In his paper "What Metaphors Mean", Donald Davidson attacks various theories of the metaphorical meaning. His radical thesis is that the metaphor has except the literal meaning no other (metaphorical or secondary) meaning. He refuses primarily the idea that the metaphor is some sort of communication-the speaker puts a hidden message in it and the recipient have to decode it. Davidson supported this negative attitude with a number of more or less conclusive arguments. I would like to discuss some of (...) them in this essay. My interpretation of Davidson's argumentation can be summed up as that the idea of the metaphorical meaning is not nonsensical, but it is unsuitable for explaining the intricate role of metaphors in our language. A positive theory of metaphor was only suggested by Davidson, but not properly elaborated. This was a task of his followers, in the first place of Richard Rorty. He emphasized, however, the causal character of a metaphorical effect, which radicalizes Davidson's account. As opposed to Rorty, Davidson shared with his predecessors an opinion that in a metaphor one thing is seen as another thing. None of the authors was able to explain this metaphorical definition of the metaphor. (shrink)

This introductory chapter presents the reader with various ways of approaching the topic ‘Wittgenstein and the creativity of language’. It is argued that any serious account of the questions arising from this joint consideration of, on the one hand, this great genius of philosophy and, on the other, the varieties of speech, text, action and beauty which go under the heading ‘the creativity of language’ will have to appreciate the potential of both, in terms of breadth as well as depth. (...) First, the chapter points out a way of understanding Wittgenstein’s discussion of rules and rule-following in relation to meaning and normativity which, in virtue of respecting Wittgenstein’s own creativity as a writer, does not fall prey to a widespread source of misunderstanding. Next, Wittgenstein’s uses of language receive some additional attention (i.e. his use of analogies, metaphors, punctuation and other literary and rhetorical devices), before a glimpse is offered of an unravelling of the knot that is Wittgenstein and the creativity of language. The multiple interrelated threads here lead into areas of human concern ranging from the philosophy of language and logic through to ethics, aesthetics and politics. Finally, the chapter offers an overview of the contents of the book from the perspective of its editors. (shrink)

Interview of David Rozen with Jakub Mácha.

This volume draws connections between Wittgenstein's philosophy and the work of Saul Kripke, especially his Naming and Necessity. Saul Kripke is regarded as one of the foremost representatives of contemporary analytic philosophy. His most important contributions include the strict distinction between metaphysical and epistemological questions, the introduction of the notions of contingent a priori truth and necessary a posteriori truth and original accounts of names, descriptions, identity, necessity and realism. The chapters in this book elucidate the relevant connections between Kripke's (...) work and Wittgenstein, specifically concerning the standard meter, contingent apriori and rule-following. The contributions shed light on how Kripke's philosophical outlook was influenced by Wittgenstein, and how mainstream analytic philosophy and Wittgensteinian philosophy can fruitfully engage with one another. Kripke and Wittgenstein will be of interest to philosophers working on Wittgenstein, Kripke, and the history of analytic philosophy. (shrink)

Both Hegel and the later Wittgenstein were concerned with the problem of how to begin speculation, or the problem of beginning. I argue that despite many differences, there are surprising similarities between their thinking about the beginning. They both consider different kinds of beginnings and combine them into complex analogies. The beginning has a subjective and an objective moment. The philosophizing subject has to begin with something, with an object. For Hegel, the objective moment is pure being. For Wittgenstein, the (...) objective moment is something that cannot be doubted. As regards the subjective moment, the philosophizing subject has to decide, without any reason, to conclude her quest for the presuppositionless beginning and finally begin at the beginning. The arational moment of this decision is echoed throughout any rational thought. Any application of a (rational) rule is, ultimately, a blind decision to apply this rule. (shrink)

