In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:RUSSELLS ARGUMENT AGAINST FREGE'S SENSE-REFERENCE DISTINCTION PAWEL TURNAu Philosophy I Jagiellonian University Cracow, Poland I n "On Denoting"l Russell argued that Frege's theory of sense and reference was an "inextricable tangle", but, ironically, many readers found the argument even more knotry. In an effort to make sense of it, commentators were often driven to attribute to Russell quite obvious and simple fallacies. A different approach was taken by (...) Peter Geach, who suggested that Russell's argument could be given a consistent reading if it were construed as arguing, not against Frege's theory, but against Russell's own earlier theory, which he put forward in The Principles of Mathematics. It is not an implausible hypothesis, considering how prone Russell was to misrepresent' other philosophers' views and read his own powerful ideas into their writings. In order to justifY Geach's hypothesis properly, one would have to show the crucial difference between Russell's and Frege's theories that made only one of them susceptible to the attack in "On Denoting ". Russell explicitly considered the two theories to be "very nearly the same"; this self-interpretation would have to be questioned. Geach's hypothesis would be further strengthened by providing an actual exegesis of the "On Denoting" argument as directed against The Principles ofMathematics theory. In this paper 1 will try to accomplish both of these tasks. Russell is often accused of confusing use and mention. The accusation is not fair, however. It is true that he does not insist on this distinction; he does not employ it extensively. But he is certainly Russell's Argument against Frege's Distinction 53 aware of it; he simply does not think that it is an important logical distinction. Today this view may seem almost incomprehensible, but that only shows the strength of Frege's influence on our ideas. There are two striking symptoms of Russell's lack of concern for the use-mention distinction: firstly, he does not observe the convention which says that putting an expression in quotation marks produces a name of that expression; secondly, he does not feel any need to employ the pair of terms "sentence" and "proposition", but contents himself with the latter only. The claim about Russell's use of inverted commas needs to be proved; I will come to that later. Russell's assertions are often ambiguous between use and mention of expressions. For example, he asserts that "propositions do not contain words" (PaM, p. 47). However, a few pages later, he speaks of propositions that contain the phrase "any number" (p. 53). If this is not to be self-contradictory, then either the term "proposition" must sometimes signifY a linguistic expression, or the term "phrase" must sometimes be understood without implying that a phrase consists of words. This ambiguity is openly admitted in a later article, where he writes: [we shall be concerned with] the distinction between verbs and substantives, or, more correctly, between the objects denoted by verbs and the objects denoted by substantives. Since this more correct expression is long and cumbrous, I shall generally use the shorter expression to mean the same thing. Thus, when I speak of verbs, I mean the object denoted by verbs, and similarly for substantives.2. Russell's attitude towards the distinction between use and mention is not unjustified. It has its reason in his view oflanguage and the subject -matter of logic. In Russell's view, the subject-matter of logic has nothing to do with language. Words, both spoken and written, are entirely outside its realm. Logic, just as other sciences (except linguistics ), is concerned with the entities indicated by words, and not with words themselves. Even the relation of indicating, which holds between words and things in the world, is of no interest to it: "mean1 In Lf(, pp. 39-56. russ.lI: the Journal of the Bertrand Russell Archives McMaster Univecsity Library Press n.s. 11 (summer 1991): 51- 66 ISSN 0036-o16~ 2 B. Russell, "On the Relations of Universals and Particulars", Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, n.s. 12 (r9II-12): 1-24; in Lf(, pp. 103-24 (at 107-8). 54 PAWEL TURNAU Russell's Argument... (shrink)

We prove an exponential lower bound on the length of cutting plane proofs. The proof uses an extension of a lower bound for monotone circuits to circuits which compute with real numbers and use nondecreasing functions as gates. The latter result is of independent interest, since, in particular, it implies an exponential lower bound for some arithmetic circuits.

Chapter One: Constructions. Entities, constructions, and functions When one travels from Los Angeles to New York, going, say, by way of St. Louis, Chicago, ...

Intensions feature prominently among the entities we talk about.

