Hebrew University Professor Emeritus and Israel Prize recipient Eliezer Schweid (1929-2022) is the greatest historian of Jewish thought of our era. In Siddur Hatefillah he probes the Jewish prayer book as a reflection of Judaism's unity of Judaism and continuity as a unique spiritual entity; and as the most popular, most uttered, and internalized text of the Jewish people. Schweid explores texts which process religious philosophical teaching into the language of prayer, and/or express philosophical ideas in prayer's (...) special language - which the worshipper reflects upon in order to direct prayer, and through which flows hoped-for feedback. With the addition of historical, philological, and literary contexts, the study provides the reader with first-time access to the comprehensive meaning of Jewish prayer- filling a vacuum in both the experience and scholarship of Jewish worship. (shrink)

Prayer is one of the central tenets of the major theistic religions, and philosophers of religion have struggled to give a philosophically acceptable account of it. Process philosophies of prayer, in particular, have been criticized for being religiously unfulfilling. In this paper, I critically evaluate previous attempts by Ford, Mason, Cooper and Suchocki to articulate a process philosophy of petitionary prayer. All of these attempts are unsuccessful because they either fail to preserve the importance and uniqueness (...) of prayer or because they reduce prayer to simply a change in the praying subject. After reviewing the previous attempts, I show how one could construct a process philosophy of petitionary prayer out of resources found in Whitehead’s Adventures of Ideas that avoids these problems and is thus more religiously satisfactory to the theist. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose to analyze the phenomenon of Christian prayer by way of combining two different analytical frameworks. We start by applying Schutz’s theories of “intersubjectivity,” “inner time,” “politheticality,” and “multiple realities,” and then proceed by drawing on the ideas and insights of linguistic philosophers, notably, Wittgenstein’s “language-game,” Austin’s “speech act,” and Evans’s “logic of self-involvement”. In conjoining these accounts, we wish to demonstrate how their combination sheds new light on understanding the phenomenon of prayer. (...) class='Hi'>Prayer is a complex phenomenon that involves two major dimensions: the private and the social, as Matthew and Acts, respectively, demonstrate. Schutz’s study of the phenomenon of “inner time” and the “polithetical” structure of consciousness, at both the subjective and intersubjective level, provides a useful lens to analyze these two dimensions. In addition, prayer, in following a specific set of rules, can also be considered as a specific, i.e., religious “language-game”. In the last analysis, however, we propose to analyze prayer within the Schutzian framework of “multiple realities,” “enclaves,” and “symbolic appresentation,” which permits accessing the “religious finite province of meaning” in the very midst of the paramount reality of everyday life. In a nutshell, we claim that Christian prayer is a practice of constructing and living within a “religious province of meaning” in the everyday world; it is a practice that revolves around self-involving language-activities such as praising, confessing, thanksgiving, or requesting to God, which enable the praying subject to transfigure the language of everydayness and “see through” the world of everyday life in order to let it appear in a different light, e.g., the light of grace, gift, and salvation. (shrink)

Most modern readers of Aristotle's "Politics" assume that the regime "according to prayer" (kat' euchên) in Book 7 is the culmination of the work as a whole, a utopia designed to guide political reform. I say no. This polis is not an ideal to be applied to practice, but one aspiration among several to be seriously examined and consulted by political people as they deliberate about what to do in particular situations. The prayer presented in chapters 4-12 is (...) not meant to be understood as Aristotle's own, but as coming from one imagined voice among the several presented in the "Nicomachean Ethics" and "Politics." Would Aristotle pray for this regime? No. It is instead the prayer of a "real man" (an anêr) fully committed to political life, someone who, unlike Aristotle, can imagine nothing more beautiful than a beautiful polis. Aristotle's subtlety here has important implications for understanding the philosophy/politics relationship. (shrink)

There is a concern about the effectiveness of petitionary prayer. If I pray for something good, wouldn’t God give it to me anyway? And if I pray for something bad, won’t God refrain from giving it to me even though I’ve asked? This problem has received significant attention. The typical solutions suggest that the prayer itself can alter whether something is good or bad. I will argue that this is insufficient to fully address the problem, but also that (...) the problem requires another assumption which can be doubted, thereby opening up a new way to solve the problem. (shrink)

Many maintain that petitionary prayer is pointless. I argue that the theist can defend petitionary prayer by giving a general account of how divine and creaturely causation can be compatible and complementary, based on the claim that the goodness of something depends on its cause. I use Thomas Aquinas’s metaphysical framework to give an account that explains why a world with creaturely causation better reflects God’s goodness than a world in which God brought all things about immediately. In (...) such a world, prayer could allow us to cause good things in a distinctive way: by asking God for them. (shrink)