The topic of exemplarity has attracted considerable interest in philosophy, legal theory, literary studies and art recently. There is broad consensus that exemplary cases mediate between singular instances and general concepts or norms. The aim of this article is to provide an additional perspective on the logic of exemplarity. First, inspired by Jacques Derrida’s discussion of exemplarity, I shall argue that there is a kind of différance between (singular) examples and (general) exemplars. What an example exemplifies, the exemplarity of the (...) example, eludes any fixed identity and follows a logic of supplement. Second, I shall present the so-called logic of exemplarity. The received paraconsistent view has it that the exemplar of X is an X and, at the same time, is not an X. Inspired by Ludwig Wittgenstein’s discussion of the standard metre, I would like to present an alternative paracomplete view whereby we can say of an exemplar of X neither that it is an X nor that it is not an X. (shrink)

This paper seeks to identify the common conditions which have supported nation formation in Mexico, abstract the specifics of the Purhepechan case to account for the degree of its advancement in contrast with other ethno-political movements in Mexico, and contextualize the regional trends vis-a- vis the ideological transformations at the level of the individual and the community. In our paper we will pay special attention to two extraordinary phenomena: the rise and discourse of the organiza- tion Ireta P’orheecheri - Purhepechan (...) Nation, and the celebration of the newly established ethnic- revivalist event P’orheecheri Jimbangi Uexurhini (Purhepechan New Year). Our thesis is that nation formation in Mexico is a result of economic and social modernization, democratization and the in- troduction of western liberal discourse, and changes in government indigenist policies that have been taken advantage of by indigenous political leaders. (shrink)

Robert Saudek, a Czech graphologist, journalist, diplomat, playwright, and novelist, was heavily influenced in his youth by Fritz Mauthner’s critique of language. Saudek later became a pioneer in the field of psychological graphology. In this article, I examine the impact of Mauthner’s critique on Saudek’s work and evaluate whether Saudek’s approach to graphology aligns with Mauthner’s ideas. I argue that, although Saudek’s graphology is rooted in Mauthner’s critique of experimental psychology, there remains room for further development in the field of (...) psychological graphology, centering on the analysis of language. With this in mind, I compare Saudek’s method and contemporary conceptual metaphor theory. I further suggest that Saudek’s extensive use of the autographs of well-known figures follows a method of working from examples, or specimens, which is not uncommon in the philosophy of science. Based on these findings, I propose a way of understanding Saudek’s graphology that challenges its characterization as a pseudoscience. (shrink)

This essay explores the notion of moral exemplarity, positing that our morality is underpinned by moral exemplars – paradigmatic examples of virtuous individuals or actions. Theoretical precepts of moral exemplarity are explored across historical and contemporary contexts, including the philosophies of Plato, Aristotle, Stoic and Christian ethics, and recent works of Alexandro Ferrara and Linda Zagzebski. This essay debates the necessity of moral exemplars, the intrinsic moral and epistemic exemplarity, and the distinction between categorical and hypothetical exemplarity, as well as (...) referencing the paradoxical Kantian dismissals of moral exemplarity. It critiques current accounts of moral exemplarity and proposes a transcendental explanation, culminating in an examination of the “exemplarist categorical imperative.”. (shrink)

In the sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit, we find one of Hegel’s famous puns, which utilizes homophonic affinities and differences between the verb beiherspielen and the noun Beispiel. I argue that the effect of this pun is that the word Beispiel acquires, beyond its usual meaning of ‘example’ or ‘instance’, the meaning of a play of something inessential, a play in passing. After reviewing all available translations into English, I suggest that, in order to preserve this wordplay, one (...) can translate Beispiel as ‘by-play’. Furthermore, I analyse other occurrences of the word beiherspielen in the Phenomenology and elsewhere in Hegel’s texts. Next, I focus on the crucial importance of this pun for Derrida’s interpretation and critique of Hegel’s dialectic. Only for a certain loose translation of beiherspielen does Derrida’s reasoning appear plausible. I conclude with a discussion of the ideal of terminological uniformity in translating Hegel’s texts. In preserving the wordplay by translating Beispiel as ‘by-play’, one is forced to sacrifice the uniformity of translation. (shrink)

