfort and delight, the desire for knowledge and the arts, as well as for fear and vainglory itself. (shrink)

À Gênes, Italie, les ruines d’un ancien couvent ont été investies depuis six ans par un collectif dont certains individu·e·s ont des compétences et/ou un parcours d’artistes professionnels. À Yaoundé, Cameroun, des artistes de rue ont commencé à fédérer plusieurs disciplines artistiques (peinture murale, body painting, création de mode) afin d’occuper l’espace public de façon éphémère (par un défilé) et durable (en peignant des murs). En s’appuyant sur ces deux cas d’études, cet article cherche à comprendre les différentes formes d’art (...) qui sont mobilisées, comme outils d’expression politique par des activistes et comme revendications activistes qui s’expriment par l’art. La recherche d’une reconnaissance individuelle et collective, le désir d’atteindre un certain niveau artistique et la volonté d’exprimer de façon artistique des revendications politiques invitent à repenser les dynamiques in situ pour mieux saisir la complexité de l’engagement artistique professionnel, politique et militant. (shrink)

‘Generally speaking, the errors in religion are dangerous; those in philosophy only ridiculous.’—Hume, Treatise , I, iv, 7. Several years have elapsed since Professor Malcolm's astonishing revival of St Anselm's ontological argument . The first shock-wave of criticism has likewise passed, having been absorbed by now into the bound volumes of the periodical literature. This note is not intended to add much weight to the common conclusion of that impressive body of criticism, for, though interesting and important logical issues remain (...) to be discussed in connection with the ontological argument, there can be little doubt that it fails as a demonstration of God's existence. Nevertheless, there is one move made by Malcolm in his determined defence of Anselm which may have had unfortunate repercussions far beyond the reaches of philosophical theology. Perhaps a discussion of this one step in the argument will help to dispel some erroneous impressions. (shrink)

The knockdown argument, the logically impregnable position are rarities in philosophy. Indeed, there are some who might argue that no philosophical argument or position is immune from damaging criticism: what seems utterly convincing to one generation of philosophers is 1iable to be held up as a classic blunder by the next. Nevertheless, Hume's presentation of the problem of evil and his allied criticisms of a Christian-type theism have seemed conclusive to an impressive array of nineteenth- and twentieth-century philosophers, and both (...) his efforts, consequently, might be regarded as likely exceptions to the principle of philosophical fallibility. But now, in a fairly recent article, Professor Nelson Pike has seen fit to challenge even these supposedly reliable cornerstones of our philosophical heritage. More recently still, Pike has included this article, unchanged, in an anthology which he has edited, and he has backed it up with an introductory note which reaffirms his challenge to Hume on evil. (shrink)

Every philosophical belief has its presuppositions; no philosopher can operate without them. Some of mine are these: that the expression of a thought and the thought expressed are distinguishable but inseparable; that one’s thought about something and one’s feeling about that something are distinguishable but inseparable; that we humans have a nature but that it consists of psycho-physical dispositions, or capacities, of such vaguely defined sorts and limits that, from a spectator’s point of view, I eschew a priori pronouncements about (...) what human beings can or cannot do and await developments, and that, as an agent, I act in the spirit of Sartre’s self-creating chooser. In short, and skipping the refinements—failures of philosophical nerve—a person, a human being, a philosopher is what he does. (shrink)

The reappearance of Professor Alasdair MacIntyre's far-ranging and provocative article, ‘Hume on “is” and “ought”’, is the proximate cause of this short excursion to an old, well-scarred, and still fascinating battleground. Re-reading MacIntyre's brilliant offensive thrust led me to review the counter-attacks and diversionary movements that followed its first appearance. They in turn sent me back, inevitably and ultimately, to look again at the cause of this philosophic skirmishing: Section 1 of Part i of Book III of Hume's Treatise of (...) Human Nature, entitled ‘Moral Distinctions not deriv'd from Reason’. The battles of the past have been waged chiefly round the last paragraph of this Section, but my primary concern here is going to be with those ‘reasonings’ that precede the celebrated ‘is-ought’ paragraph. Closer attention to the bulk of Book III, Part i, Section 1, to which ‘reasonings’ Hume says he ‘cannot forbear adding … an observation’ on ‘is’ and ‘ought’, and some selective attention as well to Books I and II of the Treatise, should help to scale down the exaggerated importance attached to the ‘is-ought’ passage. Unless this is done, one runs the risk of permitting a tailpiece to wag the body of the chapter, if not the whole Book ‘Of Morals’. (shrink)

1. Zwischen den Kulturen -- 2. Die Zeichen -- 3. Lehrgänge -- 4. Die Chiffren -- 5. Musik und Mythos.