Gibt es ein B ses der Nachmoderne, das sich von demjenigen fr herer Zeiten auf spezifische Weise unterscheidet? Macht es berhaupt Sinn, von "dem" B sen zu sprechen - in einer Welt, in der wir auf keine Personifikationen alten Zuschnitts mehr treffen? K nnten wir nicht, wenn sich die Bedingungen unserer Existenz auf so grundlegende Weise ndern, wie das gegenw rtig der Fall ist, nun endg ltig auf eine metaphysische Redeweise verzichten, die auch schon in der Moderne nur noch den (...) Charakter eines Relikts hatte? Der Essay von Max Lorenzen geht, um diese Fragen zu beantworten, einen Weg, der in dieser Weise bisher noch nie beschritten wurde. Er verbindet die ungesch tzte Darstellung pers nlichen Erlebens und die philosophische Reflexion, um in diesem wechselseitigen Bezug eine Haltung der denkenden Erfahrung entstehen zu lassen. In ihr, einer Zone der wirklichen und direkten Betroffenheit, setzt sich das Ich der Begegnung mit den Bildern des nachmodernen Lebens aus. Sie sind r tselhaft und unheimlich. Um sie zu verstehen, bedarf es einer neuen Metaphysik, die keinen ontologischen Systemcharakter mehr hat und sich von den tradierten Vorgaben l st. Diese Metaphysik ist ein Desiderat der gegenw rtigen philosophischen Situation: sie kann dazu beitragen, die Erstarrung eines eingefahrenen Frage- und Antwortspiels zu durchbrechen. Auch unsere Zeit muss die Erfahrung des Lebens und des Todes, des Fremden und Kalten, aufeinander beziehen, um ihre spezifischen Bedingungen der Freiheit, von Kunst, Literatur und Philosophie, zu schaffen. Der Beitrag Lorenzens hierzu besteht nicht zuletzt darin, eine nachmoderne Ethik zu entwerfen, in der sich plurale und flexibilisierte Formen mit einem ernsthaften Engagement verbinden. (shrink)

William James and Wisconsin, by G.C. Sellery.--The distinctive philosophy of William James, by M.C. Otto.--William James, man and philosopher, by D.S. Miller.--William James and psychoanalysis, by Norman Cameron.--The William James centenary dinner: Introductory remarks, by C.A. Dykstra. William James and the world today, by John Dewey, read by Carl Boegholt. William James in the American tradition, by B.H. Bode.--The Sunday service: William James as religious thinker, by J.S. Bixler.

This chapter highlights the impact of the work of French phenomenologist Michel Henry and Austrian psychoanalyst Otto Rank on psychoanalysis. I contend that Henry and Rank clarify the nature and role of mindfulness and creativity in psychoanalysis. To begin, I draw out the implications of Henry’s critique of Freudian psychoanalysis. In my view, Henry’s work reveals and untangles basic inconsistencies in Freud’s views on the unconscious, affective layer of the subject’s life, and establishes that the creativity of life’s immanent (...) movement is essential to the development of the subject’s personality and to the acquisition and alleviation of neuroses. At the same time, I maintain that, while Henry’s work acknowledges a potential role for mindfulness in the development of life’s creativity, his account is problematic. At the end of the day, Henry’s conception of life as an immanent, self-enclosed reality fails to adequately account for the relation between life (creativity) and intentionality (mindfulness). As a result, it fails to sufficiently account for the intersubjective character of creativity and mindfulness. To address these issues, I bring Henry’s insights into these matters into dialogue with Rank’s psychology of difference, which similarly regards affectivity and creativity as central to human life and to psychoanalysis. By doing so, what comes forward is that mindfulness and creativity are relationships that can strengthen and weaken one another, and which always involve self-enclosure and openness towards others and the cosmos. Bearing this in mind, I maintain that mindfulness and creativity can play an important role in allowing psychoanalysis to realize its aim of improving the well-being of human beings. (shrink)