Zusammenfassung: Gegenstand der Arbeit ist das Konzept der metaphorischen Be-deutung, soweit dessen Ursprung in der analytischen Philosophie zu finden ist. In der Ein-leitung der Untersuchung werden jedoch auch ältere Theorien der Metapher vorgestellt, die aus der Perspektive der metaphorischen Bedeutung relevant sind oder als relevant be-trachtet werden können. Allen diesen Theorien liegt die Definition zugrunde, dass in der Metapher etwas als etwas anderes gesehen wird. Daher kann von einer Wahrnehmungs-metaphorik die Rede sein. Das erste Kapitel meiner Arbeit behandelt die Frage, (...) wie Metaphern in der Sprache zu erkennen sind. Es wird die Schlussfolgerung gezogen, dass eine Metapher, anstatt erkannt zu werden, vielmehr als solche akzeptiert werden muss. Im zweiten Kapitel werden zwei der bedeutsamsten zeitgenössischen Theorien der Metapher, nämlich von Max Black und Donald Davidson, erörtert und kritisch ausgewertet. Der Argumentation Davidsons zufolge muss die metaphorische Bedeutung als etwas All-gemeines verstanden werden, das nicht einer bestimmten Metapher, sondern der Metapher überhaupt zukommt. Dabei bleibt Davidson aber der Wahrnehmungs-metaphorik verhaftet, die bei ihm wie bei Black keine Erläuterung findet. Gegen Ende des zweiten Kapitels und hauptsächlich im dritten Kapitel werden drei Arten des Herangehens an die Wahrnehmungsmetaphorik vorgeschlagen: Sie kann entweder verworfen oder interpretiert oder aufgehoben werden. Die zwei letztgenannten Zugänge werden anhand der Schriften von Ludwig Wittgenstein, José Ortega y Gasset und Wallace Stevens weiter ausgearbeitet. -/- Abstract: This thesis investigates the concept of the metaphorical meaning originating in analytical philosophy. Also, in the Introduction are considered older theories of the meta-phor, which can be seen from the perspective of the metaphorical meaning. All these ac-counts are based on a definition that in the metaphor is something seen as something else. Therefore, all our understanding of the metaphor issues from a visual perception. But that’s a metaphor, too. Chapter I. examines the question, how to detect metaphors in lan-guage. It is concluded that metaphors must be accepted instead of detected. The chapter II. aims at introducing and criticizing the two nowadays prominent analytical theories of metaphor given by Max Black and Donald Davidson. The consequence of the argumenta-tion by Davidson is that the concept of the metaphorical meaning has to be applied to the metaphor as such, not to any particular one. In their theories, Davidson and Black are still likening the metaphor to the visual perception but this simile or rather metaphor remains unexplained. The final chapter III. presents three approaches how to deal with the visual perception metaphor in explanations of the metaphor: it can be rejected, interpreted or sublated. The last approaches are elaborated on the basis of writings by Ludwig Wittgen-stein, José Ortega y Gasset and Wallace Stevens. (shrink)

Conceptual Metaphor Theory makes some strong claims against so-called Classical Theory which spans the accounts of metaphors from Aristotle to Davidson. Most of these theories, because of their traditional literal-metaphorical distinction, fail to take into account the phenomenon of conceptual metaphor. I argue that the underlying mechanism for explaining metaphor bears some striking resemblances among all of these theories. A mapping between two structures is always expressed. Conceptual Metaphor Theory insists, however, that the literal-metaphorical distinction of Classical Theories is empirically (...) wrong. I claim that this criticism is based rather on terminological decisions than on empirical issues. Conceptual Metaphor Theory focusses primarily on conventional metaphors and struggles to extend its mechanism to novel metaphors, whereas Classical Theories focus on novel metaphors and struggle to extend their mechanisms to conventional metaphors. Since all of these theories study metaphors from the synchronic point of view, they are unable to take into account any semantic change. A diachronic perspective is what we need here, one which would allow us to explain the role of metaphor in semantic change and the development of language in general. (shrink)

Language meets reality by measuring it. My aim in this paper is to shed some light on Wittgenstein's metaphors of language's meeting and measuring reality. My additional aim will be to delimit to what extent or in what sense these functions of language are transcendental.

