This reconsideration of Hume’s classic essay “Of Miracles” via the lens of American pragmatist ways of thinking about history and power shifts our attention from Hume’s epistemic concerns about the legitimacy of witnesses and testimony to his distaste for sacred history, his critical stance regarding the social force of revelation, and his disdain for religious authority. To view Hume’s essay both as an articulation of a critical philosophy of history and as an exercise in moral dynamism (...) (social power or, authority, is a result of epistemic transactions), is to intervene in both Hume studies and Contemporary Pragmatism. (shrink)

This book is an account of the philosophical movement named Lebensphilosophie, which flourished at the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century. There many philosophers who participated in the movement, but this book concentrates on the three most important: Friedrich Nietzsche, Wilhelm Dilthey and Georg Simmel. The movement was called Lebensphilosophie—literally, philosophy of life—because its main interest was not life as a biological phenomenon but life as it is lived by human beings. They regarded (...) human life and experience as the fundamental reality, the basis of all knowledge and value, and disputed the relevance of any supernatural realm transcending human experience. The purpose of life was therefore life itself. Lebensphilosophie was the first modern philosophical movement in the Western tradition. It was “modern” in the sense that it was entirely humanist and secular, deriving all values from a non-religious perspective. Nietzsche, Dilthey and Simmel were either atheists or agnostics; they denied the relevance of any transcendent reality or being for human life. They abjured the traditional Christian concern with salvation and immortality. They also disputed the existence of natural law, teleology or a providential order; human beings created their own values and they did not conform to any made by nature. In anticipation of later existentialism, the Lebensphilosophen maintained that human beings are the makers of their own fate. Contrary to pessimism, they affirmed the great value of life while still acknowledging its frequent tragedy. The Lebensphilosophen were champions of an individualist ethics, which maintained that the highest good for a human being was self-realization, the development of a persons’s unique individuality. Their ethics was neither utilitarian nor de-ontological: it was not utilitarian because it did not regard the highest good as pleasure; self-realization could be a very unpleasant experience; and it was not de-ontological because it grounded moral norms upon the facts of human development and experience. The Lebensphilosophen were major advocates of historicism. They believed that human experience is formed by history, and that its horizons and limits are historical. Just as it was impossible to transcend human experience, so it was impossible to transcend history. All values and norms were therefore historical. In attempting to describe historical experience, the Lebensphilosophen developed the discipline of hermeneutics. They refused to accept mechanical explanation as a paradigm of explanation. This book attempts to describe and analyze the fundamental aspects of Lebensphilosophie by looking in detail at the views of its three leading figures. It examines their ethics, their religious background, their responses to pessimism and relativism, and their contributions to hermeneutics and historicism. (shrink)

This volume of essays examines the problem of mind, looking at how the problem has appeared to neuroscientists from classical antiquity through to contemporary times. Beginning with a look at ventricular neuropsychology in antiquity, this book goes on to look at Spinozan ideas on the links between mind and body, Thomas Willis and the foundation of Neurology, Hooke’s mechanical model of the mind and Joseph Priestley’s approach to the mind-body problem. The volume offers a chapter on the 19th century (...) Ottoman perspective on western thinking. Further chapters trace the work of nineteenth century scholars including George Henry Lewes, Herbert Spencer and Emil du Bois-Reymond. The book covers significant work from the twentieth century, including an examination of Alfred North Whitehead and the history of consciousness, and particular attention is given to the development of quantum consciousness. Chapters on slavery and the self and the development of an understanding of Dualism bring this examination up to date on the latest 21st century work in the field. At the heart of this book is the matter of how we define the problem of consciousness itself: has there been any progress in our understanding of the working of mind and brain? This work at the interface between science and the humanities will appeal to experts from across many fields who wish to develop their understanding of the problem of consciousness, including scholars of Neuroscience, Behavioural Science and the History of Science. (shrink)

Explores the people and ideas that contributed to the formation of the 19th-century philosophico-religious movement known as New Thought, a movement dedicated in large measure to the remedying of illness through nonphysical means. Originally presented as the author's doctora thesis (Boston U., 1962) under the title Horatio W. Dresser and the Philosophy of New Thought. Supplementary bibliographical notes and an addendum outlining the author's further thoughts accompany this presentation. Annotation c. by Book News, Inc., Portland, Or.

