The article’s primary purpose is to discuss the process of creating the extended interview titled _“Innego końca świata nie będzie”. Z Barbarą Skargą rozmawiają Katarzyna Janowska i Piotr Mucharski_ [En. _“There will be no Other End of the World”. Katarzyna Janowska and Piotr Mucharski Are Talking with Barbara Skarga_], published in 2007. The analysis refers to Barbara Skarga`s personal archive, which is available at the Joint Libraries of the Faculty of Philosophy and Sociology of the University of Warsaw, the Institute (...) of Philosophy and Sociology of the Polish Academy of Sciences, and the Polish Philosophical Society. Archival materials related to this ‘spoken book’ involve mainly computer printouts with handwritten deletions, notes, and additions. The article also includes the philosopher’s typescripts related to her academic activity. Studying the process of shaping the conversation in _Innego końca świata nie będzie_… leads to more general conclusions about the style of Barbara Skarga’s language. Conclusions indicating the type of subjectivity revealed in the interview were also used to discuss the author’s essays. (shrink)

Tomasz Ignacy Szpot Dunin SJ w swoim dziele poświęconym historii Chin nie ominął postaw znaczących chińskich dowódców w okresie przełomu historycznego jakim był upadek dynastii Ming i jej zastąpienie przez mandżurską dynastię Qing. Jednym z nich był Wu Sangui, który początkowo wspierał Mingów w walce z zewnętrznymi i wewnętrznymi wrogami, by w kluczowym momencie przyczynić się do powodzenia najazdu mandżurskiego, a po niemal trzech dekadach działania pod zwierzchnością nowej dynastii wypowiedzieć jej posłuszeństwo i stanąć na czele tzw. Rebelii Trzech Lenników. (...) Sprawa ta była znana w Europie i stała się nawet przedmiotem zainteresowania literackiego w XVIII w. Szpot Dunin nie poddaje się w swoim opisie skrajnym tendencjom, umiejętnie rozważa okoliczności decyzji i przedstawia zniuansowany, ale jednocześnie wyrazisty obraz postaci Wu Sangui, jego zamiarów i niepowodzeń. (shrink)

Tekst omawia związek sformułowanej przez Leona Chwistka koncepcji przeżycia artystycznego z charakterem ocen dotyczących najnowszych zjawisk w sztuce polskiej formułowanych przez niego w latach 30. XX w. Ukazuje pokrewieństwo tej koncepcji z pojęciem „całościowego sensu plastycznego dzieła sztuki”, określającym charakter eksperymentów artystycznych dokonywanych w środowisku przedwojennej Grupy Krakowskiej. Ufundowana na założeniach teorii wielości rzeczywistości, koncepcja przeżycia artystycznego podkreśla nierozdzielność doświadczenia odbioru rzeczywistości wyobrażeniowej dzieła sztuki z impulsem jej współtworzenia. W zamierzeniu Chwistka koncepcja ta dostarczać mogła ugruntowania teoretycznego sztuki zaangażowanej społecznie. (...) Stanowić miała również fundament dla kreślonego przez Chwistka projektu nominalistycznej estetyki zorientowanego na wypracowanie intersubiektywnych zasad oceny dzieł sztuki, na podstawie poddanych refleksji teoretycznej indywidualnych doświadczeń odbioru, przez wspólnotę osób zaangażowanych w publiczną dyskusję o sztuce. Wypracowane w ramach tego projektu kryteria oceny dzieł sztuki mogły znaleźć zastosowanie w krytyce artystycznej. (shrink)

This paper centers around the notion that internal, mental representations are grounded in structural similarity, i.e., that they are so-called S-representations. We show how S-representations may be causally relevant and argue that they are distinct from mere detectors. First, using the neomechanist theory of explanation and the interventionist account of causal relevance, we provide a precise interpretation of the claim that in S-representations, structural similarity serves as a “fuel of success”, i.e., a relation that is exploitable for the representation using (...) system. Then, we discuss crucial differences between S-representations and indicators or detectors, showing that—contrary to claims made in the literature—there is an important theoretical distinction to be drawn between the two. (shrink)

