What is pedagogy, exactly? Merriam-Webster defines it simply as “the art, science, or profession of teaching.” In contemporary academic discourse, however, pedagogy is generally left undefined — with its apparent implicit meanings ranging anywhere from a specific “model for teaching” (e.g., behaviorist or progressivist instruction) to a broadly political philosophy of education in general (most famously, a “pedagogy of the oppressed”). In this paper, Norm Friesen and Hanno Su follow the Continental pedagogical tradition in giving pedagogy a general but (...) explicit definition. They do so by looking at how pedagogy arises both in everyday life and in school as unavoidably ethical activity undertaken primarily for the sake of the young person or child. Such activities, the authors maintain, are structured not so much by processes, methods, and outcomes, but by irresolvable oppositions and the tensions between them. They illustrate this inductively through a series of images and examples — moving gradually from ones involving parenting and early childhood to ones from elementary and secondary schooling. In this way, Friesen and Su show that pedagogy is not so much one or more ideologically focused or evidence-based instructional or psychological approaches to be mastered by a professional or teaching specialist. It is instead an independent but ethically informed practical perspective — one that can (and has) been extended to form a distinctively pedagogical theory and discipline. As such, it is something that is not only a part of our everyday life and culture, but arguably of all human cultures. (shrink)

If speaking of justice were the same thing as banging on the table, then normative discourse could not be taken seriously. The aim of this paper, however, is to vindicate the meaningfulness, and rationality, of normative discourse, and to outline its conditions of possibility. Normative discourse can be understood as if there were, in its structure, different “stages,” or layers. In the transition from one stage to the next, complexity increases. Thus, I shall depict (...) the emergence of normative discourse as a kind of genetic process. (shrink)

Many normative judgments play a practical role in our thought. This paper concerns how their practical role is reflected in language. It is natural to wonder whether the phenomenon is semantic or pragmatic. The standard assumption in moral philosophy is that at least terms which can be used to express “thin” normative concepts – such as 'good', 'right', and 'ought' – are associated with certain practical roles somehow as a matter of meaning. But this view is rarely given (...) explicit defense or even articulation. I’ll consider several versions of the view, and argue that even the most promising among them are problematic. Terms like 'ought' are often used in ways where their customary practical role is absent. Such cases give us a choice: either offer some plausible explanation of why the relevant practical upshots don’t show up in these cases despite featuring in our semantic theory for these expressions, or else don’t build them into that theory. I argue that plausible explanations of the requisite sort aren’t forthcoming in either descriptive semantics or metasemantics for normative language. In closing I briefly consider the prospects for a pragmatic account of the phenomenon and some broader ramifications for metaethics and the philosophy of normativity. (shrink)

In the context of the perpetual reproduction of consumerism in contemporary western societies, the varied and often contradictory principles of third wave feminism have been misunderstood or redefined by the dominant economic discourse of the markets. The lack of homogeneity in the theoretical debates of the third wave feminism seems to be a vulnerable point in the appropriation of its emancipatory ideals by the post-modern consumerist narratives. The beauty norm, particularly, brings the most problematic questions forth in the contemporary (...) feminist dialogues. In this paper I will examine the validity of the concept of empowerment through practices of the body, practices that constitute the socially legitimized identity of women in a consumerist western society. My thesis is that the beauty norm is constructed as a socio-political instrument in order to preserve the old, patriarchal regulation of women’s bodies. Due to the power of invisibility of the new mechanisms of social control and subjection, the consumerist discourse offers the most effective political tool for gender inequality and a complex discussion about free will and emancipation in third wave feminism debates. This delicate theoretical issues question not only the existent social order, but the very political purposes of contemporary feminism. (shrink)

Among scholars and intellectuals, Europe is often celebrated as a postnational space, i.e. a space built around cosmopolitan values rather than culturally and/or ethnically specific factors. This view is also often sketched in normative terms, being rarely based on what people actually think of this post-national Europe. The present article essays to fill this gap, by focusing on two post-national questions: is European identity constructed in the absence of an Other? Does Europe stand for the separation of the `cultural' (...) from the `political'? Relying on qualitative information collected in four regional case studies in Western Europe, this article maintains that the `postnational' view finds expression also among people. Yet, it coexists with a `national' view, which continues to shape how people see themselves and the world, Europe included. The article argues that it is exactly in the interaction, at times contradictory, between these two views that the normative idea of Europe as a post-national space should be analysed. (shrink)