We cannot but begin this volume with Wittgenstein’s famous remark that “Hegel seems to me to be always wanting to say that things which look different are really the same. Whereas my interest is in showing that things which look the same are really different.” (MDC: p.157) This is, however, a casual remark, and it seems that we should not put too much emphasis on it. (For a discussion of how the remark should properly be understood, see Chapter 20.) In (...) compiling this collection of essays we adopted from this remark the idea that the problem of difference in identity is the common topic between Hegel and Wittgenstein. The remark presents a certain interplay (or, one might say, dialectics) of identity and difference. And it is questions of identity and difference between Hegel and Wittgenstein (with respect to certain aspects of their works, under certain interpretations, etc.) that are addressed by the essays in this volume. (shrink)

Dieser Aufsatz untersucht den Begriff der moralischen Exemplarität und geht davon aus, dass unsere Moral durch moralische Exemplare − paradigmatische Beispiele tugendhafter Personen oder Handlungen − untermauert wird. Theoretische Grundsätze der moralischen Exemplarität werden in historischen und zeitgenössischen Kontexten untersucht, darunter die Philosophien von Platon, Aristoteles, die stoische und christliche Ethik sowie neuere Arbeiten von Alexandro Ferrara und Linda Zagzebski. Der Aufsatz diskutiert die Notwendigkeit moralischer Exemplare, die intrinsische moralische und epistemische Exemplarität und die Unterscheidung zwischen kategorischer und hypothetischer Exemplarität (...) und verweist auf die paradoxe kantische Ablehnung der moralischen Exemplarität. Er kritisiert die gegenwärtigen Darstellungen der moralischen Exemplarität und schlägt eine transzendentale Erklärung vor, die in einer Untersuchung des „exemplaristischen kategorischen Imperativs“ kulminiert. (shrink)

This article surveys theories of metaphor in analytic philosophy and cognitive science. In particular, it focuses on contemporary semantic, pragmatic and non-cognitivist theories of linguistic metaphor and on the Conceptual Metaphor Theory advanced by George Lakoff and his school. Special attention is given to the mechanisms that are shared by nearly all these approaches, i.e. mechanisms of interaction and mapping between conceptual domains. Finally, the article discusses several recent attempts to combine these theories of linguistic and conceptual metaphor into a (...) unitary account. (shrink)

I argue that Hegel and Wittgenstein, each in their own specific way, used the idea of God at the beginning of creation as a complex analogy for other kinds of beginning, most notably the beginning of philosophical thought. Hegel’s Logic describes God’s mind before the creation of the world, i.e. God’s pure thinking. For a philosopher, beginning afresh means resolving to consider this kind of abstraction from the existence of the world. Wittgenstein, by contrast, says that the idea of a (...) creator of the world does not explain anything. It marks the terminus ad quem of asking for explanations; we must not ask further who created the creator of the world. Wittgenstein generalizes this for any kind of reasoning: “Explanations come to an end somewhere.” (Philosophical Investigations: §1) Any sort of explanation must eventually arrive at its terminus ad quem, which means only that any kind of reasoning must have its logical beginning. (shrink)

Arnošt Kolman (1892–1979) was a Czech mathematician, philosopher and Communist official. In this paper, we would like to look at Kolman’s arguments against logical positivism which revolve around the notion of the fetishization of mathematics. Kolman derives his notion of fetishism from Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism. Kolman is aiming to show the fact that an entity (system, structure, logical construction) acquires besides its real existence another formal existence. Fetishism means the fantastic detachment of the physical characteristics of real things (...) or phenomena from these things. We identify Kolman’s two main arguments against logical positivism. In the first argument, Kolman applied Lenin’s arguments against Mach’s empiricism-criticism onto Russell’s neutral monism, i.e. mathematical fetishism is internally related to political conservativism. Kolman’s second main argument is that logical and mathematical fetishes are epistemologically deprived of any historical and dynamic dimension. In the final parts of our paper we place Kolman’s thinking into the context of his time, and furthermore we identify some tenets of mathematical fetishism appearing in Alain Badiou’s mathematical ontology today. (shrink)

