Frege: Indexicals and Demonstratives, Misc

카플란은 고유 이름과 지표사 같은 단칭어들을 분석하면서 프레게의 뜻 이론이 한계를 갖는다고 비판하였다. 그러나 필자는 두 가지 점에서 프레게가 카플란의 비판을 피할 수 있다고 주장한다. 먼저 카플란은 단칭어들이 대상을 직접 지시한다고 주장할 뿐, 프레게가 정보를 제공하는 동일성 진술을 설명할 목적으로 뜻 이론을 도입한 이유는 무시한다. 카플란은 또한 독창적인 지표사 분석을 통해 프레게식의 뜻 이론이 지표사를 포함하는 문장을 취급할 수 없다고 주장하지만, 필자는 프레게의 뜻 이론과 필자가 제안한 확장된 맥락의 원리에 의해 지표사를 포함하는 문장을 취급할 수 있다고 주장한다. 이를 보이기 위해 (...) 먼저 프레게의 뜻 이론과 이 이론을 기반으로 하는 가능 세계 의미론을 살핀 다음 프레게에 대한 카플란의 비판이 어떤 형태로 진행되는지 구체적으로 살펴보겠다. Kaplan criticized Frege’s theory of sense as having limitations while analyzing singular terms such as proper names and indexicals. However, I argue that Frege can avoid Kaplan’s criticism in two ways. First, Kaplan only claims that singular words refer directly to objects, but ignores the reason why Frege introduced the theory of meaning for the purpose of explaining informative identity statements. Kaplan also argues, through an original analysis of indexicals, that Frege’s theory of meaning cannot handle sentences containing indexicals. I argue that Frege’s own theory of meaning and the expended principle of context proposed in this paper can handle sentences containing indexicals. To show this, we will first look at Frege’s theory of meaning and possible world semantics based on this theory, and then look specifically at the form in which Kaplan’s criticism of Frege progresses. (shrink)

What is the relationship between Frege’s puzzle and the puzzle of the de se? An increasingly influential view claims that the de se puzzle is merely an instance of Frege’s puzzle and that the idea that de se attitudes pose a distinctive theoretical challenge rests on a myth. Here we argue that this view is misguided. There are important differences between the two puzzles. First, unlike Frege puzzle cases, de se puzzle cases involve unshareable Fregean senses. Second, unlike Frege puzzle (...) cases, de se puzzle cases cannot be resolved by objective information alone. Further, there seem to be pure cases of each puzzle: instances of the de se puzzle which do not have a Fregean structure, and instances of Frege’s puzzle, which do not involve de se attitudes. We conclude that the two puzzles are fundamentally different and that the traditional theory of attitudes needs to be amended. (shrink)

This dissertation is about the structure of thought. Following Gottlob Frege, I define a thought as the sort of content relevant to determining whether an assertion is true or false. The historical component of the dissertation involves interpreting Frege’s actual views on the structure of thought. I argue that Frege did not think that a thought has a unique decomposition into its component senses, but rather the same thought can be decomposed into senses in a variety of distinct ways. I (...) extend Frege’s position and use it to develop an account of the hierarchy of senses, the senses expressed by indexicals and demonstratives, and the distinction between logical and non-logical structure. I also discuss various connections with the nature of meta-representation, our capacity for reflective judgment, some aspects of the structure of conscious experience, the way we perceive regions of space and durations of time, and our conscious awareness of our own perceptions and events of thinking. (shrink)

According to a criterion of difference for thoughts derived from Frege, two thoughts are different if it is at the same time possible for a rational subject to take conflicting epistemic attitudes toward them. But applying this criterion to perception-based demonstrative thoughts seems to slice thoughts too finely and lead to their proliferation which makes the criterion implausible. I argue that such a proliferation of thoughts is blocked by transforming this criterion into a related one that is shown to be (...) essential in individuating thoughts as they are conceived of in this paper. This has to do with the fact that what makes demonstrative sense synchronically or diachronically the same is the subject’s unreflective taking-for-granted that the object that she is perceiving is a single object that does not require her to keep track of it in the sense supposed by Evans and Campbell. (shrink)