"This book is an intellectual biography of Johann Friedrich, who was one of the most famous philosophers in early 19th century Germany. Herbart was trained in the German idealist tradition under Fichte, but he eventually broke with Fichte and major idealist doctrines. His own philosophy was opposed to the idealist tradition in important respects: he defended a dualism between the factual and normative; he was an ontological pluralist rather than monist; and he accepted crucial Kantian dualisms that had (...) been rejected by the idealists. While Herbart still retained elements of idealism, he was more realistic than his idealistic counterparts, maintaining that elements of the sensible manifold were given rather than posited by the mind. Herbart was also an important forerunner of analytic philosophy, first in breaking with the idealist tradition, and second in insisting that the proper method of philosophy is the analysis of concepts rather than speculation about the universe as a whole"--. (shrink)

Neo-Kantianism was an important movement in German philosophy of the late 19th century: Frederick Beiser traces its development back to the late 18th century, and explains its rise as a response to three major developments in German culture: the collapse of speculative idealism; the materialism controversy; and the identity crisis of philosophy.

In this enduring text, renowned philosopher Robert C. Solomon provides students with a detailed introduction to modern existentialism. He reveals how this philosophy not only connects with, but also derives from, the thought of traditional philosophers through the works of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty.

The Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies has been and continues to be enormously influential in the physiology, psychology, and philosophy of perception. In simple terms, the Doctrine states that we directly perceive in the first instance the activity of our nerves, rather than properties in the external world. The canonical early statement of the Doctrine by the physiologist Johannes Peter Müller had profound influence on both the phi- losophy and psychology of the 19th and early 20th centuries, especially (...) as reformulated and transmitted by Müller’s student Helmholtz. A common assumption of historical and ongoing debate about the Doctrine has been its supposedly idealist or skeptical implications. What is not commonly recognized is that Müller himself ad- vanced a realist interpretation along lines that would be recognized today as a form of epistemic structural realism. This paper analyzes Müller’s structuralist epistemology in detail and reconstructs his articulation and defense of the Doctrine of Specific Nerve Energies in its canonical form. Part II argues for the continued im- portance of the Doctrine and its structuralist interpretation for contemporary psychology, philosophy of per- ception, and history of philosophy of science. (shrink)

In this enduring text, renowned philosopher Robert C. Solomon provides students with a detailed introduction to modern existentialism.

Attention to care in modern society has fallen out of view as an ethos of personal responsibility, free markets, and individualism has been in the ascendant. The Liberalism of Care argues that contemporary liberalism is suffering from a crisis of care, manifest in a decaying sense of collective political responsibility for citizens' well- being and for the most vulnerable members of our communities. The book maintains that this practical crisis stems from a theoretical one. We have lost the political language (...) of care, which, prior the 19th century, was commonly used to express these dimensions of political life. To recover that language, Shawn C. Fraistat turns to three prominent philosophers-Plato, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and William Godwin-who illuminate the varied ways caring language and caring values have structured core debates in the history of Western political thought about the proper role of government, as well as the rights and responsibilities of citizens. The Liberalism of Care presents a distinctive vision for our liberal politics where political communities and citizens can utilize the ethic and practices of care to face practical challenges. (shrink)