2 Popper's Logical Definition of Verisimilitude. 3 Popper's Probabilistic Definition of Verisimilitude. 4 Conclusion.

It is well known that the manner in which a definitely descriptive term contributes to the meaning of a sentence depends on the place the term occupies in the sentence. A distinction is accordingly drawn between ordinary contexts and contexts variously termed non-referential, intensional, oblique, or opaque. The aim of the present article is to offer a general account of the phenomenon, based on transparent intensional logic. It turns out that on this approach there is no need to say (as (...) Frege does) that descriptive terms are referentially ambiguous or to deny (as Russell does) that descriptive terms represent self-contained units of meaning. There is also no need to tolerate (as Montague does) exceptions to the Principle of Functionality. The notion of an ordinary (i.e., non-intensional) context is explicated exclusively in terms of logical structure and it is argued that two aspects of ordinariness (termed hospitality and exposure) must be distinguished. (shrink)

Motivated by the problem of finding finite versions of classical incompleteness theorems, we present some conjectures that go beyond NP ≠ coNP. These conjectures formally connect computational complexity with the difficulty of proving some sentences, which means that high computational complexity of a problem associated with a sentence implies that the sentence is not provable in a weak theory, or requires a long proof. Another reason for putting forward these conjectures is that some results in proof complexity seem to be (...) special cases of such general statements and we want to formalize and fully understand these statements. Roughly speaking, we are trying to connect syntactic complexity, by which we mean the complexity of sentences and strengths of the theories in which they are provable, with the semantic concept of complexity of the computational problems represented by these sentences. -/- We have introduced the most fundamental conjectures in our earlier works. Our aim in this article is to present them in a more systematic way, along with several new conjectures, and prove new connections between them and some other statements studied before. (shrink)

In this article I explore Maimon’s role in the evolution of Kant’s understanding of the function of the history of philosophy in philosophical enquiry. Kant is often viewed as holding an ambivalent...

I. The framework. 1, Aristotle's project and methods. 2, The perceptual capacity of the soul. 3, The sensory apparatus. 4, The common sense and the related capacities -- II. The terminology. 1, Overlooked occurrences of the phrase 'common sense'. 2, De anima III.1 425a27. 3, De partibus animalium IV.10 686a31. 4, De memoria et reminiscentia 1 450a10. 5, De anima III.7 431b5. 6, Conclusions on the terminology -- III. Functions of the common sense. 1, Simultaneous perception and cross-modal binding. 2, (...) Perceptual discrimination. 3, Waking, sleep, and control of the senses. 4, Perceiving that what we see and hear, and monitoring of the senses. 5, Other roles of the common sense -- Conclusion. (shrink)

Traxler, Pickering, and Clifton found that ambiguous sentences are read faster than their unambiguous counterparts. This so-called ambiguity advantage has presented a major challenge to classical theories of human sentence comprehension because its most prominent explanation, in the form of the unrestricted race model, assumes that parsing is non-deterministic. Recently, Swets, Desmet, Clifton, and Ferreira have challenged the URM. They argue that readers strategically underspecify the representation of ambiguous sentences to save time, unless disambiguation is required by task demands. When (...) disambiguation is required, however, readers assign sentences full structure—and Swets et al. provide experimental evidence to this end. On the basis of their findings, they argue against the URM and in favor of a model of task-dependent sentence comprehension. We show through simulations that the Swets et al. data do not constitute evidence for task-dependent parsing because they can be explained by the URM. However, we provide decisive evidence from a German self-paced reading study consistent with Swets et al.'s general claim about task-dependent parsing. Specifically, we show that under certain conditions, ambiguous sentences can be read more slowly than their unambiguous counterparts, suggesting that the parser may create several parses, when required. Finally, we present the first quantitative model of task-driven disambiguation that subsumes the URM, and we show that it can explain both Swets et al.'s results and our findings. (shrink)

The article analyzes approaches to the ethicalization of officialdom in the realities of digitalization. The author believe that demonstrative behavior harms the authority of public service. Administrative ethics should be based on traditional values, the main of which are deemed to be integrity and loyalty to the Motherland. В статье анализируются подходы к этизации чиновничества в реалиях цифровизации. Автор полагает, что демонстративность поведения вредит авторитету государственной службы. Административная этика должна базироваться на традиционных ценностях, главными из которых почитаются принципиальность и верность (...) Отечеству. (shrink)