According to Frege, neither demonstratives nor indexicals are singular terms; only a demonstrative together with ‘circumstances accompanying its utterance’ has sense and singular reference. While this view seems defensible for demonstratives, where demonstrations serve as non-verbal signs, indexicals, especially pure indexicals like ‘I’, ‘here’, and ‘now’, seem not to be in need of completion by circumstances of utterance. In this paper I argue on the basis of independent reasons that indexicals are in fact in need of completion; I identify the (...) completers as uses of circumstances of utterance by the speaker; and I show how these uses together with the utterance of indexical sentences express thoughts. The starting point of the paper is a criticism of Kripke’s and Künne’s alternative treatment of indexicals in Frege’s framework. (shrink)

La tesis de este artículo es que tenemosrazones suficientes para considerar losdeícticos un problema para la propuestasemántica de Gottlob Frege. Dividiremosel texto en dos partes: en la primera,expondremos el programa semánt i codel l ógi co al emán por medi o de t rest e s i s e s t r uc t ur ant e s. En l a s e gunda,introduciremos la cuestión de los deícticos,explorando en qué medida representan unproblema para dicho programa. The thesis of this (...) article is that we haveenough reasons to consider indexicals asa problem for Gottlob Frege’s semantic.We will divide the text into two parts: inthe first one, we will expose the semanticprogram of the german logician by meansof three structuring theses. In the secondone, we will introduce the question of theindexicals, exploring how they representa problem for the above mentioned program. (shrink)

In his paper on ‘Frege's Theory of Sense and Reference’ Saul Kripke remarks: “Like the present account, Künne stresses that for Frege times, persons, etc. can be part of the expression of the thought. However, his reading is certainly not mine in significant respects . . .”. On both counts, he is right. As regards the differences between our readings, in some respects I shall confess to having made a mistake, in several others I shall remain stubbornly unmoved. Thus I (...) shall insist on the need for distinguishing Fregean sense from linguistic (lexico-grammatical) meaning, I shall resist Kripke's function-theoretic account of ‘hybrid’ thought-expressions, and I shall deplore his transformation of Gottlob Frege into Gottrand Fressell. As regards this transformation, I shall argue that some of the main points Kripke wants to drive home do not depend on it. (shrink)

In the article I present a new way to integrate occasional expressions into Frege's semantic. The principal thesis of the article is that it is possible to construct an interpretation that is fully Fregean and which is immune to the counterexamples put forward by Perry and Kaplan. According to this interpretation occasional expressions are functional expressions that name first-order functions specified on objects. Such functional expressions taken together with the objects constitute so-called hybrid proper names. I argue that Frege's requirement (...) that functions possess a value for every argument is not well justified for name-forming functions. In the second part of the article I present a proposal for the structural analysis of occasional expressions and I offer a definition of their domains. (shrink)

Does the English demonstrative pronoun 'that' (including complex demonstratives of the form 'that F') have sense and reference? Unlike many other philosophers of language, Frege answers with a resounding 'No'. He held that the bearer of sense and reference is a so-called 'hybrid proper name' (Künne) that contains the demonstrative pronoun and specific circumstances of utterance such as glances and acts of pointing. In this paper I provide arguments for the thesis that demonstratives are hybrid proper names. After outlining why (...) Frege held the hybrid proper name view, I will defend it against recent criticism, and argue that it is superior to views that take demonstrative pronouns to be the bearer of semantic properties. (shrink)

It is a characteristically Fregean thesis that the sense expressed by an expression is the linguistic meaning of that expression. Sense can play this role for Frege since it meets fundamental desiderata for meaning, that it be universal and invariantly expressed and objectively the same for everyone who knows the language. It has been argued,1 however, that, as a general thesis about natural languages, the identi cation of sense and meaning cannot be sustained since it is in con ict with (...) another characteristically Fregean thesis, that sense uniquely determines reference. The argument is quite simple and can be outlined as follows. Assume the two theses we have just stated. (shrink)