In the author's words: "This book is an honest attempt to understand what it means to be educated in today's world." His argument is this: No matter how important science and technology seem to industry or government or indeed to the daily life of people, as a society we believe that those educated in literature, history, and other humanities are in some way better informed, more knowing, and somehow more worthy of the descriptor "well educated." This 19th-century conception (...) of the educated mind weighs heavily on our notions on how we educate our young. When we focus on intellectual and scholarly issues in high school as opposed to issues, such as communications, basic psychology, or child raising, we are continuing to rely on outdated notions of the educated mind that come from elitist notions of who is to be educated and what that means. To accommodate the realities of today's world it is necessary to change these elitist notions. We need to rethink what it means to be educated and begin to focus on a new conception of the very idea of education. Students need to learn how to think, not how to accomplish tasks, such as passing standardized tests and reciting rote facts. In this engaging book, Roger C. Schank sets forth the premises of his argument, cites its foundations in the Great Books themselves, and illustrates it with examples from an experimental curriculum that has been used in graduate schools and with K-12 students. Making Minds Less Well Educated Than Our Own is essential reading for scholars and students in the learning sciences, instructional design, curriculum theory and planning, educational policy, school reform, philosophy of education, higher education, and anyone interested in what it means to be educated in today's world. (shrink)

Rosemary doesn’t believe in the divinity of Christ. With her 31 years she has long since got beyond that stage of credulity. Nor does she put any faith in the foundation of a church by the man Jesus, but only in his preaching of the kingdom and with Alfred Loisy she is convinced that the irony of Christianity was that the result of Christ’s preaching was not the kingdom but the church! With gigantic strides she gets far beyond Vatican II (...) and rejects flatly the church as an institution hierarchically organized and with that she refuses to have anything to do with the sacramental system. She doesn’t believe that infallibility has anything to do with telling the truth and as a conse quence does not expect a very high degree of credibility from the ‘infallible teaching authority of the Church’. But Rosemary does believe in God. She seems to be convinced that God does in fact exist. The basis for such a belief she never reveals. She keeps it locked up in her bosom. Searching for a reason to all this one can find it, meseems, in the bibliography she appends to her revivalist ruminations. There it becomes as clear as daylight. Rosemary has been caught. Badly caught. She has swallowed it. Line, hook and sinker. The bultmannian line, of course. Absolutely uncritically. In spite of the erudite, the would-be erudite, multilingual bibliography. Since the rise of modernism right up to the bultmannian era serious Catholic scholars—exegetes, historians, theologians—have examined seriously and eruditely the teachings of men like Loisy, Schweitzer, Bultmann and have honestly attempted to make their own the valid insights of these men without however sacrificing the essentials of the Catholic faith. Not one of these Catholic scholars merits Rosemary’s attention. Not even mentioned in the bibliography. Completely ignored. Dishonesty or just plain ignorance? It’s very hard to say. One of the main sources of her musings is the work of Albert Schweitzer. She quotes the first German edition of his famous and brilliant work on the various attempts of 19th century scholars to interpret the Life of Christ but omits all mention of the second edition which carried a different title. A scholarly slip-up? Nor does she mention the fact that Schweitzer himself felt obliged already in 1913 to write a short work warning against the danger of misunderstanding his own thoroughgoing eschatological interpretation of the Life of Jesus, and that a second edition of this work appeared in 1933. Strange omission forsooth. (shrink)

The study presents the Russian historical-philosophical process in the context of the discovery of a new object, themes, personae, set of reactions and formation of a product for the intellectual community. The author's reliance on philosophical empirical material and appropriate hermeneutics in its processing allows the author to highlight those factors that influenced individual and collective reception. The author sees as a convenient case study the “discovery” by the Russian philosophical community of the early 20th century of both American (...) class='Hi'>philosophy in general and C.S. Peirce in particular. Since the beginning of the 19th century, Russian thinkers have turned their attention to American philosophy in all the diversity of its manifestations. Russian intellectuals paid special attention to American pragmatism and everything associated with it. In Russia, in addition to translations, numerous reviews of foreign publications on this topic are appearing. Of particular interest to us in the Russian “collective reflection” of American ideas is the system of preferences for ideas, texts, events, and names. The point is that what might have been a priority for a European thinker, for a Russian one turned out to be on the “periphery” of his consciousness, as well as vice versa. While James appeared among the priority figures for Russian thinkers, Peirce was in his “shadow”. Using rich empirical material, the author shows all the stages of Peirce’s image formation in the Russian intellectual community. The research shows that “image” of Peirce, which represents not so much the thinker himself, but characterizes the intellectual community that turned to him. The results of the study may be useful both for contemporary foreign and Russian interpreters of Peirce and for historians of philosophy who are rethinking the past and forming in the present new objects of reception and reflection. (shrink)

