Participants were required to switch among randomly ordered tasks, and instructional cues were used to indicate which task to execute. In Experiments 1 and 2, the participants indicated their readiness for the task switch before they received the target stimulus; thus, each trial was associated with two primary dependent measures: (1) readiness time and (2) target reaction time. Slow readiness responses and instructions emphasizing high readiness were paradoxically accompanied by slow target reaction time. Moreover, the effect of task switching on (...) readiness time was an order of magnitude smaller then the (objectively estimated) duration required for task preparation (Experiment 3). The results strongly suggest that participants have little conscious awareness of their preparedness and challenge commonly accepted assumptions concerning the role of consciousness in cognitive control. (shrink)

The ArgumentMicroscopical consideration played a crucial role in German physiology in the period of, grosso modo, 1780–1830. Specifically, a conception of material change was established, according to which all life is grounded in the process of the generation of microscopical forms out of an amorphous, primitive generative substance. Embryological development, tissue growth, and the generation of microorganisms were all considered to be the manifestation of this fundamental developmental process. In contrast to the common historiography, I try to understand Theodor Schwann's (...) 1838 discovery of the cell theory in terms of the epistemological categories he applied to the prevailing conceptions of life and living matter. I argue that Schwann was able to discern cells not because of any superior microscopical methods, but rather as part of his wider investigative endeavor to explicate life processes according to specific causal agents. I argue that Schwann was able to demonstrate the existence of cells only when he considered animal tissues in terms of a causal relation between specific material agents and their effect, that is, the developmental history of tissue. (shrink)

Traditionally, autoimmune disease has been considered to be a case of false recognition; the immune system mistakenly identifies 'self' tissues as foreign, attacking them thus causing damage and malady. Accordingly, the history of autoimmunity is usually told as part ot the history of immunology, that is, of theories and experiments relating to the ability of the immune system to discriminate between self and nonself. This paper challenges this view, claiming that the emergence of the notion of autoimmunity in the 1950s (...) must be considered as part of a long develolpment in thought about pathology throughout the twentieth century, namely the conceptualisaiton of disease as a reactive and self-destructive process. During the first part of the twentieth century this notion became one of the cornerstones of pathology and was increasingly employed for the explanation of the non-infections, slow-burning diseases. Thus, the category of chronic disease had been defined anew, now encompassing all those diseases characterised by a persistent inflammatory process. Inflammation, in turn, was conceived as double-eged physiological mechanism, which was usually the direct mediator of damage, of the essence of disease. The paper also shows how this kind of analysis could emable a unified historical discussion of autoimmunity and allergy, hitherto considered to have distinct conceptual origins. (shrink)

This article publishes the surviving parts of a hitherto unknown Mandaean spell for the protection of a woman from childlessness. The spell has been reconstructed from two fragmentary amulets that were written on lead lamellae in the Sasanid period (MLSC 18 and 19). The overlapping sections of the two amulets show some linguistic differences but are otherwise clearly parallel copies of the same formula. The spell is narrated in the name of Iauar son of Iauar and mentions other figures known (...) from the Mandaean canonical literature. Iauar witnesses the unnatural behavior of the demons, who cause barrenness and infertility by the purloining of male and female seed, and cause infant mortality through acts of demonic violence. The text breaks off at the point where the narrator binds the demons. The formula adds several words to the Mandaic lexicon and a previously unattested form of the 1 c.s. personal pronoun. (shrink)

This article presents a first edition of three Mandaic lamellae from the Schøyen Collection, MS 2087/10, 2087/11, and 2087/18, which are the product of the same scribe and probably constituted a single amulet. The language of the amulet differs from that of other Mandaic texts, and demonstrates unknown or rare phonetic and morphological features. In addition, several lexemes that were hitherto unattested in Mandaic have been identified. Some of the amulet’s formulae are familiar from previously published texts, but in several (...) cases the new textual evidence allows us to improve upon their readings. (shrink)

Like the Theory of Event Coding (TEC), theories of executive functions depict cognition as a flexible and goal-directed system rather than a reflex-like one. Research on task-switching, a dominant paradigm in executive control, has revealed complex and some apparently counterintuitive results. Many of these are readily explained by assuming, like TEC, that cognitive control is based on selecting information from commensurate representations of stimuli and actions.