Using birth stories as our object of inquiry, this article examines the ways in which normative discourses about gender, disability and Down syndrome construct the birth stories of three mothers of children with Down syndrome. Their stories are composed of the mothers’ recollections of the first hours after birth as a time when their infants are separated from them and their postpartum needs are ignored. Together, their stories illustrate socio-cultural tropes that position Down syndrome as a dangerous form of (...) the “other” and mothers who give birth to children with Down syndrome as implicated in transgressing cultural norms. (shrink)

Allan Hazlett has recently developed an alternative to the most popular form of anti-realism about epistemic normativity, epistemic expressivism. He calls it “convention-relativism about epistemic discourse”. The view deserves more attention. In this paper, I give it attention in the form of an objection. Specifically, my objection turns on a distinction between inescapable and categorical norms. While I agree with Hazlett that convention-relativism is consistent with inescapable epistemic norms, I argue that it is not consistent with categorical epistemic norms. (...) I then argue that Hazlett's account of a controversial upshot of convention-relativism – namely, that epistemic discourse is not “normative” – should, but does not, adequately address the question of whether epistemic norms are categorical. This leads to a more general discussion of anti-realism in epistemology. (shrink)

The author of the article assumes that any human activity is normative. In the case of philosophical discourse, the normative ground is its indispensable condition, which makes it possible to compare the foundations of philosophy and other scientific disciplines. The norm (law) has, on the one hand, descriptive content related to the description of the noumenal world, and, on the other, prescriptive content related to the counterfactuality of what ought to be. The author emphasizes that the functional (...) aspect of a norm is that it is a means of socially integrating the behavior of people and social groups into a whole. Due to the requirements and requirements of society, social groups are transformed into standards, models, standards of modal and obligatory behavior of the representatives of these groups, performing the function of motivation, orientation and legitimacy. In the second part of the article, the author focuses on a narrower understanding of discourse as speech, dialogue, discussions, which presuppose argumentation based on certain principles, rules, rules and regulations. This interpretation of discourse is peculiar to representatives of the ethics of discourse (K.-O. Apel, Y. Habermas, D. Böhler, V. Kulman, G. Gronke, etc.). Within ethics, principles, imperatives, rules, norms and guidelines both normalize the discourse and substantiate this discourse. Adherence to these principles, rules, norms, and guidelines ensures the normative coherence of discourse as the instance of consensus building on the basis of revealing the performative contradiction of the statement. The normative coherence of discourse is also the basis for its functioning as a meta-institution of justification of social (moral, legal) norms and legitimation of institutions of deliberative democracy in a society of communication and dialogical civilization. Summarizing, the author formulates generalized requirements-guidelines that make it possible to implement the principles, norms and rules of discourse as a meta-institutional instance of society. (shrink)

This paper is an exploration of Habermas’ critical reconstructions of the problematic of rationality via critical theory’s critique of instrumental reason. It brings together several key ideas ranging from the dialectic of instrumental reason and how it leads to epistemological dissonance to the discursive redemption of the normativity of reason. It sketches, as a concluding reflection, whether or not his ideas may be situated within the larger methodological trajectory of Philippine social science research. The paper thus considers the concepts of (...) discourse, discourse ethics and normative validity as crucially important. (shrink)

One of the main vocations of scientific communication is to find points of fruitful theoretical debate - those features of ideas, argumentation, established ideas that can become the source of new intellectual pursuits and conceptual assets. Acceptance of differences of positions, giving impulse to view too commonplace - that served as an impulse for raising the question of the normativity of philosophical discourse.

In Greek inscriptions on cult foundations and regulations from the Hellenistic period onwards it is possible to see the development of an especial religious discourse that includes ancient and new hymnic elements, in addition to new topoi that do not belong to the Hymn tradition. This new religious discourse develops incorporating new features of Greco-Roman religion, strongly influenced by oriental cults, and at the same time well aware of the new philosophical trends that very much pervaded religion at (...) this time. Some sacred inscriptions from the third century BC onwards show precedents of elements well attested in the sacred literary prose of the second century AD. In this paper, the main topoi that constitute this new religious discourse will be analyzed looking specifically at the topoi concerning the founder of the sacred institution or norms, the god or gods worshipped and the worshippers, and also the topoi concerning the content of the foundation norms and the resources used to force the observance of the norms. (shrink)

