Purpose The manner in which people, businesses and governments perform is changing because of the spread of technology. Digitalization of governments can be considered a necessity as we are now entering the era of the Internet-of-Things. The advantages and disadvantages of electronic governments have been examined in several research studies. This study aims to examine the attitudes of decision-makers towards e-government. The research aims are as follows: to determine the problems related with e-government usage, to establish the factors which decrease (...) the usage of e-government services and to propose recommendations for the effective application of e-government practices. Design/methodology/approach Qualitative research has been used for the study. Participants were chosen by the snowball sampling method, and face-to-face in-depth interviews were conducted with all decision-makers. In-depth interviews are more efficient and enable the acquisition of better qualitative information, in-depth knowledge and statistics, as the distance between the interviewer and interviewee is reduced. Questions asked can be categorized under two sections, where the questions in the first section are related to the decision-maker’s management style/managerial proposition, and in the second section, technological questions are asked in terms of the preferred communication method and the decision-makers’ attitudes towards e-government practices. Findings Decision-makers perceive electronic government to be important, while the level of importance is observed to be different among the decision-makers. Chronic problems exist in many countries, such as nepotism, where the decision-makers have conflicting arguments about e-government and the resulting effect on nepotism. Furthermore, the study also indicates that decision-makers are aware of the importance of mobile government, although they acknowledge that more time is required, as their country is still developing. Electronic voting is also perceived to be important, although the decision-makers believe that security and privacy issues need to be solved before related projects can be initiated. Originality/value This research can be a benchmark study for the decision-makers of small island developing states by means of e-government. The impediments preventing the effective application of e-government practices are also discussed in the study. This study will be useful to highlight the triggers and obstacles for e-government development in the context of a developing country. Internet penetration has increased significantly since the 2000s, and therefore, decision-makers need to consider the shift in citizens’ behaviour, such as the high usage of smartphones and the emergence of the Internet-of-Things. (shrink)

This article investigates the capacity of artificial intelligence (AI) systems to claim the right to self-determination while exploring the prerequisites for individuals or entities to exercise control over their own destinies. The paper delves into the concept of autonomy as a fundamental aspect of self-determination, drawing a distinction between moral and legal autonomy and emphasizing the pivotal role of dignity in establishing legal autonomy. The analysis examines various theories of dignity, with a particular focus on Hannah Arendt’s perspective. Additionally, the (...) article discusses the influence of societal perceptions on AI, illustrating how AI's interactions in social contexts can shape public attitudes and compliance with legal rights. Ultimately, the article emphasizes the necessity of a comprehensive understanding of the relationship between AI, dignity, and the legal framework governing human rights, stressing the significance of recognizing dignity and societal acceptance in determining AI’s right to self-determination. (shrink)

Cet ouvrage donne une place importante à l'idée de la justice selon deux philosophes : selon la théorie de Thomas Hobbes elle est prise dans un cercle entre la loi, le souverain et la violence, tandis que pour Jacques Derrida, elle ne doit pas être limitée à la loi. L'intention de l'auteure, n'est pas d'apporter une nouvelle théorie, mais de montrer qu'une idée philosophique peut avoir une influence en politique ou en droit selon les propositions des Critical Legal Studies.

Falsificationist and confirmationist approaches provide two well-established ways of evaluating generalizability. Yarkoni rejects both and invents a third approach we call neo-operationalism. His proposal cannot work for the hypothetical concepts psychologists use, because the universe of operationalizations is impossible to define, and hypothetical concepts cannot be reduced to their operationalizations. We conclude that he is wrong in his generalizability-crisis diagnosis.

We investigate the explanatory role of epistemic virtue in accounting for the success of science as a social institution that is characterized by predominantly epistemic ends. Several structural explanations of the epistemic success of science that commonly rule out virtue attributions to scientists are explored in reference to a case of collective epistemic vice; namely, the credibility crisis in the social and behavioral sciences. These accounts underline the social structure of science as the chief explanatory factor in its collective success, (...) and endorse a common conclusion, namely that individual virtue is neither necessary nor sufficient for science to be successful. While acknowledging that divergent motivations and behaviors might also serve the collective goals of science, our analysis of the credibility crisis shows that the presence of a significant proportion of epistemically virtuous scientists in a scientific community is a necessary condition for collective epistemic success in a scientific community. (shrink)

