A power of attorney for healthcare (POAHC) form gives designated individuals legal status to make healthcare decisions when patients are unable to convey their decisions to medical staff. Completion of a POAHC form is crucial in the provision of comprehensive healthcare, since it helps to ensure that patients’ interests, values, and preferences are represented in decisions about their medical treatment. Because increasing numbers of people suffer from debilitating illness and cognitive deficits, healthcare systems may be called upon to navigate the (...) complexities of patients’ care without clear directives from the patients themselves. Hence, the healthcare industry encourages all individuals to complete a POAHC form to ensure that persons who have the patients’ trust are able to act as their surrogate decision makers. However, sometimes POAHC agents, even when they are patients’ trusted agents, lack the capacity to make fully informed decisions that are in the patients’ best interests. We describe designated surrogate decision makers who have impaired or diminished judgment capacity as incapacitated surrogates. Decision making that is obviously flawed or questionable is a significant impediment to providing timely and appropriate care to patients. Moreover, failure to redress these issues in a timely and efficient manner can result in significant costs to an institution and a diminished quality of patient care. The authors offer a legal, ethical, and interdisciplinary framework to help navigate cases of incapacitated surrogates. (shrink)

Structuralism is often associated with a program, in keeping with the Durkheimian tradition, of reducing social norms to a kind of causality. On this reading, Émile Durkheim's collective representations became, in Claude Lévi-Strauss' work, cognitive or logical constraints. If so, then structuralism falls under Wittgenstein's objections to treating rules as causes. What this article shows, however, is that this reading of structuralism is misguided. The necessity and justification of introducing structural methods, first in linguistics and then in anthropology, as well (...) as the general concept of the sign, were rooted in the perception of a problem too often overlooked: that of the characterization of the data in the social and cultural sciences. Just as Saussure showed that the real problem of linguistics is not, what does it mean? but what are the units of language?, so Lévi-Strauss showed that social sciences should not be concerned with the causes of human behaviors but instead with the categorization of actions. In both cases, it appears that an individual action is the actualization of a common practice, habit, or custom that, itself, cannot be reduced to a set of observable features but must be defined by its differential position in a system. Structural anthropology thus leads to a truly ontological problem, which resonates interestingly today, in the context of the “ontological turn.”. (shrink)

In The Order of Things (OT), Foucault recounts the birth and imminent death of Man as an object of study for science and philosophy. Foucault's point is that this very notion of “Man” is dependent on a particular transformation in the history of Being. The mere formulation of this hypothesis opens up a whole series of questions. First, is it true that Man has only become an object of concern in the late eighteenth century. Secondly, if Man has indeed only (...) recently become an object of theoretical interest, is Foucault's description and explanation of this process correct. Thirdly, why should we overcome the concept of “ Man”. Fourthly, in what sense was structuralism deemed to help us overcoming the limitations of this paradigm. In conclusion, if OT has to be overcome, it seems that it should be on grounds slightly different from those usually advanced. (shrink)

Les travaux de Patrice Bret occupent une place centrale en histoire des sciences et en histoire des techniques. Ce livre entend les mettre à l'honneur, qu'il s'agisse de l'histoire des savoirs académiques, du régime techno-politique du XVIIIe siècle, des interactions entre savants et praticiens à l'heure de la chimie lavoisienne, des circulations culturelles et des traductions ou encore de la place des femmes de sciences. Les contributions réunies dans ce volume illustrent, par leur diversité, l'influence de Patrice Bret (...) dans la communauté historienne. Nous proposons ainsi de mettre en perspective son oeuvre en la replaçant dans un contexte intellectuel, scientifique et épistémologique. Un constat s'impose : loin de distinguer entre les approches conceptuelles, érudites et méthodologiques, Patrice Bret joue un rôle de premier plan dans un milieu scientifique qui a choisi de conjuguer le renouvellement des questionnements avec la production d'instruments de recherche et les interrogations de repérage, de dénomination, d'identification, seules à même de contrer les récits téléologiques qui ont longtemps prévalu dans ce domaine. Si l'histoire des sciences et l'histoire des techniques sont de nos jours à l'avant-poste du renouvellement de la science historique, c'est aussi grâce au rôle de passeur de Patrice Bret. (shrink)