This essay provides an intellectual history for the cultural turn that transformed the human sciences in the mid-20th century and led to the creation of cultural sociology in the late 20th century. It does so by conceptualizing and contextualizing the limitations of the binary primitive/modernity. In the 19th and early 20th centuries, leading thinkers – among them Marx, Weber, Durkheim, and Freud – confined thinking and feeling styles like ritual, symbolism, totem, and devotional practice to a primitivism that (...) would be transformed by the rationality and universalism of modernity. While the barbarisms of the 20th century cast doubt on such predictions, only an intellectual revolution could provide the foundations for an alternative social theory. The cultural turn in philosophy, aesthetics, and anthropology erased the division between primitive and modern; in sociology, the classical writings of Durkheim were recentered around his later, religious sociology. These intellectual currents fed into a cultural sociology that challenged the sociology of culture, creating radically new research programs in the late 20th and early 21st centuries. (shrink)

A bibliographical search through the major libraries of Italy has revealed a large and various collection of writings of logic published during the 19th century before the rise of Peano and his school (from the 1880son). A survey of current findings is provided.

Though remembered chiefly as author of the Declaration of Independence and the president under whom the Louisiana Purchase was effected, Thomas Jefferson was a true revolutionary in the way he thought about the size and reach of government, which Americans who were full citizens and the role of education in the new country. In his new book, Kevin Gutzman gives readers a new view of Jefferson--a revolutionary who effected radical change in a growing country. Jefferson's philosophy about the size (...) and power of the federal system almost completely undergirded the Jeffersonian Republican Party. His forceful advocacy of religious freedom was not far behind, as were attempts to incorporate Native Americans into American society. His establishment of the University of Virginia might be one of the most important markers of the man's abilities and character. He was not without flaws. While he argued for the assimilation of Native Americans into society, he did not assume the same for Africans being held in slavery while--at the same time--insisting that slavery should cease to exist. Many still accuse Jefferson of hypocrisy on the ground that he both held that "all men are created equal" and held men as slaves. Jefferson's true character, though, is more complex than that as Kevin Gutzman shows in his new book about Jefferson, a revolutionary whose accomplishments went far beyond the drafting of the Declaration of Independence. (shrink)

A collection of essays by friends, students, and colleagues on Max Wartofsky's 65th birthday. Reflecting Wartofsky's own interests, topics discussed in this text range from the arts and sciences, to ethics and history, from the Enlightenment, through the 19th century to the present day.

Too often, since the 19th century, sensitivity is dismissed as mere “sentimentality” in philosophy and in literature. It is charged that sentimentality is distorting, self-indulgent, self-deceptive. I argue that all of these charges are misplaced or themselves distorted and betray a suspicion of emotions and the tender sentiments that is unwarranted.

Although no other topic in political thought has attracted the attention of so many as the subject of democracy, Mr. Heald has thought that a re-evaluation in the light of rapidly changing social conditions is greatly overdue, since many of its underlying assumptions are derived from 18th and early 19th century theory. The result is a book in which the character of the democratic idea, and its relation to ethics are carefully analysed, and the development of democratic theory from (...) the Greeks down to our own time—a textbook rather than an original work. (shrink)

Although no other topic in political thought has attracted the attention of so many as the subject of democracy, Mr. Heald has thought that a re-evaluation in the light of rapidly changing social conditions is greatly overdue, since many of its underlying assumptions are derived from 18th and early 19th century theory. The result is a book in which the character of the democratic idea, and its relation to ethics are carefully analysed, and the development of democratic theory from (...) the Greeks down to our own time—a textbook rather than an original work. (shrink)