This thesis presents a communicative account of personhood that argues for the inseparability of the metaphysical and the practical concepts of a person. It connects these two concepts by coupling the question “what is a person” with the question "how does one become a person". It argues that participation in social interactions that are characterized by mutual recognition and giving-and-taking reasons implied by the practical concept of a person is in fact an ecological and developmental condition for an entity to (...) possess the kind of characteristics and capacities such as reflexive self-consciousness addressed by the metaphysical concept. The chief theoretical contribution of the dissertation research lies, accordingly, in demonstrating that an adequate metaphysical concept of a person has to make reference to the kind of social processes that are necessary for the emergence and development of the distinguishing attributes of persons among other moving, perceiving, desiring and cognizing agents. Methodologically, it undertakes an original philosophical analysis that is enriched by an interdisciplinary investigation of several notions and insights from semiotics, comparative and developmental psychology, cognitive science and anthropology. The main argument of the thesis is that one becomes a person through internally recreating a social, communicative process; namely, that of dialogical transformation of habits. We find the paradigmatic case of this social process in mutual persuasion. The internalization of this process in the form of an inner dialogue cultivates a social self that is in ongoing communication with the embodied, organismic self of uncritically habituated attitudes, convictions and desires. This inner dialogue can be conceived as a temporally extended process of self-persuasion, which is characterized by an ongoing strive for attaining higher degrees of self-control; that is, for achieving a more coherent alignment between our habits and the kind of person we would like to be. It starts with self-interpretation and self-evaluation, and culminates in the formation of higher-order desires that facilitate habit-change and novel habit formation in accordance with certain social, moral, aesthetical or intellectual categories and norms one comes to endorse. For this reason, self-induced, deliberate habit-change is also a process of appropriation or self-appropriation, through which we strive to cultivate habits of feeling, thinking, acting that we can deem more truly ours. The thesis demonstrates that the capacity for engaging in this kind of self-persuasion consists chiefly in the capacities for metasemiosis, perspective-taking, and for cultivating habits of reflexivity. It explicates how all these capacities have a social origin and ultimately a social function by showing that they all presuppose certain higher-order communicative patterns that arose through an evolutionary and cultural history, and develop through the internal reconstruction of these patterns as cognitive-semiotic processes. The thesis concludes that becoming a kind of being who can engage in self-persuasion, thus a person, consists ultimately in internalizing the patterns of communicative social interactions in the form of an ongoing auto-communication. (shrink)

Integrative experiment design assumes that we can effectively design a space of factors that cause contextual variation. However, this is impossible to do so in a sufficiently objective way, resulting inevitably in observations laden with surrogate models. Consequently, integrative experiment design may even deepen the problem of incommensurability. In comparison, one-at-a-time approaches make much more tentative assumptions about the factors excluded from experiment design, hence still seem better suited to deal with incommensurability.

An expert is commonly considered to be somebody who possesses the right kind of knowledge and skills to find out true answers for questions in a domain. However, this common conception that focuses only on an individual’s knowledge and skills is not very useful to understand the epistemically interdependent nature of contemporary scientific expertise, which becomes increasingly more relevant due to the rise of large interdisciplinary research collaborations. The typical scientific expert today relies substantially on complex scientific instruments and numerous (...) other experts in forming expert judgment. Moreover, we have research collaborations where multiple scientists interact in a way that gives rise to distributed cognitive systems, which can act as a single informant. Accordingly, our concept of scientific expertise should not consist only in individual knowledge and skills, but also accommodate epistemic dependence and collective knowledge production. To this aim, this paper proposes a reconstruction of the concept of scientific expertise as informant reliability by building on the virtue-epistemological account of epistemic competences and theories of extended and distributed cognition. Considered in reference to the social epistemic function of expertise, a scientific expert should be conceived as a reliable informant in a scientific domain, which implies that when consulted on matters in that domain they assert competently, honestly, and completely. Competent expert assertion involves the epistemic responsibility to draw on nothing but the highest degree of epistemic competence relevant to the given context. Thus, being a reliable informant may require one to draw on an extended epistemic competence that goes beyond one’s individual competence, or to form supra-individual or group-informants that manifest collectively the kind of complex epistemic competence required for the investigation of certain research questions. (shrink)

The epistemic subject of collective scientific knowledge has been a matter of dispute in recent philosophy of science and epistemology. Following the distributed cognition framework, both collective-subject accounts (most notably by Knorr-Cetina, in _Epistemic Cultures_, Harvard University Press, 1999) as well as no-subject accounts of collective scientific knowledge (most notably by Giere, Social Epistemology 21:313–320, 2007; in Carruthers, Stich, Siegal (eds), _The Cognitive Basis of Science_, Cambridge University Press, 2002a) have been offered. Both strategies of accounting for collective knowledge are (...) problematic from the perspective of mainstream epistemology. Postulating genuinely collective epistemic subjects is a high-commitment strategy with little clear benefit. On the other hand, eliminating the epistemic subject radically severs the link between knowledge and knowers. Most importantly, both strategies lead to the undesirable outcome that in some cases of scientific knowledge there might be no individual knower that we can identify. I argue that distributed cognition offers us a fertile framework for analyzing complex socio-technical processes of contemporary scientific knowledge production, but scientific knowledge should nonetheless be located in individual knowers. I distinguish between the production and possession of knowledge, and argue that collective knowledge is collectively produced knowledge, not collectively possessed knowledge. I then propose an account of non-testimonial, expert scientific knowledge which allows for collectively produced knowledge to be known by individuals. (shrink)