I will discuss some aspects of the concept of “point” in quantum gravity, using mainly the tool of noncommutative geometry. I will argue that at Planck’s distances the very concept of point may lose its meaning. I will then show how, using the spectral action and a high momenta expansion, the connections between points, as probed by boson propagators, vanish. This discussion follows closely.

Malgré sa proximité avec le courant cypherpunk, le secteur des cryptomonnaies n’a pas toujours été fidèle à ses valeurs anarchistes, la finance capitaliste investissant toujours davantage dans les cryptomonnaies pour s’approprier ces nouveaux produits financiers. Cette ambiguïté se retrouve dans les DAO, cette nouvelle forme de gouvernance créée par la technologie blockchain. Cette gouvernance décentralisée est en effet tout à la fois l’expérimentation d’une démocratie radicale, bien qu’asociale, et un retour à une ploutocratie qui peut cacher la violence de ses (...) décisions par l’automatisme des mécanismes informatiques. (shrink)

On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll's regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll's regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws. Such a standpoint can (...) take two forms. One can adopt either a broadly externalist model of inference or a sceptical stance. I will attempt, in what follows, to defend a version of internalism which is not affected by the regress. The main strategy will be to show that externalism and scepticism are not satisfying standpoints to adopt with regard to our inferential practice, and then to suggest an internalist alternative. (shrink)

On an internalist account of logical inference, we are warranted in drawing conclusions from accepted premises on the basis of our knowledge of logical laws. Lewis Carroll’s regress challenges internalism by purporting to show that this kind of warrant cannot ground the move from premises to conclusion. Carroll’s regress vindicates a repudiation of internalism and leads to the espousal of a standpoint that regards our inferential practice as not being grounded on our knowledge of logical laws. Such a standpoint can (...) take two forms. One can adopt either a broadly externalist model of inference or a sceptical stance. I will attempt, in what follows, to defend a version of internalism which is not affected by the regress. The main strategy will be to show that externalism and scepticism are not satisfying standpoints to adopt with regard to our inferential practice, and then to suggest an internalist alternative. (shrink)

In this paper, I evaluate recently defended mechanistic accounts of the unity of neuroscience from a metaphysical point of view. Considering the mechanistic framework in general , I argue that explanations of this kind are essentially reductive . The reductive character of mechanistic explanations provides a sufficiency criterion, according to which the mechanism underlying a certain phenomenon is sufficient for the latter. Thus, the concept of supervenience can be used in order to describe the relation between mechanisms and phenomena . (...) Against this background, I show that the mechanistic framework is subject to the causal exclusion problem and faces the classical metaphysical options when it comes to the relations obtaining between different levels of mechanisms . Finally, an attempt to improve the metaphysics of mechanisms is made and further difficulties are pointed out. (shrink)

An adequate analysis of experiences and situations specific to women, especially mothering, requires consideration of women's difference. A focus on women's difference, however, jeopardizes feminism's claims of women's equal individualist subjectivity, and risks recuperating the inequality and oppression of women, especially the view that all women should be mothers, want to be mothers, and are most happy being mothers. This book considers how thinkers including Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva, Nancy Choderow and Adrienne Rich struggle to negotiate this dilemma of (...) difference in analyzing mothering, encompassing the paradoxes concerning embodiment, gender and representation they encounter. Patrice Di Quinzio shows that mothering has been and will continue to be an intractable problem for feminist theory itself, and suggests the political usefulness of an explicitly paradoxical politics of mothering. (shrink)

