The theoretical literature on vertical relationships usually assumes that beliefs about secret contracts take specific forms. In a recent paper, Eguia et al. (Games Econ Behav 109:465–483,2018) propose a new selection criterion that does not impose any restriction on beliefs. In this article, we extend their criterion by generalizing it to risk-averse retailers, and we show that risk aversion modifies the size of the belief subsets that support each equilibrium. We conduct an experiment which revisits that of Eguia et al. (...) (Games Econ Behav 109:465–483,2018). We design a new treatment effect on equilibrium selection depending on the retailers’ risk sensitivity. Experimental results confirm the treatment effect: the more sensitivity there is towards risk, the more the equilibrium played is consistent with passive beliefs. In addition, extending Eguia et al.’s (Games Econ Behav 109:465–483,2018) criterion to risk-averse retailers improves its predictive power on the equilibria played, especially for a population of retailers with moderate to extreme risk aversion. (shrink)

In this paper, we argue that, in order to account for the apparently substantive nature of definitional disputes, a commitment to what we call ‘Socratic essentialism’ is needed. We defend Socratic essentialism against a prominent neo-Carnapian challenge according to which apparently substantive definitional disputes always in some way trace back to disagreements over how expressions belonging to a particular language or concepts belonging to a certain conceptual scheme are properly used. Socratic essentialism, we argue, is not threatened by the possibility (...) that some apparently substantive definitional disputes may turn out to be verbal or conceptual, since this pluralist strategy, in our view, requires a commitment to more, rather than fewer, essences. What is more, a deflationary, metaphysically ‘light-weight’ construal of the essence-ascriptions in question leads to a peculiar conception of the pursuit of metaphysicians as behaving like deceptive (or self-deceived) grammarians pretending to be scientists. Moreover, this deflationary attitude, we argue, spreads beyond metaphysics and philosophy more broadly to apparently substantive definitional disputes in the sciences as well as other in other disciplines, such as art criticism. (shrink)

Social phenomena—quite like mental states in the philosophy of mind—are often regarded as potential troublemakers from the start, particularly if they are approached with certain explanatory commitments, such as naturalism or social individualism, already in place. In this paper, we argue that such explanatory constraints should be at least initially bracketed if we are to arrive at an adequate non-biased description of social phenomena. Legitimate explanatory projects, or so we maintain, such as those of making the social world fit within (...) the natural world with the help of, e.g., collective intentionality, social individualism, and the like, should neither exclude nor influence the prior description of social phenomena. Just as we need a description of the mental that is not biased, for example, by (anti)physicalist constraints, we need a description of the social that is not biased, for example, by (anti)individualist or (anti)naturalist commitments. Descriptive social ontology, as we shall conceive of it, is not incompatible with the adoption of explanatory frameworks in social ontology; rather, the descriptive task, according to our conception, ought to be recognized as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. If social phenomena are, for example, to be reduced to nonsocial (e.g., psychological or physical) phenomena, we need first to understand clearly what the social candidates for the reduction in question are. While such descriptive or naive approaches have been influential in general metaphysics (see Fine 2017), they have so far not been prominent in analytic social ontology (though things are different outside of analytic philosophy, see esp. Reinach (1913). In what follows, we shall outline the contours of a descriptive approach by arguing, first, that description and explanation need to be distinguished as two distinct ways of engaging with social phenomena. Secondly, we defend the claim that the descriptive project ought to be regarded as prior to the explanatory project in the order of inquiry. We begin, in Section 2, by considering two different ways of engaging with mental phenomena: a descriptive approach taken by descriptive psychology and an explanatory approach utilized in analytic philosophy of mind. We take these two ways of approaching the study of the mind to be analogous to the distinction we want to draw in social ontology between a descriptive and an explanatory approach to the study of social phenomena. We consider next, in Section 3, how our approach compares to neighboring perspectives that are familiar to us from general metaphysics and philosophy more broadly, such as Aristotle’s emphasis on “saving the appearances”, Strawson’s distinction between descriptive and revisionary metaphysics, as well as Fine’s contrast between na¨ive and foundational metaphysics. In Section 4, we apply the proposed descriptive/explanatory distinction to the domain of social ontology and argue that descriptive social ontology ought to take precedence in the order of inquiry over explanatory social ontology. Finally, in Section 5, we consider and respond to several objections to which our account might seem to be susceptible. (shrink)