An expert is commonly considered to be somebody who possesses the right kind of knowledge and skills to find out true answers for questions in a domain. However, this common conception that focuses only on an individual’s knowledge and skills is not very useful to understand the epistemically interdependent nature of contemporary scientific expertise, which becomes increasingly more relevant due to the rise of large interdisciplinary research collaborations. The typical scientific expert today relies substantially on complex scientific instruments and numerous (...) other experts in forming expert judgment. Moreover, we have research collaborations where multiple scientists interact in a way that gives rise to distributed cognitive systems, which can act as a single informant. Accordingly, our concept of scientific expertise should not consist only in individual knowledge and skills, but also accommodate epistemic dependence and collective knowledge production. To this aim, this paper proposes a reconstruction of the concept of scientific expertise as informant reliability by building on the virtue-epistemological account of epistemic competences and theories of extended and distributed cognition. Considered in reference to the social epistemic function of expertise, a scientific expert should be conceived as a reliable informant in a scientific domain, which implies that when consulted on matters in that domain they assert competently, honestly, and completely. Competent expert assertion involves the epistemic responsibility to draw on nothing but the highest degree of epistemic competence relevant to the given context. Thus, being a reliable informant may require one to draw on an extended epistemic competence that goes beyond one’s individual competence, or to form supra-individual or group-informants that manifest collectively the kind of complex epistemic competence required for the investigation of certain research questions. (shrink)

While fetal surgery—and pregnancy termination as a possible therapeutic alternative—have been examined in a number of studies, very few have addressed the issues and tensions that arise when prenat...

Large research collaborations constitute an increasingly prevalent form of social organization of research activity in many scientific fields. In the last decades, the concept of distributed cognition has provided a suitable basis for thinking about collective knowledge in the philosophy of science. Karin Knorr-Cetina’s and Ronald Giere’s analyses of high energy physics experiments are the most prominent examples. Although they both conceive the processes of knowledge production in these experiments in terms of distributed cognition, their accounts regarding the epistemic subject (...) of knowledge thus produced are quite different. While Knorr-Cetina argues for an irreducibly collective subject, Giere argues for eliminating the epistemic subject and opting for using the passive voice in describing collectively produced knowledge. Neither of these views are easy to assimilate within an epistemological account, since epistemology traditionally operates within an individualist framework. They both entail that we should deny knowledge to individuals when the processes of knowledge production are distributed. I will argue that epistemology should be extended in a way that can accommodate collectively produced knowledge, but that we would have a serious problem if we deny scientific knowledge to individuals. If the members of a large collaboration cannot be said to know, we have to accept the absurd conclusion that either no one or only a supra-individual entity learns from the most successful research collaborations we have. I will argue instead for conceiving research collaborations in terms of a cognitive system that produces knowledge, which can eventually be possessed by constituent individuals when certain conditions are met. Firstly, the distributed research process should be reliable in producing scientific evidence and secondly, there should be a reliable distributed process of criticism for scrutinizing the reliability of the scientific evidence that is collectively produced. I will analyze both conditions in terms of distributed first-order and second-order justification, where I put forward a reliabilist account of justification that is compatible with epistemic dependence. I will conclude that the notion of justified epistemic dependence enables us to attribute knowledge to individuals when knowledge production is irreducibly social. (shrink)

A descriptive, cross-sectional study aimed to determine the inclination of nursing students towards ethical values and the effects of these values on care behaviours. The data for this study were collected from 466 students studying from May 13–24, 2019. The data were collected using a questionnaire on the sociodemographic characteristics of the students, Inclination to Ethical Values Scale (IEVS), and Caring Behaviors Inventory-24 (CBI-24). In this study, 43.1 per cent of them belonged to families who had a protective attitude. The (...) total mean (SD) IEVS and CBI-24 scores were 63.99 (12.68) and 117.19 (17.95), respectively. The mean item score was 4.88 (0.74). A moderate positive correlation was observed between the inclination of the students towards ethical values and their care behaviours. The general family structure of the nursing students and their participation in an ethics class affected the inclination of the nursing students to ethical values and their care behaviours. This study showed that the ethical values of the students positively affected their care behaviours. (shrink)

BackgroundInformation and communication technology solutions have the potential to support active and healthy aging and improve monitoring and treatment outcomes. To make such solutions acceptable, all stakeholders must be involved in the requirements elicitation process. Due to the COVID-19 situation, alternative approaches to commonly used face-to-face methods must often be used. One aim of the current article is to share a unique experience from the Pharaon project where due to the COVID-19 outbreak alternative elicitation methods were used. In addition, an (...) overview of common functional, quality, and emotional goals identified by six pilot sites is presented to complement the knowledge about the needs of older adults.MethodsOriginally planned face-to-face co-creation seminars were impossible to carry out, and all pilot sites chose alternative requirements elicitation methods that were most suitable in their situation. The elicited requirements were presented in the form of goal models. In one summary goal model, we provide an overview of common functional, quality, and emotional goals.ResultsDifferent elicitation methods were combined based on the digital literacy of the target group and their access to digital tools. Methods applied without digital technologies were phone interviews, reviews of literature and previous projects, while by means of digital technologies online interviews, online questionnaires, and virtual co-creation seminars were conducted. The combination of the methods allowed to involve all planned stakeholders. Virtual and semi-virtual co-creation seminars created collaborative environment comparable to face-to-face situations, while online participation helped to save the time of the participants. The most prevalent functional goals elicited were “Monitor health,” “Receive advice,” “Receive information.” “Easy to use/comfortable,” “personalized/tailored,” “automatic/smart” were identified as most prevalent quality goals. Most frequently occurring emotional goals were “involved,” “empowered,” and “informed.”ConclusionThere are alternative methods to face-to-face co-creation seminars, which effectively involve older adults and other stakeholders in the requirements elicitation process. Despite the used elicitation method, the requirements can be easily transformed into goal models to present the results in a uniform way. The common requirements across different pilots provided a strong foundation for representing detailed requirements and input for further software development processes. (shrink)