An adequate analysis of experiences and situations specific to women, especially mothering, requires consideration of women's difference. A focus on women's difference, however, jeopardizes feminism's claims of women's equal individualist subjectivity, and risks recuperating the inequality and oppression of women, especially the view that all women should be mothers, want to be mothers, and are most happy being mothers. This book considers how thinkers including Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva, Nancy Choderow and Adrienne Rich struggle to negotiate this dilemma of (...) difference in analyzing mothering, encompassing the paradoxes concerning embodiment, gender and representation they encounter. Patrice Di Quinzio shows that mothering has been and will continue to be an intractable problem for feminist theory itself, and suggests the political usefulness of an explicitly paradoxical politics of mothering. (shrink)

Authors sometimes treat the promise of de-extinction as a forgone conclusion. But if we take Kasperbauer’s approach and assess the moral acceptability of de-extinction by weighting benefits to species against the suffering of individuals, the promise of de-extinction deserves greater critical attention. Accepting de-extinct individuals as replacements for extinct predecessors assumes species are separate from environment and can be reduced to DNA. In this response to Kasperbauer’s essay, I examine how the acceptability of de-extinction might shift if we instead view (...) species as the persistence of processes—the successful know-how of living in relation to other unfolding processes. (shrink)

The concept of ‘problem’ has been recently promoted by the official academic institutions and put at the centre of a new field of research, self-styled ‘transdisciplinary studies’, in order to provide a foundation to a resolutely transdisciplinary approach to research and thought in general. The paper notes that the same move can be found in Deleuze’s philosophy, which provides us with what the technocratic image of thought advocated by transdisciplinary studies ultimately cannot provide: a positive concept of problems where those (...) are not negative moments but originary and active matrices of thought. It then argues that Deleuze owes this concept to the French epistemological tradition, and more specifically to Bachelard, where it is nothing other than the concept of structure. It ends by explicating what particular version of structuralism Deleuze was thus led to construct in order to account for the role of problems in a radically transdisciplinary account of thought: it is the fact that all structures are multi-structured that grounds the essentially transdisciplinary nature of thought. The fact that we could think differently is precisely what makes us think. (shrink)

The paper argues that a functional reduction of ordinary psychology to neuropsychology is possible by means of constructing fine-grained functional, mental sub-types that are coextensive with neuropsychological types. We establish this claim by means of considering as examples the cases of the disconnection syndrome and schizophrenia. We point out that the result is a conservative reduction, vindicating the scientific quality of the mental types of ordinary psychology by systematically linking them with neuroscience. That procedure of conservative reduction by means of (...) functional sub-types is in principle repeatable down to molecular neuroscience. (shrink)

Critics often take conservationists to task for delivering a constant barrage of bad news without offering a compelling vision of the future. Could recent advances in synthetic biology—an optimistic, forward‐looking field with a can‐do attitude—let conservationists develop a new vision and generate some better news? Synthetic biology and related gene‐editing applications could be used to address threats to species. Genetic interventions might also be used in plants to better protect biodiversity in U.S. rangelands and forests. One possibility has stood out (...) in its ability to capture media attention and the public imagination—recreating extinct species. And perhaps a de‐extinction story could counter the seemingly relentless negativity in biodiversity talk. De‐extinction proponent Stewart Brand writes that resurrecting species could shift the “conservation story … from negative to positive, from constant whining and guilt‐tripping to high fives and new excitement.” So, why do many people in conservation oppose the de‐extinction narrative? This essay is an inquiry into whether there are intrinsic social reactions to these types of conservation solutions that might offset their potential benefits. If genetic tools are to be applied to address conservation issues in a realistic and responsible way, their broader social‐cultural implications deserve far more attention than they have so far received. (shrink)

In his paper "Analyticity", Boghossian defends the notion of analyticity against Quine's forceful criticism. Boghossian's main contention is that nonfactualism about analyticity of the kind advocated by Quine entails scepticism about meaning -- and this shows that Quine's argument can't be right. In other words, Boghossian presents us with a _reductio of Quine's thesis. In this paper, I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian's attempted _reductio fails. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that Quine's (...) argument, properly interpreted, has a more limited scope than is generally believed and that it leaves the door open to non-Platonistic account of meaning. (shrink)

