Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 700-705.

The harmonization of reason and faith was for Averroes the main scientific challenge whereby Aristotle served him as a key philosophical point of reference. Whilst Averroes followed Aristotle to a large extent, Thomas Aquinas attempts to make use of Aristotle's work in a different manner for his own philosophical-theological model whilst still referring to Averroes. For the two philosophers reason and revelation attain a singular synthesis which is, however, not completely tension free. In this study Averroes is praised as a (...) congenial thinker of scholarly topics. Thomas' handling of islamic-arabic philosophy proves an example worthy of attention of intercultural philosophical discourse which can serve contemporary Western-world philosophy projects as a valuable point of reference. (shrink)

Complex modern societies require new ways of political conflict solution, especially concerning environmental conflicts. We distinguish six forms of conflict solution, including those of mediated bargaining and cooperative discourse. If one opts for cooperative discourse, further orientation according to criteria such as fairness, competence, legitimation and efficiency seems to be important. Three procedural steps within cooperative discourse-i.e. establishing relevant value attitudes, expert-hearings, evaluation of options by citizen panels-are sketched and critically discussed, making use of experience from recent discoursive siting panels (...) in Switzerland and Southern Germany. With the exception of a legitimatory deficiency (which may be improved) cooperative discourse and citizen participation in environmental decision-making turn out to be most promising. (shrink)

This essay takes as its point of departure Charles Taylor's contention, in Sources of the Self that literature — and in particular the poetry associated with what he calls'Romantic expressivism' — enables an articulation of constitutive goods that can figureas a viable alternative for the theistic support of our moral commitments. While Taylordeserves credit for his honest attempt to take literature philosophically seriously, his cavalier treatment of the actual texts he invokes to underpin his argument tends to thwart his enterprise. (...) By way of a preliminary, broadly deconstructive reading of a set of texts also used by Taylor , I argue that literary texts simultaneously invite and resist transcendentalising interpretations such as Taylor's. To the extent that literature allows for such interpretationsit is not an alternative for but a non-critical variation of theistic groundings; to the extent that it resists such framing it offers a singular intimation of a critical ethics that is strictly insupportable but not therefore irresponsible. (shrink)

Letters commenting on Hardwig, J "Is There a Duty to Die?" with a reply to those letters by the author.

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 1 Seiten: 305-314.

This paper presents the main aspects of the views of the Tibetan logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge (1109–1169) on argumentation “by consequence” (thal ʼgyur, Skt. prasaṅga) based on his exposition of the topic in the fifth chapter of his Tshad ma yid kyi mun sel and on a parallel excursus in his commentary on Dharmakīrti’s Pramānaviniścaya. It aims at circumscribing primarily the nature and function of consequences (thal ʼgyur/thal ba) for this author—in particular the distinction (...) between “proving consequences” and “refuting consequences”—and the form prescribed for their enunciation in the context of debate. In addition to pointing out differences with the systems adopted by his predecessors, contemporaries and successors, the paper also discusses some of the similarities and differences between Phya pa’s understanding of argumentation by consequence and the notion of reductio ad absurdum in Western logic. (shrink)

This paper attempts to reinterpret asylum theory (1954) propounded by Ortwin Henssler (1923–2017) as a free-space theory of education, as a way of grasping the problematic nature of ‘pedagogical protection.’ The theoretical potential of Henssler’s thought has been more appreciated, accepted, and developed in Japan than in his native Germany. First, I outline Henssler’s theory of asylum and show how his theory has been received and developed in Japan, especially in the fields of historical researches. Secondly, I discuss the (...) possibility of reading Henssler’s thought of asylum as a theory of ‘pedagogical protection.’ Thirdly, I consider whether it is possible to interpret ‘free space’ in education based on the model of asylum. Finally, I delineate some prospects for and challenges involved in connecting the theory of asylum to the theory of education. (shrink)