The fact that we still group all his predecessors together as ‘presocratics’ indicates that Socrates significantly changed the character of philosophy. Yet it is not easy to determine exactly what change Socrates made, much less why. Socrates himself left no record of his thoughts, so we have to refer to the writings of the three authors who knew him. But in the Clouds Aristophanes depicts ‘Socrates’ as a ‘sophist’ who taught cosmology as well as rhetoric, i.e. as a ‘presocratic’. (...) In his Memorabilia Xenophon merely declares that Socrates did not investigate the nature of all things or the cosmos. To find out when and why Socrates turned to study the human things, we have to put together three retrospective statements he gives about his development as a philosopher in Plato’s dialogues. Working on the basis of the supposed chronology of composition, scholars have not done so. (shrink)

David Hume is famous as a sceptical philosopher but the nature of his scepticism is difficult to pin down. Hume's True Scepticism provides the first sustained interpretation of Part 4 of Book 1 of Hume's Treatise: his deepest engagement with sceptical arguments, in which he notes that, while reason shows that we ought not to believe the verdicts of reason or the senses, we do so nonetheless. Donald C. Ainslie addresses Hume's theory of representation; his criticisms of Locke, Descartes, and (...) other predecessors; his account of the imagination; his understanding of perceptions and sensory belief; and his bundle theory of the mind and his later rejection of it. (shrink)

This book defends a new interpretation of Hegel's theoretical philosophy, according to which Hegel's project in his central Science of Logic has a single organizing focus, provided by taking metaphysics as fundamental to philosophy, rather than any epistemological problem about knowledge or intentionality. Hegel pursues more specifically the metaphysics of reason, concerned with grounds, reasons, or conditions in terms of which things can be explained-and ultimately with the possibility of complete reasons. There is no threat to such metaphysics (...) in epistemological or skeptical worries. The real threat is Kant's Transcendental Dialectic case that metaphysics comes into conflict with itself. But Hegel, despite familiar worries, has a powerful case that Kant's own insights in the Dialectic can be turned to the purpose of constructive metaphysics. And we can understand in these terms the unified focus of the arguments at the conclusion of Hegel's Science of Logic. Hegel defends, first, his general claim that the reasons which explain things are always found in immanent concepts, universals or kinds. And he will argue from here to conclusions which are distinctive in being metaphysically ambitious yet surprisingly distant from any form of metaphysical foundationalism, whether scientistic, theological, or otherwise. Hegel's project, then, turns out neither Kantian nor Spinozist, but more distinctively his own. Finally, we can still learn a great deal from Hegel about ongoing philosophical debates concerning everything from metaphysics, to the philosophy of science, and all the way to the nature of philosophy itself. (shrink)

The attempt to understand and develop Plato's philosophical views has a long history, starting with Aristotle and Plato's institutional successors in the academy towards the end of the fourth century bc. This article traces the history and development of the idea of Platonism. The development of a specifically Platonic philosophy took place mainly within the academy. As a result, the idea that Plato's dialogues already presented a well defined, comprehensive, and essentially correct philosophical system seems not to (...) have arisen until the first century bc. And it was probably not until toward the beginning of the second century ad that a disparate set of philosophers who identified themselves as “Platonists” conceived the project of advocating and defending a specifically Platonic philosophy of this kind by systematically interpreting and explaining Plato's texts. (shrink)

The investigation that I am going to pursue here is part of a larger effort on my part to understand the relationship between Kant’s so-called “philosophical anthropology” and the development of early German anthropology since it is my sense that Kant had a determinate, if indirect, effect on the history of that separate field. For now this larger project has three main foci: an account of Kant’s philosophical anthropology in all its parts, an inquiry into Kant’s relationship to the (...) theories engaged by German anthropologists between roughly the 1750s-1790s, and finally, an effort to track the subsequent routes taken by German anthropology in the first half of the 19th-c. In this discussion I am going look at one particular trajectory in anthropological research where we can see Kant’s effect. (shrink)