One of the most prevalent rationales for public healthcare policies is a human right to healthcare. Governments are the typical duty-bearers, but they differ vastly in their capacity to help those vulnerable to serious health problems and those with severe disabilities. A right to healthcare is out of the reach of many developing economies that struggle to provide the most basic services to their citizens. If human rights to provision of such goods exist, then governments would be violating rights without (...) doing anything wrong. I argue that such variable ability to provide healthcare depends not only on financial resources, but on institutional capacity, and that the latter represents a more fundamental challenge to the existence of a human right to healthcare than previously recognized. This challenge does not imply that government has no obligations to protect and improve the health of their citizens, but that it is best to think of such obligations as generated by conventional rights, namely rights arising from local legal and social conventions, which require governments to pursue health-related moral goals such as reducing suffering, closing opportunity gaps for the disadvantaged, and preventing the spread of contagious diseases. We need not think of such moral goals in terms of human rights. (shrink)

Despite relative neglect in the literature, Kant’s published and unpublished writings in theoretical philosophy reveal a sustained and at times ambivalent effort to come to terms with the problem of miracles. Because they entail a form of supernatural causation that undermines the law-governedness of the order of nature, miracles pose a significant problem for Kant’s metaphysics. I explore in detail Kant’s account of miracles in conjunction with the relevant aspects of his metaphysics of nature in order to establish in what (...) sense miracles are possible, and how they fit into Kant’s architectonic more generally. (shrink)

It is widely held that oblique contexts and indexical terms present difficulties to Frege's theory of sense. The aim of the present paper is to show that a simple device involving no revision of Frege's semantic doctrine resolves all the alleged difficulties. A simple extension of Frege's notation is proposed which makes it possible to translate oblique contexts into the concept script.

A review of Jozef Kovalčik´s and Max Ryynänen´s Aesthetics of Popular Culture.

The article offers a rigorous truth condition for subjunctively conditional statements. The theory is framed in the system of transparent intensional logic and takes connections (especially the cause-Effect relation) as basic. Counterexamples are given to rival theories based on the notion of world similarity.

The paper deals with the semantics of mathematical notation. In arithmetic, for example, the syntactic shape of a formula represents a particular way of specifying, arriving at, or constructing an arithmetical object (that is, a number, a function, or a truth value). A general definition of this sense of "construction" is proposed and compared with related notions, in particular with Frege's concept of "function" and Carnap's concept of "intensional isomorphism." It is argued that constructions constitute the proper subject matter of (...) both logic and mathematics, and that a coherent semantic account of mathematical formulas cannot be given without assuming that they serve as names of constructions. (shrink)

European Journal of Philosophy, EarlyView.

Of two false theories, One can be, Intuitively, Closer to the truth than the other. The purpose of the article is to propose a rigorous explication of this intuitive notion.

This Festschrift is in honour of Professor Marie Duzí, VSB - Technical University of Ostrava. The 16 contributions, authored by 24 colleagues, run the gamut from foundations in logic and theoretical computer science through philosophical logic, multi-agent systems and theory of communication to personal recollections. Marie Duzí is best known for her profound and extensive work on both the foundations and multiple applications of Transparent Intensional Logic, originally developed by Pavel Tichý in the late 1960s. Her work, whether single-authored or (...) co-authored, has appeared in various high-level journals. In 2008 the Rector of her home university granted Marie the award Outstanding Results in the Development of Science and Research. The 2010 monograph Procedural Semantics for Hyperintensional Logic earned Marie and her coauthors the prestigious Award for Outstanding Results of Major Scientific Importance from the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic. The major achievements of Transparent Intensional Logic that Marie has been involved in over the last decade have been compiled into the volume Transparent Intensional Logic: Selected Recent Essays, also published by College Publications. (shrink)