The Tibetan Buddhist logician Phya pa Chos kyi seng ge devoted a large part of his discussion on argumentation to arguments by consequence. Phya pa distinguishes in his analysis arguments by consequence that merely refute the opponent and arguments by consequence that qualify as probative. The latter induce a correct direct proof which corresponds to the reverse form of the argument by consequence. This paper deals with Phya pa’s classification of probative consequences based on the type of the logical reason (...) involved. I first establish the basis of Phya pa’s classification—the typology of logical reasons in inference-for-oneself—with a special attention to logical reasons consisting in the ‘apprehension of something incompatible [with the negandum]’ and among them the specific case of the ‘apprehension of the cause of something incompatible [with the negandum]’. The treatment of the latter is shown to be instrumental in Phya pa’s classification, as well as in explaining the divergences that occur in the models adopted by his successors, such as gTsang nag pa brTson ʾgrus seng ge and mTshur ston gZhon nu seng ge. Turning to Phya pa’s effective application of this typology when he resorts himself to arguments by consequence, I examine Phya pa’s rephrasing, in the form of four arguments by consequence, of the discussion on the relation between the two realities found in the Saṃdhinirmocanasūtra and relate it to a parallel discussion in an earlier Madhyamaka work by rGya dmar ba Byang chub grags. I compare the variant versions of these four arguments in three Madhyamaka works of Phya pa and show that the differences pertaining to the identification of the type of the logical reason result from apparently insignificant variations in the formulation of each of the arguments. In the conclusion, I discuss the potential philosophical or practical interest of such a classification. (shrink)

Exegesis on Buddhist dialectics and logics.

Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that (...) it is bad. We consider the possibility that a consequenlialist should simply equate wrongness with badness. We reject this on the grounds that there is not a satsifactory way for a consequentialist to account for the badness of actions, as opposed to states of affairs. We explore two concepts of wrongness: to do something wrong is to be blameworthy; and the fact that something is wrong creates a reason not to do it. We argue that the first of these is not available to the consequentialist because of her views on blame, and that the second is just as much a feature of badness as of wrongness. We conclude that the consequentialist can make no sense of the concept of wrongness. (shrink)

Satisficing and maximizing versions of consequentialism have both assumed that rightness is an alI-or-nothing property. We argue thal this is inimical to the spirit of consequentialism, and that, from the point of view of the consequentialist, actions should be evaluated purely in terms that admit of degree. We first consider the suggestion that rightness and wrongness are a matter of degree. If so, this raises the question of whether the claim that something is wrong says any more than that (...) it is bad. We consider the possibility that a consequenlialist should simply equate wrongness with badness. We reject this on the grounds that there is not a satsifactory way for a consequentialist to account for the badness of actions, as opposed to states of affairs. We explore two concepts of wrongness: to do something wrong is to be blameworthy; and the fact that something is wrong creates a reason not to do it. We argue that the first of these is not available to the consequentialist because of her views on blame, and that the second is just as much a feature of badness as of wrongness. We conclude that the consequentialist can make no sense of the concept of wrongness. (shrink)

Resumen El artículo se sitúa ante los nuevos contextos que los jóvenes viven en América Latina, especialmente, considerando las estructuras de corrupción ante lo cual los jóvenes son más vulnerables por su condición de búsqueda de espacios de desarrollo y crecimiento social. Esta situación, plantea nuevos retos para la Pastoral Juvenil latinoamericana teniendo en cuenta que la misma institución eclesial no ha estado ajena a situaciones de corrupción. A través de un análisis documental, desde las Escrituras, pasando por cuatro de (...) las Conferencias Episcopales Latinoamericanas, el artículo pretende desarrollar la tensión entre jóvenes, sociedad y pastoral juvenil, para finalmente presentar una propuesta que se fundamenta en un proceso juvenil de cinco décadas que transita desde una pastoral liberadora a una pastoral regeneradora, donde los sujetos jóvenes rotos buscan renacer en nuestra América Latina.s The article is set against the new contexts that young people live in Latin America, especially considering the structures of corruption lo which young people are more vulnerable because oj their search for spaces of development and social growth. This situation poses new challenges for Latin American Youth Ministry bearing in mind that the Church institution itself has not been unaware of situations of corruption. Through a documentary analysis, from the Scriptures, through four of the Latin American Episcopal Conferences, the article aims to develop the tension between young people, socieíy and youth pastoral, lo finally present a proposal thal is based on a youth process of five decades that It goes from a liberating pastoral to a regenerative pasloral, where the broken young subjects seek to be reborn in our Latin America. (shrink)

In the Middle Age it was tried to show that índex of five predicables that Porfirio proposes in Isagoge was suitable and complete. More recently it is affirmed that chis índex is incomplete, and thal can add a new predicable that also Aristotle would have considered: the accidents per se.