La réforme de la formation en travail social au niveau des hautes écoles spécialisées en Suisse romande tend à gommer les spécificités des métiers historiques du travail social. Elle soulève, par conséquent, la question d’une identité professionnelle non plus liée au métier mais à un champ caractérisé par son hétérogénéité. Sur la base de rapports de formation pratique et de témoignages d’étudiant·es issus de l’analyse des pratiques, nous proposons, dans cette contribution, d’analyser la portée rhétorique du lien dans la constitution (...) d’une communauté de pratique et, par-là, d’une identité professionnelle rattachée à une appartenance au champ du travail social. Comment les discours sur le « lien » peuvent-ils faire « reliance »? (shrink)

Systems of units still fail to attract the philosophical attention they deserve, but this could change with the current reform of the International System of Units. Most of the SI base units will henceforth be based on certain laws of nature and a choice of fundamental constants whose values will be frozen. The theoretical, experimental and institutional work required to implement the reform highlights the entanglement of scientific, technological and social features in scientific enterprise, while it also invites a philosophical (...) inquiry that promises to overcome the tensions that have long obstructed science studies. (shrink)

À partir du témoignage de Sénèque et d’Épictète, le présent article vise à montrer comment les stoïciens rendent compte des réactions involontaires à partir de leur propre psychologie de l’action. Les références faites à Zénon et les allusions à Chrysippe prouvent qu’une théorie des « affections préliminaires » existait dès les débuts du Portique. Le fragment 9 d’Épictète et l’ouverture du deuxième livre du De Ira sont ainsi interprétés comme deux versions concurrentes se rapportant à deux théories subtilement différentes. À (...) partir du matériau textuel emprunté aux premiers stoïciens, on montre l’influence de Zénon sur le De Ira et celle de Chrysippe sur le passage du livre perdu des Entretiens. Cette hypothèse a pour conséquence d’accorder l’exposé de Sénèque à l’orthodoxie stoïcienne défendant un monisme psychologique, et non à la filiation posidonienne, marquée par un dualisme psychologique à tendance platonico-aristotélicienne. (shrink)

Tel qu’Arrien l’indique dans les Entretiens, le cours d’Épictète comprenait une partie technique, où l’apprentissage de la doctrine et des démonstrations était de mise, et une autre, à laquelle nous avons seulement accès, où le maître discutait plus librement avec des interlocuteurs de tous horizons sur des sujets d’ordre spécifiquement éthiques en interprétant la doctrine stoïcienne selon ses propres catégories conceptuelles. Cette deuxième séquence pédagogique interroge directement l’utilité de la première, et engage une réflexion plus large sur l’école philosophique, reprenant (...) la discussion traditionnellement menée entre stoïciens et académiciens sur la scholè. Épictète apporte ainsi un éclairage original sur le rôle, le sens et la fonction des pratiques scolaires à l’époque romaine, dans la perspective stoïcienne d’une vie philosophiquement authentique, en accord avec la nature. (shrink)

On a souvent souligné que l’usage du concept de substance était problématique dans les Méditations, préférant l’exposé plus rigoureux des Principia. À l’encontre de cette interprétation, cet article affirme que le traitement analytique de la substance est non seulement conforme à l’ordre des raisons, mais que s’y développe une aventure révélatrice : si la réflexion sur l’ ego et la cogitatio tend à faire de celui-ci une quasi substance, la formule « ego autem substantia » accomplit dans la Troisième Méditation (...) une substantialisation qui n’est que transitoire. Car cette substantialisation, fondée sur la présomption de l’ ego se concevant comme author, est aussitôt contestée à la lumière de la relation que l’ ego entretient au Dieu infini. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage, qui contient les actes d’une conférence internationale tenue en mars 2008 à l’Université Catholique du Sacré Cœur de Milan, permet de mesurer les progrès réalisés dans la connaissance de Stobée depuis les Doxographi Graeci de Diels, sur les plans tant philologique que doxographique et thématique. L’épaisseur du volume, muni d’un index locorum et d’une bibliographie étoffée, interdit de faire autre chose, dans le cadre d’un compte-rendu, qu’indiquer brièvement les points saillants...