Pár slov úvodem k dopisu, který poslal Pavel Tichý z University of Otago Pavlu Maternovi (který v té době ´pracoval´ na brněnské univerzitě bez možnosti učení a publikování). K dataci dopisu: Shoduji se s odhadem Dr. Raclavského, že jde patrně o r. 1975. Ti, kdo neprožili normalizaci, si těžko představí situaci. To nebylo tak, že můj přítel Tichý momentálně působí na Novém Zélandě a píše mi z momentálního zahraničního pobytu. Tichý byl emigrant, což mj. znamenalo, že žádnou z jeho odborných (...) statí nebylo možno u nás citovat, dále že dík faktu, o kterém každý věděl, že dopisy emigrantů jsou u nás na příslušných institucích otvírány, znamenala korespondence s emigrantem kádrovou skvrnu. O tom jsem tehdy nepřemýšlel, už proto, že četba Tichého dopisů byla nesmírně zajímavá. Byl jsem na shromažďování korespondence lajdák. Moje krátkozrakost zavinila, že se z této korespondence zachoval nepatrný zlomek. Dopis, který následuje, je ovšem obzvlášť zajímavý, a to z následujícího důvodu: Tichý měl už od šedesátých let – ještě v Československu – v hlavě zárodky svého přístupu k logice a logické analýze přirozeného jazyka (svědčí o tom jeho stati v tehdejším Filosofickém časopise, zejména stať „Smysl a procedura“ z r. 1968). Dopis, který zde uveřejňujeme, má však hodnotu historického dokumentu. Jde o první ´neformální´ formulaci jeho pojetí tzv. konstrukcí a jeho postoje k logice, což se postupně promítlo do systému Transparentní intenzionální logiky (TIL), vyloženého souvisle v monografii The Foundations of Frege´s Logic, vydané asi 13 let po tomto dopisu. Ze vzhledu dopisu je patrné, že byl psán na psacím stroji, což v těch letech bylo standardní. Musíme omluvit překlepy (ostatně to byl osobní dopis), pokud jde o nespisovnosti, vím, že Tichý ovládal češtinu velmi dobře, ale dával přednost psát přirozeně, blízko k hovorové češtině. Jistě připustíte, že jeho jazyk je zde velmi živý a že úpravy směrem ke spisovnému jazyku by narušily kouzlo bezprostřednosti a jistého emocionálního zaujetí, které z dopisu vyzařuje. Tichý posílal mně a Pavlovi Cmorejovi i nadále jednak osobní dopisy, jednak rukopisy svých statí, takže jsme měli výhodu být účastni procesu budování TIL, kterou oba (a dnes už nejenom my) pokládáme za podstatný přínos ke světové logice. --Pavel Materna. (shrink)

My book is about the human creativity being a source of progress, and cycling of evolution caused by platitude and triviality of once high-reaching idealism. In essence the book presents an original perception of human history, based on Christian values as vital coordinates system. I hope this book will revive the interest to the Russian school of thoughts and to humanism in general.

Roman Catholic and Eastern Orthodox theologians claim that the unique event of Christ’s sacrifice on Calvary is present in Eucharistic liturgies. A popular explanatory strategy for this miraculous presence suggests that due to its supernatural character the Eucharist “conquers time,” transcends its boundaries, and allows for temporal coincidence of two chronologically distant events. I discuss the four main approaches within this strategy that can be discovered in contemporary theological writings. The first approach implies a time travel of the Calvary event. (...) The second suggests the time travel of Eucharistic participants. The third eliminates the chronological distance by relocating one of the events into a timeless reality. The fourth assumes multilocation of the event across time. I argue that each of these approaches is untenable on philosophical or theological grounds. (shrink)

In this paper we argue that Aristotle operates with a particular theoretical model in his explanation of animal locomotion, what we call the ‘centralized incoming and outgoing motions’ model. We show how the model accommodates more complex cases of animal motion and how it allows Aristotle to preserve the intuition that animals are self-movers, without jeopardizing his arguments for the eternity of motion and the necessary existence of one eternal unmoved mover in Physics VIII. The CIOM model helps to elucidate (...) Aristotle’s two central yet problematic claims, namely that the soul is the efficient cause of animal motion and that it is the internal supporting-point necessary for animal motion. Moreover, the CIOM model helps us to explain the difference between voluntary, involuntary and non-voluntary motions, and to square Aristotle’s cardiocentrism with his hylomorphism, but also, more generally, it provides an interesting way of thinking about the place of intentionality in the causal structure of the world. (shrink)

The article offers a rigorous explication of the intuitive notion of verisimilitude, I.E., Of the distance of a theory from the truth. The proposal is defended against charges of material inadequacy made by popper, Niniluoto, And miller.