Leading philosophical accounts presume that Thomas H. Morgan’s transmission theory can be understood independently of experimental practices. Experimentation is taken to be relevant to confirming, rather than interpreting, the transmission theory. But the construction of Morgan’s theory went hand in hand with the reconstruction of the chief experimental object, the model organism Drosophila melanogaster . This raises an important question: when a theory is constructed to account for phenomena in carefully controlled laboratory settings, what knowledge, if any, indicates the theory’s (...) relevance to phenomena outside highly controlled settings? The answer, I argue, is found within the procedural knowledge embedded within laboratory practice. †To contact the author, please write to: Minnesota Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota, Department of Philosophy, 831 Heller Hall, 271 19th Ave., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, MN 55455‐0310; e‐mail: [email protected]. (shrink)

John Stuart Mill's essay On Liberty, published in 1859, has had a powerful impact on philosophical and political debates ever since its first appearance. This volume of essays covers the whole range of problems raised in and by the essay, including the concept of liberty, the toleration of diversity, freedom of expression, the value of allowing 'experiments in living', the basis of individual liberty, multiculturalism and the claims of minority cultural groups. Mill's views have been fiercely contested, and they are (...) at the centre of many contemporary debates. The essays are by leading scholars, who systematically and eloquently explore Mill's views from various perspectives. The volume will appeal to a wide range of readers including those interested in political philosophy and the history of ideas. (shrink)

This book provides a new interpretation of the ethical theory of G.W.F. Hegel.

German Idealism was without doubt one of the most fruitful, influential, and exciting periods in the history of philosophy. The Palgrave Handbook of German Idealism covers this revolutionary philosophical movement in remarkable detail and includes contributions from 36 of the leading scholars in the field, including Paul Guyer, Terry Pinkard, Violetta Waibel, Jason Wirth, and Günter Zöller. In his introduction, Matthew Altman investigates the meaning of idealism and sets the historical context. Ensuing chapters then consider the philosophical importance (...) of the movement’s four most important thinkers (Kant, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel) and explore the areas of philosophy on which they had their greatest impact. A concluding chapter examines the legacy of German Idealism from the nineteenth century to the present day. (shrink)

Classical and Post-Classical Philosophy in the Greek tradition played powerful roles in the formation of philosophical, scientific and theological thought by thinkers in the religious and cultural milieux of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Yet the scriptures, theologies, and fundamental concerns of these Abrahamic religious traditions reciprocally enriched the development of religious thought and secular philosophy and science by prompting ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological questions that have continued to challenge philosophers and theologians up to the present day. While political (...) conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have led to a public emphasis on distinctions and differences between these faiths, the history of philosophy shows that thinkers of each tradition over the centuries share in the common purpose of seeking to conciliate in a variety of ways the principles and insights of religious beliefs with the truths of secular natural reason into a coherent worldview. (shrink)