The article presents Leibniz's preoccupation (in 1675?6) with the difference between the notion of infinite number, which he regards as impossible, and that of the infinite being, which he regards as possible. I call this issue ?Leibniz's Problem? and examine Spinoza's solution to a similar problem that arises in the context of his philosophy. ?Spinoza's solution? is expounded in his letter on the infinite (Ep.12), which Leibniz read and annotated in April 1676. The gist of Spinoza's solution is to distinguish (...) between three kinds of infinity and, in particular, between one that applies to substance, and one that applies to numbers, seen as auxiliaries of the imagination. The rest of the paper examines the extent to which Spinoza's solution solves Leibniz's problem. The main thesis I advance is that, when Spinoza and Leibniz say that the divine substance is infinite, in most contexts it is to be understood in non-numerical and non-quantitative terms. Instead, for Spinoza and Leibniz, a substance is said to be infinite in a qualitative sense stressing that it is complete, perfect and indivisible. I argue that this approach solves one strand of Leibniz's problem and leaves another unsolved. (shrink)

In her stimulating article, Catherine Wilson considers the moment of worlds-making in Leibniz’s philosophy. She raises the following question: “How do possible substances give rise to possible worlds?“ and observes that the moment of world-making is as puzzling as it is interesting. In section 2 of her article, Wilson considers two approaches to the question. According to the first, possible individuals logically precede possible worlds and possible worlds are constituted either by combinations of possible individuals or by mechanically checking the (...) compossibility relations among them. This approach assumes that possible individuals are given and complete and that worlds result from their various conjunctions. On this approach, a world is a set of compossible individuals, i.e., a set of complete individuals whose co-existence is possible. (shrink)

While the definition of the ‘genotype’ has undergone dramatic changes in the transition from classical to molecular genetics, the definition of the ‘phenotype’ has remained for a long time within the classical framework. In addition, while the notion of the genotype has received significant attention from philosophers of biology, the notion of the phenotype has not. Recent developments in the technology of measuring gene-expression levels have made it possible to conceive of phenotypic traits in terms of levels of gene expression. (...) We demonstrate that not only has this become possible but it has also become an actual practice. This suggests a significant change in our conception of the phenotype: as in the case of the ‘genotype’, phenotypes can now be conceived in quantitative and measurable terms on a comprehensive molecular level. We discuss in what sense gene expression profiles can be regarded as phenotypic traits and whether these traits are better described as a novel concept of phenotype or as an extension of the classical concept. We argue for an extension of the classical concept and call for an examination of the type of extension involved. (shrink)

This article analyses the biochemical object of tnf inhibitors from the perspective of living with an autoimmune disease. The author tries to tease out how the concept of immune inhibition is used in tandem with the biochemical object of tnf inhibitors to dominate in defining and narrating what health and disease, normal and pathological, cure and healing can mean in the context of autoimmune bodies. Specifically, and within the ‘pathological’ framework of autoimmune diseases, the pharmacological treatment of tnf inhibition is (...) designed to suppress the ‘overly’ active immune system, thus acting as a negative or suppressing biochemical agent aimed at putting the ‘malfunctioning’ immune system back in balance. As can be seen in the current conjuncture, tnf inhibitors officially —and governmentally— place those taking them in a risk group, as they 'lower' their overall bodily immunity and make them more vulnerable to infectious diseases, while stabilizing their patho-logical, ‘over’-immune uninhibited condition. Part personal narrative of being diagnosed with an autoimmune condition, part speculative autoimmune theory inspired by such a diagnosis, the article ultimately calls for a different form of embodiment that is neither negative nor affirmative, and yet is resistant even to itself. (shrink)

Hjorth introduced a Scott analysis for general Polish group actions, and asked whether his notion of rank satisfies a boundedness principle similar to the one of Scott rank—namely, if the orbit equivalence relation is Borel, then Hjorth ranks are bounded. We answer Hjorth’s question positively. As a corollary we prove the following conjecture of Hjorth—for every limit ordinal \, the set of elements whose orbit is of complexity less than \ is a Borel set.