In this paper, I present a problem for the realist with respect to the institutional sphere, and suggest a solution. Roughly, the problem lies in a contradiction that arises as soon as institutional contexts are allowed to influence the institutional profile of objects and events not only in the present, but also in the past. If such “retroactive enactments” are effective, in order to avoid contradiction the realist seems to have to accept the unpleasant conclusion that institutions can create a (...) past that has never been present. I will defend a solution which involves a distinction between temporal and atemporal types of institutional kinds that has, I maintain, independent interest. (shrink)

İran’ın kuzeybatısında İslam coğrafya âlimlerinin Cibâl olarak tavsif ettikleri bölgede Sâsânîler döneminde kurulan Kazvin, İslâm orduları tarafından bölgede ele geçirilen ilk İran şehirlerinden biri olmuştur. Kuruluşundan itibaren Deylem cihetine yönelik saldırılarda askerî karargâh amaçlı kullanılan kent, İslâm fetihleriyle de bu hüviyetini korumuştur. Halkın İslâm’ı benimsemesinin zamanı ve niteliği hususunda ihtilaflar olmakla birlikte Kazvin'de kısa süre içinde İslâmlaşma tamamlanmıştı. Garnizon kent olmasından kaynaklı iskân ettirilen Arap askerler, diğer beldelerden sınıra cihada gelen Müslümanlar, âlimler ve şehre ayrı imtiyazlarda bulunan halifeler sebebiyle şehir (...) kısa süre içinde fizikî ve kültürel olarak İslâm şehrine dönüşmüştür. Çalışmamızda örnekleriyle somutlaştıracağımız bu unsurlardan ilk olarak Kazvin fatihi Berâ b. Âzib tarafından şehre yerleştirilen Arap askerlerinden aralarında âlim ve ravilerin de bulunduğu kimselerin askerî faaliyetler dışında şehrin İslâm kültür ve medeniyetine katkılarından bahsedeceğiz. Keza İslâm büyükleri ve halifeler tarafından sınırda cihat etmenin faziletine dair sözleri ile teşvik edilen gönüllü askerleri ve gerek evlerinde gerekse camilerde ilim faaliyetlerini sürdüren âlimleri de bu minvalde zikredeceğiz. Son olarak bu askerler için kale, sûr ve şehrin sınıra yakın bölgelerinde inşa edilen mahalleler ile fiziki ortamı sağlayan, şehirde sürekli cihat ortamı olması hasebiyle halkı vergilerden muaf tutan ve vakıflarla malî destekte bulunan halifeleri ve sair idarî amillleri de kentin İslamlaşmasındaki diğer unsurlar arasında ele alacağız. (shrink)

“Dil politik bir zorunluluk olmanın yanı sıra, iletişim boyutunda bir oluş biçimi olarak estetik bir tutum da varlığa getirir. Bir şeye, dışarıda duran bir şeye gönderme yapma, gönderenin o şeyle olan tutum alışını gösterir. Ağaç ormanda bir anlama bürünürken, bir park alanında ya da yol kenarında başka bir anlama bürünür. Ağaç her zaman bir ağaç değildir; çünkü o ağaç olmaklığını benden bağımsız olarak almış olmasına rağmen, orada bir varlık olarak benim ifade etme biçimime bağlı olarak farklı anlamlara açıktır. Yine de (...) benim olan ağaç ile benim varlığıma gereksinim duymayan aynı ağaç, benim ağaç dediğim şeyle aynı değildir. “ağaç hakkında konuşuyorum,” bir betimleme sunmaz, dahası olmayan ağaç üzerinden bir ağaç var eder. Bu bir anlamada “o bir balık değil, balık resmidir,” türü bir yargıya doğru ilerler.” Bu örnek aslında felsefenin dilsel bir etkinlik olan nitel ya da nicel belirleniminin bize sunduğu ontolojiden bağımsız bir düşünüm olamayacağını açıklar mahiyettedir. (shrink)

Bu çalışma, Suyûtî’nin el-İtkân fî ulûmi’l-Kur’ân isimli kitabının birinci türüyle ilgili bir incelemedir. Bu başlık nüzul zamanı ve mekânı ile ilgili Kur’ân ayetlerinin taksimi konusunda söylenen sözlerin tahlilini içermektedir. Ebu’l-Kâsım el-Hasan b. Muhammed en-Nisabûrî bu türleri et-Tenbîh 'alâ fadl-i ulûmi’l-Kur’ân isimli kitabında 25 türe ayırmıştır. Bu türlerin, Kur’ân ilimlerinin en üstünü ve tefsir ilmine başlamak için şart olduğunu ifade etmiştir. Suyûtî, İtkânı’nda bu türlerin çoğunu müstakil başlıklar altında ele alarak bu görüşe katılmıştır. Bu durum bazı âlimlerin çekingen kaldığı diğer bazılarının (...) abartı ve aşırılık olarak nitelediği, bir kısmının da şüpheye kapı araladığını belirttikleri bir husustur. Bu şüphelerin en önemlilerinden birisi de Kur’ân’ın tarihselliği söylemidir. Zira Mekkî ve Medenî konusunda aktarılanlar, pek çok müsteşrik ve modernistin Kur’ân’ın bütün zaman ve mekânlar için geçerli olmasını reddetmelerinde onların imdadına yetişmiştir. İşte bu araştırma konuyla ilgili en önemli görüş ve söylemlerin problemlerini gidererek çözüm yollarını ortaya koyan bir analiz ve tartışmadır. Ayrıca bu araştırma şüphe yollarının kapatılmasına katkı sağlayacak, Mekkî ve Medenî konusunda geniş bir bakışı açısı sunacaktır. (shrink)