According to the predictive coding theory of cognition , brains are predictive machines that use perception and action to minimize prediction error, i.e. the discrepancy between bottom–up, externally-generated sensory signals and top–down, internally-generated sensory predictions. Many consider PCT to have an explanatory scope that is unparalleled in contemporary cognitive science and see in it a framework that could potentially provide us with a unified account of cognition. It is also commonly assumed that PCT is a representational theory of sorts, in (...) the sense that it postulates that our cognitive contact with the world is mediated by internal representations. However, the exact sense in which PCT is representational remains unclear; neither is it clear that it deserves such status—that is, whether it really invokes structures that are truly and nontrivially representational in nature. In the present article, I argue that the representational pretensions of PCT are completely justified. This is because the theory postulates cognitive structures—namely action-guiding, detachable, structural models that afford representational error detection—that play genuinely representational functions within the cognitive system. (shrink)

Perceptual experience usually comes with “phenomenal force”, a strong sense that it reflects reality as it is. Some philosophers have argued that it is in virtue of possessing phenomenal force that perceptual experiences are able to non‐inferentially justify beliefs. In this article, I introduce an alternative, inferentialist take on the epistemic role of phenomenal force. Drawing on Bayesian modeling in cognitive science, I argue that the sense of reality that accompanies conscious vision can be viewed as epistemically appraisable in light (...) of its rational etiology. (shrink)

Despite the fact that the notion of internal representation has - at least according to some - a fundamental role to play in the sciences of the mind, not only has its explanatory utility been under attack for a while now, but it also remains unclear what criteria should an explanation of a given cognitive phenomenon meet to count as a representational explanation in the first place. The aim of this article is to propose a solution to this latter problem. (...) I will assume that representational explanations should be construed as a form of mechanistic explanations and proceed by proposing a general sketch of a functional architecture of a representational cognitive mechanism. According to the view on offer here, representational mechanisms are mechanisms that meet four conditions: the structural resemblance condition, the action-guidance condition, the decouplability condition, and the error-detection condition. (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Frühmittelalterliche Studien Jahrgang: 50 Heft: 1 Seiten: 129-162.

Debunking arguments aim to undermine common sense beliefs by showing that they are not explanatorily or causally linked to the entities they are purportedly about. Rarely are facts about the aetiology of common sense beliefs invoked for the opposite aim, that is, to support the reality of entities that furnish our manifest image of the world. Here I undertake this sort of un-debunking project. My focus is on the metaphysics of ordinary physical objects. I use the view of perception as (...) approximate Bayesian inference to show how representations of ordinary objects can be extracted from sensory input in a rational and truth-tracking manner. Drawing an analogy between perception construed as Bayesian hypothesis testing and scientific inquiry, I sketch out how some of the intuitions that traditionally inspired arguments for scientific realism also find application with regards to proverbial tables and chairs. (shrink)

This book presents a new approach to semantics based on Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning, which in effect reduces semantics of the analysed language to the combination of its syntax and pragmatics. The author argues that the DTM was forgotten because for many years philosophers didn’t have conceptual tools to appreciate its innovative nature, and that the theory was far ahead of its time. The book shows how a redesigned and modernised version of the DTM can deliver a new (...) solution to the problem of defining linguistic meaning and that the theory can be understood as a new type of functional role semantics. The defining feature of the DTM is that it presents meaning as a product of constraints on the usage of words. According to the DTM meaning is not use, but the avoidance of misuse. Readers will see how the DTM was shelved for reasons that we don’t find so dramatic anymore, and how it contains enough original ideas and solutions to warrant developing it into a full-blown contemporary account. It is shown how many of the underlying ideas of the theory have been embraced later by philosophers and treated simply as brute facts about natural languages or even as new philosophical discoveries. Philosophers of language and researchers with an interest in how languages and the mind work will find this book a fascinating read. (shrink)

This paper is the first part of an exploration into the logical properties of relative identity. After providing the semantic grounds for various monadic logics of relative identity, I define the minimal system and its nine extensions. It is suggested that despite their purely formal origin at least some of them may contain nontrivial philosophical insights. All logics are axiomatized by means of sound and complete sequent calculi. I show their affinities with existing formalizations.

