Lange has argued that contingencies lack the modal strength to be necessity-makers. Here, I argue that Lange’s case turns upon a faulty premise, and that there is no obvious fixes he might pursue. The general upshot is that his argument gives us no reason to think that contingencies could not be necessity-makers after all.

General consensus has it that contingencies lack the requisite modal umph to serve as explanations for the modal status of necessities. The central aim of this paper is to show that this received opinion is incorrect: contingent necessity-makers are in fact possible. To do so, I identify certain conditions the satisfaction of which entail the possibility of contingent necessity-makers. I then argue for two broad instances where these conditions are satisfied. Consequently, the associated necessities in fact (...) have contingent necessity-makers. (shrink)

"Anselm of Canterbury gave the first modal "ontological" argument for God's existence. Yet, despite its distinct originality, philosophers have mostly avoided the question of what modal concepts the argument uses, and whether Anselm's metaphysics entitles him to use them. Here, Brian Leftow sets out Anselm's modal metaphysics. He argues that Anselm has an "absolute", "broadly logical", or "metaphysical" modal concept, and that his metaphysics provides acceptable truth makers for claims in this modality. He shows that his modal argument is (...) committed to the Brouwer system of modal logic, and defends the claim that Brouwer is part of the logic of "absolute" or "metaphysical" modality. He also defends Anselm's premise that God would exist with absolute necessity against all extant objections, providing new arguments in support of it and ultimately defending all but one premise of Anselm's best argument for God's existence"--. (shrink)

The mature Leibniz frequently uses the phrase “moral necessity” in the context of discussing free choice. In this essay I provide a seventeenth century geneology of the phrase. I show that the doctrine of moral necessity was developed by scholastic philosophers who sought to retain a robust notion of freedom while purging bruteness from their systems. Two sorts of bruteness were special targets. The first is metaphysical bruteness, according to which contingent events or states of affairs occur without (...) a sufficient explanation. The second is semantic bruteness according to which a proposition can be true without a truth maker. Denying eithersort of bruteness was thought by some to raise problems for freedom. Defenders of moral necessity thought the notion solved these problems without having to invoke bruteness. (shrink)

The mature Leibniz frequently uses the phrase “moral necessity” in the context of discussing free choice. In this essay I provide a seventeenth century geneology of the phrase. I show that the doctrine of moral necessity was developed by scholastic philosophers who sought to retain a robust notion of freedom while purging bruteness from their systems. Two sorts of bruteness were special targets. The first is metaphysical bruteness, according to which contingent events or states of affairs occur without (...) a sufficient explanation. The second is semantic bruteness according to which a proposition can be true without a truth maker. Denying eithersort of bruteness was thought by some to raise problems for freedom. Defenders of moral necessity thought the notion solved these problems without having to invoke bruteness. (shrink)

Consciousness, as a higher-order cognitive capacity allowing for the explicit representation of abstract mental states, might be the incidental byproduct of design features from other adaptive systems, such as those governing expansion of the frontal lobes in primates. Although such abilities may have occurred entirely by chance, the standardized entrenchment of this representational capacity in human cognition may have posed engineering dilemmas for natural selection in that consciousness could not be easily removed without disrupting the adaptive features of other design (...) solutions. If so, then those organisms saddled with the burden of higher-order representation by the occurrence of these chance events were suddenly assaulted with a series of social problems previously unencountered by any other species in evolutionary history. Such consciousness-based problems constituted enormous selective pressure for generating ancestrally adaptive psychological programs designed to cope with them. Each of these design solutions was, by necessity, generated and progressively pruned over an extraordinarily short span of geological time. In addition, these programs ran into conflict with more ancient primate social adaptations — such as those underlying sexual coercion and violence — that did not evolve to be sensitive to the epistemic positions of others. These mosaic processes have likely resulted in selection for innumerable algorithmic properties driving human-specific behaviors which are both proximally and ultimately caused by consciousness. Consciousness by itself should be classified as maladaptive; what is adaptive are those psychological programs in place to support its incidental and problematic arrival in the human brain. (shrink)

Modal properties are notorious epistemic trouble-makers. That theme is very much at the heart of Michael Rea’s thesis that the Discovery Problem (roughly, the problem of explaining how we know when ascriptions of modal properties are true) has no naturalistic resolution. That might encourage the thought that supernaturalism will somehow resolve the problem. This paper argues that supernaturalism is unlikely to offer a solution of the Discovery Problem.