The MS. hie tunc of V. 6 has no friends. L. Mueller's hoc tunc is weak and flat, and L. Rank, Mnemosyne 40. 51, is justly dissatisfied with the hietans of M. Havet's larger and smaller editions, to which the hians of Verg. Aen. 12. 754 lends no sufficient support, as there the dog is opening its mouth before it bites. Add to this that it is by no means certain that Phaedrus would either have used the word or used (...) it in the simple sense of opening the mouth. Rank's own proposal, ‘heu’ tunc, fails also to carry conviction. There is however a word which belongs to our author's vocabulary and is as near to the manuscripts as either of the above, and which hits the sense at which hietans aims. This is rictus. The word is often used of the opened mouths of dogs, Lucr. 5. 1064, Ovid Met. 13. 568. Juvenal 10. 271 sq. ‘canino latrauit rictu,’ and of other animals. That it is appropriate with dimisit ‘let go’ may be seen from the counterpart expression of Martial 1. 48. 1 ‘rictibus his tauros non eripuere magistri.’. (shrink)

The MS. hie tunc of V. 6 has no friends. L. Mueller's hoc tunc is weak and flat, and L. Rank, Mnemosyne 40. 51, is justly dissatisfied with the hietans of M. Havet's larger and smaller editions, to which the hians of Verg. Aen. 12. 754 lends no sufficient support, as there the dog is opening its mouth before it bites. Add to this that it is by no means certain that Phaedrus would either have used the word or used (...) it in the simple sense of opening the mouth. Rank's own proposal, ‘heu’ tunc, fails also to carry conviction. There is however a word which belongs to our author's vocabulary and is as near to the manuscripts as either of the above, and which hits the sense at which hietans aims. This is rictus. The word is often used of the opened mouths of dogs, Lucr. 5. 1064, Ovid Met. 13. 568. Juvenal 10. 271 sq. ‘canino latrauit rictu,’ and of other animals. That it is appropriate with dimisit ‘let go’ may be seen from the counterpart expression of Martial 1. 48. 1 ‘rictibus his tauros non eripuere magistri.’. (shrink)

The Tafsīr al-Muqātil (d. 150/767) is the oldest available complete commentary text. In this respect, it has been a focus of attention. In this tafsīr, the references to the Battle of Badr in the explanation of some Makkī surahs are remarkably numerous. Badr was the first war that the Prophet made with the polytheists of Makkah, and it took place in the second year of the migration to Madīna (A. H. 2). The polytheists were far superior to the Muslims in (...) terms of both equipment and numbers. Therefore, the success achieved in this expedition meant a lot not only in terms of survival but also in terms of morale of Muslims. Details of this war are included in Surah Anfāl, and various aspects of it are referred to in other Madanī surahs. It is not difficult to understand the mention of such an important war in Madanī surahs. However, the references to the Battle of Badr -which has not yet taken place- in the commentary of the Makkī surahs, are particularly challenging. In this tafsīr, 66 verses of various Makkī surahs are explained through the Battle of Badr. This study was carried out in order to reveal the background of the Badr references of the Makkī surahs in Muqātil tafsīr. Muqātil stands out in the Hadith in terms of reliability, and in the Kalām as a widely discussed personality with his various views. Although he has been criticized from various aspects of his Tafsīr, it is generally considered a great authority. His work is easy to understand; it combines narration and insight. The similar of every possible verse has been given. The author's mastering at the Arabic language showed itself in the words of the Qur’ān. Almost no words remained unexplained. Muqātil is closely related to the Arabic language that had been in effect in the era of revelation, and he generally carried out his tafsīr activities by considering the era of revelation. In Muqātil's view of tafsīr, no verse is independent from the experiences of the period, and each verse gains meaning with its context. In his tafsīr, Muqātil draws a view of Badr without alternatives. While other tafsīrs include other achievements of Muslims in addition to Badr, such as the victory of the Battle of the Ditch and the conquest of Makkah, in the tafsīr of Muqātil the difference of Badr as the biggest blow against the polytheists of Makkah is clearly stated. It may not be very convincing to explain his insistence on Badr as random touches and sometimes anachronistic mistakes, given his skill in tafsīr and his command of the Qur’ān in terms of both content and language. Badr stands as a conscious choice, not a mistake in Muqātil. As it can be seen in examining the verses, the forward-looking statements present in the majority of the verses; this emphasis also prepared the ground for Muqātil's explanations. In any case, Muqātil sometimes did not care about falling into historical inconsistency. If we exclude these 5 verses, which can be explained with Badr although they are Makkī, the attitudes of other commentators regarding the emphasis of Badr in the Makkī verses in the remaining 61 verses are as follows: al-Ṭabarī (d.310/923) included the views pointing to Badr in only 3 of the 61 verses in his tafsīr. This shows us that the emphasis of Badr in the Makkī verses was not generally adopted by other early commentators except Muqātil. Because in al-Ṭabarī's tafsīr, the views on tafsīr from the era of Aṣ-ṣaḥābah (the Companions), Tābiʿūn (the second generation following the Companions) and Tābiʿū al-Tābʿīn (the third generation) are mentioned together with isnad (the chain of reporters), except for Muqātil and al-Kalbī. al-Zad̲j̲d̲j̲ād̲j̲ (d. 311/923), who was contemporary of Ṭabarī, included Badr in only two of the 61 verses in his philological tafsīr. In other words, al-Zad̲j̲d̲j̲ād̲j̲ is on a very different line from Muqātil regarding Badr. al-Māturīdī (d. 330/944) included Badr among other explanations in only 4 of the 61 verses in his tafsīr, and did not mention Muqātil's view even among the possible meanings of the other verses. al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) included Badr in 10 of 61 verses among other explanations. In the remaining 51 verses, he did not find it necessary to mention Muqātil's view along with other possibilities. Apparently, al-Rāzī, like others, did not consider Muqātil's explanations reasonable. Nevertheless, Razi was the commentator who gave greater place to the Badr emphasis of Muqātil in his tafsīr. In this case, how can the passion for Badr, seen in the Muqātil tafsīr, be explained? We think it would be correct to seek the reasons of Muqātil's -sometimes reasonable, sometimes inappropriate, and sometimes anachronistic- explanations of Badr in the importance he gave to this expedition and in the method of relying on concrete data in the interpretation of the Qur’ānic verses. In his view of tafsīr, no verse is independent of the experiences of the period. (shrink)