The discussion “scientism vs. dialectic” centers around the problem of value-judgements since Max Weber.Scientism holds the thesis that in all scholarly disciplines (whether politics, economics, law or the sciences) the value-free methods of the sciences should be followed. The dialectical scholars, following Kant, Hegel and Marx claim on the other hand the primacy of practical reason, i.e. that reason can (and should) justify norms. After an historical introduction into the controversy, this lecture sketches how the dialectical thesis can be proven. (...) The new approach consists in a critical reconstruction ofall the words relevant for the discussion, beginning with such ethical modalities as “obligatory,” “permissible.” With these words we judge about aims: the judgements are norms of the form, e.g., “Under the condition C, the aim A is obligatory” (in Symbols: C Δ A).The task in practical reason is to justify such norms. Practical philosophy has to provide the basic vocabulary and the principles of justification. It starts with basic terms of the philosophy of mind as “wanting” and “willing.” The teaching method has to be described without using these words. (For all details cf.Normative Logic and Ethics, B.J. Mannheim, 1969.) In the same sense as “true” opinions are the result of reasonable discussions in which all participants try to overcome (“transcend”) their merely subjective opinions, it is the result of “transsubjective” argumentation whether in a certain situation an aim is (morally) required or forbidden. This categorical imperative of transcending all mere subjectivity is a “formal” principle for justifying norms. Material norms are justifiable only by investigating the genesis of the cultural situation in which they are applied. This leads, in a critical reconstruction of a method of Hegel (especially in his “philosophy or right”), to the formulation of a “dialectical” method as a spiral movement from factual geneses to normative geneses.By this method philosophy does not prescribe any “values” but prescribes how the cultural sciences should proceed in establishing material norms. (shrink)

In der Geschichte der Pädagogik treten immer wieder bestimmte typische Auffassungen von der Erziehung auf. Wenn sie auch selten in reiner Form verwirklicht sind; so ist es doch wichtig, sie zunächst einmal in reiner Form, als Idealtypen im Sinne Max Webers, herauszuarbeiten, gewissermaßen als Erziehungsmodelle durchzukonstruieren, um erst einmal eine Übersicht in der verwirrenden Fülle der pädagogischen Theorien zu gewinnen, und dann zu fragen, wie weit sie angemessen sind, wie weit sie einander ausschließen oder miteinander verträglich sind, wie weit sie (...) sich sogar ergänzen können oder müssen, um so ein angemessenes Bild von dem zu gewinnen, was tatsächlich in der Erziehung geschieht oder geschehen muss. (shrink)