In his paper ‘Analyticity’, Boghossian defends the notion of analyticity against Quine's forceful criticism. Boghossian's main contention is that non‐factualism about analyticity of the kind advocated by Quine entails scepticism about meaning – and this shows that Quine's argument can’t be right. In other words, Boghossian presents us with a reductio of Quine's thesis. In this paper, I present an argument to the effect that Boghossian's attempted reductio fails. In the course of making this case, I will suggest that Quine's (...) argument, properly interpreted, has a more limited scope than is generally believed and that it leaves the door open to non‐Platonistic accounts of meaning. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage se présente comme une introduction d'histoire littéraire et doctrinale au premier volume de l'édition critique des oeuvres de Hugues de Saint-Victor. Il exploite les données fournies par l'étude de la tradition manuscrite du De archa Noe et du Libellus de formatione arche, qui aboutissent à une perception et à une reception renouvellées de ces traîtés. Du premier ouvrage on a tenté, non seulement une histoire, mais une préhistoire: car il a connu un stade oral, celui de collationes dont (...) on aura pu cerner au plus près le contenu avant de reconstituer les procédés rédactionnels du maître victorin. Au cours de ces entretiens du cloître une pédagogie de l'image avait été mise en oeuvre, utilisée conjointement avec la parole. Et de même que la parole donna naissance à une oeuvre écrite (le De archa Noe), de même le dessin qui l'accompagnait est donné sous une forme littéraire, par un écrit qui en livre les modalités concrètes de réalisation (le Libellus). Le statut de cet écrit, longtemps incertain ou atypique, fut originellement celui d'un appendice, distinct mais non disjoint du De archa. Le Libellus est transmis par la tradition manuscrite en deux états: une version brève et une version longue. Le réviseur en fut le victorin lui-même, dont la psychologie d'auteur est ainsi pour une part dévoilée. Un chapitre propose des compléments ou des précisions touchant la datation relative des oeuvres du victorin. L'image employée par maitre Hugues avait été support de ce que l'on pourrait appeler exégèse visuelle. L'histoire du salut, telle qu'elle est représentée dans la figuration de l'arche de Noé, est méditée selon les trois sens scriptuaires médiévaux, qui correspondent en outre à une série d'exercices spirituels, selon la séquence lectio-meditatio-speculatio-contemplatio. Des considérations d'herméneutique (l'image. (shrink)

The paper argues that a functional reduction of ordinary psychology to neuropsychology is possible by means of constructing fine-grained functional, mental sub-types that are coextensive with neuropsychological types. We establish this claim by means of considering as examples the cases of the disconnection syndrome and schizophrenia. We point out that the result is a conservative reduction, vindicating the scientific quality of the mental types of ordinary psychology by systematically linking them with neuroscience. That procedure of conservative reduction by means of (...) functional sub-types is in principle repeatable down to molecular neuroscience. (shrink)

This book explores the mind-body issue from both the perspectives of philosophy of mind and philosophy of science. Starting from the problem of mental causation, it provides an overview of the contemporary metaphysical discussion and argues in favour of the token-identity thesis, as the only position that can account for the causal efficacy of the mental. Showing furthermore that this ontological reductionism is not dissociable from epistemological reductionism, the author applies a new strategy of inter-theoretic reduction, which is compatible with (...) the multiple realizability of mental properties. Using functionally defined sub-types, this account establishes a conservative reduction of psychology to neuroscience, which vindicates both the scientific legitimacy and the theoretical indispensability of psychology. This account is illustrated by several empirical examples borrowed from contemporary neuroscience. (shrink)