Classical and Post-Classical Philosophy in the Greek tradition played powerful roles in the formation of philosophical, scientific and theological thought by thinkers in the religious and cultural milieux of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. Yet the scriptures, theologies, and fundamental concerns of these Abrahamic religious traditions reciprocally enriched the development of religious thought and secular philosophy and science by prompting ethical, metaphysical, and epistemological questions that have continued to challenge philosophers and theologians up to the present day. While political (...) conflicts of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries have led to a public emphasis on distinctions and differences between these faiths, the history of philosophy shows that thinkers of each tradition over the centuries share in the common purpose of seeking to conciliate in a variety of ways the principles and insights of religious beliefs with the truths of secular natural reason into a coherent worldview. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:BOOK REVIEWS 323 Person and Religion: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Religion. By ZOFIA J. ZDYBICKA, U.C.J.A. Translated by Theresa Sandok. New York: Peter Lang, 1991. Pp. xix+ 397 (cloth). Zdybicka's volume is the third in Peter Lang's series, "Catholic Thought from Lublin." A convenient way to display the contents of Person and Religion is to elaborate the meaning of " philosophy of religion " and (...) its comprising terms. Philosophy of religion designates the attempt to arrive at an ultimate explanation of the empirically given and existentially apprehended fact of religion (p. 96). In other words, why does religion exist at all and what are its subjective and objective grounds? This endeavor Zdybicka understands to be a recent one. Despite a wealth of reflection on religion over the centuries (See her historical survey, pp. 1-49), only since the 19th century have there been separate disciplines with the phenomenon of religion as their object. Zdybicka also emphasizes that not any kind of philosophy is equal to the task of carrying out the above mentioned attempt. Since the ultimate explanation of religion as truth or fantasy will entail determining whether God exists, only philosophies capable of grasping the real can serve the interests of philosophy of religion. Forms of Kantianism and phenomenology are not equal to the task (p. 97). Only a realistic philosophy connected with a theory of being stands a chance of offering an ultimate explanation of religion. In particular, the metaphysics borne in mind here is that of Krapiec. Peter Lang has recently published an English translation of it under the title, Metaphysics: An Outline of the History of Being (see my review in the January issue of The Thomist.) This work is indispensable background reading for Part III of Zdybicka's volume. Though this metaphysics is existential Thomist, its employment in a philosophy of religion will not resolve the question of which religion is true, though some religions will be ruled out as unsuitable for the human being (p. 97). What is understood as "religion"? In its basic meaning the religious fact is the reference or orientation of the human being toward a transcendent reality (p. 109). Considered more closely, the religious fact is actually multiphasic. First, there is the experience of our own ontic insufficiency and the consciousness of our transcendence and search for a value capable of preserving us in being and giving us complete existential meaning. Second, there is the religious experience in its strict sense. This second phase is itself divided into three phases. First is some kind of revelation from the religious object. Zdybicka stresses that this revelation occurs through signs to which we respond in faith; there is no direct cognitive contact with the religious object. 324 BOOK REVIEWS Second, there is the active response of the one struck by this revelation. The response consists in pursuing union with the deity. This second phase involves purification. Finally, there is the realization of the bond with the sacrum. What is achieved in the human person is holiness. The book concludes (pp. 315-22) with an extended discussion of this value. In sum, the phases of the religious experience properly speaking are: encounter, dialogue, and union. Zdybicka regards religious cults and rites as simply the externalization of religious acts (p. 129). They complete the description of the religious fact. Zdybicka also takes some time to distinguish religious experience from cognitive, moral, and aesthetic experience. Finally, pp. 157-59 contain an interesting inductive argument that the object of religious experience has always been understood as personal. In Part III Zdybicka performs a philosophical assessment of the religious fact. Specifically, the assessment is of the above mentioned introductory phase. Also as mentioned, Zdybicka takes advantage of Krapiec's Gilsonian existential Thomism which has denominated "classical philosophy." This philosophy's analysis of the human person and of reality critically validates both the subjective and objective grounds for the fact of religion properly speaking. The philosophically established subjective grounds include the contingent ontic status of the human person as this is evinced in the presence of the essence/existence composition. They also include an analysis of the person's ability to know and... (shrink)

Since the very beginnings of Philosophy, the multifaceted problem of time has constituted one of the central concerns of philosophers and other thinkers. From pre-Socratic speculation to Platonic metaphysics, from St. Augustine to the medieval theologians, meditation upon time was unceasing, and the issue became yet more acute with the development of modern philosophy following Descartes One might summarize the slow evolution of Western thought in this area as follows: time began in Greek philosophy as a property (...) of the world, was later referred basically to human beings, and in the twentieth century has recovered its cosmic nature thanks to contemporary physics .It is of course beyond the reach of a single article to tackle the problem of time in its entirety. Here, I shall concentrate on a single very specific aspect: the definition of the past and the question of whether the past has any explicative value. It is largely on the answer to this question that the possibility of maintaining the coherent identity of history as a branch of knowledge depends. (shrink)

I argue that the fallacy concerning false speech (283e-284c) in Plato’s Euthydemus does not entail conflation of the alleged existential and veridical senses of ‘einai’ (‘to be’), but instead confusion regarding predicative statements. I consider this passage by advancing interpretations of nonbeing and the structure of true and false speech in the Sophist. I aim to refute those who hold that this passage demands an ‘existential’ sense of ‘einai ’ by offering a more Platonic interpretation.