Stressful life situations can impair or facilitate various cognitive functions. In the present study, the effect of examination stress on students was examined using two executive function tasks, task-switching and the Stroop task, in a between-subject crossover design. Students showed increased anxiety in the 2 week period prior to exams compared to the beginning of the semester, manifested as higher scores on the Spielberger State-Trait Anxiety Scale and a shift to more sympathetic activation when heart rate variability was assessed. During (...) the stressful period, the switching cost was reduced on a spatial task-switching paradigm and reaction times in the Stroop task were faster. This is the first study to show stress-induced facilitation of performance on these executive function tasks. (shrink)

This paper argues that God's immanent causation and Spinoza's account of activity as adequate causation (of finite modes) do not always go together in Spinoza's thought. We show that there is good reason to doubt that this is the case in Spinoza's early Short Treatise on God, Man and His Well‐being. In the Short Treatise, Spinoza defends an account of God's immanent causation without fully endorsing the account of activity as adequate causation that he will later introduce in the Ethics (...) (E3def2). We turn to an examination of how God's immanent causation relates to the activity of finite things in the Ethics. We consider two ways to think about the link between God, seen as immanent cause, and the activity of finite things: namely, in terms of entailment and in terms of production. We argue that the productive model is most promising for understanding the way in which the activity of finite things and God's immanent causality are connected in Spinoza's (mature) philosophy. (shrink)

Inquiry into the felt dimension of experience can be deeply transformative, but more than promoting transcendence it can help us make contact with the intricacy of our open and embodied self-….

We suggest that the network approach to comorbidity (Cramer et al.) is best examined by using longitudinal, multi-measurement, intra-individual data. Employment of time-series analysis to the examination of the generalized anxiety disorder and major depressive disorder comorbidity enables a detailed appreciation of fluctuations and causal trajectories in terms of both symptoms and cognitive vulnerability.

We discuss two inference patterns for inferring the coevolution of two characters based on their properties at a single point in time and determine when developmental interactions can be used to deduce evolutionary order. We discuss the use of the inference patterns we present in the biological literature and assess the arguments’ validity, the degree of support they give to the evolutionary conclusion, how they can be corroborated with empirical evidence, and to what extent they suggest new empirically addressable questions. (...) We suggest that the developmental argument is uniquely applicable to cognitive-cultural coevolution. (shrink)

In notes from 1675-76 Leibniz is using the notion of an infinite number as an illustration of an impossible notion. In the same notes, he is also using this notion in contrast to the possibility of the ‘Ens perfectissumum’ (A.6.3 572; Pk 91; A.6.3 325). I suggest that Leibniz’s concern about the possibility of the notion of ‘the greatest or the most perfect being’ is partly motivated by his observation that similar notions, such as ‘the greatest number’, are impossible. This (...) leads to the question how Leibniz convinced himself that the notion of the greatest number is self-contradictory and that of the greatest being is not. I consider two suggestions, one that stress the difference between beings and numbers and one that stress the difference between two notions of infinity, and conclude that neither of them provides a satisfactory solution to this question. (shrink)

This paper examines the Leibnizian background to Kant's critique of the ontological argument. I present Kant's claim that existence is not a real predicate, already formulated in his pre-critical essay of 1673, as a generalization of Leibniz's reasoning regarding the existence of created things. The first section studies Leibniz's equivocations on the notion of existence and shows that he employs two distinct notions of existence ? one for God and another for created substances. The second section examines Kant's position in (...) his early paper of 1763. My claim is that Kant's view of existence in 1763, namely that it is not a predicate, is strongly related to the logical notion of possibility, formulated by Leibniz and accepted by Kant. (shrink)

This work presents Leibniz's view of infinity and the central role it plays in his theory of living beings. Nachtomy argues that Leibniz employs three degrees of infinity: absolute infinity, which applies to God; maximum or infinite in kind, which applies to created, living beings; and mathematical infinity.

This volume contains essays that examine infinity in early modern philosophy. The essays not only consider the ways that key figures viewed the concept. They also detail how these different beliefs about infinity influenced major philosophical systems throughout the era. These domains include mathematics, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, science, and theology. Coverage begins with an introduction that outlines the overall importance of infinity to early modern philosophy. It then moves from a general background of infinity up through Kant. Readers will learn (...) about the place of infinity in the writings of key early modern thinkers. The contributors profile the work of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibniz, and Kant. Debates over infinity significantly influenced philosophical discussion regarding the human condition and the extent and limits of human knowledge. Questions about the infinity of space, for instance, helped lead to the introduction of a heliocentric solar system as well as the discovery of calculus. This volume offers readers an insightful look into all this and more. It provides a broad perspective that will help advance the present state of knowledge on this important but often overlooked topic. (shrink)