Background Few empirical studies have been found that explore ethical challenges among persons in high public positions that are responsible for elder care. The aim of this paper was to illuminate the meaning of being in ethically difficult situations related to elder care as experienced by high level decision-makers. Methods A phenomenological-hermeneutic method was used to analyse the eighteen interviews conducted with political and civil servant high level decision-makers at the municipality and county council level from two counties (...) in Sweden. The participants worked at a planning and control as well as executive level and had both budget and quality of elder care responsibilities. Results Both ethical dilemmas and the meaning of being in ethically difficult situations related to elder care were revealed. No differences were seen between the politicians and the civil servants. The ethical dilemmas mostly concerned dealings with extensive care needs and working with a limited budget. The dilemmas were associated with a lack of good care and a lack of agreement concerning care such as vulnerable patients in inappropriate care settings, weaknesses in medical support, dissimilar focuses between the caring systems, justness in the distribution of care and deficient information. Being in ethically difficult situations was challenging. Associated with them were experiences of being exposed, having to be strategic and living with feelings such as aloneness and loneliness, uncertainty, lack of confirmation, the risk of being threatened or becoming a scapegoat and difficult decision avoidance. Conclusion Our paper provides further insight into the ethical dilemmas and ethical challenges met by high level decision-makers', which is important since the overall responsibility for elder care that is also ethically defensible rests with them. They have power and their decisions affect many stakeholders in elder care. Our results can be used to stimulate discussions between high level decision-makers and health care professionals concerning ways of dealing with ethical issues and the necessity of structures that facilitate dealing with them. Even if the high level decision-makers have learned to live with the ethical challenges that confronted them, it was obvious that they were not free from feelings of uncertainty, frustration and loneliness. Vulnerability was revealed regarding themselves and others. Their feelings of failure indicated that they felt something was at stake for the older adults in elder care and for themselves as well, in that there was the risk that important needs would go unmet. (shrink)

Purpose The manner in which people, businesses and governments perform is changing because of the spread of technology. Digitalization of governments can be considered a necessity as we are now entering the era of the Internet-of-Things. The advantages and disadvantages of electronic governments have been examined in several research studies. This study aims to examine the attitudes of decision-makers towards e-government. The research aims are as follows: to determine the problems related with e-government usage, to establish the factors (...) which decrease the usage of e-government services and to propose recommendations for the effective application of e-government practices. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative research has been used for the study. Participants were chosen by the snowball sampling method, and face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with all decision-makers. In-depth interviews are more efficient and enable the acquisition of better qualitative information, in-depth knowledge and statistics, as the distance between the interviewer and interviewee is reduced. Questions asked can be categorized under two sections, where the questions in the first section are related to the decision-maker’s management style/managerial proposition, and in the second section, technological questions are asked in terms of the preferred communication method and the decision-makers’ attitudes towards e-government practices. Findings Decision-makers perceive electronic government to be important, while the level of importance is observed to be different among the decision-makers. Chronic problems exist in many countries, such as nepotism, where the decision-makers have conflicting arguments about e-government and the resulting effect on nepotism. Furthermore, the study also indicates that decision-makers are aware of the importance of mobile government, although they acknowledge that more time is required, as their country is still developing. Electronic voting is also perceived to be important, although the decision-makers believe that security and privacy issues need to be solved before related projects can be initiated. Originality/value This research can be a benchmark study for the decision-makers of small island developing states by means of e-government. The impediments preventing the effective application of e-government practices are also discussed in the study. This study will be useful to highlight the triggers and obstacles for e-government development in the context of a developing country. Internet penetration has increased significantly since the 2000s, and therefore, decision-makers need to consider the shift in citizens’ behaviour, such as the high usage of smartphones and the emergence of the Internet-of-Things. (shrink)

Although the historical‐causal picture of reference Kripke sketches in Naming and Necessity is highly influential, Kripke in fact says very little about what reference is and how it comes about. In this paper I point out that the possibility of asking WH‐questions (i.e. ‘what?’, ‘who?’, ‘which?’) about a sound or inscription pattern (e.g., what does that refer to?) shows that in case of names especially, their reference, if there is one, will be preserved by a causal‐historical chain constituted by (...) transmissions of the (physical) patterns themselves, even in absence of language users or any linguistic intentions. I sketch out a causal‐informational theory of reference, that holds that the causal aspect of refence transmission is due to two‐factors. On the other hand there are informational chains constituted by data transmissions, on the other, also communicational rules by which speakers can interpret the data as information of something are needed. In most part the causal‐informational theory sketched in the paper can be viewed as complementing Kripke’s original causal picture. However, I will argue that Kripke's account of fixing the reference of proper names in ‘initial baptisms’ is inadequate. I will argue that most cases of seemingly fixing the reference via use of a definite description (e.g., the naming of Neptune) in fact presuppose a prior causal‐informational connection to the named object, thus essentially fixing the reference in the same way as in cases of baptism by ostension. I will further argue that in the cases that do not fall into the previous category, the baptism by definite description simply fail to fix any reference. I thus conclude that there is no such thing as fixing the reference of a proper name by definite description. (shrink)