There are no moral entitlements with respect to pollution prior to legal conventions that establish them, or so I will argue. While some moral entitlements precede legal conventions, pollution is part of a category of harms against interests that stands apart in this regard. More specifically, pollution is a problematic type of harm that creates liability only under certain conditions. Human interactions lead to harm and to the invasion of others’ space regularly, and therefore we need an account of undue (...) harm as a basis of assigning legal protections and obligations to different agents, which creates standards for holding those agents responsible for harm. Absent such positive standards with respect to pollution at the domestic or international level, it does not make sense to hold agents responsible. This fact has two fundamental implications. First, contrary to what some defenders of environmental justice argue, we cannot hold people responsible for polluting without a system of legal rights in place that assigns entitlements, protections, and obligations, and second, contrary to what opponents of environmental regulation claim, the lack of moral entitlements to pollute creates room for quite extensive legal restrictions on people’s ability to pollute for the sake of the environment and human health. Indeed the scope of those restrictions is wide and open-ended. (shrink)

The article critically covers the current issues of "value-driven management" and the creative economy. Analyzing the concept of a "fragile and incomprehensible" (BANI) world, the author conclude that the widely proclaimed era of the knowledge economy is nothing more than utopia. A value-based transformation is possible if it is approached in a comprehensive and systemic way, which requires large-scale transformations initiated and supported by the power structures. The author believe that the creative economy is more extensive than the traditional one, (...) and its development potential is rather limited. The paradigm of "commercial creativity", in fact, is aimed at providing employment and meeting the needs of the population of the "golden billion" countries. Статья в критическом ключе освещает актуальные вопросы «ценностного менеджмента» и креативной экономики. Анализируя концепцию «хрупкого и непостижимого» (BANI) мира, автор приходит к выводу, что широко провозглашенная эра экономики знаний — не более чем утопия. Ценностная трансформация возможна, если подход к ней будет комплексным и системным, для чего требуются масштабные преобразования, инициируемые и поддерживаемые властными структурами. Креативная экономика, как полагает автор, в большей степени экстенсивна, чем традиционная, а потенциал ее развития весьма ограничен. Парадигма «коммерческого креатива», по сути, нацелена на обеспечение занятости и удовлетворение потребностей населения стран «золотого миллиарда». (shrink)

The vision informing 20th Century philosophy has been aptly described as one of a desert landscape. Philosophers behave as if in expectation of an ontological tax collector to whom they will owe the less the fewer entities they declare. The metaphysical purge is perpetrated under a banner emblazoned with Occam’s Razor. But Occam never counselled ontological genocide at all cost. He only cautioned against multiplying entities beyond necessity His Razor is thus in full harmony with the complementary principle, known as (...) Menger’s Comb, which cautions against trying to do with less what requires more. The two methodological precepts are just two sides of the same coin. (shrink)

In this article, I explore the role of the first principle in Fichte’s philosophy of history and assess the extent to which its introduction is able to resolve problems in the philosophies of history of his predecessors. Particularly, I focus on Fichte’s response to the question of how history can be grasped in a systematic manner for the purposes of theoretical cognition. I argue that while Fichte is able to resolve the tension between Herder’s pluralism and Kant’s chiliasm in an (...) innovative manner, the deployment of his first principle is ultimately unsuccessful in establishing historiography on a firmer scientific foundation. (shrink)

his article will focus on the mechanistic origins of the computer metaphor, which forms the conceptual framework for the methodology of the cognitive sciences, some areas of artificial intelligence and the philosophy of mind. The connection between the history of computing technology, epistemology and the philosophy of mind is expressed through the metaphorical dictionaries of the philosophical discourse of a particular era. The conceptual clarification of this connection and the substantiation of the mechanistic components of the computer metaphor is the (...) main goal of this article. The statement is substantiated that the invention of mechanical computing devices, having a long history in the European engineering tradition, formed the prerequisites for the emergence of machine functionalism in the modern philosophy of mind. The idea of multiple implementation stems from the principle that a formal symbol system prescribes rules for the use of rational abstractions through the physical architecture of a computational engine. The article considers the reasons for the conceptual shift and reveals the semantic foundations for the metaphorical transfer of the properties of abstract objects from the theory of automata to the field of modern philosophy of mind. The criticism and ways of protecting the philosophical program of machine functionalism are analyzed by changing the content of the metaphor “Mind as machine”. The reasons for the stability of the information-computer approach in cognitive sciences are also disclosed and explained. (shrink)