Modern contract law accords considerable significance to the basic assumptions on which a contract is made. It thus takes to heart a failure of a belief whose truthfulness is taken for granted by both parties. Where the failure results from the parties’ mistake at the time of formation, “the contract is voidable by the adversely affected party,” if that mistake “has a material effect on the agreed exchange of performances” and unless that party “bears the risk of the mistake.”1 Where, (...) in turn, the failure of such a basic assumption results from the parties’ erroneous beliefs about future states of the world, a party’s duty to render performance may be discharged if they are not responsible for the supervening impracticability or frustration and “unless the language or the circumstances indicate the contrary.”2. (shrink)

This paper examines a widely accepted reading of monads as the most fundamental elements of reality. Garber [Leibniz – Body, Substance, Monad, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009] argues that simple monads – seen as mind-like atoms without parts and extension – replace the corporeal substance of Leibniz’s middle period. Phemister [Leibniz and the Natural World – Activity, Passivity and Corporeal Substances in Leibniz’s Philosophy, Dordrecht: Springer, 2005] argues that monads figure also at the top as complete corporeal substances. Building on (...) Fichant [‘L’invention métaphysique’ in G.W. Leibniz, Discours de métaphysique suivi de Monadologie et autres textes, edited by Michel Fichant, Paris: Gallimard, 2004], I argue that, for Leibniz, monads function not only as building blocks at the bottom level of composition but also at the top, as grounding the unity and hence the being of complete substances and organic unities. Since organic unities or living beings are seen by Leibniz as natural machines with a nested structure, and since monads are likened to living beings, this would imply that the use of the concept ‘monad’ holds not only at the bottom, and not only at the top, but all over the range between them. (shrink)

Während Leibniz' Vorstellung eines vollständigen Begriffs viel Beachtung fand, blieb die Frage seiner Begründung im Verstand Gottes eher unbeachtet. In diesem Aufsatz versuche ich auf diese Frage einzugehen, indem ich den Zeitraum (ungefähr 1672-1679), in dem Leibniz die Vorstellung eines vollständigen Begriffs als eine explizite Definition eines Individuums entwickelte, näher untersuche. Meine Darstellung über die Begründung des individuellen Begriffs im Verstand Gottes beinhaltet drei Thesen: (1) Leibniz sieht einen inneren Zusammenhang zwischen der Bildung einfacher Begriffe zu zusammengesetzten Begriffen und der (...) Individuation von Begriffen, so daß die Zusammengesetztheit der Begriffe zu ihrer Individualität und Einzigartigkeit beiträgt. (2) Ein individueller Begriff sollte nicht als eine Menge von Prädikaten betrachtet werden, sondern vielmehr als eine einzigartige Struktur von Prädikaten, in der die Reihenfolge der Prädikate eine essentielle Rolle spielt. (3) Ein individueller Begriff sollte nicht nur mit einer einzigartigen Struktur in Verbindung gebracht werden, sondern auch mit einer kombinatorischen Regel, die eine solche einzigartige Struktur von Prädikaten im Verstand Gottes erzeugt. (shrink)

This work develops a Leibnizian approach to possibility by explicating the notions of possibility in general, in chapter 1; possible individuals in chapter 2; possible worlds in chapter 3; and actualization in chapter 4. ;A Leibnizian notion of possibility is characterized against the traditional view of an intelligible realm of thoughts in God's mind. It is understood in terms of self-consistent thoughts and is developed by explicating the notions of thought and of possibility in terms of the combinatorial structure common (...) to both, that is, the construction of complex structures by progressive combinations of simple elements. According to this view, God mentally combines his simple forms, and complex concepts arise in his mind. Such complex and self-consistent concepts are deemed possible. ;Against this general view of possibility, a possible individual is identified with the combinatorial rule that produces a unique and maximally consistent structure of predicates. Such a rule is termed the "production rule" of the individual. The "production rule" unifies a series of predicates and constitutes the individual's logical subject and its principle of individuation. ;Given this view of a possible individual, the notion of a possible world is defined as a set of compossible individuals. It is argued that the compossiblity relation result from the consideration of two individuals in the same logical space. It is suggested that the inner structure of each individual entails its possible connections with other individuals, and that God's consideration of the individuals splits them into compossible sets or possible worlds. ;Finally, it is suggested that actualization involves endowing the "production rule" in God's mind with power of action. The union of a divine prescription of action with power of action yields an active and self-sufficient agent. Upon creation, the agent's activity generates the sequence of predicates prescribed to it by its production rule. ;The explication of the above notions accounts for the conceptual dependence of possible individuals and for the causal independence of created individuals--both of which are indispensable for Leibniz's notion of preestablished harmony. (shrink)