This paper explores the presence of late medieval ius commune in Grotius’s thought on the use of force in internal strife and war, based on De iure belli ac pacis. To this end, it examines Grotius’s use of ius commune sources, and considers some similar sources, which he does not actually cite, but which relate to his discussion. By clarifying Grotius’s selection and use of ius commune sources, the paper intends to contribute to the achievement of a double aim: firstly, (...) to determine the place of rebellion and civil war in De iure belli ac pacis, especially in relation to war; and, secondly, to assess Grotius’s approach to the two former issues, particularly with regard to the criteria by which a distinction between rebellion and civil war can be drawn, and to the effects of this distinction. (shrink)

O artigo apresenta uma investigação, no âmago do pensamento de Nicolau Maquiavel, sobre o papel que os conflitos romanos ocorridos entre nobres e plebe tiveram para que a República de Roma se tornasse uma potência militar. O entrechoque de desejos de grandes e povo foi responsável por promover naquela cidade um autêntico vivere civile e libero, mas também foi a principal causa de sua expansão político-militar. Aqui, buscaremos elucidar os motivos que alçaram Roma àquela grandeza. Em um primeiro lugar, as (...) dissensões ocasionaram o aperfeiçoamento constitucional das instituições romanas, encaminhando-as rumo a um estado republicano de governo misto. Com a instituição dos Tribunos da Plebe, o povo alcançava seu reconhecimento político, possibilitando que os exércitos fossem formados pelos próprios cidadãos advindos da plebe. Em segundo lugar, a regulação institucional dos conflitos e o anseio expansionista de Roma foram a razão pela qual a "guarda da liberdade" havia sido confiada à plebe, promovendo um governo popular, medida que permitiu que a República se voltasse para campanhas expansionistas em direção a conquista do império. Em terceiro lugar, reconhecer o conflito e institucionalizá-lo foi um meio para precaver-se dos caprichos da fortuna. Dessa forma, regular institucionalmente os eventos que atribulam a ordem política interna significava dar garantias para que os confrontos externos fossem bem-sucedidos. (shrink)

La période est à la transgression. Transgresser est en effet la nécessité même de l'ordre. Tel est le principe de base de tout pouvoir dès lors qu'il se proclame souverain. Autrement dit, il n'est de pouvoir que transgresseur. Telle est aussi l'énigme de la puissance attribuée à l'État depuis son élaboration principielle par Jean Bodin jusqu'aux énoncés de Carl Schmitt dont la formule "est souverain celui qui décide de la situation exceptionnelle", a permis au XXe siècle de donner un autre (...) contenu, dictatorial, à la question de la souveraineté. L'évolution récente de cette notion prise au piège de la fondation des grands ensembles plurinationaux telle l'Union européenne, réactualise la question de l'adéquation de la souveraineté avec la nation. C'est dans cette logique qu'une archéologie de cette notion paraît indispensable pour évaluer sa double évolution dont la première, transcendante et de type vertical, la fait descendre de la toute-puissance divine jusqu'à son incarnation populaire à travers ses séquences ecclésiales (le souverain pontife), royales, nationales et populaires. Une seconde évolution à partir de la Révolution française, que l'on peut qualifier d'horizontale, l'instaure sur le versant de son incarnation imaginée au sein de la nation, souveraineté nationale, ou au plan de l'universalité des citoyens, souveraineté populaire. Qu'elle soit fondée sur une représentation imaginée collective de soi, la nation, ou sur une identité citoyenne étendue à tous, le peuple, la question de la souverainetén'est soluble que dans cette double identité, nationale et populaire à travers la question de la démocratie qui apparaît ici fondamentale pour restituer au souverain-peuple la légitimité des choix qu'il opère au travers de la délégation de ses compétences aux représentants qu'il se donne. En fin de compte, la souveraineté est avant tout toute-puissante, et ainsi, il n'y a de puissance politique que découlant d'elle. (shrink)