I provide a distinctively Wittgensteinian interpretation of Hegel’s Subjective Logic, including the parts on the concept, the judgement and the syllogism. I argue that Wittgenstein implicitly recognised the moments of universality, particularity and individuality; moreover, he was sensitive to Hegel’s crucial distinction between abstract and concrete universals. More specifically, for Wittgenstein the moment of particularity has the status of a paradigmatic sample which mediates between a universal concept and its individual instances. Thus, a concrete universal is a universal that includes (...) every individual via its paradigmatic sample. Next, I provide a generic account of the emergence of concrete universals through a series of negations that follows the basic structure of Hegel’s judgement—“the individual is the universal”—and the syllogism—“the individual is the universal mediated by the particular”. This development is illustrated with examples from Hegel (a plant, Socrates, Caesar, a Stoic sage, Jesus) as well as from Wittgenstein (colour samples, the standard metre, works of art). I take Wittgenstein’s argument against private language as implying that we cannot do without paradigms in our epistemic practices. If the conclusion of the section “Subjectivity” in Hegel’s Science of Logic is that the moment of particularity cannot be ignored or dispensed with, then it would mean that we cannot do without paradigms in our epistemic practices: that is, that private rules are impossible. (shrink)

A paradox, according to Wittgenstein, is something surprising that is taken out of its context. Thus, one way of dealing with paradoxical sentences is to imagine the missing context of use. Wittgenstein formulates what I call the paradigm paradox: ‘one sentence can never describe the paradigm in another, unless it ceases to be a paradigm.’ (PG, p.346) There are several instances of this paradox scattered throughout Wittgenstein’s writings. I argue that this paradox is structurally equivalent to Russell’s paradox. The above (...) quotation is Wittgenstein’s version of the vicious circle principle which counteracts the paradox. The prohibition Wittgenstein describes is, however, limited to a certain language-game. Finally, I argue that there is a structural analogy between a noun being employed as a self-membered set and a paradigmatic sample being included in or excluded from the set it generates. Paradoxical sentences are not prohibited forever; they can indicate a change in our praxis with a given paradigm. (shrink)

Understanding Hegel's account of particularity has proven to be anything but straightforward. Two main accounts of particularity have been advanced: the particular as an example or instance and the particular as a subjective perspective on a universal concept. The problem with these accounts is that they reduce particularity either to singularity or to universality. As Derrida's analyses make apparent, the ‘structure of exemplarity’ in Hegel is quite intricate. Hegel uses ‘example’ in three senses: it means (1) ‘instance’, ‘illustration’, or (2) (...) ‘model’, ‘exemplary individual’, ‘paradigm’, or (3) a by-play (a meaning derived from Hegel's neologismbeiherspielen, in whichBeispielis understood quasi-etymologically as a ‘by-play’ of accidental moments). ABeispielin the first sense can be replaced by another instance in a free play (by-play). This play of accidental moments, however, is not entirely free; it generates a series (of replacements) that ultimately leads to an example in the second sense, to an exemplary individual. I argue that particularity can be taken as exemplarity of this kind, oscillating between a singular example and a universal paradigm. Within this by-play, the universal concept, its law, is supposed to be mediated and determined. However, out of the differences between the examples the by-play induces another law, the law of non-mediation, which may, in Derrida's view, actually negate the dialectical movement towards universality. I argue, utilizing Malabou's concept of plasticity, that this disruption may be recovered. This implies that each individual example within a series is a particular determination of the universal. Hence, we can take literally Hegel's claim that the movement of the concept is play. (shrink)

In this paper I discuss the idea of a semantic code in the contemporary debate between contextualism and minimalism. First, I identify historical sources of these positions in Grice’s pragmatics and in Davidson’s theory of meaning in order to sketch the role of a semantic code there. Then I argue that contextualism is committed to the idea of an ad hoc code, while minimalism involves a persistent code. However, the latter approach to a code requires disambiguation which must be carried (...) out in the early stages of speech act processing. I raise a concern that primary pragmatic processes may be active here, especially in the case of disambiguating polysemous expressions, which could be problematic or even devastating for the minimalist program. At the end I evaluate a possible minimalist way out by examining the minimalist account of metaphor, which lies at the root of polysemy. If a code robust enough to deal with polysemy could be created, minimalist conceptions would present a new impetus to understand language as a code. Without such a code, very little would be left of the notion of a persistent code and hence of minimalism itself. (shrink)

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "1800-1900" verfügbar.