In this paper I will argue, contrary to common assumptions, that rational atheistic prayer is possible. I will formulate and respond to two powerful arguments against the possibility of atheistic prayer: first, an argument that the act of prayer involves an intention to communicate to God, precluding disbelief in God’s existence; second, an argument claiming that reaching out to God through prayer requires believing God might exist, precluding rational disbelief in God. In showing options for response (...) to these arguments, I will describe a model on which atheistic prayer is not only possible, but is on a par with theistic prayer in many more ways than one might expect. (shrink)

The practice of prayer for the dead has been criticized by some Christians on the grounds that it is useless (on the assumption that a postmortem change in spiritual state is impossible) and even sinful inasmuch as it wills a state of affairs contrary to that which God has already ordained. In this article, I challenge these arguments using a Boethian or Augustinian conception of God’s relationship to time. If prayers from all times are perceived by God in a (...) tenseless present, I argue that prayer for the dead becomes no more problematic than petitionary prayer about the future. (shrink)

Preview: /Zofia Rosińska interviewed by Mikołaj Sławkowski-Rode/ MSR: Your book Po śladach. Doświadczenie modlitewne w ujęciu filozofii kultury [After the Traces. The Experience of Prayer in the Perspective of Philosophy of Culture] has an unusual format for an academic work. Apart from an overview and discussion of various conceptions and examples of prayer you have added an annex containing eight interviews with various people as well as five testimonials concerning the experience of prayer – some very (...) intimate. What was the motivation for choosing such a format and how did you select the texts comprising the annex? ZR: My book is not a cultural study or a work of theology, psychology, or psychiatry, although it touches the boundaries of all these disciplines. What I mean here is that it takes up topics and utilizes the categories specific to these fields. My book is a book about the human being and it is written from the perspective of philosophy of culture. You say that the format of my book is not typical for an academic work, because of the decision to include the annex containing conversations with people who pray and with others who reject it. This is true. However my book necessitates this minor structural difference. The goal of the book was to discern and understand various forms of prayer present in our culture: from set prayers through poetry, painting and music to activities like work. I call this ‘ontological prayer’. Unfortunately I could not include painting and music in this work. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers assume that, before one can discuss prayer, the question of whether there is a God or not must be settled. In this title, first published in 1965, D. Z. Phillips argues that to understand prayer is to understand what is meant by the reality of God. Beginning by placing the problem of prayer within a philosophical context, Phillips goes on to discuss such topics as prayer and the concept of talking, prayer and (...) dependence, superstition and the concept of community. This is a fascinating reissue that will be of particular value to students with an interest in the philosophy of religion, prayer and religious studies more generally. (shrink)

The fact that our asking God to do something can make a difference to what he does underwrites the point of petitionary prayer. Here, however, a puzzle arises: Either doing what we ask is the best God can do or it is not. If it is, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. If it is not, then our asking won’t make any difference to whether he does it. So, our asking won’t make any (...) difference to whether God does it. Our asking is therefore pointless. In this paper, we try to solve this puzzle without denying either that God must do the best he can or that petitioning God can make a difference to what he does. (shrink)

Petitionary prayer might seem pointless. If God is omnipotent and omnibenevolent, then why wouldn't God give us what is good for us regardless of whether we ask for it? I answer this question by arguing that the efficacy of petitionary prayer does not contradict the doctrines of divine omnipotence and omnibenevolence.

Most modern readers of Aristotle's Politics assume that the regime “according to prayer” ( kat'euch ê n) in Book 7 is the culmination of the work as a whole, a utopia designed to guide political reform. I say no. This polis is not an ideal to be applied to practice, but one aspiration among several to be seriously examined and consulted by political people as they deliberate about what to do in particular situations. The prayer presented in chapters (...) 4-12 is not meant to be understood as Aristotle's own, but as coming from one imagined voice among the several presented in the Nicomachean Ethics and Politics. Would Aristotle pray for this regime? No. It is instead the prayer of a “real man” (an anêr) fully committed to political life, someone who, unlike Aristotle, can imagine nothing more beautiful than a beautiful polis. Aristotle's subtlety here has important implications for understanding the philosophy/politics relationship. (shrink)

is a collection of ten essays on the topic of prayer in the later Platonic tradition. Composed by a panel of distinguished scholars, they offer a comprehensive view of the various roles and levels of prayer characteristic of this period.

