Abstract

This work develops a Leibnizian approach to possibility by explicating the notions of possibility in general, in chapter 1; possible individuals in chapter 2; possible worlds in chapter 3; and actualization in chapter 4. ;A Leibnizian notion of possibility is characterized against the traditional view of an intelligible realm of thoughts in God's mind. It is understood in terms of self-consistent thoughts and is developed by explicating the notions of thought and of possibility in terms of the combinatorial structure common to both, that is, the construction of complex structures by progressive combinations of simple elements. According to this view, God mentally combines his simple forms, and complex concepts arise in his mind. Such complex and self-consistent concepts are deemed possible. ;Against this general view of possibility, a possible individual is identified with the combinatorial rule that produces a unique and maximally consistent structure of predicates. Such a rule is termed the "production rule" of the individual. The "production rule" unifies a series of predicates and constitutes the individual's logical subject and its principle of individuation. ;Given this view of a possible individual, the notion of a possible world is defined as a set of compossible individuals. It is argued that the compossiblity relation result from the consideration of two individuals in the same logical space. It is suggested that the inner structure of each individual entails its possible connections with other individuals, and that God's consideration of the individuals splits them into compossible sets or possible worlds. ;Finally, it is suggested that actualization involves endowing the "production rule" in God's mind with power of action. The union of a divine prescription of action with power of action yields an active and self-sufficient agent. Upon creation, the agent's activity generates the sequence of predicates prescribed to it by its production rule. ;The explication of the above notions accounts for the conceptual dependence of possible individuals and for the causal independence of created individuals--both of which are indispensable for Leibniz's notion of preestablished harmony.