The article reviews the book Konstytucja wolności [The Constitution of Liberty], by Friedrich August von Hayek.

Recently, it has been objected that naïve realism is inconsistent with an empirically well-supported claim that mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously (SFK). The main aim of this paper is to establish the following conditional claim: if SFK turns out to be true, the naïve realist can and should accommodate it into her theory. Regarding the antecedent of this conditional, I suggest that empirical evidence renders SFK plausible but not obvious. For it (...) is possible that what is currently advocated as unconscious perception of the stimulus is in fact momentaneous perceptual awareness (or residual perceptual awareness) of the stimulus making the subject prone to judge in some way rather than another, or to act in some way rather than another. As to the apodosis, I show that neither the core of naïve realism nor any of its main motivations is undermined if SFK is assumed. On the contrary, certain incentives for endorsing naïve realism become more tempting on this assumption. Since the main motivations for naïve realism retain force under SFK, intentionalism is neither compulsory nor the best available explanation of unconscious perception. (shrink)

Universals are usually considered to be universal properties. Since tropes are particular properties, if there are only tropes, there are no universals. However, universals might be thought of not only as common properties, but also as common aspects (“determinable universals”) and common wholes (“concrete universals”). The existence of these two latter concepts of universals is fully compatible with the assumption that all properties are particular. This observation makes possible three different trope theories, which accept tropes and no universals, tropes and (...) determinable universals and tropes and concrete universals. (shrink)

Recent developments in virtual reality technology raise a question about the experience of presence and immersion in virtual environments. What is immersion and what are the conditions for inducing the experience of virtual presence? In this paper, we argue that crucial determinants of presence are perception of affordances and sense of embodiment. In the first section of this paper, we define key concepts and introduce important distinctions such as immersion and presence. In the second and third sections, we respectively discuss (...) presence, immersion and their determinants in detail. In the fourth and fifth sections, we argue for the importance of perception of affordances and sense of embodiment in increasing the degree of presence. Finally, we show the consequences of our view and discuss possible future implications. (shrink)

The first aim of this paper is to remind the reader of a very original theory of meaning which in many aspects has not been surpassed by subsequent theories. The theory in question is Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz’s Directival Theory of Meaning. In the first section I present a version of this theory which, I trust, retains the gist of the original but loses its outdated language. In the second section I analyze some problematic consequences of the directival theory and show how (...) they can be addressed. The second aim of this paper is exploiting some of the similarities between the directival theory and later theories of meaning. In the third section I argue that using the directival theory as an interpretative tool enables us to create explications of some of the notoriously vague notions which contemporary theories of meaning employ. (shrink)

Psychedelic substances elicit powerful, uncanny conscious experiences that are thought to possess therapeutic value. In those who undergo them, these altered states of consciousness often induce shifts in metaphysical beliefs about the fundamental structure of reality. The contents of those beliefs range from contentious to bizarre, especially when considered from the point of view of naturalism. Can chemically induced, radically altered states of consciousness provide reasons for or play some positive epistemic role with respect to metaphysical beliefs? In this paper, (...) I discuss a view that has been underexplored in recent literature. I argue that psychedelic states can be rationally integrated into one’s epistemic life. Consequently, updating one’s metaphysical beliefs based on altered states of consciousness does not have to constitute an instance of epistemic irrationality. (shrink)

The article reviews the book Metodologia nauk [Methodology of the Sciences], by Adam Grobler.