Why would God institute the practice of efficacious petitionary prayer? Why would God not simply give us what we need before we ask? I examine recently proposed solutions to this puzzle and argue that they are inadequate to explain why an omniscient and perfectly good God would act differently in response to prayer. I propose that God has reasons to not always maximize a creature’s good, even in a sinless world, and that petitionary prayer functions as a (...) means to reward those who trust God, to enable us to actively love those we cannot otherwise help, and to give the petitioner personal evidence of God’s existence and care for her, creating a virtuous cycle of increasing faith. I refine this proposal by responding to several objections involving human responsibility and the epistemology of divine action. Along the way, I offer several ways petitioners can recognize God’s having answered a prayer and how God might help us with some common obstacles to prayer. (shrink)

This collection of ground-breaking essays considers the many dimensions of prayer: how prayer relates us to the divine; prayer's ability to reveal what is essential about our humanity; the power of prayer to transform human desire and action; and the relation of prayer to cognition. It takes up the meaning of prayer from within a uniquely phenomenological point of view, demonstrating that the phenomenology of prayer is as much about the character and boundaries (...) of phenomenological analysis as it is about the heart of religious life.The contributors: Michael F. Andrews, Bruce Ellis Benson, Mark Cauchi, Benjamin Crowe, Mark Gedney, Philip Goodchild, Christina M. Gschwandtner, Lissa McCullough, Cleo McNelly Kearns, Edward F. Mooney, B. Keith Putt, Jill Robbins, Brian Treanor, Merold Westphal, Norman Wirzba, Terence Wright and Terence and James R. Mensch. Bruce Ellis Benson is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Wheaton College. He is the author of Graven Ideologies: Nietzsche, Derrida, and Marion on Modern Idolatry and The Improvisation of Musical Dialogue: A Phenomenology of Music. Norman Wirzba is Associate Professor and Chair of the Philosophy Department at Georgetown College, Kentucky. He is the author of The Paradise of God and editor of The Essential Agrarian Reader. (shrink)

In an environment where astrology was widely respected, Plotinus accepted the role of heavenly bodies in answering prayer. Considering them divine, he denied them the use of memory (iv 4, 6-8); how then could he explain response to prayer received after an interval of time? Plotinus was also concerned to deny attributing intentionality in any response given, for good or evil, since that would make the astral deities responsible also for morally dubious answers. In his treatment of the (...) issue in this passage, Plotinus draws on a lengthy earlier discussion of the role of memory in the soul’s thinking and knowing (iv 3, 25-iv 4, 12), as associated primarily with that which exists in time and is characterized by αἴσθησις, i.e., the lower soul belonging to the composite living being (iv 3, 25.12-14; iv 4, 16-17). If astral deities have bodies, these are of a highly refined fiery nature, and can be affected only inasmuch as they participate in the cosmic circuit. What suppliants may regard as intentional response must therefore be understood as the effect of a type of ‘linking’ of the universe as a living organism in which all parts are coordinated in an interrelationship characterized by sympathy. This is why answers to prayer represent no more than the unintended reaction of natural forces in the universe, the very same forces also responsible for effective use of magic. If Plotinus does not assign much value to prayer, he does recognize that, as with magic, such incantations may have a harmful effect, if only for the lower soul. He therefore warns the wise person to guard against such outcomes by focusing the soul in its contemplation of what is higher, i.e., its inner life. (shrink)

In this paper, we examine the issue of the language of the Christian prayer from philosophical and theological point of view. We come to the conclusion that for the closer enquiry of the Christian prayer philosophy can be inspired by theology. For if we want to determine exactly between whom the relation of prayer lies, we might need to draw on the inspiration from the theological sources concerning the Holy Trinity as well as the involvement of (...) all the saints, especially of Virgin Mary, and angels in the prayers. Within the framework of the philosophical analysis of the prayer we determine it as a participatory dialogical relation between the praying human being, the three divine persons, Virgin Mary, other saints, the angels, and the group of meaningful assertions that form the content of a prayer. Beside this on the basis of our faith we accept that every prayer is preceded by God, and the structure of this approaching of man by God we adopted from Bocheński. (shrink)

If God actually answers prayers that petition him for something, then it seems he is willing to withhold some good from the world unless and until someone prays for those goods. But how is this compatible with His benevolence? On the other hand, if God is dedicated to providing every good to us that we may need, it would seem that He would provide these to us even if we did not pray for them. But if so, it would appear (...) that petitionary prayer is pointless. This discussion reviews the various contributions made by philosophers in trying to answer these questions, and in criticizing these answers. (shrink)