This book is an attempt to examine the concept of "public interest" and show that, while it has no general, unchanging, descriptive meaning applicable to all policy decisions, it does have a non-arbitrary descriptive meaning which can be determined in particular cases. This meaning can be found through "reasoned discourse" which attempts to relate the anticipated effects of a policy to community values. The concept of public interest is, the author argues, neither a vacuous phrase nor a verbal device (...) useful only for propaganda purposes. The author then attempts to see whether "reason" as it appears in "reasoned discourse" mentioned above can carry the burden assigned to it. In a close examination of what "giving reasons" consists of in the absence of a hierarchy of values, the author shows that it amounts to more than an infinite logical regress. The author admits that there remains an arbitrary element in value judgments which is much smaller and capable of more precise definition than is usually thought). In situations of conflict and diversity of values among reasoning men, the dilemma is resolved by the principle of "authority." Authority itself is required to justify its decisions by giving reasons, but precisely what authority is, beyond this giving of reasons based on somewhat arbitrary values, is not examined.—S. W. (shrink)

In Between Facts and Norms, Jürgen Habermas works out the legal and political implications of his Theory of Communicative Action (1981), bringing to fruition the project announced with his publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962. This new work is a major contribution to recent debates on the rule of law and the possibilities of democracy in postindustrial societies, but it is much more. The introduction by William Rehg succinctly captures the special nature of the work, (...) noting that it offers a sweeping, sociologically informed conceptualization of law and basic rights, a normative account of the rule of law and the constitutional state, an attempt to bridge normative and empirical approaches to democracy, and an account of the social context required for democracy. Finally, the work frames and caps these arguments with a bold proposal for a new paradigm of law that goes beyond the dichotomies that have afflicted modern political theory from its inception and that still underlie current controversies between so-called liberals and civic republicans. The book includes a postscript written in 1994, which restates the argument in light of its initial reception, and two appendixes, which cover key developments that preceded the book. Habermas himself was actively involved in the translation, adapting the text as necessary to make it more accessible to English-speaking readers. (shrink)

The situation of public functioning of philosophy today is being fundamentally changed in comparison with it that even was by the end of last century. The new opportunities of free appeal to philosophical concepts and meanings and their use by every participant of unlimited networks of open communication raise issues of preservation and protection of normative philosophical discourse. The author formulates the need in such normativity as an issue of difference between the context of reproduction and the innovation (...) one or as interdependence of reproduction and elaborating interpretation of normative meanings in philosophy. He takes attention to highlighting the issue of making and recognizing normativity in discourse/communicative practices that could be find out in works of Michel Foucault and Jurgen Habermas. It helps to clarify a role and place of validity claims in communication actions including their meaning in philosophical discourse. Following Habermas’ theory of both linguistic and contextual depending of discourse’s normative meanings the author pays particular attention to meaning creation role of lifeworld as a cultural context that determines communicators’s understanding. It gives an opportunity to point out a principle role of communicator’s position or his or her self-understanding the lifeworld context they embodied. It also makes it possible to demonstrate clear examples of inconsistency of philosophical discourses depending on the position taken by a philosopher as we can meet radical critical position of Roger Scruton in his assessment of many prominent European philosophers’ works. In conclusion the author stresses on dependence of capacity to get added interpretation value in philosophy not only from a level of theoretical knowledge, but from his or her personal appropriation of own horizon of cultural meanings. Following Habermas's theory of linguistic and contextual dependence of normative values of discourse on context, the author draws attention to the role in the creation of values of the lifeworld as a cultural context that determines the participant's understanding. It gives an opportunity to point out a principle role of communicator’s position or his or her understanding the lifeworld context they embodied. It also allows to demonstrate clear examples of inconsistency of philosophical discourses depending on the position taken by a philosopher as we can meet in radical critical position of Roger Scruton within his assessment of many prominent European philosophers’ works. In conclusion the author stresses capacity to get added interpretation value in philosophy depends not only on a level of theoretical knowledge a person owns, but from his or her personal appropriation of own horizon of cultural meanings. (shrink)