The aim of the article is to assess the situation in terms of wage inequality and identify factors influencing changes in the levels, dynamics and relations of wages in voivodeships in Poland in 2012–2021. In Poland, during the analyzed period, an economic crisis occurred in 2012 as a consequence of the crisis of 2008–2009 and since 2020. Average monthly gross wages in Poland will be used for this purpose. Based on this data, deviations, relationships, and rates of change will be (...) calculated. To carry out the analysis and evaluation, I will use statistical data published in the Statistical Yearbooks of the Central Statistical Office in Warsaw for the years 2012–2021. In this article, the region will be identified with the voivodeship, according to the administrative division. (shrink)

According to unconscious perception hypothesis (UP), mental states of the same fundamental kind as ordinary conscious seeing can occur unconsciously. The proponents of UP often support it with empirical evidence for a more specific hypothesis, according to which colours can be seen unconsciously (UPC). However, UPC is a general claim that admits of many interpretations. The main aim of this paper is to determine which of them is the most plausible. To this end, I investigate how adopting various conceptions of (...) colour and perceptual phenomenal character affects UPC’s resilience to objections. This brings me to the conclusion that the most plausible reading of UPC is the one according to which the phenomenal character of colour perception (i) is constituted by colours qua primitive mind-independent qualities of the environment and (ii) is not essentially tied to consciousness. My conclusion not only identifies the most plausible interpretation of UPC, but also highlights and supports an unorthodox version of the relational theory of perception, which is a perfectly viable yet so far overlooked stance in the debate about unconscious perception. (shrink)

Brain activity determines which relations between objects in the environment are perceived as differences and similarities in colour, smell, sound, etc. According to selectionism, brain activity does not create those relations; it only selects which of them are perceptually available to the subject on a given occasion. In effect, selectionism entails that perceptual experience is diaphanous, i.e. that sameness and difference in the phenomenal character of experience is exhausted by sameness and difference in the perceived items. It has been argued (...) that diaphaneity is undermined by phenomenological considerations and empirical evidence. This paper considers five prominent arguments of this sort and shows that none of them succeeds. (shrink)

Infertility is a serious social problem. Very often the only treatment possibility are IVF methods. This study explores the possibility of outcome prediction in the early stages of treatment. The data, collected from the previous treatment cycles, were divided into four subsets, which corresponded to the selected stages of treatment. On each such subset, sophisticated data mining analysis was carried out, with appropriate imputations and classification procedures. The obtained results indicate that there is a possibility of predicting the final outcome (...) at the beginning of treatment. (shrink)

Thought style and thought collective are two well-known concepts from Ludwik Fleck’s theory of science, which he originally formulated in Polish and German. This paper contends that these two concepts cannot be fully understood without a third—Stimmung/nastrój, which is one of the musical metaphors that play an important role in Fleck’s thinking. Because it is most often translated into English as “mood”, Fleck’s musical metaphors are mostly lost in translation, appearing as mere rhetoric. Only if and when we understand Stimmung/nastrój (...) in the musical meaning of attunement, we can fully understand thought collectives, for which Stimmung/nastrój is sine qua non, and thought style, which appears if and when a collective turns out to be an enduring and not a momentary one. (shrink)

In the paper entitled “Scientific Explanation and Metaphor” Jerzy Kmita divided all metaphors on reporting and explicative ones. He assumed that the explicative metaphors could play a cognitive function in science, and also characterized them according to Max Black’s interactive theory of metaphor. The main purpose of my paper is to analyse Kmita’s explicative conception of metaphor in the view of Lakoff & Johnson’s cognitive theory of metaphor. I attempt to show that metaphors play an important role in a process (...) of making knowledge, especially in a conceptualization of domain being studied. In spite of an interactive account of metaphor I claim that making use of a metaphor is a process, which proceeds only in the one direction. In the last section of the paper I briefly analyse a few examples of metaphors used in natural sciences. (shrink)

Predictive Processing (PP) framework construes perception and action (and perhaps other cognitive phenomena) as a matter of minimizing prediction error, i.e. the mismatch between the sensory input and sensory predictions generated by a hierarchically organized statistical model. There is a question of how PP fits into the debate between traditional, neurocentric and representation-heavy approaches in cognitive science and those approaches that see cognition as embodied, environmentally embedded, extended and (largely) representation-free. In the present paper, I aim to investigate and clarify (...) the cognitivist or ‘conservative’ reading of PP. I argue that the conservative commitments of PP can be divided into three distinct categories: (1) representationalism, (2) inferentialism, and (3) internalism. I show how these commitments and their relations should be understood and argue for an interpretation of each that is both non-trivial and largely ecumenical towards the 4E literature. Conservative PP is as progressive as conservatism gets. (shrink)