This paper offers the Eastern Mediterranean Region (EMR) viewpoint with Qatar as a case for lasting transformation of health systems. The Qatar case study illustrates the importance of research in the development of health policy. It provides description of a series of projects that have been undertaken in relevant national areas such as autism, dementia, genomics, palliative care and patient safety. The paper discourse draws attention to investment requirement in health research systems to respond to country national health priorities and (...) to strengthen public health policies for improving health and social outcomes by narrowing the gap between research and politics. In short, the discussion highlights the following: i) health is a human right marching towards universal health care, with research underpinning every advance in health care and quality medical services; ii) evidence-based research is emerging as a critical tool to aid policy- and decision-makers; iii) investment necessity in healthcare research/systems to enable responding to a country’s national health priorities and to strengthen public health policies; and iv) need for multi-sectoral involvement of stakeholders to bridge the gap between research and politics. Finally, atypical stakeholders’ engagement and bond to politics is a prerequisite to achieve healthcare objectives and policy success so as to reap the benefits of public health results. (shrink)

A constant refrain in both public discourse and academic research on shale gas development has been the necessity for 'sound science' to govern policy decisions. Rare, however, is the recommendation that effective policy on this topic also include 'sound moral thought'. I argue that: (1) philosophy (particularly moral thought and ethical reasoning) and science must work in tandem for making good policy decisions related to shale gas development, and (2) this realisation is essential for policy-makers, journalists, researchers, educators (...) and the public. By examining the range of normative claims offered within academic and public discourse, the variation in claims across contexts and the degree to which the normative arguments are well-supported, I illustrate the important role increased attention to moral thought could play in forwarding policy construction on shale gas development. Finally, I offer recommendations for how policy-makers, journalists, researchers and educators can more actively acknowledge the importance of both science and moral thought in policy-making related to shale gas development. (shrink)

Theoria, Volume 88, Issue 2, Page 326-347, April 2022.

Maker (philosophy, Clemson U.) contends that Hegel's philosophy is not consummately foundational and absolutist, but rather a nonfoundational philosophy which incorporates some contemporary criticisms of foundationalism without abandoning ...

Quite often, for one or the other purpose, the fact (or phenomenon) that does not exist is presented to the society or individuals as the real, really existing although it (the fact or phenomenon) simply does not exist in the real life. And often the term “fiction” is used to describe such phenomena. Although fiction is considered an inseparable companion of a social life, the question arises what the actual (true) fiction is and whether the use of it in criminal (...) proceeding does not mean an intentional law maker’s (or the person’s applying the law) fraud, deceit directed towards the addressee of the applicable law. Fiction and its impact on criminal proceedings is analyzed in this article. Features, characterizing fiction are discussed here as well. (shrink)

Hegel’s notion of a systematic science requires that his system be autonomous. Any determinative role for extra systemic givens would compromise the system’s autonomy. Nonetheless, the system addresses an extra-systemic given world. It is usually held that the basis for this lies in Hegel’s postulation of a metaphysical idealism that denies the autonomy of that world from conceptual thought. I argue that this interpretation is exactly wrong. Just by beginning in logic as the self-articulation of conceptual autonomy, the system is (...) equipped to conceive of other domains of the real in and as they are thoroughly and radically autonomous from and other than the system itself. A consideration of the end of the logic and the beginning of the philosophy of nature shows how Hegel brings this off and establishes his system as capable of conceptualizing autonomy and otherness because of its thoroughgoing rejection of reductionist metaphysics. (shrink)

Agreeing that Hegel is a realist, I take issue concerning how Hegel establishes realism. Westphal’s Hegel develops a Kantian formal-transcendentalphilosophy founded in an epistemology which establishes how consciousness apprehends a given world. My account contends that Hegel has moved beyondfoundational epistemology, beginning philosophical science in a logic which develops conceptual self-determination independently of and prior to any assumptions about consciousness and world. This methodological idealism leads to metaphysical realism in that the completion of logic’s selfdeterminationnecessitates the subsequent consideration of the (...) nonlogical in the Realphilosophie. This reconciles Hegel’s insistence that philosophy be thoroughly self-grounding with his recognition of a world beyond thought which philosophy conceptualizes realistically as a distinct domain that is neither thought itself nor thought-like. (shrink)