La pensée de Benjamin Constant se distingue par son intemporalité. Ce libéral en tout, né à Lausanne en 1767, est l’un des théoriciens et des praticiens les plus profonds de la philosophie libérale. Il fut l’un des membres illustres du groupe de Coppet, autour de Madame de Staël, dévolu à l’étude et au développement intellectuel de la liberté sous tous ses aspects. Dans la concurrence des idées qui caractérise l’Occident, ses principes demeurent à bien des égards inégalés jusqu’à ce jour. (...) Il fait notamment figure de précurseur de l’école (nobelisée) des choix publics. D’où l’intérêt de s’y replonger à une époque d’incertitudes sur l’avenir des démocraties libérales, que l’étatisme et le collectivisme ont tendanciellement éloignées de leurs vertus. La primauté du droit sur l’arbitraire, le respect des libertés des individus face aux majorités électorales, la garantie de la propriété envers l’excès fiscal et réglementaire, le rôle des constitutions, les questions religieuses, les conceptions même de liberté, d’individualité et de perfectibilité au vingt-et-unième siècle trouvent des points de départ ou des réponses dans la réflexion constantienne. Pour Constant, l’État doit s’articuler autour d’une seule tâche : celle de préserver la liberté individuelle. Et celle-ci ne se divise pas à l’envi. La liberté de conscience et la liberté de pensée sont indissociables de la liberté économique, de la liberté éducative ou encore de la liberté d’opinion et d’expression. Benjamin Constant anticipe et analyse ainsi de nombreux défis auxquels sont confrontées les sociétés contemporaines. Ce volume, qui réunit les contributions thématiques de certains des meilleurs experts de Constant et du libéralisme, offre une perspective appliquée et actuelle sur la philosophie politique à l’origine de l’harmonie et de la prospérité de nos régions. (shrink)

Aborder l’histoire des mathématiques et son enseignement à travers les institutions scientifiques est une démarche dorénavant courante et souvent pertinente. De nombreux travaux l’ont montré en particulier dans le cadre des grandes institutions scientifiques militaires comme l’École polytechnique [Belhoste 1994], [Bret 2002]. L’histoire de l’enseignement et de la diffusion des sciences, en particulier des mathématiques, a été renouvelée depuis une vingtaine d’années tant en France que dans d’autres pays européens ou américains. Par ailleurs, le rôle des écoles militaires dans la (...) production des mathématiques est connu. L’École polytechnique et son école d’application du génie et d’artillerie de Metz ont une place centrale dans le développement des mathématiques au début du xix e siècle [Gillispie 1994]. Il est aussi à noter que les diverses académies militaires ont été créées relativement au même moment : les écoles régimentaires d’artillerie et l’Académie royale militaire de mathémati... (shrink)

La Semaine d'épigraphie créto-mycénienne a été organisée par l'École française d'Athènes du 24 au 28 mars 1998, dans le but de réunir, pour quelques séances de travail, des savants reconnus et de jeunes doctorants spécialisés dans l'étude des écritures linéaires A et B. Chacun des participants a présenté un état de ses recherches personnelles : M.-L. Bech Nosch, L'administration des textes en Crète centrale, hors des séries Lc/Le/Ln ; Chr. Boulotis, Les nouveaux documents en linéaire A d'Akrotiri (Théra) : remarques (...) préliminaires ; P. Carlier, wa-na-ka derechef. Nouvelles réflexions sur les royautés mycéniennes; P. Darcque, Archives réelles, archives virtuelles en linéaire B; H. Landenius Enegren, Some Problems of the Prosopography of Knossos; J. T. Killen, The Pylos Ta Tablets Revisited ; S. Lupack, The Role of the Religious Sector in Mycenaean Economics; J.-P. Olivier, Le syllabaire chyproclassique : un inventaire; M. Perna, Gli ideogrammi dei vasi in lineare A ; Fr. Rougemont, Quelques problèmes liés à l'étude des «collecteurs» dans les tablettes en linéaire B; M.-St. Speciale, Gli antroponimi in lineare B di Cnosso e la Creta del TM II-III; M. Tsipopoulou, The Hieroglyphic Archive at Petras, Siteia ; C. Varias Garcia, Antroponimia micénica en las tablillas de h sene B de Cnoso y en Micenas. (shrink)