Depuis le célèbre article de Merleau-Ponty, « De Mauss à Claude Lévi-Strauss », la manière dont on évalue le rapport entre ces deux auteurs détermine ou exprime autant d’interprétations historiques du structuralisme et de choix théoriques ou philosophiques quant aux sciences sociales. Cette filiation se voulait une critique: être fidèle à la découverte de Mauss, celle du caractère central de la réciprocité dans la vie sociale, imposait de dépasser la sociologie vers une sémiologie générale. Cet article s’efforce de montrer qu’il (...) ne s’agit pas là, contrairement à l’interprétation subtile qu’en fit Merleau-Ponty, de faire de la réalité sociale un système de points de vue substituables ou de mouvements corrélés de sub-jectivation, mais de montrer que ce sont les « valeurs » qui, du fait de leur nature, de leur ontologie, doivent nécessairement circuler entre plusieurs points de vue exclusifs et complémentaires. Il revisite la célèbre critique de Lévi-Strauss à Mauss sur l’explication de l’obligation de donner par une « force des choses », et replace l’apport de l’anthropologie structurale dans la philosophie de l’esprit contemporaine, là où elle se confronte aux questions ouvertes par la physique sur l’ontologie des objets quantiques. (shrink)

An adequate analysis of experiences and situations specific to women, especially mothering, requires consideration of women's difference. A focus on women's difference, however, jeopardizes feminism's claims of women's equal individualist subjectivity, and risks recuperating the inequality and oppression of women, especially the view that all women should be mothers, want to be mothers, and are most happy being mothers. This book considers how thinkers including Simone de Beauvoir, Julia Kristeva, Nancy Choderow and Adrienne Rich struggle to negotiate this dilemma of (...) difference in analyzing mothering, encompassing the paradoxes concerning embodiment, gender and representation they encounter. Patrice Di Quinzio shows that mothering has been and will continue to be an intractable problem for feminist theory itself, and suggests the political usefulness of an explicitly paradoxical politics of mothering. (shrink)

This investigation of time and space is motivated by gaps in our current understanding: by the lack of definitions, by our failure to appreciate the nature of these entities, by our inability to pin down their properties. The author's approach is based on two key ideas: The first idea is to seek the geo-historical origins of time and space concepts. A thorough investigation of a diversified archaeological corpus, allows him to draft coherent definitions; it furthermore gives clues as to whether (...) time and space were discovered or invented. The second idea is to define the units before trying to define space and time. The results presented here are unexpected: Time and space were not discovered in nature, but they were invented; time is not a phenomenon and space has no materiality; they are only concepts. This runs contrary to the opinion of most scientific and the philosophical authorities, although one would seek in vain for a theoretical validation of the conventional position. This book will provide much food for thought for philosophers and scientists, as well as interested general readers. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage est une réédition numérique d’un livre paru au XXe siècle, désormais indisponible dans son format d’origine.

Despite the important role of the consistency concept in various theoretical frameworks of memory research and its influence on practical investigations it remains unclear as to whether consistency has been firmly grounded as a explanatory factor. Consistency does not determine either a cognitive load or the development of automaticity. However, it does explain the nature of empirical facts that are subsumed by these terms. Consistency is not a psychological factor involved in many important and highly related topics of consciousness research (...) including, implicit learning, and implicit memory. Rather it is the way human beings relate their various mental experiences. (shrink)

Les révolutions de la biologie ont profondément modifié l'homme. Des cellules souches à l'épigénome, des thérapies géniques aux transplantations du microbiote, des interfaces cerveau-machine à l'application de l'intelligence artificielle en matière de santé, Patrice Debré dresse dans ce livre une fresque fascinante des avancées et perspectives de cette transformation possible d'Homo sapiens. A travers elle, le lecteur comprendra les différentes configurations que peut épouser la condition humaine.0Les connaissances de la maîtrise du vivant doivent s'appuyer sur la science et non (...) pas sur les préjugés et les fausses rumeurs! Si la biologie va plus vite que l'homme, elle doit avancer au pas d'un nouvel humanisme."--Page 4 of cover. (shrink)