Madani surahs generally describe the process in which various rules related to the regulation of the moral dimension of religion are determined. Some of the divine declarations made in this framework consist of rules and principles in the nature of command and prohibition. These statements, which have a normative character, also contain some evaluations about the attitudes of the interlocutors in relation to the events that took place in the period of descent. The warnings against the words and actions of (...) believers, which cannot coincide with faith, are among the most striking subjects of the Madani surahs. It is striking that these warnings, which sometimes increase in severity, generally focus on the economic concerns, demands and expectations of the believers. The increase in the welfare level with the Hijra, the inability of the new converts to fully comprehend the teachings of the religion, and the negative effect of the Jahiliyya tradition are among the main reasons for warnings against believers. On the other hand, these warnings and criticisms, which point to the weakness of speech and action, aim to prompt the believers to question their attitudes and stances by determining the ideal style of behavior compatible with faith, rather than merely condemning. In this respect, the article aims to examine the relationship of believers with worldly possibilities and material blessings in the axis of this differing dimension of Madani surahs. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg by Véronique DecaixBrian Francis ConollyVéronique Decaix. Constituer le Réel. Noétique et Métaphysique chez Dietrich de Freiberg. Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2021. Pp. 336. Paperback, $48.00.Dietrich of Freiberg's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect, as presented in his De origine rerum praedicamentalium, has proved unusually resistant to contextualization within the philosophical and theological discussions at the (...) University of Paris in the last two decades of the thirteenth century. There is little indication in the quodlibet literature that any of his contemporaries were aware of his unusual doctrine, let alone interested in responding to it, and Dietrich himself provides few hints as to which quaestiones of contemporary interest he is responding to. One therefore welcomes this study by Véronique Decaix in which it is argued that "il est irréfutable que les concepts centraux du De origine ont été forgés dans une discussion permanente avec Henri de Gand" (223). Drawing upon and developing the work of Pasquale Porro, Jan Aersten, and others, Decaix establishes Dietrich's indebtedness to Henry of Ghent, all while providing a comprehensive and remarkably clear, detailed, and precise presentation of Dietrich's theory of the constitutive power of the intellect. [End Page 706]Particularly noteworthy is the manner in which Decaix clarifies that there are several distinct ways in which the intellect, on Dietrich's theory, exercises its constitutive power. Thus, for instance, "categorial constitution," whereby certain relations and the six posterior relative categories are constituted, is distinguished from "quidditative constitution," wherein a real natural thing is constituted in its quidditative being, which is at the same time the mode or manner in which the intellect constitutes its own proper object. Decaix clarifies that such modes of constitution differ not only with respect to what is constituted, but by the kind of causality exercised by the intellect. Categorial constitution is a kind of formal causality—because it concerns only accidents, and because intellect grasps these accidents "sur une modalité déduite d'un élément extrinsèque" (284)—whereas quidditative constitution is efficient—it is "plus fondamentale, car elle est plus essentielle et plus intérieure" and "s'exerce sur la forme substantielle et cause l'étant en tant qu'étant" (286). In either case, whether the mode of constitution is categorial or quidditative, Decaix makes clear that constitution is not creation, and does not pertain to the reality or absolute entity of the thing affected by the intellect's constitutive power. Rather, constitution in the relevant sense here entails introducing and imposing upon the real natural thing a new mode of being: with respect to categorial constitution, that mode of being is ad aliud (to be in relation to another); with respect to quidditative constitution, the constituted mode of being is quidditative being.Decaix argues that Dietrich consciously develops his theory of categorial relation within the framework provided by Henry of Ghent. She cites as evidence, among other factors, that Dietrich concludes his analysis of categorial relation with what Decaix calls the "exacte contre-pied" (154) to question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX: "Utrum circumscripta re sui fundamenti relatio possit signari per nomen primae impositionis?" Dietrich in effect responds: "Si autem ab huiusmodi entibus removeamus actum rationis, tunc secundum nullum modum sunt entia quantum ad id, quod significatur per nomen, sed relinquitur sola realitas et entitas fundamenti" (160).Question 3 of Henry's Quodlibet IX is still more important for Decaix's argument. For she sees herein more than a germ of Dietrich's doctrine of the constitutive power of the intellect. As Decaix explains, in addition to the real foundation (quantity or quality) provided by nature, and the pure ratio of relation, provided by the intellect, Henry introduces the modus characterizatus a re, whereby the peculiar nature of the foundation (e.g. the length or the color) particularizes the general notion of the pure relation (157–58). Thus, the real, particular relation, for example, "is shorter than" or "is similar to," arises only from both nature and the intellect as joint contributing causes. In this... (shrink)