Frege held that referring expressions in general, and demonstratives and indexicals in particular, contribute more than just their reference to what is expressed by utterances of sentences containing them. Heck first attempts to get clear about what the essence of the Fregean view is, arguing that it rests upon a certain conception of linguistic communication that is ultimately indefensible. On the other hand, however, he argues that understanding a demonstrative (or indexical) utterance requires one to think of the object denoted (...) in an appropriate way. This fact makes it difficult to reconcile the view that referring expressions are "directly referential" with any view that seeks (as Grice's does) to ground meaning in facts about communication. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against an influential view of Frege's writings on indexical and other context-sensitive expressions, and in favour of an alternative. The centrepiece of the influential view, due to (among others) Evans and McDowell, is that according to Frege, context-sensitiveword-meaning plus context combine to express senses which are essentially first person, essentially present tense and so on, depending on the context-sensitive expression in question. Frege's treatment of indexicals thus fits smoothly with his Intuitive Criterion of difference of (...) sense. On my view, by contrast, Frege stuck by the view which he held in his unpublished 1897 ‘Logic’, namely that the senses expressed by the combination of context-sensitive word-meaning and context could just as well be expressed by means of non-context-sensitive expressions: being first person, present tense and so on are properties, in Frege's view, only of language, not of thought. Given the irreducibility of indexicals – a phenomenon noticed by Castañeda, Perry and others – Frege's treatment of indexicals thus turns out to be inconsistent with the Intuitive Criterion. I argue that Frege was not aware of the inconsistency because he was not aware of the irreducibility of indexicals. This oversight was possible because the source of Frege's interest in indexicals, as inother context-sensitive expressions, differed from that of contemporary theorists. Whereas contemporary theorists are most often interested in indexicals (and in Frege's treatment of them) because they are interested in the indexical versions of Frege's Puzzle and their relation to psychological explanation, Frege himself was interested in them because they pose a prima facie threat to his general conception of thoughts. The only indexical expression Frege's view of which the above account does not cover is ‘I’ insofar as it is associated with ‘special and primitive’ senses, but Frege did not introduce such senses with a view to explaining theirreducibility of ‘I’ his real reason for introducing them remains obscure. (shrink)

I have three main objectives in this essay. First, in chapter 2, I shall put forward and justify what I call worldlessness, by which I mean the following: All truths (as well as falsehoods) are wholly independent of any circumstances, not only time and place but also possible worlds. It follows from this view that whatever is actually true must be taken as true with respect to every possible world, which means that all truths are (in a sense) necessary. However, (...) the account I shall propound is different from what is known in the trade as necessitarianism, i.e. the view that there is only one possible world, viz. the actual one, for the doctrine of the worldlessness of truth values, despite its commitment to the necessity of truths and falsehoods, is quite compatible with the idea of there being other possible worlds. Another important issue in chapter 2, explored in particular in section 2.12, is the claim that there is no real change in the world. Secondly, in chapter 3 I consider the eminent traditional argument for determinism, deriving from Aristotle, namely, logical determinism, i.e. determinism justified by an appeal to the logical principle of bivalence (that all proper statements, including those concerning the future, are either true or false). In this connection I try to show that, (i), the formulation of the conclusion of this argument as "Whatever will happen will happen of necessity" is implausible, at least from the modern point of view, (ii), the formulation as "Whatever will happen will happen inevitably" is more to the point, and (iii), on the basis of the worldless and timeless aspect advocated in chapter 2, this latter formulation is quite harmless, essentially amounting to the trivial statement, "Whatever will happen will happen". Thirdly, in chapter 4 I study theological determinism, or determinism that arises from God's supposed providential control over everything that happens. In this connection, I shall survey some historical accounts of the relation between human free will and determinism (not only theological but also causal determinism); the philosophers the views of whom I shall attend to include Chrysippus, St. Augustine, Boethius and Aquinas. I shall in particular consider G.W. Leibniz' theodicean aspirations, viz. his solution to the problem of evil and, especially, his compatibilist attempts to reconcile human free will with the strictly deterministic flow of actual events. I think it is important to try to explicate Leibniz' ingenious account of these matters, since it seems that it has not been fully appreciated in the literature, not even by contemporary Leibniz scholars (such as B. Mates, R.C. Sleigh, C. Wilson, R.M. Adams and D. Rutherford). In providing the Leibnizian compatibilist solution of the problem of determinism and freedom in chapter 4, I shall utilize the approach of chapter 2. (shrink)