Cet article a pour objet d’élucider la disposition philosophique que Lyotard paraît placer au principe de son travail et qu’il appelle signijicativement probité. Cette disposition consiste tout d’abord à offrir à tout ce qui se présente une sensibilité à la singularité du cas, aux différends et aux différences. Mais elle réside également dans un mouvement inverse, dans l’effort d’invention des règles de l’enchaînement entre chacune des occurrences qui auront été respecté en leur spécificite. Dans un premier temps, il s’agira d’analyser (...) la structure de la probité comme possibilité à l’événement et devoir d’enchaînement; puis, en un second moment, nous nous attacherons à I’organisation générale des différentes figures de la probité, en essayant de déterminer la fonction spécifique de la phrase prescriptive. Enfin, nous essayerons de comprendre comment Lyotard oriente la philosophie, par l’intimité qu’il instaure entre la passivité éthique et la réceptivité de la probité, vers une intrication de la prescription et deI’honneur du philosopher, une intrication qui n’est pas sans conséquences politiques.This article attempts to clarify the philosophical disposition which Lyotard seems to establish as the starting point of his work, and which he significantly calls probity. This disposition consists, on the one hand, in showing to all that presents itself a certain sensitivity to the singularity of the case, to disagreements and differences; but it resides also in an opposite movement, to wit, in the task of inventing rules of linkage between all occurrences which will have been respected in their specificity. First, we will analyze the structure of probity as a possibility towards the event and as a duty to link the occurrences. Then, we will consider the overall organization of the different forms of probity, while seeking to determine the specific function of the prescriptive assertion. Finally, we will attempt to understand how Lyotard positions philosophy, in his establishing an intimacy between ethical passivity and the receptivity of probity, towards an intricacy of the prescription and the honor of philosophizing, an intricacy that is not without political consequences. (shrink)

In a famous passage from his Logic, Kant says that three questions ultimately hang on the third one, which is the question of Man. This paper examines the nature of this special link between the very ends of philosophy and the question of Man. Its intent is to show how Culture, as receptive to Ideas, provides both the unity of the different definitions of Man given by Kant, and the condition of possibility for the questioning of philosophy. This distinctive quality (...) of man, according to Kant, is the precondition for Metaphysics, Ethics, and Religion. In the end, philosophy's principle of unity lies not in the limitation or finiteness of man, but in the fact that man, according to Kant, is always in relation with some form of infinity, whether it is that of Ideas (metaphysics), that of the Law (ethics), or that of the ultimate Good (religion). (shrink)

Sixteen years after Kim’s seminal paper offering a welcomed analysis of the emergence concept, I propose in this paper a needed extension of Kim’s work that does more justice to the actual diversity of emergentism. Rather than defining emergence as a monolithic third way between reductive physicalism and substance pluralism, and this through a conjunction of supervenience and irreducibility, I develop a comprehensive taxonomy of the possible varieties of emergence in which each taxon—theoretical, explanatory and causal emergence—is properly identified and (...) defined. This taxonomy has two advantages. First, it is unificatory in the sense that the taxa it contains derive from a common unity principle, which consequently constitutes the very hallmark of emergentism. Second, it can be shown that the emergence taxa it contains are able to meet the challenges that are commonly considered as being the hot topics on the emergentists’ agenda, namely the positivity, the consistency and the triviality/liberality challenges. (shrink)

Cet article souhaite porter un regard réflexif sur le projet scientifique de constitution et d’exploitation d’un grand corpus de français parlé, les Enquêtes sociolinguistiques à Orléans, né à l’aube de la sociolinguistique et qui se développe au tournant méthodologique et épistémologique des digital humanities. Quels objectifs? Quelles données? Quels traitements? Ce sont les questions qui guident la réflexion proposée ici afin d’apporter une contribution à l’élaboration de nouvelles pratiques scientifiques dans une perspective variationniste contemporaine.

Of all the things we do and say, most will never be repeated or reproduced. Once in a while, however, an idea or a practice generates a chain of transmission that covers more distance through space and time than any individual person ever could. What makes such transmission chains possible? For two centuries, the dominant view was that humans owe their cultural prosperity to their powers of imitation. In this view, modern cultures exist because the people who carry them are (...) gifted at remembering, storing and reproducing information. How Traditions Live and Die proposes an alternative to this standard view. What makes traditions live is not a general-purpose imitation capacity. Cultural transmission is partial, selective, often unfaithful. Some traditions live on in spite of this, because they tap into widespread and basic cognitive preferences. These attractive traditions spread, not by being better retained or more accurately transferred, but because they are transmitted over and over. This theory is used to shed light on various puzzles of cultural change and to explain the special relation that links the human species to its cultures. Morin combines recent work in cognitive anthropology with new advances in quantitative cultural history, to map and predict the diffusion of traditions. This book is both an introduction and an accessible alternative to contemporary theories of cultural evolution. (shrink)