Like most goods‐producing sectors in the West, modern health‐care systems have been profoundly changed by globalization and the neoliberal policies that attend it. Since the 1970s, the role of the welfare state has been considerably reduced; funding and management of health systems have been subjected to wave upon wave of reorganization and assimilated to the private sector. At the same time, neoliberal policy has imposed the notion of patient empowerment, thus turning patients into consumers of health. The literature on nursing (...) has accordingly reported on the significant repercussions on all aspects of the profession, from delivery of care and treatment, through training for new nurses, to legislated policy reforms regarding the role and responsibilities of modern nurses. In light of these developments, this paper analyses and theorizes about the way the injection of neoliberal policy is linked to and affects the practice of nursing. Drawing on a number of Nietzschean arguments, we begin with an exploration of the complex effects of neoliberalism, bureaucratization, and technocratization on the health system and the practice of nursing. Our main theoretical point here is that neoliberal policy engenders and promotes a neoliberal tide, which results in the conversion of the values that drive modern nursing practice. We then examine this tide in the light of Nietzsche's concepts. Starting with an analysis based on the ontology of the will to power, we show that nurses are dominated by neoliberal values embedded in technocratic and bureaucratic ideologies. Finally, we argue that the application of neoliberal policy constitutes a form of domestication from which one might potentially be freed through the Nietzschean concept of transvaluation of values. This transvaluation, as its freeing from some of the neoliberal tide, may be accomplished in accordance with a hierarchy of specific life‐affirming values for nursing culture and practice. (shrink)

The paper discusses the thesis of virtual realism presented by David Chalmers in his paper “The Virtual and the Real” (2017). Here, I suggest an even stronger version of the claim that I call “virtual physicalism”. According to this view, virtual objects are not only real but physical as they are identical to the physical states of computers that run VR software. I suggest that virtual objects should have a similar ontological status to toys—they should be treated as models or (...) simplifications of ordinary objects. Just like toys, virtual objects can sometimes be good enough to be used instead of their ordinary counterparts. In these cases, virtual objects start to be treated as instantiations of the same kind. In the last part of the paper, I use Johan Huizinga’s notion of a “magic circle” to suggest how different objects could be successfully “virtualized”, that is, moved into a digital realm while remaining objects of the same kind as their non-virtual counterparts. I suggest this will happen once virtual reality becomes permanent and causally connected with non-virtual reality. I finish the paper by looking at examples of natural kind objects and individuals, which seem to be the hardest cases for successful virtualization. (shrink)

The purpose of this article is to define the perspective from which a coach should analyze and evaluate personality traits that influence sports performance in team sports. The subjects of the research are Polish players in senior age from 10 team sports. A sample of champions was selected from the study population, and the Big Five model was applied to examine their personality with the use of the NEO Five-Factor Inventory questionnaire. Statistical analyses were performed with the IBM SPSS Statistics (...) software, version 25. The study revealed statistically significant differences between team sports in four personality traits: neuroticism, extraversion, agreeableness, and conscientiousness. Champions of team sports were characterized by a lower level of neuroticism, a higher level of extraversion, and openness to experiences in relation to other sportsmen. It was also confirmed that the personality traits distribution levels depend on the sport discipline. Therefore, an important role must be assigned to those mental training techniques that favor emotional balance, team communication, and tactical thinking skills and are manifested in triggering start-up readiness. (shrink)

The paper critically examines the conception of majoritarian democracy. In the second part of the text, the author introduces the definition of majoritarian democracy based on the Joseph Schumpeter’s theory of minimal democracy. The thesis of the paper is that electing the government by universal suffrage is neither necessary nor sufficient as a condition for a democratic regime. The concept of democracy is broader, including the catalogue of democratic values connected with the concept of democratic citizenship, special circumstances of political (...) action and the limitation of government powers. (shrink)

Paweł Gładziejewski, Is empathy is mental simulation? Remarks on the representative approach based on the concept of mirror neurons., Diametros 27 This paper draws on the theoretical achievements of analytic philosophy of mind and the empirical results of psychology and cognitive neuroscience in order to understand the nature of empathy and the sub-personal mechanisms upon which it is based. The paper distinguishes two types of empathy, which are often not sufficiently clearly distinguished in the literature, empathy as a kind (...) of social perception and empathy as compassion. The argument attempts show to that neither of these can be identified with a mental simulation process understood as a sub-personal process. Nevertheless mental simulation may play a limited explanatory role with respect to these two types of empathy. (shrink)

Bioethics, Volume 36, Issue 8, Page 821-828, October 2022.