In order to contribute to the consolidation in the field ofPositive Psychology, we reinvestigated the factor structure of top 10 positive emotions of Barbara Fredrickson. Former research in experimental settings resulted in a three-cluster solution, which we tested withexploratoryandconfirmatorymethodology against different factor models. Within our non-experimental data (N= 312), statistical evidence is presented, advocating for a single factor model of the 10 positive emotions. Different possible reasons for the deviating results are discussed, as well as the theoretical significance to various (...) subfields inPositive Psychology(e.g., therapeutical interventions). Furthermore, the special role ofawewithin the study and its implications for further research in the field are discussed. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Winnicott’s “Fear of Breakdown” : On and Beyond TraumaMax Hernandez (bio)y no hallé cosa en que posar los ojos / que no fuese recuerdo de la muerte[I could find no thing on which to rest my eyes / which was not a reminder of death]—Francisco de Quevedo, “Sonetos”The ubiquitous occurrence of violent events and the growing realization that the inscription of this violence in the psyches of those exposed (...) to these events remains to be known have helped to make trauma an emblematic issue at the end of a century saturated with unprecedented wounding events [see Caruth, Unclaimed Experience].1 Trauma’s enigmatic immediacy thrusts itself upon any attempt to encompass it within a theory. It is as though no one approximates (even the study of) trauma with impunity: complex affects are stirred. A precipitous interplay of cognitive and affective dispositions, a heightened tension between the intense identifications elicited and the need experienced for some protective distance from the pain evoked undermine the stability of the boundaries between witnessing and telling, event and historical narration, narrative and reading. Hence the ambivalent appeal of the notion of trauma for the historian as well as for the cultural and literary theorist.The most cursory description of trauma reflects the complex temporal structure that punctuates the psyche’s relation to the traumatic event. The asymmetrical relation between experience and memory and the gross disparity between their affective and cognitive components are evident at once. Trauma has been characterized by virtue of the disjunctions it manifests. Its very formulation bears the mark of a construction emerging as the narrative of a belated experience.2 In recent publications on trauma, the references to the works of Freud, Janet, Kardiner, Lacan, and Laplanche take pride of place. Also noticeable is the emphasis placed on certain psychoanalytic notions: deferred action, death instinct, repetition compulsion, the real.Along with the explorations of trauma by psychoanalysts, historians, and literary theorists and the ethical issues they bring to the fore, the research of neurobiologists and cognitive scientists has raised a number of epistemological issues. A new wave of radical questioning of psychoanalysis comparable to that of the beginnings of this century shows its force today. The notions of repression and the repressed are considered logical impossibilities; the operations of the unconscious are deemed entirely inexplicable; and [End Page 134] defense mechanisms are considered to be mere verbal paradoxes. In what appears to be a species of defensive tactics, a supposedly neurophysiological rephrasing of psychoanalysis is taking place in some quarters, seemingly oblivious to the possibility of profoundly altering the very cohesion of this theory through the process of revision.Otto Fenichel in the thirties and Masud Khan in the sixties have provided us with succinct yet comprehensive overviews of the manner in which, since the very beginnings of psychoanalysis, every phase of theory making has influenced and reciprocally been influenced by the current concept of trauma and its clinical evaluation. It could be said that psychoanalytic theories are themselves organized around some sort of trauma. This is clearly the case in Freud’s theorizing. After his initial theory where the interrelated aspects of trauma, repression, and symptom formation became problematic, he arrived at the conclusion that castration constituted what might be termed a nuclear structuring trauma. An analogous theoretical point is implied in the Lacanian notion of the splitting of the subject. A normative trauma defines the limits of these theories and establishes a fixed relation between historical structural events. One has to shift perspectives in reading the works of those analysts concerned particularly with object relations. For example, Melanie Klein’s clinical researches on early childhood led her to postulate that the traumatic pathogenic situation par excellence is the overriding triumph of the death instinct. Winnicott understood this situation as entailing the annihilation of the core self by intrusion, while defining the traumatic impingement as the failure of the holding environment.It is relevant to comment on these different perspectives, as they afford the psychoanalytic clinician the possibility of differentiating between structuring (sexual) trauma and narcissistic trauma. When the sexual seduction trauma theory was displaced by the theory that privileged psychic reality, the Oedipus complex became... (shrink)

Die Debatte über Inhalt, Begründung und Tragfähigkeit eines universalistischen Begriffs von Vernunft wird zunehmend zur zentralen Debatte der Philosophie. Hat die Tradition des ”okzidentalen Rationalismus“ (Max Weber) den Vernunftbegriff lediglich intern differenziert - in ”theoretische“ und ”praktische“ Vernunft (Kant), in ”Verstand“ und ”Vernunft“ (Hegel), in ”Zweckrationalität“ und ”Wertrationalität“ (Weber) -, so wurde im Lichte der Erfahrung zweier Weltkriege in diesem Jahrhundert mit der Kritik an der Irrationalität einer verselbständigten ”instrumentellen“ Vernunft (Horkheimer/Adorno) eine Dialektik skeptisch reflektiert die heute im Zeichen einer (...) ”radikalen Vernunftkritik“ diese Tradition als ganze in Frage gestellt hat: statt der ”zwanglosen Geltung von Vernunft“ nur Macht (Foucault), statt der ”einen“ Vernunft ein Plural von nicht mehr vermittelbaren Rationalitäten (MacIntyre, Lyotard), statt der ”Selbstbegründung“ nur kontingente Konventionen (Rorty), statt der ”Handlungsrationalität“ von Menschen die Rationalität sozialer Systeme (Luhmann), statt ”idealtypischer Rationalitätsstandards“ nur kontextrelative und fallspezifische Handlungsgründe (Toulmin). Der vorliegende Band, zu dem sechzehn angelsächsische und deutsche Philosophen beigetragen haben, widmet sich dieser Diskussion mit dem Ziel einer vertieften Bestandsaufnahme der Problemstellung. Darüber hinaus wird die Integrationskraft eines typologisch differenzierten, diskurstheoretischen Vernunftkonzepts erprobt. (Quelle: buchhandel.de). (shrink)