As a consequence of the world’s present ecological crisis, the potential for political protest has increased and a demand for technologies of conflict resolution has arisen. One method, favored by Ortwin Renn, applies the ethics of open discourse to negotiations between politicians, experts, and citizens. The ethical appeal of this method can easily lead to an undervaluation of its shortcomings and risks-a problem which I will try to help amend in this article. Above all, it has to be noticed (...) that the participation in open discourse can tranquilize grass-root protests even in areas where the willingness to engage in a compromise might hurt the true public interest. And who should choose which technology of conflict resolution is applied? The citizens themselves and not just the experts of discourse should probably decide. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make?William EdelglassThe Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Edited by Georges B. J. Dreyfus and Sara L. McClintock. Boston: Wisdom Publications, 2003. Pp. viii + 398.As early as Bhāvaviveka (sixth century), Indian Buddhist doxographers situated important philosophers in schools and sub-schools characterized by adherence to distinct views, thereby providing a coherent, hierarchical presentation of the Buddha's teaching. In (...) Tibet this practice continued and gained considerable importance: the pedagogical and hermeneutical significance of ordering texts occasioned widespread doxographical literary production.1 The doxographical projects, in which the systematic understanding of unchanging 'tenets' was privileged over the singular views of individual authors, were highly contested. Much of the disagreement was due to the multiplicity of interpretations bound to arise during a millennium of intellectual exchange. Doxographical hierarchy set the parameters of intellectual discourse, and thus the classification of tenets was not simply a matter of historical interest. Traditions were constructed in such a way that one's own thought would conform to an acceptable view, to say nothing of the complex relationship between political power and religious doctrine in Tibet. Despite the contested status of Tibetan doxographical categories, the classifications and distinctions that order much contemporary Western scholarship on Mahāyāna Buddhism in India were inherited from Tibet. Until recently, even the best research often uncritically employed dominant Tibetan classifications as basic interpretive categories and was thus able to bring order to an enormous body of literature.The most philosophically significant and vigorously contested classification in Tibetan doxography is the distinction between the Rang rgyud pa and the Thal 'gyur ba (sanskritized by modern scholars as 'Svātantrika' and 'Prāsaṅgika', respectively). The original locus of the discussion is three Indian commentaries on Nāgārjuna's (second century) Mūlamadhyamakakārikā. Buddhapālita (fifth-sixth centuries), in what is the oldest extant commentary on the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā by a known author, followed Nāgārjuna's reductio ad absurdam form of argumentation, leading from the opponent's premise to an untenable consequence (prasaṅga, thal 'gyur). Shortly thereafter Bhāvaviveka claimed that for every prasan.ga argument in Nāgārjuna's text there is an unstated positive argument, and he criticized Buddhapālita for not utilizing the new methods of Buddhist logic to demonstrate the validity of Madhyamaka thought. Bhāvaviveka argued that Mādhyamikas ought to present formal probative (prayoga; sbyor ba) and autonomous (svatantraprayoga; rang rgyud kyi sbyor ba) arguments and argued that inferential reasoning was necessary to establish the Madhyamaka view of emptiness. Candrakīrti (seventh century) then defended Buddhapālita, insisting that prasaṅga arguments were the only fitting method for a Mādhyamika because they do not require the affirmation of inherent nature. Roughly five centuries later, although Madhyamaka had already been divided according to a variety of classifications in India and Tibet, some Tibetan scholars retroactively characterized Bhāvaviveka as the founder of the Svātantrikas and Candrakīrti as the [End Page 415] founder of the Prāsaṅgikas. Tsong kha pa (1357-1419), the most famous proponent of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, believed this debate was about more than methodological or epistemological questions: because autonomous argumentation requires inherently existing objects, even if only conventionally, he claimed that Svātantrikas were crypto-realists who deviated from Nāgārjuna's radical understanding of emptiness.Tsong kha pa's analysis of the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction, and therefore Madhyamaka philosophy in general, came to dominate Western scholarly research. However, in the last few decades there has been considerable exploration of the forces and influences that contributed to the emergence of conflicting Tibetan doxographical systems.2 This research program has been significantly furthered with the publication of The Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika Distinction: What Difference Does a Difference Make? Because the Svātantrika-Prāsaṅgika distinction is a Tibetan conceptual construction based on Indian commentaries, an understanding of the issues involved requires a careful analysis of the Indian sources, an investigation of the growth of the various doxographies in Tibet... (shrink)