The aim of this article is to critically examine what I call Action-Centric Theories of Representation (ACToRs). I include in this category theories of representation that (1) reject construing representation in terms of a relation that holds between representation itself (the representational vehicle) and what is represented, and instead (2) try to bring the function that representations play for cognitive systems to the center stage. Roughly speaking, according to proponents of ACToRs, what makes a representation (that is, what is constitutive (...) of it being a representation) is its being functionally involved in preselecting or guiding the actions of cognitive systems. I intend to argue that while definitely valuable, ACToRs are underconstrained and thus not entirely satisfying, since there exist structures that would count as representations according to ACToRs, but which do not play functional roles that could be nontrivially or in an explanatorily valuable way classified as representing something for a cognitive system. I outline a remedy for this theoretical situation by postulating that a fully satisfying theory of representation in cognitive science should have two factors; i.e., it should combine the pragmatic, action-oriented aspect present in ACToRs with an element that emphasizes the importance of the relation holding between a representational vehicle and what is represented. (shrink)

This article takes issue with Kuhn’s description of the ‘Aristotle experience,’ an event that took place in 1947 and that he retrospectively characterized as a revelation that instantly delivered to him the key concepts of The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962). We trace a certain transformation of this narrative over time: whereas it commenced from a description of his impression of disparity between the textbook image of science and the study of historical sources, Kuhn started to characterize it as a (...) revelation after learning of the English translation of Fleck’s 1935 Entstehung und Entwicklung einer wissenschaftlichen Tatsache. This book anticipates many central Kuhnian claims. Kuhn read it as early as 1949, but never fully acknowledged it as a source of inspiration. We discuss four hypotheses concerning the possible influence of Fleck’s theory on Kuhn’s in light of the available evidence. We conclude that the degree of similarity between them is too great to be coincidental. (shrink)

We prove that the homeomorphism relation between compact spaces can be continuously reduced to the homeomorphism equivalence relation between absolute retracts, which strengthens and simplifies recent results of Chang and Gao, and Cieśla. It follows then that the homeomorphism relation of absolute retracts is Borel bireducible with the universal orbit equivalence relation. We also prove that the homeomorphism relation between regular continua is classifiable by countable structures and hence it is Borel bireducible with the universal orbit equivalence relation of the (...) permutation group on a countable set. On the other hand we prove that the homeomorphism relation between rim-finite metrizable compacta is not classifiable by countable structures. (shrink)

Assuming, according to Jaspers, that the measure of truth of a philosophical system is the lifestyle of its creator as well as his ability at drawing conclusions resulting from philosophical speculation to the requirements of practical action, the question must be asked, to what extent, if at all Wojciech Słomski's book tries to recognise and name the philosophically characteristic merging of theory and practise. Despite this, it shouldn't be the superior aim of any biography, let alone the biography of a (...) philosopher. However in the case of Professor Antoni Kępiński, the connection between theoretical views and real life holds meaning not only for judging the truth of these views but most of all for a correct understanding of them. (shrink)

We show that for an uncountable κ in a suitable Cohen real model for any family {A ν } ν<κ of sets of reals there is a σ-homomorphism h from the σ-algebra generated by Borel sets and the sets A ν into the algebra of Baire subsets of 2 κ modulo meager sets such that for all Borel B, B is meager iff h(B) = 0. The proof is uniform, works also for random reals and the Lebesgue measure, and in (...) this way generalizes previous results of Carlson and Solovay for the Lebesgue measure and of Kamburelis and Zakrzewski for the Baire property. (shrink)