Indexical expressions--e.g., 'I', 'here', 'yesterday', 'this', etc.--pose a serious challenge for a Fregean theory of meaning. A Fregean theory holds that the meaning of an expression is its sense, and that this sense determines the reference of the expression independently of context. The most notable feature of indexicals, however, is their sensitivity to context. David Kaplan and John Perry argue that there can be no Fregean solution to this issue. They assume that the Fregean sense of a singular term is (...) given by a definite description, and argue that this picture cannot work. Kaplan and Perry advance a theory of indexicals according to which the contribution an indexical makes to a proposition is the referent itself, and the meaning of the indexical is a context-sensitive rule associated with it. However, neither sort of meaning accounts for what a hearer understands. Frege's view on 'I' involves a 'special and primitive' mode of presentation of self, so that thoughts involving this mode of presentation are incommunicable. Gareth Evans bases an interpretation on Frege's remarks according to which the notion of sense is understood as a 'way of thinking' of the reference. Frege's remarks on 'I', however, violate his own strictures against psychologism. Hence, the view Evans builds on these remarks fails as an interpretation of Frege and is for the same reason unattractive as an account of indexicals. ;The proper way to construe Frege's expression 'mode of presentation' is the way Frege himself did: namely, as a criterion of identity. The appeal of the direct reference theory rests largely on the seeming transparency of indexical reference; but the idea that we have a language-independent grasp of concrete objects is an illusion. Reference requires a criterion of identity. The meaning of a particular utterance of an indexical is a Fregean sense, which is to be understood as a criterion of identity. ;Frege's few, tentative remarks on indexicals have been persistently neglected in the secondary literature. The writings of Michael Dummett are an exception in this regard. Nevertheless Dummett has never marshalled a full response to criticism of Frege on indexicals. Drawing on Frege's writings and Dummett's commentary on them, it is shown that Frege's antagonists do not present an attractive alternative theory, and that an account of indexicals consistent with Frege's theory of sense and reference can and must be given. (shrink)

It is widely held that oblique contexts and indexical terms present difficulties to Frege's theory of sense. The aim of the present paper is to show that a simple device involving no revision of Frege's semantic doctrine resolves all the alleged difficulties. A simple extension of Frege's notation is proposed which makes it possible to translate oblique contexts into the concept script.

Wodurch wird der Sinn des Prädikats in einer Äußerung des indexikalischen Satzes 'Ich habe Blutgruppe A' zu dem propositionalen Gehalt vervollständigt, den der Sprecher ausdrückt? Durch einen Individualbegriff (unter den der Sprecher fällt)? Durch ein Individuum (den Sprecher in propria persona)! Keiner dieser Lösungsvorschläge für das (von Perry zuerst formulierte) Vervollständigungsproblem ist überzeugend. Für Frege ist der in einer solchen Äußerung verwendete Eigenname hybrid: er besteht aus einem Vorkommnis von 'ich' und den Umständen seiner Äußerung. Der Indikator 'ich' allein ist (...) kein Fregescher Eigenname, sondern ein namenbildender Funktor. Seine semantische Rolle ähnelt der von "token-quotes". (shrink)

'You ask me about the idiosyncrasies of philosophers? There is their lack of historical sense, their hatred of even the idea of becoming, their Egyptianism. They think they are doing a thing honour when they dehistoricize it, sub specie aeternitatis — when they make a mummy of it.'Nietzsche, Twilight of the Idols.

Demonstratives seem to have posed a severe difficulty for Frege’s philosophy of language, to which his doctrine of incommunicable senses was a reaction. In “The Thought,” Frege briefly discusses sentences containing such demonstratives as “today,” “here,” and “yesterday,” and then turns to certain questions that he says are raised by the occurrence of “I” in sentences (T, 24-26). He is led to say that, when one thinks about oneself, one grasps thoughts that others cannot grasp, that cannot be communicated. However, (...) nothing could be more out of the spirit of Frege’s account of sense and thought than an incommunicable, private thought. In the first part of the paper, I explain the problem demonstratives pose for Frege, and explore three ways he might have dealt with it. I argue that none of these ways provides Frege with a solution to his problem consistent with his philosophy of language. The first two are plausible as solutions, but contradict his identification of the sense expressed by a sentence with a thought. The third preserves the identification, but is implausible. In the second part, I suggest that Frege was led to his doctrine of incommunicable senses as a result of some appreciation of the difficulties his account of demonstratives faces, for these come quickly to the surface when we think about “I.” I argue that incommunicable senses won’t help. I end by trying to identify the central problem with Frege’s approach, and sketching an alternative. (shrink)