This essay attempts to describe some basic aspects of the political logic of religious belief by reference to some recent work of Sarah Coakley. It does so in two parts. First we examine two models of God, the model of “competition,” shared by pop atheism and religious fundamentalism, and the model of “cooperation,” as espoused by classical religious belief. As an explication of this latter model, in the second part we examine what I term the “doxological feminism” of Sarah Coakley (...) as it appears in her recent major work God, Sexuality and the Self. Coakley’s specific insight concerns the intrinsic connection between her religious practice of contemplative prayer and her theoretical reflection on the nature of desire, which is interrogated by reference to the thought of Jean Daniélou. (shrink)

In this article, we give much needed attention to the nature and value of corporate prayer by drawing together insights from theology, philosophy, and psychology. First, we explain what it is that distinguishes corporate from private prayer by drawing on the psychological literature on joint attention and the philosophical notion of shared situations. We suggest that what is central to corporate prayer is a “sense of sharedness,” which can be established through a variety of means—through bodily (...) interactions or through certain environments. Second, we argue that corporate prayer, when understood as a kind of shared situation, enables common knowledge, as well as a kind of alignment between participants. Through this process, participants’ attention is focused on the same target and affiliation between participants increases. Thus, we suggest, one benefit of understanding corporate prayer as a shared situation is that it establishes and deepens a sense of community in such a way that common purposes and goals can be enacted more effectively. (shrink)

In response to Timaeus’ invocation of the gods at Timaeus 27c1-d4, Proclus discusses, in his commentary on the text, the value of prayer. Heralding the fact that prayer marks the soul’s epistrophe or return to its causative principle, Proclus proceeds to exonerate those who invoke and pray to the gods, arguing that prayer enacts the emergence of human freedom in the determined world. He argues that since the gods are not only our superior causes but also the (...) ones who have wisely granted self-motion to human souls, we possess the freedom to acknowledge the role of providence or to remain, as Proclus describes, entrapped in the realm of Fate. In other words, human beings must decide (boulesis) to become what they are in the simple act of revering the gods, i.e. reverting to or knowing their divine cause. To pray is not to ask for things to be otherwise, but to pray is to fulfill providence freely, to become self-moved and self-knowing, therein becoming like and returning to our divine origins. Proclus concludes that this is the peculiar form of prayer for the philosopher as the philosophical life is dependent upon our will and the decisive commitment to articulating and communing with the highest metaphysical principles. Accordingly, for Proclus, Timaeus, in illustrating the order and providential nature of things in his “likely story,” frees himself from the trappings of fate, praying decisively and silently throughout his entire endeavor. (shrink)

Many contemporary philosophers assume that, before one can discuss prayer, the question of whether there is a God or not must be settled. In this title, first published in 1965, D. Z. Phillips argues that to understand prayer is to understand what is meant by the reality of God. Beginning by placing the problem of prayer within a philosophical context, Phillips goes on to discuss such topics as prayer and the concept of talking, prayer and (...) dependence, superstition and the concept of community. This is a fascinating reissue that will be of particular value to students with an interest in the philosophy of religion, prayer and religious studies more generally. (shrink)

In recent decades, there has been a significant increase in the interest taken by experimental researchers in issues that have traditionally belonged to the sphere of interest of the philosophy of mind, the philosophy of cognition, and even the theology of spirituality. The availability of new research methods, as well as the increase in the knowledge of the world, has opened another door to the reality in which we live. By studying the functioning of the human brain in (...) specific laboratory conditions, scientists are looking for the answers to questions that have been troubling us for centuries: what consciousness is, how do we recognize intentions, and what are spiritual experiences? This article deals with the topic of prayer as a specific religious experience in the context of neurocognitive research. In the 20th and 21st centuries, the frequency of such studies has increased significantly; for example, through the experiments of Nina Azari, Mario Beauregard, and Andrew B. Newberg. Selected experiments in the field of the neuroscience of spirituality and their results are discussed. Important philosophical questions about how we define prayer and other spiritual experiences in the context of the above research, the interdisciplinary nature of the research, as well as emerging problems and implications, e.g., the risk of reducing these phenomena to their biological base, the explanations of religious practices and experiences in cognitive science of religion have also been raised. (shrink)

I critically respond to Scott A. Davison, Petitionary Prayer: A Philosophical Investigation. I attack his Contrastive Reasons Account of what it takes for a request to be answered and provide an alternative account on which a request is answered as long as it has deliberative weight for the person asked. I also raise issues with Davison’s dismissive treatment of direct divine communication. I then emphasize the importance of value theory for addressing the puzzles of petitionary prayer. Whether a (...) defense of petitionary prayer is successful depends on whether it can support the sort of requests that are central to the theological practices of the religion in question, explaining how they could be known to be effective, and this depends on the value theory of the theology in question. As an example, I show the relevance the traditional distinction between temporal and spiritual goods could have for knowing whether one’s prayers have been answered. How prayers could make a difference also depends on the theology in question, raising issues of ecclesiology and collective action that demand further attention. (shrink)