Keine ausführliche Beschreibung für "1953-1989" verfügbar.

The only encounter of the Czech philosopher and Communist official Arnošt Kolman with Bertrand Russell at the Tenth International Congress of Philosophy in Amsterdam in 1948 was unfortunate. Kolman’s paper, “The Tasks of Contemporary Philosophy in the Struggle for New Humanism”, aroused a vitriolic rejoinder by Russell. However, the text of the paper as published in the congress Proceedings has a conciliatory tone. This version could not have aroused such a reaction. There is, however, an article, with a similar title, (...) published in Czech in 1948, stating that this is Kolman’s paper from the congress. I argue that this article more likely reflects what Kolman actually said at the Congress. Finally, I provide an English translation of this article. (shrink)

Předložená trojdílná série představuje základní teorie metafory v analytické filosofii: V první části v minulém čísle časopisu1 byly prezentovány počátky interakční teorie u I. A. Richardse, jak ji podal v knize The Philosophy of Rhetorics. Tato druhá část osvětluje dnes již klasické podání inter­akční teorie u M. Blacka. Třetí část představí kritiku interakční teorie od D. Davidsona a jeho kauzální teorii.

The notion of ontology originates in philosophy. It has been recently employed in computer science and information technology for representing knowledge. In the first part of the paper, I argue that there is a significant overlap in these notions of ontology. Utilizing this overlap, I show in the second part that ontologies can be used for developing a new powerful heuristic method for resolving verbal disputes in philosophy. Verbal disputes can be defined in terms of ontologies: A dispute over two (...) texts P and S is verbal if and only if both of them can be mapped into the same ontology. In the appendix, I analyze the dispute over logical pluralism and indicate how my method of resolving verbal disputes can be employed. (shrink)

In this paper, I shall discuss the issue whether the standard meter in Paris is in fact one meter long. Whether one could meaningfully assert this proposition depends on how the unit of length a meter is defined. I would like to suggest three conceivable definitions. One meter long is everything that has the same length as an arbitrary chosen rod S now has. According to the second definition one meter long is everything that coincides in the endpoints with the (...) rod S when placed alongside. The third definition states that one meter long is-in a literal sense-the rod S solely. Other objects are one meter long-although in a derived sense-if they coincide in the endpoints with S when placed alongside. The first definition is in essence the standpoint of Kripke, the second one can be attributed to Wittgenstein, the last definition is the proposal I would like to advocate here. In particular, I hold that the third definition can be attributed to Wittgenstein as well. A language-game of measuring presupposes a preparatory game of fixing a unit of measure. The meaning of the expression "standard meter" must thus be derived from this preparatory game. Therefore with all other objects, one can say only in a derived sense that they are one meter long or not. (shrink)

This paper investigates the issue whether metaphors have a metaphorical or secondary meaning and how this question is related to the borderline between philosophy and linguistics. On examples by V. Woolf and H. W. Auden, it will be shown that metaphor accomplishes something more than its literal meaning expresses and this “more” cannot be captured by any secondary meaning. What is essential in the metaphor is not a secondary meaning but an internal relation between a metaphorical proposition and a description (...) of its effects. In order to understand metaphors, we have to share an ability to construe metaphorical meanings at once. The aim of this ability is to uncover an internal relation, which lies behind a particular metaphor. (shrink)

The problem of metaphor has come to a noteworthy revival in the analytical philosophy of today. Despite all progress that has been made, the majority of important studies consider the function of metaphor as an analogue to visual perception. Such comparison may be conceived as metaphor as well. In his late philosophy, Wittgenstein spent a lot of effort to explain the use of the expression "seeing as". I argue that his explanations can be transposed to the explanation of the function (...) of metaphor. Firstly, it is shown that all earlier attempts to do that are not satisfying. The occurrence of the expression "to see as" in everyday language led Wittgenstein to the elaboration of the notion of "aspect". Primarily these ideas should be employed in order to explain metaphors in everyday or even poetic language. My conclusion is that an internal relation can be perceived and thought of in the metaphor. (shrink)