Four critical essays (on De Anima, on In Illud: Tunc et Ipse Filius, on Patristic Platonism, and on the doctrine of apokatastasis in Gregory of Nyssa and Origen), new Greek edition of De anima also based on the Coptic version predating every Greek manuscript, translations of, and commentaries on, both De Anima and In Illud: Tunc et Ipse Filius, appendixes (on the Syriac and Coptic translations of De Anima and on its reception among the Cambridge Platonists, with the first Italian (...) translation of an essay by Jane Lead[e]), bibliographies. (shrink)

Im Verlauf des 6. Jahrhunderts fanden unter den ostgotischen Königen die ersten päpstlich-kaiserlichen Treffen in Konstantinopel statt, die die religiösen Auseinandersetzungen und die politischen und diplomatischen Beziehungen zwischen Ostgoten und Byzanz klären sollten. Der erste Papst, der auf Befehl Theoderichs als Leiter einer Gesandtschaft in die östliche Hauptstadt reiste (Ende 525 oder Anfang 526), war Johannes I.; er sollte sich dort für die arianische Kirche einsetzen. Der ‚Anonymus Valesianus‘ berichtet, daß der Kaiser Justinos I. dem ankommenden Papst Johannes als Anführer (...) einer Delegation von Senatoren ita occurrit ac si beato Petro. Mit einem ähnlichen Ausdruck hatte der Anonymus auch die Beschreibung des adventus Theoderichs in Rom (Jahr 500) eingeführt: Der ostgotische König occurrit beato Petro devotissimus ac si catholicus. Im Falle von Justinos sind mit dieser Formulierung wahrscheinlich sämtliche Ehren gemeint, welche dem Papst erwiesen wurden. Diese werden in dem wesentlich detaillierteren Bericht des ‚Liber Pontificalis‘ geschildert: … occurrerunt beato Iohanni a miliario XV [XII] omnes civitas cum cereos et cruces in honore beatorum apostolorum Petri et Pauli. Qui veteres Grecorum hoc testificabantur dicentes a tempore Constantini Augusti a beato Silvestro episcopo sedis apostolicae, Iustini Augusti temporibus meruisse parte Greciarum beati Petri apostoli vicarium suscepisse cum gloria. Tunc Iustinus Augustus, dans honorem Deo, humiliavit se pronus et adoravit beatissimum Iohannem papam. (shrink)