Generic stereotypes are generically formulated generalizations that express a stereotype, like “Mexican immigrants are rapists” and “Muslims are terrorists.” Stereotypes like these are offensive and should not be asserted by anyone. Yet when someone does assert a sentence like this in a conversation, it is surprisingly difficult to successfully rebut it. The meaning of generic sentences is such that they can be true in several different ways. As a result, a speaker who is challenged after asserting a generic stereotype can (...) often simply dismiss the objection and maintain that the stereotype is true in a way that is compatible with the challenger’s objection. In this paper, a semantic theory for generics is presented that accounts for this type of defensive shifting in upholding generic stereotypes. This theory is then used to develop two strategies to object more efficiently. The first strategy is to immediately deny that either of the two possible ways in which a generic can be true obtains. The second strategy is to deny the satisfaction of an additional condition that is necessary for a generic sentence to be true. (shrink)

The main purpose of the present chapter is to argue in favor of the claim that, contrary to what is usually and tacitly assumed, organization is not necessary for organicism. To this purpose, I first set up the stage by providing a working characterization of organicism that involves two free parameters, whose variations allow for covering the rich and diverse conceptual landscape of organicism, past and present. In particular, I contend that organization is usually construed as a “mean to an (...) end” notion, or as a tool put at the service of vindicating organicism’s twofold defining assumption, namely, that organisms are determinative entities in their own right, to the effect that (organismic) biology is epistemologically autonomous from physico-chemistry. After a short detour devoted to show that organicism generally collapses on a spectrum of variants of emergentism, I take inspiration from a recent account of emergence called “transformational emergence” to put forward a transformational version of organicism. For such a version meets organicism’s defining standards in a way that is free of any commitment to organization, arguing for its very conceptual soundness finally allows for legitimizing the claim that organicism doesn’t really need organization. (shrink)

Scientists often communicate using generic generalizations, which are unquantified generalizations such as ‘Americans overestimate social class mobility’ or ‘sound waves carry gravitational mass’. In this paper, I explain the role of such generic generalizations in science, based on a novel theory about their characteristic meaning. According to this theory, a scientific generalization of the form ‘Ks are F’ says that F is one property based on which category K qualifies as a scientific kind. Because what it takes to qualify as (...) a scientific kind varies depending on the discipline, what a generic sentence entails also varies. Based on this semantic theory, I discuss the benefits and drawbacks of using generic language in science. (shrink)

Peirce’s attitude towards Hegel seems at first sight ambivalent and difficult to justify in a coherent way. On the one hand, Peirce praises Hegel's concern to show the importance of the three “universal categories”, in particular that of “Thirdness”; on the other hand, he reproaches the author of the Phenomenology of Spirit for reducing the first two categories to the third, but also for yielding to an insidious form of nominalism. The ambition of this paper is to clarify the stakes (...) of Peirce's interpretation of Hegel and to evaluate the relevance of his criticisms, in particular those concerning the ontological status of the possible and of universal categories. (shrink)

Descartes pose à la fois la question de ce que je suis (une substance pensante) et de qui je suis (l’unité de l’âme et du corps). Mais il n’est pas le premier à faire de la pensée l’attribut d’une substance : Olivi avait déjà formulé cette hypothèse. Ainsi, malgré la nouveauté de la problématique, Descartes retrouve les difficultés et les concepts fondamentaux de la théologie scolastique. Cela le conduit même à réhabiliter le concept de forme substantielle, et à s’engager dans (...) le débat christologique. (shrink)