Hegel Society of America members of long standing will remember that The Owl first took flight in the summer of 1969 as a newsletter featuring notes of interest to Hegel aficionados — and book reviews. I was then an undergraduate philosophy major, caught up in the heady thrall of Nietzsche mania, and as contemptuously dismissive of that “dead dog” Hegel as any of the epigones Marx denounced. How times have changed! When, in 1982, our Editor told me of his plans (...) to transform The Owl into a full-fledged journal and asked me to take the job of its Book Review Editor, I was a relatively new Ph.D. with an even newer teaching position and an enthusiasm for the importance of Hegel’s philosophy which had first begun to take shape in the fall of 1969, when my philosophical education temporarily shifted to Germany. I am still at the same university as in 1982, still handling the book reviews for The Owl, and still as enthusiastic about Hegel as before, if not more so. (shrink)

Since its emergence in Marx by way of German idealism, what has come to be known as critical theory has remained powerfully appealing while being plagued with fundamental problems which its more sophisticated proponents have to some extent recognized and wrestled with. I shall connect these problems to a serious equivocation within critical theory concerning the kind of theory it aims to be, an equivocation which can be traced to Marx and which has manifested itself in different ways throughout the (...) tradition of critical theory. My central objective is to indicate that what critical theory sees as its defining theoretical move in fact gives rise to the equivocation and is the ultimate source of its persistent and most vexing problems. (shrink)

Leading scholars consider Hegel's philosophy of art and its contemporary significance.

This paper argues that Hegel and Rorty agree in rejecting foundationalism, but diverge significantly in their critiques of it, with important consequences for their visions of postfoundational discourse. An analysis of the Phenomenology of Spirit indicates how Hegel effects a thoroughly immanent critique of foundationalism. In contrast, the flaws of Rorty’s critique are shown to trap him in a cryptofoundationlism which undermines his efforts to endorse humanism, realism, and pluralism. Hegel’s successful transcendence of foundationalism is disclosed as enabling his postfoundational (...) philosophy which succeeds in providing coherent articulations of the nature and truth of humanism, realism, and pluralism. (shrink)

Agreeing that Hegel is a realist, I take issue concerning how Hegel establishes realism. Westphal’s Hegel develops a Kantian formal-transcendentalphilosophy founded in an epistemology which establishes how consciousness apprehends a given world. My account contends that Hegel has moved beyondfoundational epistemology, beginning philosophical science in a logic which develops conceptual self-determination independently of and prior to any assumptions about consciousness and world. This methodological idealism leads to metaphysical realism in that the completion of logic’s selfdeterminationnecessitates the subsequent consideration of the (...) nonlogical in the Realphilosophie. This reconciles Hegel’s insistence that philosophy be thoroughly self-grounding with his recognition of a world beyond thought which philosophy conceptualizes realistically as a distinct domain that is neither thought itself nor thought-like. (shrink)

In 1807 Hegel published thePhenomenology of Spiritwhich calmly asserted that philosophy had, at long last, ceased to be merely the love of knowing and had finally consummated its lust for truth, giving birth to ‘strenge Wissenschaft’ in logic and the system (Hegel, 1807: 3). In 1944, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno circulated mimeographed copies ofDialectic of Enlightenment, ominously asserting that the same process of reason's self-clarification which Hegel described brings us, not, as he claimed, to truth and freedom, but to (...) barbarism. Somehow critical reflection's efforts to liberate humanity from superstition, darkness, and oppression has lead instead to Auschwitz.A crucial aspect of Horkheimer and Adorno's critique of enlightenment is the notion that enlightenment and its seeming antithesis, myth, are inextricably linked. In thePhenomenologyHegel had already investigated the underlying link between the rationality of the Enlightenment period and faith, its ostensible arational other, in Chapter VI. In various places Horkheimer and Adorno acknowledge the influence of Hegel, and they make suggestive passing references to thePhenomenology. Obviously, their connecting of enlightenment and myth bears more than a family resemblance to Hegel's pairing of enlightenment and faith. Just as Hegel disclosed that enlightenment and faith have more in common than usually thought, Horkheimer and Adorno aim to show that there is an important aspect of enlightenment already in myth and further, that enlightenment has itself fallen back into the essential features of myth it purports to be have overcome. (shrink)