The idea of radical pedagogy is connected to the ideals of social justice and democracy and also to the ethical demands of love, care and human flourishing, an emotional context that is sometimes forgotten in discussions of power and inequality. Both this emotional context and also the emphasis on politics can be found in the writings of Paolo Freire, someone who has provided much inspiration for radical pedagogy over the years. However, Freire did not create any explicit ethical foundation for (...) radical pedagogy. This paper argues that, when constructing normative grounds for radical pedagogy, Habermas’s discourse ethics can be an important source, with the caveat that discourse ethics on its own is not sufficient grounding enough where radical pedagogy is concerned. Habermasian critical theory should be supplemented with Axel Honneth’s theory of recognition, as Freire’s focus on love and human flourishing corresponds well with Honneth’s theory’s three modes of recognition: love, rights and respect (solidarity stemming from mutual relations of respect). (shrink)

In Between Facts and Norms Jürgen Habermas works out the legal and political implications of his Theory of Communicative Action, bringing to fruition the project announced with his publication of The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere in 1962. This new work is a major contribution to recent debates on the rule of law and the possibilities of democracy in postindustrial societies, but it is much more.The introduction by William Rehg succinctly captures the special nature of the work, noting that (...) it offers a sweeping, sociologically informed conceptualization of law and basic rights, a normative account of the rule of law and the constitutional state, an attempt to bridge normative and empirical approaches to democracy, and an account of the social context required for democracy. Finally, the work frames and caps these arguments with a bold proposal for a new paradigm of law that goes beyond the dichotomies that have afflicted modern political theory from its inception and that still underlie current controversies between so- called liberals and civic republicans.The book includes a postscript written in 1994, which restates the argument in light of its initial reception, and two appendixes, which cover key developments that preceded the book.Habermas himself was actively involved in the translation, adapting the text as necessary to make it more accessible to English-speaking readers. (shrink)

The following paper considers the extent to which discourse ethics can adequately respond to Habermas' own call for normative justification for the expectation of tolerance. It concludes that discourse ethics is able to lend its services to the flagging fortunes of the idea of toleration, not by seeking to underscore this idea with rationally compelling argumentation,but by offering insights into the possibilities opened up to a life which accepts this principle.

Examines issues in legal and democratic theory found in the work of Jürgen Habermas.

Discursive theories of justice have been questioned for putting forward high-level principles that should nevertheless play a role in practical discourses in which the justice of a claim is at stake. Here, I will critically examine and systematize the main tenets in Rawls’s and Habermas’s discursive theories, and will suggest that the principles of justice (Rawls) and universalization (Habermas) can and play the role of mandates of optimalization in real deliberations on justice.

In this paper, I discuss the relevance of indigenous normativity in advocating a deliberative yet autonomous political institution of the Gran Cordillera. I develop what I call ‘normative intercultural discourse.’ This notion attempts to integrate indigenous normative approaches and deliberative theory judiciously, without eliminating the distinctive character of each. In my opinion, this view can forge a shared understanding in the direction of the proposed Cordillera autonomous region. I argue that it can open the possibility for a (...) stronger Cordillera demos that reflects the Cordilleran aspiration to determining its economic, political, and social affairs. (shrink)

What is the function of concepts pertaining to meaning in socio-linguistic practice? In this study, the authors argue that we can approach a satisfactory answer by displacing the standard picture of meaning talk as a sort of description with a picture that takes seriously the similarity between meaning talk and various types of normative injunction. In their discussion of this approach, they investigate the more general question of the nature of the normative, as well as a range of (...) important topics specific to the philosophy of language. (shrink)

Moral grandstanding is the use of moral talk for self-promotion. Recent philosophical work assumes that people can often accurately identify instances of grandstanding. In contrast, we argue that people are generally unable to reliably recognize instances of grandstanding, and that we are typically unjustified in judging that others are grandstanding as a result. From there we argue that, under most circumstances, to judge others as grandstanders is to fail to act with proper intellectual humility. We then examine the significance of (...) these conclusions for moral discourse. More specifically, we propose that moral discourse should focus on others’ stated reasons and whether their actions manifest respect. (shrink)

This study addresses a range of central topics in Anglo-American philosophy of language.

Why would we argue about taste, norms or morality when we know that these topics are relative to taste preferences, systems of norms or values to which we are committed? Yet, disagreements over these topics are common in our evaluative discourses. I will claim that the motives to discuss rely on our attitudes towards the standard held by the speakers in each domain of discourse, relating different attitudes to different motives –mainly, conviction and correction. These notions of attitudes and (...) motives will allow me to claim that different domains of evaluative discourse have a different distribution of disagreements driven by them. (shrink)

It is argued that understanding is the norm of political discourse, and it is shown why political assertions can be epistemically problematic within a liberal democracy even when asserted knowledgeably.