This book presents the framework for a new, comprehensive approach to cognitive science. The proposed paradigm, enaction, offers an alternative to cognitive science's classical, first-generation Computational Theory of Mind. _Enaction_, first articulated by Varela, Thompson, and Rosch in _The Embodied Mind_, breaks from CTM's formalisms of information processing and symbolic representations to view cognition as grounded in the sensorimotor dynamics of the interactions between a living organism and its environment. A living organism enacts the world it lives in; its embodied (...) action in the world constitutes its perception and thereby grounds its cognition. _Enaction_ offers a range of perspectives on this exciting new approach to embodied cognitive science. Some chapters offer manifestos for the enaction paradigm; others address specific areas of research, including artificial intelligence, developmental psychology, neuroscience, language, phenomenology, and culture and cognition. Three themes emerge as testimony to the originality and specificity of enaction as a paradigm: the relation between first-person lived experience and third-person natural science; the ambition to provide an encompassing framework applicable at levels from the cell to society; and the difficulties of reflexivity. Taken together, the chapters offer nothing less than the framework for a far-reaching renewal of cognitive science. Contributors: Renaud Barbaras, Didier Bottineau, Giovanna Colombetti, Diego Cosmelli, Hanne De Jaegher, Ezequiel A. Di Paolo. Andreas K. Engel, Olivier Gapenne, Véronique Havelange, Edwin Hutchins, Michel Le Van Quyen, Rafael E. Núñez, Marieke Rohde, Benny Shanon, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone, Adam Sheya, Linda B. Smith, John Stewart, Evan Thompson. (shrink)

One primary goal for metaphysical theories of natural kinds is to account for their epistemic fruitfulness. According to cluster theories of natural kinds, this epistemic fruitfulness is grounded in the regular and stable co- occurrence of a broad set of properties. In this paper, I defend the view that such a cluster theory is insufficient to adequately account for the epistemic fruitfulness of kinds. I argue that cluster theories can indeed account for the projectibility of natural kinds, but not for (...) several other epistemic operations that natural kinds support. Natural kinds also play a role in scientific explanations and categorizations. A theory of natural kinds can only account for these additional kind-based epistemic practices if it also analyzes their causal structure. (shrink)

Depuis 70 ans, les avocats peuvent créer des structures d’exercice pour exercer en commun la profession d’avocats. Depuis 1990, la grande innovation réside dans la possibilité pour les avocats de structurer leur activité au moyen de sociétés commerciales particulières, les sociétés d’exercice libéral (SEL), dont l’objectif est la préservation de l’indépendance et de la déontologie des professionnels qui exercent en son sein. En 2015, les avocats sont autorisés à avoir recours aux sociétés commerciales de droit commun (SA, SAS, SARL), sauf (...) celles qui confèrent à leur associé la qualité de commerçant (SNC et SCA). Ce dispositif vient d’être réformé par la très récente ordonnance no 2023-77 du 8 février 2023 qui soulève la difficile distinction entre les SEL et les sociétés de droit commun. L’étude de cette distinction met en lumière la caractéristique de ces sociétés, l’exercice en commun d’une profession libérale réglementée, dont le régime juridique est posé par des règles professionnelles d’ordre public. (shrink)

In order to understand the place Max Scheler occupied in the debates of his time around the notion of Europe, this article aims to shed some light on the possible convergences between Max Scheler and Rudolf Eucken, who was his thesis director at Jena. The article begins by outlining Rudolf Eucken's conception of Europe, then it identifies a number of points in common between the two authors, before finally measuring the extent of these convergences in Scheler's conception of Europe. At (...) the end of the discussion, it appears that the reception of Augustinianism and a shared conception of community reveal interesting links between the two authors. This connection will give the twenty-first-century reader a better understanding of the framework in which Max Scheler's reflections on Europe are set. (shrink)

We present a theoretical framework bearing on the evolution of written communication. We analyze writing as a special kind of graphic code. Like languages, graphic codes consist of stable, conventional mappings between symbols and meanings, but (unlike spoken or signed languages) their symbols consist of enduring images. This gives them the unique capacity to transmit information in one go across time and space. Yet this capacity usually remains quite unexploited, because most graphic codes are insufficiently informative. They may only be (...) used for mnemonic purposes or as props for oral communication in real-time encounters. Writing systems, unlike other graphic codes, work by encoding a natural language. This allows them to support asynchronous communication in a more powerful and versatile way than any other graphic code. Yet, writing systems will not automatically unlock the capacity to communicate asynchronously. We argue that this capacity is a rarity in non-literate societies, and not so frequent even in literate ones. Asynchronous communication is intrinsically inefficient because asynchrony constrains the amount of information that the interlocutors share and limits possibilities for repair. This would explain why synchronous, face-to-face communication always fosters the development of sophisticated codes (natural languages), but similar codes for asynchronous communication evolve with more difficulties. It also implies that writing cannot have evolved, at first, for supporting asynchronous communication. (shrink)