Columella invites his readers to plant different flowers, including violets—which will be the main focus of the following discussion :uerum ubi iam puro discrimine pectita tellusdeposito squalore nitens sua semina poscet, 95pangite tunc uarios, terrestria sidera, flores:candida leucoia et flauentia lumina caltae,narcissique comas et hiantis saeua leonisora feri, calathisque uirentia lilia canis,necnon uel niueos uel caeruleos hyacinthos. 100tum quae pallet humi, quae frondes purpurat auro,ponatur uiola, et nimium rosa plena pudoris.96 pangite Heinsius: pingite SAR || 99 nitentia Gesner || 101 (...) frondes SA: frondens R | purpurat auro ϛ: purpura tabo SAR: purpura et auro Ursinus: purpurat albo HeinsiusThis is the text of Rodgers's recent OCT, but with a somewhat modified apparatus criticus. For the purposes of my argument, it will be useful also to quote from the outset a related catalogue of melliferous flowers from another book of Columella's treatise : mille praeterea semina uel crudo caespite uirentia uel subacto sulco flores amicissimos apibus creant, ut sunt in uirgineo solo […] gladiolus narcissi. at in hortensi lira consita nitent candida lilia nec his sordidiora leucoia, tum Punicae rosae luteolaeque et Sarranae uiolae, nec minus caelestis luminis hyacinthus.There are a number of more general similarities, but the relevant point is that the two catalogues list many of the same flowers and describe them in similar ways, which means that one catalogue can serve as an interpretative guide to the other. The first two items in the prose list of garden flowers correspond to candida leucoia and calathisque uirentia lilia canis, similarly listed in the first half of the verse catalogue; nitent can thus support Gesner's emendation nitentia for uirentia, unduly neglected by recent editors. The metaphoric periphrasis gladiolus narcissi can be compared with narcissique comas. Both texts describe the hyacinth as sky-blue, which seems to be otherwise unparalleled. Finally, just like the prose list, Columella's poem groups roses with two varieties of violet :tum quae pallet humi, quae frondes purpurat auro,ponatur uiola, et nimium rosa plena pudoris.The prose version makes it all but certain that the poem should likewise refer to a yellow and a purple varieties of violet. While Columella's verse description of the former variety is fairly unambiguous, that of the latter raises questions. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:[Quaestio prima: quomodo est anima omnia]“Anima quodammodo est omnia.”2Verbum Philosophi est et abbreviatum; non autem omnibus satis manifestum. Quid me, Vir Dei,3 iam sollicitas in isto? Scis enim quod imperitussum scientia, et iste sermo profunda forte indiget exquisitione. Quaeris ergo specificari tibi illud quod dico ‘quodammodo’; quomodo enim erit anima omnia? Istum modum velles tibi specificari: autin summa dictione una, aut secundum singula entia singulos modos explicare.Videtur ergo ipse (...) Philosophus declarare istam propositionem inductive sic:‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia, intellectus est quodammodo intelligibilia’,4igitur etc.[Obiectiones]Hic statim duo obicis:Primum quod cum anima tres partes habeat – vegetativam, sensitivam,intellectivam – in hac ostensione Philosophi ipsum vegetativum nulli entium attribuitur per quodammodo essendi idem, ergo videtur quod non debeatdicere: anima simpliciter quodammodo est omnia, sed secundum aliquas parteseius solum.Item, videtur quod debeat dici quod solum intellectivum sit quodammmodo omnia; nam omnia omnino sunt intelligibilia: universalia, singularia. Omnes naturae vere et simpliciter intelligibiles sunt quantum in ipsis est, licet prima et remotissima principia a nobis non intelligantur. Defectus enim in nobis est sicut in oculis vespertilionis, quibus non videt solem.[2] Item, quomodo est sensus ipsa sensibilia et intellectus ipsa intelligibilia?Aeque enim ignotae sunt hae assumptiones sicut et conclusio. Nam sensitivum res vivens est et substantia; sensibilia, res non-viventes et accidentia, qualitates de tertia specie qualitatis.5 Quomodo ergo est haec illa? Iam enim patet quod non conveniunt nisi in esse et ente tantum; in nullo enim genereomnino. Igitur videtur quod nihil sit dictu ‘sensus est quodammodo sensibilia’.Nam multo magis proprie et vere dictum videretur si diceret quis ‘homoquodammodo est asinus’, nam haec conveniunt in genere et generibus.Similiter, quaeris ex parte intellectus et intelligibilium. Intelligibilia enimsunt et substantiae et accidentia, et res viventes et non-viventes; ipsum autem intellectivum, solum substantia et res vivens.[Prima responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: Sensus est in potentia tale quale sensibile in actu]6Vir Dei, dices mihi, colligendo ex ipso eodem auctore, et respondebis |A 281vb| mihi cum quaero: sensus quomodo est ipsum sensibile? Respondebis cum Philosopho, quia hoc modo, scilicet quod ‘sensus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum sensibile in actu’,7 et illud pertractabis ad singulos sensus et sensibilia. Sic visus est in potentia tale quale est ipsum visibile in actu, et ita de aliis.Sed ego contra: Vir Dei, si ‘sensus est in potentia tale etc.’, ergo aliquando erit in actu tale, etc.Ad idem: sentire quoddam pati est et quaedam alteratio. Est enim sensus de genere virtutum passivarum secundum eundem Philosophum.8 Agens autem et patiens in principio sunt dissimilia; in fine vero, cum passum est, sunt similia.Igitur sensitivum ex quo sentiendo quodammodo patitur et passivum est. Infine cum passum est, simile erit ipsi activo, scilicet sensibili. Tunc igitur erit‘sensus tale in actu quale est etiam ipsum sensibile in actu’.Sed nunc quaero quid hoc sit dictu, scilicet quod aliquando ipsum sensitivum in actu sit tale quale ipsum sensibile. Quid dicis ‘tale quale’? Numquid si actu video colorem, est virtus visiva oculi mei actu color? Aut non dicis talis estcolor? Quaero, si in qualitate assimilabitur illa virtus visiva actu colori, nihil videtur huiusmodi expositio. |E 107vb| Sicut enim superius dictum est, non videntur convenire nisi in solo ente et esse.9Confiteor, Vir Dei, quia haec ultimo obiecta tentativa sunt, sed necessaria tamen ad propositum si recte dissolvantur, per gratiam ergo Dei et per orationes tuas, Vir Dei, spero ad haec quandoque redire.[Secunda responsio Philosophi ad obiectionem secundam: homo ut mundus minor]Sed nec illud quod legimus videtur sufficere ad propositum problema, Vir Dei: ‘homo est quodammodo omnis creatura et mundus’, minor scilicet,10 et communicans cum omnibus creaturis, hoc modo: “esse cum lapidibus, vivere cum plantis, sentire cum brutis, intelligere cum angelis,” et tandem cum Deo.11Si secundum hunc modum velim praedictum sermonem exponere, non erit.. (shrink)