Inhalt: K.-O. Apel: Vorwort - G. Calabro: Gesprach uber Hobbes mit Karl-Heinz Ilting - I. Grundfragen der praktischen Philosophie: H.-G. Gadamer: Die Gegenwart der sokratischen Frage in Aristoteles - P. Lorenzen: Politische Ethik - J. D'Hondt: Die Ethik und der Weltlauf - K.-O. Apel: Faktische Anerkennung oder einsehbar notwendige Anerkennung? - H. Schnadelbach: Rationalitat und Normativitat - F. W. Veauthier: Vom sozialen Verantwortungsapriori im phanomenologischen Denken - K. Lorenz: Der Antagonismus von Freiheit und Gerechtigkeit - P. Rohs: Moralische Praferenzen (...) - H. Hoppe: Normenbegrundung ohne naturalistischen Fehlschluss? - W. Kuhlmann: Solipsismus in Kants praktischer Philosophie und die Diskursethik - R. Maliandi: Anerkennung oder Argumentation? - L. H. Meyer: Anerkennung, Zumutbarkeit und Diskussion als praktische Prinzipien - A. Cortina: Substantielle Ethik oder wertfreie Verfahrensethik? - R. Zimmer: Der Selbstbezug des asthetischen Zeichens - II. Zur Geschichte der praktischen Philosophie: P. R. Franke: Zu einem Munzbildnis des Stoikers Chrysippos - V. Hosle: Recht und Geschichte bei Giambattista Vico - M. Riedel: Imputation der Handlung und Applikation des Sittengesetzes - A. Buha: Moral und Geschichte - C. Cesa: Zum Begriff des Praktischen bei Fichte - N. Bobbio: Hegel und das Recht - L. W. Beck: Reformation, Revolution und Restauration in Hegels politischer Philosophie - D. Losurdo: Moralisches Motiv und Primat der Politik bei Hegel - P. Becchi: Die Wurzeln der Ethik der Uberzeugung - R. Pozzo: 'Bourgeois' oder 'citoyen'? Zu Hegels Begriff der burgerlichen Gesellschaft - Die Veroffentlichungen K.-H. Iltings von P. Becchi - Personenregister - Sachregister. (shrink)