In this article first appeared in 1997, Jean-Louis Chrétien examines the meaning of prayer in Kierkegaard’s writings and existence. By focusing on the difficulties of this task and with meticulous attention to the vast work of the Danish philosopher, Chrétien describes prayer as a tense and agonistic experience, akin to the evangelical struggle between Jacob and the angel. Just like in his well-known phenomenological analysis, “The Wounded Word: Phenomenology of Prayer”, the author identifies in prayer a (...) paradoxical articulation of struggle and peace, gift and endeavour, speaking and listening, through which the human being is profoundly transformed and finally learns to truly say “thank you”. (shrink)

Contextualizationof Biblical texts is a priority of every exegete, who endeavors to bring the ancient scripts to dialogue with contemporary issues. This paper, which studies Psalm 72 and a prayer composed for good governance in Anambra State Nigeria, focuses on this hermeneutical interpretation. The writer adopts a simplified literary method in Biblical research that takes cognizance of the varied poetic techniques in Psalm 72 and engages in a detailed comparative study of a Psalm composed more than two millennia ago (...) and a prayer of our time. Such comparative study reveals a striking similar preoccupation of the composers of both texts. Both prayed for good governance of which all developing countries today are in dire need. (shrink)

This chapter contains sections titled: Notes.

Many contemporary philosophers assume that, before one can discuss prayer, the question of whether there is a God or not must be settled. In this title, first published in 1965, D. Z. Phillips argues that to understand prayer is to understand what is meant by the reality of God. Beginning by placing the problem of prayer within a philosophical context, Phillips goes on to discuss such topics as prayer and the concept of talking, prayer and (...) dependence, superstition and the concept of community. This is a fascinating reissue that will be of particular value to students with an interest in the philosophy of religion, prayer and religious studies more generally. (shrink)

in eds. Yujin Nagasawa and Erik Wielenberg, New Waves in Philosophy of Religion (Palgrave MacMillan 2008).

‘Prayer’ can be defined as ‘the offering, in public worship or private devotion, of petition, confession, adoration, or thanksgiving to God; also the form of words in which such an offering is made’ (cf. Cohn-Sherbok 2010). In addition to this simple definition it could be said that there are different forms of prayer: some are vocal and articulate and others are only mental in nature; some prayers are communal and liturgical and other prayers are spontaneous or at least (...) composed by the one saying the prayer (cf. Stump 1999). Accordingly, it is evident that there are manifold intricacies involved in any characterisation of ‘prayer’. In this article my aims are twofold. First, I explore the implications of Martin Buber’s philosophy, particularly of his conception of God as Thou for our understanding of ‘prayer’; second, I will argue that Buber’s understanding of ‘prayer’ as dialogue serves as a way for the individual to seek reconciliation with itself, with others, and with God. (shrink)

This essay is a systematic exposition and partial defense of Kant's philosophy of prayer. "Does Kant even HAVE a philosophy of prayer?" you may ask.

Lawrence J. Dennis’s intellectual biography of John L. Childs, a leading figure in twentieth-century American educational philosophy between 1930 and 1960, traces Childs’s influence not only on education but also on midcentury politics, economics, and social issues. A disciple of John Dewey and an associate of William Heard Kilpatrick, George S. Counts, Boyd Bode, and other key figures in modern American education, Childs laid the philosophic basis for social reconstruction and became an important contributor to and interpreter of pragmatism (...) as a philosophy of education. Dennis describes how the Christian beliefs so central to Childs as a youth led him as a young man into a decade of YMCA missionary work in China. When he returned to the United States, Childs studied with John Dewey, later coauthoring two chapters of a book with him. Though Childs became a recognized expert on Dewey’s educational theory, he eventually became more of a reconstructionist than his mentor. Dennis carefully recounts Childs’s long association with Dewey as well as his political activities in the American Labor Party, the Liberal Party, and the American Federation of Teachers. He likewise traces the debate about metaphysics, democracy, and indoctrination that ensued among the foremost pragmatists of the day. (shrink)

In this paper I defend the Direct Actualisation of Conditional Situations as a way of explaining how God answers prayers without assuming that God acts on the world after the prayer is made. My hypothesis states that God, in creating, brings about conditionals without either preventing the antecedent or bringing about the consequent. I compare this hypothesis with some rivals, notably the appeals to foreknowledge and to middle knowledge.