In his ‘Theory of Light and Colours’, presented to the Royal Society in November 1801, Thomas Young defended a mechanical explanation of the coloured fringes observed outside of the shadow of an opaque object – the so-called ‘colours by inflection’ – that was based on the hypothesis of an ethereal density gradient surrounding all material bodies. However, two years later, he publicly rejected that hypothesis, without giving much detail of his reasons. Although Geoffrey Cantor has demonstrated the crucial role of (...) mechanical and astronomical arguments in explaining the withdrawal of this fundamental hypothesis long ago, the purpose of this article is to draw deeper attention to a set of experiments performed by David Brewster on the inflection of light, described in a letter he addressed to the Royal Society in January 1802, but was retained by William Herschel, and finally was neither read before the Society, nor published in its Philosophical Transactions. For the hypothesis that will be evaluated here is that these unpublished experiments of Brewster’s were eventually known to Young through the mediation of Herschel, and eventually played a significant role in Young’s rejection of his ether distribution hypothesis. (shrink)

This discussion paper responds to two recent articles in Biology and Philosophy that raise similar objections to cultural attraction theory, a research trend in cultural evolution putting special emphasis on the fact that human minds create and transform their culture. Both papers are sympathetic to this idea, yet both also regret a lack of consilience with Boyd, Richerson and Henrich’s models of cultural evolution. I explain why cultural attraction theorists propose a different view on three points of concern for our (...) critics. I start by detailing the claim that cultural transmission relies not chiefly on imitation or teaching, but on cognitive mechanisms like argumentation, ostensive communication, or selective trust, whose evolved or habitual function may not be the faithful reproduction of ideas or behaviours. Second, I explain why the distinction between context biases and content biases might not always be the best way to capture the interactions between culture and cognition. Lastly, I show that cultural attraction models cannot be reduced to a model of guided variation, which posits a clear separation between individual and social learning processes. With cultural attraction, the same cognitive mechanisms underlie both innovation and the preservation of traditions. (shrink)

Le concept d’émergence est récemment réapparu avec force sur le devant de la scène philosophique. La notion est séduisante, notamment en cela qu’elle permettrait de promouvoir une vision « non réductionniste » du monde naturel. À cet égard, elle se retrouve souvent mobilisée à tort et à travers à tous les niveaux du discours scientifique, de la physique aux sciences cognitives, en passant par la biologie. Mais qu’est-ce que l’émergence exactement ? Est-ce seulement un concept cohérent ? N’y gagnerait-on pas (...) à identifier, derrière l’idée traditionnelle du « tout est plus que la somme des parties », une pluralité de lectures possibles, chacune associée à des limites et des enjeux différents ? (shrink)

The main contention of this article is that current approaches to ontological emergence are not comprehensive, in that they share a common bias that make them blind to some conceptual space available to emergence. In this article, I devise an alternative perspective on ontological emergence called ‘flat emergence’, which is free of such a bias. The motivation is twofold: not only does flat emergence constitute another viable way to fulfill the initial emergentist promise, but it also allows for making sense (...) of some emergence ascriptions that traditional accounts are unable to accommodate. (shrink)

Après l'âge d'or de l'Antiquité, où il constitua un enjeu éminemment politique et philosophique, le motif de l'amitié a perdu de son éclat. Au lendemain de la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, des philosophes s'en emparent à nouveau et le replacent au coeur de l'activité de pensée. Maurice Blanchot le premier, Gilles Deleuze, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, Roland Barthes ensuite; ensemble, ils ont contribué à rendre à l'amitié sa dignité philosophique en faisant de celle-ci non plus une catégorie affective mais conceptuelle, sinon (...) impersonnelle. L'amitié telle que ceux-ci la conçoivent, la représentent et la vivent s'affirme sous le signe d'un refus absolu. Refus d'une identification aux dogmes, aux lois, aux normes, aux présupposés, à la nécessité, et jusqu'à la volonté. Comme si l'amitié n'avait plus aucun contenu positif qu'elle ne coïncidait jamais avec elle-même, qu'elle ne se définissait que contre, dans le rejet de la transcendance, du visage même. Figure de l'Intraitable, le nom d'amitié incarne pour cette génération le pur espace d'affirmation d'une pensée révoltée. (shrink)