In pre-democratic – also pre-modern – times, religion had been at the centre of much of human life, filling the private as well as the public realm of people’s daily existence. However, with the change to democratic rule in major countries in the modern world (see, most influentially, Article 1 of the French Constitution after the French Revolution and the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States, influencing all other democracies in their wake), religion has for the most (...) part reflexively been sidelined from public life. Or has it? Does religion not still hold a special place in law in democratic societies, but now in reverse? Firstly, whereas matters of religious faith had throughout the greater part of human history been included in matters of politics, it is now as a matter of course of law excluded, purposely so. Religion is thus still a ‘special case’, a unique aspect of humanity when compared to all other matters, in law as much as in politics and other aspects of public life. Secondly, in the post-secular cultural climate dawning across the world, matters of faith (religion, spirituality) are no longer as stringently excluded from public life, which impacts directly on how religion is touched upon in law, sociology, philosophy, music and other academic disciplines too. Our dawning post-secular age is bringing something new. Two scholars, who have been doing foundational work in this regard, have done so fully in parallel, not taking cognisance of the mutualities in their academic contributions. Otto in Munich, Germany, has been combining his two areas of expertise, the Pentateuch in the Hebrew Bible and the sociologist Max Weber, to indicate the trajectory through history of democratic impulses from Ancient Near Eastern founding documents into the current era. Benson in Sydney, Australia, has on his part been drawing on his expertise in law as practised in Canada and taught in Europe, South Africa and Australia to indicate how, in inclusively liberal democracies, law cannot justifiably be used to exclude religion from the public domain, as has been the usual modern case. Drawing together these parallel contributions, Lombaard places these initiatives within the emerging post-secular climate, which augurs a different way of being religious or non-religious, publicly as much as privately, in democratic societies in our time. (shrink)

For Max Weber it was still a matter of course to understand the process of rationalization in occidental history as an outcrop of our modern world; and the classical writers of social theory have described the new reflective treatment of tradition and the differentiation of the spheres of life more exactly. In the fifties the “modernization” of societies was presented with neutral detachment, and Arnold Gehlen was able to maintain that rationalization in our “post-history” was proceeding in crystallized forms, but (...) was no longer able to make a creative critical appraisal of its own underlying suppositions. Subversive criticism tried to unmask reason as the will to power and was thus able to proclaim the post-modern age. It is the complicity between these conservative and anarchic forces that Habermas is here opposing, taking the project of modernity as something incomplete that is still waiting for completion. (shrink)

Section one of this article gives the narrative background to the love affair between Otto Gross and Else Jaffé. Otto Gross took Freud's psychoanalytic method in a libertarian direction and he became an influential figure in German anarchist circles shortly before 1914. Else Jaffé was a leading figure in Heidelberg's academic community. Section 2 provides the first complete translation of the Gross-Jaffé letters. Section 3 contrasts the positions of Gross and Max Weber to Nietzsche and comments on Else (...) Jaffé's intermediate role. It was her person that contributed to the development of both men's thinking on the erotic. An appendix provides the transcription of the Gross-Jaffé correspondence in German. (shrink)

Laboratory manuals, notebooks and instrumentation from Otto Warburg’s Institute of Cell Physiology have been discovered at the Max Planck Institute of Biochemistry. Following Warburg’s death in 1970 one of his technicians was transferred from Berlin-Dahlem to the newly founded biochemical institute at Martinsried near Munich, and brought with him these resources, which epitomize the singular position of Warburg’s work style and institute in the 1950s and 1960s. Since the technician’s skills and apparently outmoded instrumentation like the Warburg apparatus were (...) still used in the context of 1970s membrane biochemistry, this trove also documents an unexpected continuity of research within the life sciences. Moreover, the service of Warburg’s technician, which spans more than four decades, as well as the meticulous documentation of preparations and experiments, serve as a case in point for the importance of routine and rather mundane techniques in the post-war molecular life sciences. (shrink)

This fascinating study reveals the extensive influence of Cold War politics on academia, philosophical inquiry, and the course of intellectual history. From the rise of popular novels that championed the heroism of the individual to the proliferation of abstract art as a counter to socialist realism, the years of the Cold War had a profound impact on American intellectual life. As John McCumber shows in this fascinating account, philosophy, too, was hit hard by the Red Scare. Detailing the immense political (...) pressures that reshaped philosophy departments in midcentury America, he shows how the path of American philosophy was altered to follow a political agenda. McCumber begins with the story of Max Otto, whose appointment to the UCLA Philosophy Department in 1947 was met with widespread protest charging him as an atheist. Drawing on Otto’s case, McCumber details the conservative efforts that, by 1960, had all but banished existentialism and pragmatism—not to mention Marxism—from philosophy departments across the country. These paradigms were replaced with what McCumber calls Cold War philosophy, ideas that valorized scientific objectivity and free markets and which downplayed the anti-theistic implications of modern thought. As McCumber shows, the effects of this trend can still be seen at American universities today. (shrink)