This paper develops some important observations from a recent article by Maria Rosa Antognazza published in The Leibniz Review 2015 under the title “The Hypercategorematic Infinite”, from which I take up the characterization of God, the most perfect Being, as infinite in a hypercategorematic sense, i.e., as a being beyond any determination. By contrast, creatures are determinate beings, and are thus limited and particular expressions of the divine essence. But since Leibniz takes both God and creatures to be infinite, creatures (...) are simultaneously infinite and limited. This leads to seeing creatures as infinite in kind, in distinction from the absolute and hypercategorematic infinity of God. I present three lines of argument to substantiate this point: (1) seeing creatures as entailing a particular sequence of perfections and imperfections; (2) seeing creatures under the rubric of an intermediate degree of infinity and perfection that Leibniz, in 1676, calls “maximum in kind”; and (3) observing that primitive force, a defining feature of created substance, may be seen as infinite in a metaphysical sense. This leads to viewing Leibniz’s use of infinity within a Neoplatonic framework of descending degrees of Being: from the hypercategorematic infinite, identified with the most perfect Being; to the intermediate degree of maximum in kind, identified with creatures; to the lowest degree of entia rationis (or beings of reason), identified with mathematical and abstract entities. (shrink)

In his Pensées, Blaise Pascal gives vivid voice to both the wonder and anxiety that many early modern thinkers felt towards infinity. Contemplating our place between the infinite expanse of space and the infinite divisibility of matter, Pascal writes.

In this article we examine the “phenotype” concept in light of recent technological advances in Genome-Wide Association Studies . By observing the technology and its presuppositions, we put forward the thesis that at least in this case genotype and phenotype are effectively coidentifled one by means of the other. We suggest that the coidentiflcation of genotype-phenotype couples in expression-based GWAS also indicates a conceptual dependence, which we call “co-deñnition.” We note that viewing these terms as codeflned runs against possible expectations, (...) viz., that genotypes and phenotypes could ultimately be expressed independently from one another. In addition, the co-definition of genotypes and phenotypes in this context emphasizes the correlative character of both genotypes and phenotypes in GWAS. (shrink)

In her stimulating article, Catherine Wilson considers the moment of worlds-making in Leibniz’s philosophy. She raises the following question: “How do possible substances give rise to possible worlds?“ and observes that the moment of world-making is as puzzling as it is interesting. In section 2 of her article, Wilson considers two approaches to the question. According to the first, possible individuals logically precede possible worlds and possible worlds are constituted either by combinations of possible individuals or by mechanically checking the (...) compossibility relations among them. This approach assumes that possible individuals are given and complete and that worlds result from their various conjunctions. On this approach, a world is a set of compossible individuals, i.e., a set of complete individuals whose co-existence is possible. (shrink)

In her stimulating article, Catherine Wilson considers the moment of worlds-making in Leibniz’s philosophy. She raises the following question: “How do possible substances give rise to possible worlds?“ and observes that the moment of world-making is as puzzling as it is interesting. In section 2 of her article, Wilson considers two approaches to the question. According to the first, possible individuals logically precede possible worlds and possible worlds are constituted either by combinations of possible individuals or by mechanically checking the (...) compossibility relations among them. This approach assumes that possible individuals are given and complete and that worlds result from their various conjunctions. On this approach, a world is a set of compossible individuals, i.e., a set of complete individuals whose co-existence is possible. (shrink)

Italo Calvino’s Invisible Cities presents a wide array of possible cities—cities whose composition turns on a productive ambiguity of their being described or invented by Marco Polo in his conversations with Kublai Khan. Implicit in this book is also a theory about how all possible cities are composed. The method turns on decomposing a city down to its basic elements and recomposing it in different ways through the imagination. I argue that there is a close affinity between Calvino’s theory of (...) fictional cities and Leibniz’s theory of possible worlds. The main similarity is that both theo­ries are combinatorial—they suppose that possibilities are produced by combination and variation of basic elements. The paper presents Leibniz’s theory of possibility in its metaphysical context and explores the similarity with Calvino’s cities in their literary context. I suggest that there is a rather strong relation between the theory of literary fiction implicit in Invisible Cities and Leibniz’s theory of possibility, in that both define the possible in terms of the conceivable. Indeed, Leibniz often refers to literary examples to substantiate his position, and I argue that this reveals an essential feature of his theory. (shrink)