This paper expounds and defends a judge-dependence account of aesthetic concepts, where aesthetic concepts are construed widely, to include for example both concepts of personal taste and more narrowly aesthetic concepts. According to such an account, it can depend on personal features of a judge whether it is correct for that judge to apply an aesthetic concept to a given object. After introducing and motivating the account, the article sets out to explain how some aesthetic questions can seem more objective (...) than others, or how there seem to be experts on some aesthetic questions, despite the judge-dependence of aesthetic concepts. (shrink)

A pesar de que Max Horkheimer en Eclipse de la razón había analizado los límites de la razón subjetiva, atendien- do a las posibilidades de retornar a la razón objetiva y a su función después del eclipse, a Jay le parecían aún insuficientes estas respuestas. Por ello, regresó al estudio de las conceptualizaciones filosóficas de los fundadores de la teoría crítica y de quienes se quedaron a cargo del Instituto de Investigación Social en Frankfurt. En este sentido, este texto podría (...) verse en continuidad y a distancia respecto a su primer li- bro: Dialectical Imagination. A History of the Frankfurt School and the Institute of Social Research, 1923-1950 (1973); producto de su trabajo de doctorado, enfocado en la formación del Instituto de Investigación Social; en sus principales integrantes: Herbert Marcuse, Max Horkheimer, Theodor Adorno, Leo Löwenthal, Walter Benjamin,Franz Neumann, Otto Kirchheimer, Henryk Grossmann, Erich Fromm, Karl August Wittfogel; en la integra- ción del psicoanálisis; en su exilio a América; en los estudios empíricos sobre el autoritarismo, la estética y la industria cultural. (shrink)

During the late 1930s, the failed attempt at collaboration between the Frankfurt School and the Vienna Circle culminated in Horkheimer’s 1937 paper ‘The Latest Attack on Metaphysics’. Horkheimer ([1937] 1972), relying on a caricature of positivism as espousing an uncritical myth of the given, drew far-reaching conclusions concerning positivism’s conservative prohibition of the radical questioning of appearances. Horkheimer (1940) later applied some of these criticisms to Dilthey’s conception of Verstehen, while presenting Logical Empiricism as dismissing Dilthey’s proposals nothing more than (...) poetry. By examining Neurath’s unpublished reply to Horkheimer, and drawing on Uebel’s (2019) account of Logical Empiricism’s stance towards Verstehen, this chapter will attempt to dispel Horkheimer’s caricature. I will highlight a parallel between Neurath’s attitude towards (i) claims about Verstehen in social science and (ii) Horkheimer’s proposals for the use of Vernunft by a ‘supra-scientific’ Critical Theory. Neurath argues that once Horkheimer’s objections to ‘positivism’ are reformulated in non-metaphysical terms, they point towards a genuine problem concerning science’s relation to social praxis. For Neurath, the problem can be addressed from within (rather than, as Horkheimer would have it, from above) empirically-minded investigations in the history and sociology of science. (shrink)

Are humans too generous and too punitive? Many researchers have concluded that classic theories of social evolution (e.g., direct reciprocity, reputation) are not sufficient to explain human cooperation; instead, group selection theories are needed. We think such a move is premature. The leap to these models has been made by moving directly from thinking about selection pressures to predicting patterns of behavior and ignoring the intervening layer of evolved psychology that must mediate this connection. In real world environments, information processing (...) is a non-trivial problem and details of the ecology can dramatically constrain potential solutions, often enabling particular heuristics to be efficient and effective. We argue that making the intervening layer of psychology explicit resolves decades-old mysteries in the evolution of cooperation and punishment. (shrink)